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ABOUT THE JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY

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Articles

Where are the Victims? Remembrances of the Massacre of Koreans during the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake

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Abstract

On September 1, 1923, a massive earthquake of 7.9 magnitude struck Japan, damaging most of the Kantō region. While Japan had to recover from the devastation caused by the earthquake, it also faced a challenge: to record the violence against Korean migrants by Japanese during the earthquake. Despite the massacre of several thousands of Koreans, the Japanese government has refused to investigate the incident for over ninety years. This paper examines the relationship between the remembrances of Korean massacre among Japanese by tracing school children's essays written after the earthquake, the government's earthquake records, and the oral interviews conducted in postwar years. Combined with an analysis on the modifications in children's essays and the narrative patterns in the oral interviews, it highlights the indifference of Japanese people toward the victims of massacre and argues that the Japanese government *and* its people in general have deliberately denied responsibility of the massacre.

Keywords:

The Great Kantō Earthquake, Korean residents in Japan, massacre, *jikeidan* (vigilantes), memory, ethnic discrimination

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Introduction

In June 1960, the Cabinet Office of the government of Japan approved the establishment of “Disaster Prevention Day” to deepen the understanding of natural disasters and to ensure that the people and the national and local governments are prepared for unpredictable emergencies.¹ The day was set on September 1, connected to the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923 that left catastrophic damages to Japan’s “imperial capital” and major cities in the Kantō region. The 7.9 magnitude earthquake and its five strong aftershocks continued over two days. Many people were crushed to death or buried under the wreckage of the collapsed buildings. Those who had survived from the initial waves died from the massive fire that started soon after the earthquake. Over 105,000 were dead or missing with more than 370,000 houses destroyed.² Reflecting on the calamity of the earthquake, the Director Gen-

¹ Science and Technology Agency’s 10th Anniversary Commemoration Event Preparation Committee, *The 10-Year History of Science and Technology Agency* (Tokyo: Science and Technology Agency’s 10th Anniversary Commemorative Association, 1966), 145. In May 1982, the government established a Disaster Prevention Week, including September 1.

² Department of Social Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, ed., *The Record of Taishō Earthquake*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Department of Social Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1926): 287, 305, 307.

eral for Disaster Management has underscored the importance of preventative measures and guided local governments to prepare for natural disasters and emergencies. Schools, communities, and business offices are encouraged to implement disaster prevention drills at both national and local levels on the Disaster Prevention Day.

Compared with the amount of attention given to the earthquake, what is missing in the public discourse on the Great Kantō Earthquake is the terror of man-made disaster. The Korean massacre that took thousands of lives has been hardly discussed at the Disaster Prevention Day events. Immediately after the earthquake, groundless and false rumors regarding plunders and riots by Koreans quickly circulated and caused “Korean disturbance” (朝鮮騒ぎ *Chōsen sawagi*) that greatly agitated the Japanese. Consequently, Japanese civilians, police, and military captured, attacked and in most cases brutally murdered Korean residents, who had migrated to Japan after the annexation of Korea. While the victims also included Chinese and Japanese who had been mistaken as Koreans along with the socialist Japanese, the number of Korean victims was the highest.³ Although fires and collapsed buildings forced people to flee, “Korean disturbance” occupied Japanese minds, dominated media coverage of the time, and left vivid images in their memories for several decades.

Since the 1960s, scholars and historians in Japan laid a foundation of research and data collection in this topic. Most prior research has investigated the causes of the massacre in context of Japan’s colonization and imperialism, focusing on racism, conflicts over immigration and labor, and newly formed Japan’s modern national identity.⁴ Studies in English also

³ Byōng-dong Kūm, ed., *School Children’s Essays Related to Korean Massacre*, vol. 1: 15, 601-3. Historical Document Related to the Korean Massacre during the Great Kantō Earthquake (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 1963).

⁴ See, for example, Dōk-sang Kang, *The Great Kantō Earthquake* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1975); Bunzō Katō, *Kameido Incident and Hidden Power Crime* (Tokyo: Ōtsuki Shoten, 1991); Shōichi Matsuo, *The Great Kantō Earthquake and Martial Law* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2003); Shōji Yamada, *Korean Massacre at the Great Kantō Earthquake and its Aftermath: National and Public Responsibility for the Massacre* (Tokyo: Sōshisha, 2011); Yūko Fujino, *People’s History of Cities and Riots* (Tokyo: Yūshisha, 2015).

add different dimensions to understand why the massacre took place. Among those, Michael Allen's research posits that colonial assimilation policy and ethnic tension between Japanese and Koreans generated an explosion of violence. He argues that the pre-existing negative and hostile images of Koreans being held by the Japanese public due to the nation's initial failure in assimilation projects prompted Japanese to specifically target Koreans.⁵ Sonia Ryang takes an anthological approach to explain Japanese racism toward Koreans through the framework of Japan's modern national sovereignty, highlighting the lack of an official household registry for Koreans in Japan.⁶ Recent studies contextualize the causes of massacre by focusing on the logic and motivations of the assailants, instead of emphasizing the state's manipulation to induce its citizens or the racial and ethnic prejudices by the Japanese as a whole. Highlighting the conflicts between the lower class laborers and the migrant workers, Byung Wook Jung's comparative study on the massacre of Koreans by the Japanese and the massacre of Chinese by the Koreans in Gyeongseong in 1931 suggests, "there are other dimensions to these events that cannot be reduced to nationalism or anti-foreignism."⁷

Although existing research has discussed the causes of the massacre from national and transnational perspectives, research on the representations and descriptions of the massacre after the earthquake remains limited. Moreover, few scholars have investigated the relationship between children's essays written after the earthquake, the government records of the time, and the collections of oral interviews after the war. This study exam-

⁵ J. Michael Allen, "The Price of Identity: The 1923 Kanto Earthquake and Its Aftermath," *Korean Studies* 23 (1996): 64-93.

⁶ Sonia Ryang, "The Great Kantō Earthquake and the Massacre of Koreans in 1923: Notes on Japan's Modern National Sovereignty," *Anthropological Quarterly* 76, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 731-48; Sonia Ryang, "The Tongue That Divided Life and Death. The 1923 Tokyo Earthquake and the Massacre of Koreans," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 5, no. 9 (September 3, 2007): 1-13.

⁷ Byung Wook Jung, "Migrant Labor and Massacres: A Comparison of the 1923 Massacre of Koreans and Chinese during the Great Kanto Earthquake and the 1931 Anti-Chinese Riots and Massacre of Chinese in Colonial Korea," *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review* 22 (March 2017): 45.

ines the expressions relating to the massacre in children's essays, and it explores how the editorial intervention's methods corresponded to the representations of the "Korean disturbance" in the official records by state and local authorities. We have chosen *Children's Essays on the Earthquake Disaster* (子供の震災記 *Kodomo no shinsai ki*) because it has two different versions: the published version and the original version. Compared to the original essays, the published version indicates editorial interventions based on government censorship. The authors of *Children's Essays on the Earthquake Disaster* were elementary school children in Tokyo, aged six to twelve-year-old, and they represented a generation that was greatly affected by nationalism and emerging militarism taught at schools. They were around their twenties during Japan's accelerated militarism in the 1930s, experienced the Pacific War in their thirties, and contributed to rebuilding postwar Japan at the prime of their youth.⁸ Considering that the interviewees in the oral interview were in this age group, this study further traces the representations of the massacre through oral interviews that were conducted in the postwar years. Comparing the depictions of the massacre in the government records, the censored and original children's essays, and the remembrances of the incidents in recent oral interviews, this study will provide a more nuanced understanding of Japan's evasive attitude toward the massacre of Koreans over time.

Background

The spread of rumors during a natural disaster was common, because a temporary cutoff of public services and communication escalated people's fear and confusion. A study by J. Prasad shows that false or exaggerated information appeared when the 8.0 magnitude Bihar-Nepal earthquake in 1934 took more than 12,000 lives.⁹ The widely circulated rumors during the Bihar-Nepal earthquake originated from "legend, socially important be-

⁸ Kūm, *School Children's Essays Related to Korean Massacre*, vol. 1: 1.

⁹ J. Prasad, "The Psychology of Rumour: A Study Relating to the Great Indian Earthquake of 1934," *British Journal of Psychology* 26 (1935): 1-15.

liefs, and from superstitions.”¹⁰ Prasad posits that rumors serve “a social purpose” and are immune from criticisms, because they represent collective mentality, instead of serving the interests of individuals.¹¹ Negative effects of rumors at the time of emergency have posed serious problems over time. The proliferation of unverified information continues to challenge the present society, as misinformation and malicious contents in social media platforms at a time of crisis disrupt the flow of accurate information and threaten public safety.¹² In 1923, Japan, the rumors drove Japanese to irrationally search, detain, and attack innocent Koreans. The peculiarity of Japanese rumors was that the contents mainly focused on the imagined crimes and violence committed by Koreans. When the earthquake happened, the typical rumors—Koreans were poisoning wells, bombing buildings, plundering houses, assaulting women, and plotting rebellions against Japanese—quickly spread.

The Japanese word for rumor, contextual to this massacre, is *ryūgen* (流言) that can be translated as a “false” rumor, or canard. While a Japanese word equivalent to an English word “rumor” also exists as *uwasa* (噂), the press, authorities, and public used *ryūgen*. Osamu Hiroi, a sociologist, and the forerunner of the research on disaster information, explained that *ryūgen* has social and political functions and emerges during a crisis, whereas *uwasa* is related to someone’s private and/or social activities circulated in time of peace. Hiroi posits that *ryūgen* reflects the strong emotions including worries, fear, and wishes that have been shared by the people, and its content is presented in a way similar to that of headlines in media reports. The nature of its “reporting” style is the reason that individuals conveying *ryūgen* rarely felt the need to check the facts, even though it presented no reliable evidences. As a result, the contents of *ryūgen* grew increasingly specific and spread quickly as people evacuated to different

¹⁰ Ibid., 13.

¹¹ Ibid., 8, 13, 15.

¹² Social Media Working Group for Emergency Services and Disaster Management, and Department of Homeland Security, *Countering False Information on Social Media in Disasters and Emergencies* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018).

locations. Taking a similar view with Prasad, Hiroi considered *ryūgen* a public opinion that was disguised as a report for which no one was responsible.¹³

Furthermore, the socialist movement and the government's suppression of the radicals in the early summer of 1923 fostered a negative image of Koreans among the public as the police and military authorities had suspected a connection between Japanese socialists and Korean labor organizations.¹⁴ Japanese categorized Koreans into *futei senjin* (不逞鮮人 malcontent Koreans) or *zenryō na senjin* (善良な鮮人 good-natured Koreans) even before the earthquake to emphasize the Korean members of labor and socialist organizations' negative images. In particular, the severe suppression of Korean and Japanese socialists on May Day, in 1923, laid the foundation of a much greater suppression of Koreans and suspected socialists by police officers during the earthquake.¹⁵ The murders of the anarchist Sakae Ōsugi, his wife, and six-year-old nephew by the military officers on September 16 were a striking example of the assaults against Japanese socialists and communists by the police and military, in the aftermath of the earthquake. The authorities claimed that the radicals instigated Koreans to riot by taking advantage of the chaotic situation; hence, the image of Koreans was enforced as "the transmitters of the socialist virus" among the public.¹⁶

The devastation of the earthquake fueled a mass hysteria and the images of *futei senjin* as hostile and violent Koreans dominated the contents of *ryūgen*. The Ministry of Home Affairs issued a command to the police departments nationwide to strictly investigate Koreans, and it ordered townspeople to organize *jikeidan* (自警団 vigilantes) for guard duty against Koreans. Meanwhile, some *jikeidan* were already self-formed or semi-forcibly organized by the influential leaders in the community, such as

¹³ Osamu Hiroi, *Ryūgen to dema no shakaigaku* [The sociology of *ryūgen* and demagogue] (Tokyo: Bungeishunju, Ltd., 2001), 34-37, 67-72, 94.

¹⁴ Michael Weiner, *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 78.

¹⁵ Yamada, *Korean Massacre at the Great Kantō Earthquake and Its Aftermath: National and Public Responsibility for the Massacre*, 46-50.

¹⁶ Mikiso Hane and Louis G. Perez, *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey*, 5th (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013), 243-44; Weiner, *Race and Migration in Imperial Japan*, 78.

landlords. While the formation of *jikeidan* also aimed to provide relief measures to its community, the state's immediate announcements to warn against potential Korean rebels implied that *ryūgen* were validated as *facts* to the citizens.¹⁷ Moreover, on September 2, the government imposed martial law in Tokyo city that carried out at an unprecedented speed; it expanded to Kanagawa, Saitama, and Chiba prefectures by September 7, and remained effective until November 15. While the enforcement of martial law intended to preemptively minimize the occurrences of social disorders, it also aimed to guard against potential outrage by socialists and *futei senjin*.¹⁸

Jikeidan usually consisted of fire brigade, the urban poor who were manual laborers, the reservists, and the members of young men's associations. The increased presence of military led to the reservists taking a leadership with *jikeidan*. Wearing military uniforms and acting like active duty soldiers, they contributed to creating a warlike ambience in communities.¹⁹ As the confusion at the natural disaster and the *ryūgen* about attacks by Koreans developed extreme fear and anxiety among the public, those who participated in *jikeidan* started taking it on themselves to protect people in their communities. Simultaneously, the martial law placed the local police under military control and effectively incorporated *jikeidan* into the emergency system as the armed organizations to enforce vigilance.²⁰ It gave the ordinary people "authorization" to regard Koreans as enemies of the nation and to attack and kill them for the sake of the community and nation. An increasing sense of solidarity and responsibility with the nation resulted in escalating hostility and murderous urge toward Koreans.²¹ By the night of

¹⁷ Matsuo, *The Great Kantō Earthquake and Martial Law* 37; Masataka Tanaka, "The Great Kantō Earthquake and the Regional Activities and Current Situation of Mourning and Research," *Journal of Ohara Institute for Social Research* 669 (July 2014): 23.

¹⁸ Shinobu Ōe, *Martial Law* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978), 125-26.

¹⁹ Tadatoshi Fujii, "Military Personnel Association: Organization and Mobilization," *Modern History Quarterly* 9 (September 20, 1978): 260.

²⁰ Matsuo, *The Great Kantō Earthquake and Martial Law* 21.

²¹ Fujino, *People's History of Cities and Riots*, 280-81; Fujii, "Military Personnel Association: Organization and Mobilization" 260.

September 1, many *jikeidan* began setting up checkpoints and passwords to distinguish the townspeople from the outsiders, challenging people's identities without warning, or chasing and detaining "suspicious" people.²² To identify Koreans, some *jikeidan* forced people to say the names of successive Emperors or phrases in Japanese that many Koreans found difficult to pronounce. Once recognized as Koreans, they were killed by weapons like fire hooks, swords, bamboo spears, and metal or wooden sticks.²³ The victimization of Chinese and Japanese with regional dialects illustrate the irrationality of *jikeidan* that created greater confusion and increased fear.²⁴ Initially, the police and military urged the public to protect their communities from potential Korean attacks. However, after the government realized that no actual violence by the Koreans was confirmed, the police began to announce that *ryūgen* were false and stopped *jikeidan*'s attacks on Koreans since "a majority of them were 'good' Koreans."²⁵ This change of the authority's stand, which still implied existence of *futei senjin* and insufficiently denied "Korean disturbance," created further confusions. In some areas, *jikeidan* attacked police stations where Koreans were sheltered, resulting in the arrests and persecutions of some *jikeidan*.²⁶ The violence against Koreans, which started with rumor and involved both the authorities and civilians amidst the unprecedented disaster, lasted about ten days.²⁷ The following

²² Tokyo Shinagawa district, ed., *The Collection of Experience Records at the Great Kantō Earthquake* (Tokyo: Toppan Printing, Co., Ltd., 1978), 17, 19.

²³ So Paec, ed., *Pictorial Reports: Korean Massacre during the Great Kantō Earthquake* (Tokyo: Kage Shobō, 1988), 13; Korea University, *The Truth and Reality of Korean Massacre in the Great Kantō Earthquake* (Tokyo: The Korea University Research Materials Editorial Committee on Korea, 1963), 50-53.

²⁴ "Confusion after the Earthquake," *Kokumin Shinbun*, October 21, 1923, Reprinted in Yamada, ed., Sources for Newspaper Coverage of Korean Massacre, vol. 2: 22-23; Korea University, *The Truth and Reality of Korean Massacre in the Great Kantō Earthquake*, 64-65.

²⁵ Tokyo Municipal Office, ed., *The Record of Tokyo Earthquake Disaster*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Tokyo Municipal Office, 1926): 6-8.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 1: 11-12; Yamada, *Korean Massacre at the Great Kantō Earthquake and its Aftermath: National and Public Responsibility for the Massacre*, 90-92. For the analysis on the government's intentions and the validity of *jikeidan*'s court cases, see *Ibid.*, 87-98.

²⁷ Yamada, *Korean Massacre at the Great Kantō Earthquake and its Aftermath: National and Public Responsibility for the Massacre*, 73-74.

sections will examine the descriptions of the “Korean disturbance,” the representations of Koreans, and how they had become vanished victims in the records.

Prohibited Expressions in the Children’s Essays

When schools in the affected region gradually resumed, it was a common classroom activity for teachers to assign students to write essays about their experience during the earthquake. Those essays often depicted the details of “Korean disturbance” and a spirit of mutual helpfulness among Japanese during a chaotic situation. Some schools and local institutions published essay collections or kept them in local libraries. Unlike other collections of children’s essays, however, *Children’s Essays on the Earthquake Disaster* had two versions—an original version and a published version after censorship. In the preface, the teachers explained that children’s sensitivities and compassions toward the victims of the disaster expressed in the essays urged them to publish and preserve “jewels of children’s morality that sparkled in a time of calamity.”²⁸ The teachers confirmed that they had not edited children’s essays and the students wrote all the words.²⁹

According to the colophons and stamps in the two versions of *Children’s Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*. One has a seal of approval by the Ministry of Home Affairs in the front page and was published in July 1924. The other has no approval seal but has two stamps in its front page, indicating that it was banned from publication and was transferred to the Imperial Library from the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1937 (see figure 1 and figure 2).³⁰ In prewar Japan, the government censored all publications based on the publication law in 1893, which required publishers to

²⁸ Elementary Education Society, ed., *Children’s Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*, published version (Tokyo: Meguro Shoten, 1924), 6.

²⁹ Ibid., 7.

³⁰ Front page and colophon in Elementary Education Society, ed., *Children’s Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*, original version (Tokyo: Meguro Shoten, 1924); Elementary Education Society, *Children’s Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*, published version.



Figure 1. Front Cover and Colophon of the Published *Children's Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*



Figure 2. Front Cover and Colophon of the Original *Children's Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*

submit two copies of a book to the Ministry of Home Affairs before its publication. The government categorized disapproved books and prohibited them from publication, and a copy was stored in the Imperial Library.³¹

³¹ Preface, National Diet Library Collecting Division, ed., *List of Prohibited Books in National Dietary Library before 1945* (Tokyo: Kinokuniya Shoten, 1980).

Teachers had evidently made “corrections” in the content of the original version of *Children’s Essays on the Earthquake Disaster* to pass the censorship, and then they published the modified version in 1924. Therefore, even though the editors declared, “Nothing is better than children’s essays, in terms of depicting ‘veracity’ of events” in its preface, children’s real experiences and emotions were altered in it.³²

Comparison between the published (modified) and original (prohibited) versions revealed the images of Koreans and the representations of the Japanese that the state desired to record in history. In the original version, students often captured the brutality of *jikeidan* and endless fear and irrational mentality of Japanese people, enhanced by the intensity of a warlike atmosphere and emotional disruption. The published version, however, replaced the original words, phrases, or sentences in children’s essays with different expressions. For instance, sentences like, “I continuously heard horrible *ryūgen*, such as Koreans are setting fires one after another,” were changed to “I continuously heard horrible things one after another.”³³ One student recorded, “Fire and earthquake stopped on September 3. But we had a very tough time due to Korean disturbance.” The published version omitted the second sentence.³⁴ In the original essay by an 8th grader Taka Andō, titled “Horrible *ryūgen*,” the narrative tone and details of the event captured the irrational and frightened behavior of Japanese, and her observations contained graphic descriptions. On the 2nd day, nothing surprised her more than the “Korean disturbance.” She wrote,

Here and there, the reservists and local volunteers tied wooden sticks to their own hands and went on guard. [The reservists shouted,] “They just went into the fourth street!” “This way!” “Over there!” “[They are] in

³² Elementary Education Society, *Children’s Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*, published version, 1.

³³ Elementary Education Society, *Children’s Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*, original version, 340; Elementary Education Society, *Children’s Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*, published version, 340.

³⁴ Elementary Education Society, *Children’s Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*, original version, 96; Elementary Education Society, *Children’s Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*, published version, 96.

the graveyard!” “No, I saw them here!” Everyone looked panicked and confused. Someone told me, “Koreans will set fires, so guard your back door,” and “Korean women will throw poisons in our wells, so please have someone guard your well.” My heart ached whenever I heard such things. . . . The Korean disturbance that frightened people lasted four to five days. One time, someone said, “I just saw Koreans were killed,” and “I’ve heard that about thirty Koreans are captured in Otowa.” According to the person who witnessed the killing, *jikeidan* blindfolded Koreans and then shot them dead, counting “one, two, three” from a distance of three to four meters. When they couldn’t die by the shot and moaned with pain, people gathered to the site in droves and shouted, “Let me beat them, please,” and “Let me punch them a little bit, please.” Those Koreans eventually died because everyone beat them up.³⁵

The original words used to indicate Koreans in the essay, such as *senjin* (鮮人 a disparaging term for Koreans), were replaced with *zainin* (criminal) and *dorobō* (thief); the alternative terms, without ethnic connotations, replaced the words that directly depicted Koreans. The Koreans’ actions in *ryūgen* were also altered to the ones that sound less violent and harmful. For instance, throwing “poisons into wells” was changed to “do mischief on wells,” and the passages including the conversations about people’s desire to attack the assaulted victims were completely omitted in the published version.³⁶

Replacement of a passage or an entire essay with photographs was another method to eliminate students’ direct descriptions of the victims. For example, a photograph of a national sport hall that was destroyed by fire replaced the following essay.³⁷ Atsushi Watanabe, a 6th grader, wrote,

On the 2nd day, many people gathered in Ichigaya, making a great noise.

³⁵ Elementary Education Society, *Children’s Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*, original version, 304.

³⁶ Elementary Education Society, *Children’s Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*, published version, 304.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 144.

So, I went there to see. I found a Korean crying as he was kicked and beaten by a wood [stick]. Then, one soldier ran toward him. As I was watching and wondering what he would do, he rescued the Korean from the mob and told them that he was one of the Japanese nationals as well, so it is a pity to bully him like this. Then, the soldier took the Korean and went away. . . [That] Korean was suspected of setting fires because he had tobacco and matches. Five to six Koreans were caught on that day. Among them, one person was captured on the way to a friend's house. Another person was half-killed and taken by the police. I thought that the previous soldier was a wise and reasonable person. As *jikeidan* was formed, everyone had become able to sleep without worrying about Korean disturbance. I have heard that about 300 Koreans were killed.³⁸

In this student's narrative, the detailed observation of the event emphasized the reality of the unreasonable treatments toward the Koreans. While Watanabe felt that *jikeidan*'s behaviors were irrational compared to the soldier's action, he had no doubt that Koreans were causing trouble. Being terrified by malicious behaviors of Koreans told in *ryūgen*, he approved *jikeidan* as guardians of his community. Moreover, the soldier's logic behind rescuing a Korean on the ground because he was also a Japanese national further highlights the penetration of colonial hierarchical relationship between Japanese and Koreans underlying the assimilation process of Koreans. Watanabe did not approve of the soldier's action based on his sympathetic feeling toward the victim; he echoed the soldier's logic of colonial superiority. An insertion of a photograph to replace this episode not only renders a contrived look to the essay but also conceals the context that expressed the complex relationship between Japanese and Koreans within the Korean assimilation policy, under Japan's colonialism.

Photographs of the imperial family also appeared in the middle of children's essays. A 7th grader Kiyoshi Ishigami explained that his neigh-

³⁸ Elementary Education Society, *Children's Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*, original version, 140-46.

bors captured three to four Koreans and took them somewhere. He wrote,

Koreans were asking in awkward Japanese, “I didn’t do anything wrong. Where are you going to take me?” Then, my neighbors, holding metal and wooden sticks in their hands, responded to them, “Wherever. Just walk!” and dragged them somewhere. When I returned home, I heard a noise from outside. My neighbors said that a Korean ran away to a mountain behind our town, and everyone chased after him. . . . During the night, my neighbors captured Koreans here and there.³⁹

A photograph of an empress consoling the sufferers replaced this section in the middle of the essay left a blank to Ishigami’s vivid rendering of observed facts, without which his essay was incomplete.⁴⁰ Another example was found in an essay by a 6th grade boy, Yōzō Manabe. Called to support *jikeidan*, young boys like Manabe had to take weapons and guarded their houses against Koreans while their fathers and elder brothers went on patrol. Manabe expressed his state of anxiety in his essay.

. . . .as night advances, it became complete darkness. . . “Bang, bang, bang.” The terrifying sound of gunfire broke the darkness. I thought, “It must be a Korean’s pistol. I guess they are almost there. What should I do if they come here? I am a Japanese man. [I can fight against] 100 or 200 Koreans. . . .” I made up my mind and gripped my metal stick tightly. People went by as they yelled out “Beat rebellious Koreans to death!” “Kill lawless Koreans all!” What will happen to us? Are we heading to a happy way or an unhappy way? We are at the crossroad of fate.⁴¹

This passage captured his feeling of danger against the “rebellious Kore-

³⁹ Ibid., 299.

⁴⁰ Elementary Education Society, *Children’s Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*, published version, 299.

⁴¹ Elementary Education Society, *Children’s Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*, original version, 246-47.

ans,” when the adults around him were desperately trying to find Koreans. His final phrase sharply grasped the people’s hysteria, as if they were at the boundary between killing and being killed. Nevertheless, the published version replaced his intense fear and distress along with the madness of Japanese with a single photograph of Hirohito, who was a prince regent at the time, observing the damaged area.⁴² The sudden insertion of the members of imperial family’s photographs produced unexpectedness and awkwardness to children’s essays. The imperial presence possibly indicated the forceful power used to eliminate the victims and the records of children’s psychological fear and potential hatred toward Koreans, which was developed by the hysteria. We shall look at the implication of the imperial presence in the section on the government documents.

Besides the scenes of atrocities on innocent people, the original essays contained expressions suggesting that the Japanese were terrified by their own words and the ambience of grave delusion. The essays also mirrored the indifference to the lives of the victims. As the examples show, “Korean disturbance” and *ryūgen* occupied children’s minds, often more than the devastations caused by the earthquake. Even after the disaster, the impact of *jikeidan*’s ruthless violence and the images of assaulted Koreans reflected in a children’s popular play, “a game of *jikeidan*” (自警団遊び *jikeidan asobi*, see figure 3). By mimicking *jikeidan*’s behaviors based on their observations and experiences, children imitated the adults. One of the pictorial reports in *Miyako shinbun* by an artist, Yumeji Takehisa (竹久夢二), published in 1923, described a group of children playing *jikeidan* wherein one child was forced to play a Korean and was bullied. The report began with a dialogue of children; a group pointed at one kid, Man-chan, saying, “Man-chan, your face doesn’t look like a Japanese,” “Let’s make Man-chan an enemy.” Then, the kid refused, saying, “No, I don’t want to. You are going to poke me with a bamboo spear, aren’t you?” This kid was eventually chased and beaten till he cried. Yumeji warned the public

⁴² Elementary Education Society, *Children’s Essays on the Earthquake Disaster*, published version, 246-47.



Figure 3. “A game of *jikeidan*” by Yumeji Takehisa in *Miyako Shinbun* on September 19, 1923.

through his comment to those children; “Children, let’s stop brandishing sticks and playing *jikeidan*.”⁴³ The prevalence of a game of *jikeidan* among children indicated the social norm that any Korean had become the subject of bullying by the Japanese.

Some students used words, such as “dream” and “dreamlike” to convey their extreme tensions and fears that they had never experienced. Nonetheless, children’s descriptions of the events around massacres are strictly objective, and the distinctive characteristic in their essays was the general absence of a humane feeling toward the Korean victims. In those children’s memories, the massacre was recorded as a horrible event. However, much like Yumeji’s warning on “a game of *jikeidan*,” the lives of people who were killed without reason do not appear to be significant in children’s minds. While these essays show the reality of the brutal attacks, the victims had already been sunk into oblivion in their recorded and non-recorded memories.

⁴³ Yumeji Takehisa, “Tokyo Sainan Gashin [Pictorial Reports on the Disaster in Tokyo],” *Miyako Shinbun*, September 19, 1923.

Omissions of the Massacre in the Government Publications

As early as 1924, various levels and regions of public institutions began publishing the earthquake's disaster records. The publications, including *The Record of Taishō Great Earthquake and Fire* (大正大震火災誌 *Taishō daishin kasai shi*, 1924), *The Record of Tokyo Earthquake Disaster* (東京震災録 *Tokyo shinsai roku*, 1926), and *The Records of Taishō Earthquake* (大正震災志 *Taishō shinsai shi*, 1926), have been considered as the main disaster records of the earthquake.⁴⁴ In particular, *The Records of Taishō Earthquake* has served as the official record for the earthquake with its comprehensive coverages of the disaster in the Kantō region.⁴⁵ Published by the Ministry of Home Affairs, it was intended for the public to preserve the memories and transmit the lessons learned from the disaster to “warn and guide future generations.”⁴⁶ Thus, it reflected the government's purpose or intention on how the history of earthquake are remembered.

Throughout more than two thousand pages in two volumes, *The Records of Taishō Earthquake* contains chapters on the prefectures in the Kantō region, detailing a wide range of physical damages, human loss, and the conditions of the sufferers. However, neither a chapter nor a section reports the massacre, and the references to the incidents related to “Korean disturbance” were ambiguous. Contrary to the fact that the military and police were involved in actual violence, the chapters for Tokyo and Tokyo city briefly described the situation as “appalling sight” due to a menacing attitude of *jikeidan* and highlighted the security and protective measures that the police or military *had provided for* Koreans to protect them from

⁴⁴ Metropolitan Police Department, ed., *The Record of Taishō Great Earthquake and Fire* (Tokyo: Metropolitan Police Department, 1924); Tokyo Municipal Office, *The Record of Tokyo Earthquake Disaster*; Department of Social Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, *The Record of Taishō Earthquake*.

⁴⁵ Junichi Miyama, “Archiving Natural Disasters in Early-Modern Japan: The Role of Governmental Organizations in Compiling Records of Natural Disasters,” *The Bulletin of the National Institute of Japanese Literature* 13 (March 2017): 22-27.

⁴⁶ Preface, Department of Social Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, *The Record of Taishō Earthquake*.

jikeidan. For instance, Tokyo city spared several pages for providing examples of *ryūgen*, describing how the police maintained social order by detaining Koreans and strictly controlling *jikeidan*. While the report emphasized that frenzied *jikeidan* even “killed and wounded innocent citizens [Japanese],” the words and phrases to explain *jikeidan*’s actions against Koreans were obscure. Without using the direct expressions like “kill” or “murder,” the report concealed the atrocities committed by *jikeidan*. Moreover, the contributory factor for *jikeidan*’s “strong hatred for Koreans” and “violence (against Koreans) without reason” was pointed to “some *futei senjin*’s recklessness.”⁴⁷ Instead of attempting to record what had happened to the victims, it focused on the number of protected Koreans and the tremendous efforts by the police to convince the public to regain calm. Further, it emphasized that people’s antagonistic feeling toward Koreans turned to “beautiful sympathy” by the middle of September, and Koreans “became grateful and shed tears of happiness for relief supplies provided by *jikeidan*.”⁴⁸

Similarly, the key subjects of the narrative in Yokohama city and Kanagawa Prefecture’s reports, where most of the atrocities had occurred, were the strenuous relief efforts by the police, often highlighting the specific officers who toiled for conducting relief measures. In more than four hundred pages of reports for Yokohama city and Kanagawa Prefecture, neither *ryūgen*, *jikeidan*, nor Koreans appeared except in the context that the officers warned *jikeidan* against rashness, denied *ryūgen*, and protected Koreans.⁴⁹ Without mentioning “Korean disturbance,” it blamed the complete chaotic situation that facilitated crimes on the lack of food supply and insufficient police force.⁵⁰ These reports had only a few passages discussing the spread of *ryūgen*, confusion, and an agitated atmosphere and violence. The sections concluded that the effect of the martial law and the police and military enforcement contributed to pacifying the public feeling

⁴⁷ Ibid., 1: 385-87.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 1: 387-88.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 1: 574, 723-24.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 1: 604.

and restoring the social order, by the middle of September.⁵¹ The Chiba and Saitama prefectures' reports focused on the relief activities by young men's associations and reservists, whose members often overlapped with *jikeidan* and committed atrocities against Koreans.⁵² Saitama prefecture's report completely dismissed events surrounding "Korean disturbance," and Chiba prefecture noted that it omitted "misconducts" by *jikeidan* in its report.⁵³

The publications of the regional governments had the same tendencies: the omissions and equivocations of violence and the promotion of the authority for maintaining public peace and protecting Koreans. Both Tokyo city and Kanagawa Prefecture briefly reported the violence by the desperate populace without mentioning the murder cases in their own publications. In particular, Kanagawa Prefecture reported an unrealistically small number of crimes, violence, and disobedience committed by the public; four reports indicating the arrests for violating "law against false rumors" and eight for homicides.⁵⁴ Similar to the aforementioned examples, the military and police were the leading entities regulating *jikeidan*; they distributed flyers to stop blindly committing violence against the "good" Koreans, detained and protected them from irrational public, and even arranged for them to return to their homes in the Korean peninsula.⁵⁵

Unlike the reports of the areas where most massacres took place, the chapter for Yamanashi prefecture in *The Records of Taishō Earthquake* ex-

⁵¹ Ibid., 1: 735.

⁵² Ibid., 1: 1003, 1005, 1045-46, 1159, 1166, 1171-72. For the details on violence against Koreans in Chiba and Saitama Prefectures, see Executive Committee of the Research on Korean Massacre in Chiba Prefecture, ed., *People Who Were Killed without Reason: The Great Kantō Earthquake and Korean* (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1983); Executive Committee of the 60th Anniversary of the Korean Massacre during the Great Kantō Earthquake, ed., *The Hidden History: the Great Kantō Earthquake and Korean Massacre in Saitama* (Ōmiya: Executive Committee of the 60th anniversary of the Korean Massacre during the Great Kantō Earthquake, 1987).

⁵³ Department of Social Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, *The Record of Taishō Earthquake*, 1: 1047.

⁵⁴ Kanagawa Prefecture, ed., *The Record of Kanagawa Prefecture Earthquake Disaster* (Yokohama: Kanagawa Prefecture, 1927): 6-7, 10-11.

⁵⁵ Tokyo Municipal Office, *The Record of Tokyo Earthquake Disaster* 1: 2, 7-10.

plained the careful judgements made by the prefectural police officers regarding *ryūgen*, and their measures to control *jikeidan*. The report stated that “out of extreme fear and the spread of Korean riots,” “the formation of vigilantes” became apparent, and such phenomenon “did not differ from the Tokyo area.”⁵⁶ Indicating details of the Koreans’ number and locations in the prefecture, it also discussed how the authority had protected them. Moreover, anticipating further confusions and uncontrollable mob violence, the prefectural government issued six “warnings” and one “instruction for security guards” as early as September 3. While the reports in Tokyo and Kanagawa never denied the instances of the crimes by Koreans described in *ryūgen*, these “warnings” and “instruction” for *jikeidan* mentioned in Yamanashi prefecture’s report suggested that *ryūgen* were groundless.⁵⁷ As these examples show, the regions not affected by the massacre disclosed the official records to emphasize the successful measures by the administrative office against *jikeidan*, while the regional reports where the massacre happened avoided clarifying the information about “Korean disturbance” and incidents related to *ryūgen*. In either case, however, the reports primarily focused on the different situations and positions of Japanese, who provoked “Korean disturbance” out of their *ryūgen*, to defend what Japanese had done to unnamed Koreans; victims’ descriptions or sympathetic remarks did not appear in those records.

Imperialism and Rationalization of the Massacre

Compared to the monotonous and evasive tone of the descriptions about *ryūgen* and Korean disturbance, the official records showed the emotive use of expressions in support of the imperial family. As we observed in the children’s essays, the photographs of the empress and the prince regent Hirohito abruptly interrupted their writings. The forceful intervention by the imperial presence after censorship paralleled to the direction of the govern-

⁵⁶ Department of Social Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, *The Record of Taishō Earthquake 1*: 1198.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 1: 1198-1201.

ment-issued records to promote the imperial family, particularly strengthening the image of Hirohito as a benevolent imperial leader. A detailed account in *The Records of Taishō Earthquake* was regarding the collections and distributions of monetary and material donations in and outside Japan. The 2nd volume was essentially devoted for such accounts, and one chapter was dedicated to the relief activities by the imperial family—the amount of imperial gifts, distributions of cooked rice for refugees by the Ministry of Imperial Household, the empress’ visits to the hospitals, Hirohito’s visits to the disaster areas, his “gracious” decision to postpone his wedding ceremony, and so forth. Those accounts had excessive propensity to extol the relief efforts by the administrative organizations and displayed citizens’ deep appreciations for the generosity of the imperial family.⁵⁸

The praise of the imperial family was prominent in *The Record of Taishō Earthquake* and many disaster records published by the prefectural governments. In *The Record of the Earthquake in Yokohama* (横濱市震災誌 *Yokohama-shi shinsai shi*, 1926), the editor exaggerated people’s appreciation of the imperial family’s benevolence, explaining that citizens of Yokohama were “moved to tears” by the imperial gifts and the visits by the members of the imperial family.⁵⁹ Besides, *The Photograph Collection of Taishō Earthquake* (大正震災寫真集 *Taishō shinsai shashin shū*), which was published by the Martial Law Headquarter in September 1924, promoted the image of Hirohito in the presence of military. It began with portraits of army generals and officers followed by photographs of Hirohito’s visits to the damaged sites. Seated on a horseback in a military uniform, the composition of pictures, including Hirohito with his military officers, evokes a suggestion common to many of his photographs during the war-time.⁶⁰ The intertwining image of the imperial family and militarism was the clear representation of fruit of the martial law to guide public con-

⁵⁸ Ibid., 1: 119-57.

⁵⁹ Yokohama Municipal Office, ed., *The Record of the Earthquake in Yokohama*, vol. 1 (Yokohama: Yokohama Municipal Office, 1926): 30-32.

⁶⁰ Kantō Martial Law Headquarter, ed., *The Photograph Collection of Taishō Earthquake: September, 1923* (Tokyo: Kaikokusha, 1924), 1-4.

sciousness toward following the trajectory of military control after the earthquake.

In the public records, Prince regent Hirohito, the imperial family, and militarism symbolized the rationalization of Japanese injustice against Koreans. As the police and military realized that there was no single piece of evidence to confirm malicious crimes by Koreans, the government prohibited the press from reporting any issues on Koreans, while the cabinet office issued a declaration to ban further attacks on Koreans and ordered the police to seize weapons from *jikeidan*.⁶¹ The authority's efforts to avoid its responsibility for spreading *ryūgen*, encouraging *jikeidan* to attack Koreans, and even participating in murders greatly confused *jikeidan*, who claimed that they had sacrificed themselves to protect their community from danger.⁶² In fact, when police arrested *jikeidan* and brought them to trial, the common argument of the defendants (*jikeidan*) was the logic of self-sacrifice: the intention was purely out of patriotic spirit for the nation. Considering the motivations of defendants as patriotism, the defendants' villagers formed the Kantō *Jikeidan* Union (関東自警団同盟 *Kantō jikeidan dōmei*) and requested a reduction of penalty for them on the grounds that the police encouraged them to attack Koreans. While severely criticizing the police for not taking responsibility for urging them to protect themselves from Koreans, the focus of the union's statement was "noble spirit of self-sacrifice" that *jikeidan* demonstrated at the time of national crisis.⁶³ Consequently, Hirohito pardoned all defendants on January 26, 1924, on the occasion of his wedding.⁶⁴ These judicial trials implicated that the nation had no intention to bring justice for the Korean victims. Instead, the negotiation between civilians and the authorities over the point of responsibility for the massacre was settled by the imperial cause—they attacked

⁶¹ Dōk-sang Kang and Byōng-dong Kūm, eds., *Sources for Modern History 6: the Great Kantō Earthquake and Korean* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1963), 79.

⁶² Yamada, *Korean Massacre at the Great Kantō Earthquake and Its Aftermath: National and Public Responsibility for the Massacre*, 86-88, 148.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 146, 154-58.

⁶⁴ Matsuo, *The Great Kantō Earthquake and Martial Law; Jōmō Shinbun*, November 6, 1923.

Koreans for the sake of nation and community, therefore, the massacre was justified. Thus, the promotion of imperialism aimed to suppress any objections against the falsifications in the children's words and to satisfy the assaulters' claim of justifying their actions. Recording the earthquake was utilized to conceal the facts deemed inconvenient to the authority and to confirm and remind the people of the state's successful handling of disaster relief and maintenance of social order. Consequently, those official records dismissed the reality of the chaotic atmosphere caused by *ryūgen* and the violence and killings of Koreans.

Remembrances in the Oral History

By the 1960s, the oral history projects of the earthquake, including eyewitness accounts of the massacre, emerged from individual researchers as well as the people of the local communities in the affected areas. In the 1980s, when the authors of children's essays in the 1920s reached their mid-sixties to seventies, the grassroot movements achieved great success by collecting the narratives of personal experience from both Japanese and Koreans who lived, experienced, and witnessed the assaults and massacre. Despite the hardship in conducting interviews of the events more than a half-century ago, over a thousand interviews were recorded in multiple publications. The frequent expressions within these individual memories were their fear of "Korean disturbance" and experience in witnessing the violence and killings. Most accounts described how people were greatly confused and terrified by the *ryūgen* about Koreans. Their articulations of the massacre were generally short but vivid and implied how the witnesses have positioned themselves in their memories of the events. A witness who was a schoolchild at the time of the earthquake remembered how he thought that Koreans deserved to be killed for their malicious acts against Japanese. He depicted scenes of twenty to thirty bodies left on a street, covered by dogs, and how much he hated to cross the street to go to school. Later, the community built a cemetery for the bodies to be buried, but the cemetery became a place for a test of courage game among children. Although several decades have passed, this interviewee remembered the appalling sight of

ruthlessly left corpses and the children's games created based on the deaths of Koreans. It is noteworthy that he indicated no emotional expressions toward the victims, at least in his words. Instead, he remembered the incident as an experience that harmed his childhood memory. While explaining the incident as a mere observer, he described it as if he were the victim of witnessing a disturbing scene.⁶⁵ Similar to this recollection, most testimonies that provided the details of cruelty described the scenes objectively. Sympathetic expressions appeared in some testimonies; however, a feeling of guilt and a sense of responsibility for the deaths were rarely found. Even in the testimonies indicating sympathy, they neither stressed their community's guilt of committing injustice nor recognized the incidents as crimes. Focus of their regret was directed to a shameful Japanese character that was easily agitated and misled by *ryūgen*.⁶⁶

In 2014, Dök-sang Kang, a modern Korean historian, states in his reflections regarding the fifty-years of the research on the massacre, "In Over 6,000 homicides, there is no single testimony saying 'I did it.'"⁶⁷ The testimonies confirm his observation and sense of strangeness because only a few described themselves as active participants of massacre. Taizō Ishikawa's interview was a rare example: he discussed the circumstances that led him to volunteer to become a leader of *jikeidan*, which murdered Koreans. He explained that an extremely intense atmosphere prompted him to believe the *ryūgen* as truth and confessed that he was convinced that Koreans and socialists were traitors to Japan.⁶⁸ Moreover, a handful of testimonies

⁶⁵ Executive Committee of the 60th Anniversary of the Korean Massacre during the Great Kantō Earthquake, *The Hidden History: the Great Kantō Earthquake and Korean Massacre in Saitama*, 67-69.

⁶⁶ Tokyo Shinagawa district, *The Collection of Experience Records at the Great Kantō Earthquake*; Executive Committee of the 60th Anniversary of the Korean Massacre during the Great Kantō Earthquake, *The Hidden History: the Great Kantō Earthquake and Korean Massacre in Saitama*; Masao Nishizaki, ed., *The Records of Massacre of Koreans in the Great Kantō Earthquake: Testimony of 1100 in Tokyo* (Tokyo: Gendaishokan, 2016).

⁶⁷ Dök-sang Kang, "Beyond History of a Nation," *Journal of Ohara Institute for Social Research* 668 (June 2014): 9.

⁶⁸ Nishizaki, *The Records of Massacre of Koreans in the Great Kantō Earthquake: Testimony of 1100 in Tokyo*, 435.

expressed the guilt of Japanese by confessing their feeling of sorrow. Ichirō Matsuo stated;

. . . It was heart-rending. . . Some Koreans were killed in brutal ways in front of my eyes. Their blood shed red on their white shirts, their hands were tied, nonetheless, the cruelty continued and their bodies were laid everywhere on roads. If we had had radio then, this cruelty would have not happened. As a Japanese, I deeply and sincerely apologize to those Koreans.⁶⁹

The individuals, who had closely interacted with the victims before the earthquake, also expressed their penitence for taking the lives of Koreans.⁷⁰ One witness acknowledged the interview process as a way to make atonement for his guilt of remaining silent for decades, and that he “sincerely pray for the repose” of the victims’ souls.⁷¹ However, the expressions implying their atonement for the unreasonable killings, like the previous example, were the least in numbers. Even though there were testimonies that Japanese displayed their sympathy and remorse, the chief emphasis was usually placed more on their shameful conduct, less on their guilt and responsibility. Overall, this tendency demonstrated a sense of aloofness with the incidents and detachment from the perspectives of thousands of innocent people who were murdered without reason. The objective descriptions of the incidents effectively denied their direct involvements in any stages of massacre.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 26.

⁷⁰ Yamada, *Korean Massacre at the Great Kantō Earthquake and Its Aftermath: National and Public Responsibility for the Massacre*, 167-71.

⁷¹ Executive Committee of the 60th Anniversary of the Korean Massacre during the Great Kantō Earthquake, *The Hidden History: the Great Kantō Earthquake and Korean Massacre in Saitama*, 63.

A Difficult Path to Acknowledgement

Since the massacre occurred, the deliberate avoidance of an acknowledgement of massacre continues to be a common phenomenon among the Japanese government and people. In December 1923, a congressman, Ryūtarō Nagai inquired Prime Minister Gonbei Yamamoto at the plenary session of the House of Representatives regarding the responsibilities of the government on the incidents and requested him to take the necessary actions to console bereaved families. Yamamoto only replied that the case is “under investigation” and avoided the discussion by making an evasive statement that it is “not the right time to discuss” the matter.⁷² The nonchalant attitude of the government remained the same even after eight decades. Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi dismissed the recommendation with a report of the massacre submitted by Japan Federation of Bar Association in August 2003 that urged the government to take its responsibilities of violence and murders against Koreans and Chinese by thoroughly investigating the incidents and making an official apology.⁷³

Meanwhile, the Central Disaster Management Council (CDMC) under the Cabinet Office Disaster Management Bureau initiated a ten-year comprehensive research project on Japan’s natural disasters in 2003. It published the three volumes of report on the Great Kantō earthquake from 2006 to 2008, which included a chapter dedicated to “the expansion of damage caused by confusion,” referring to *ryūgen* and the massacre of Koreans.⁷⁴ Although the report did not aim to “investigate historical facts,” it utilized available research findings and confirmed that the military, police,

⁷² Byōng-dong Kūm, ed., “Kanpō gōgai, December 16, 1923,” in *Chōsenjin gyakusatsu kanren kanchō shiryō* [The government agency documents on Korean massacre] (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 1991), 65-68.

⁷³ Japan Federation of Bar Associations, “Recommendation to Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi,” August 25, 2003, <http://www.azusawa.jp/shiryō/kantou-200309.html>; Yamada, *Korean Massacre at the Great Kantō Earthquake and Its Aftermath: National and Public Responsibility for the Massacre*, 252.

⁷⁴ The Central Disaster Management Council, ed., *Report on the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Director General for Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, 2008): 179-221.

and people committed “homicides” against Koreans.⁷⁵ The report acknowledged the incidents as an important lesson for future disaster management and suggested “making the necessary efforts to reflect back on the past and eliminate ethnic discriminations.”⁷⁶ Nevertheless, the government’s persistent refusal has continued to date. Although designated as a committee chair of the CDMC, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe contradicted the report, claiming, “There is no record in the government that can grasp the government’s involvement in the massacre.”⁷⁷ Insisting, “The government is not held accountable to respond to the report written by intellectuals,” the Abe administration repeatedly denied the government’s responsibility and revealed no intention to make a formal apology to the victims.⁷⁸

An acknowledgement of the massacre emerged from civilians as a form of memorial service for the victims or protest against the government’s inactions to bring justice to the victims. As early as 1923, groups of Korean residents, Japanese socialists and labor activists began organizing memorial services and protest meetings, despite facing severe suppressions by police. Some villages, where *jikeidan* murdered Koreans, also held memorial services and built tombstones or monuments in memory of the victims.⁷⁹ While there are just a handful of cases, regional activities to mourn the victims have quietly continued after the postwar years. Importantly, however, until 2009 when a citizen’s group called Group Hōsenka built a monument in Tokyo near Arakawa River, the inscriptions on those monu-

⁷⁵ Ibid., 2: 206.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 2: 224.

⁷⁷ Shinzō Abe, House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan, “Memorandum on Questions Regarding Korean Massacre at the Time of Great Kantō Earthquake” (189th sess., HC, Memo. 34, February 27, 2015); Shinzō Abe, House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan, “Memorandum on Questions Regarding Korean and Chinese Massacre during the Great Kantō Earthquake” (190th sess., HC, Memo. 131, June 7, 2016).

⁷⁸ Shinzō Abe, House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan, “Memorandum on Questions Regarding Korean and Chinese Massacre during the Great Kantō Earthquake” (193rd sess., HC, Memo. 91, May 12, 2017).

⁷⁹ Yamada, *Korean Massacre at the Great Kantō Earthquake and Its Aftermath: National and Public Responsibility for the Massacre*, 194-216.

ments built by Japanese did not clarify the assailants or even the nature of the deaths of Koreans.⁸⁰ Moreover, while Japanese locals contributed to carrying out memorial projects, in many cases Korean residents initiated the activities and appealed to local communities in order to build monuments to mourn the victims. The field research on the memorial monuments by historian Shōji Yamada revealed that even though the communities embraced the feeling of grief to the victims, they could not face the reality of being assailants.⁸¹ Such subconscious response within the locals concerned in the massacre impeded the process of accepting the guilt, thus resulted in failing to acknowledge the truth of massacre. For instance, a tombstone built for a victim, who was killed by the villagers of Someya ward in Saitama, was inscribed with a phrase, “[a Korean named Daeheung Kang] died in this town during the Great Kantō Earthquake.” Takasuke Takahashi, a grandson of a headman of Someya village who organized and directed Someya’s *jikeidan*, criticizes the inscription’s use of a word “died” as it does not tell what the villagers had done to a victim accurately. “A word ‘died’ could mean a death from illness or something else,” Takahashi explains, by using an indirect expression, “[The villagers of Someya] wished to conceal the fact of homicide.” He concludes that at the fundamental level, “[The villagers] did not feel they had done wrong,” since they saw themselves “victims” of *ryūgen* and the authority’s order to attack Koreans.⁸²

⁸⁰ Ibid., 255. Group Hōsenka and another citizen’s group organized by Japanese have engaged in a grassroot study on one of the massacres that took place in Tokyo. After decades of hard work, they accomplished building a monument clearly stated the victims and assailants of massacre. See, Committee of Excavation and Mourning of Remains of Korean Massacred during the Great Kantō Earthquake, *Wind, Carry a Song of Balsam Flowers: 70 Years since the Great Kantō Earthquake and Korean Massacre* (Tokyo: Kyōikushiryō Shuppankai, 1992), <https://housesenka.jimdofree.com>.

⁸¹ Yamada, *Korean Massacre at the Great Kantō Earthquake and Its Aftermath: National and Public Responsibility for the Massacre*, 260-65.

⁸² Oral interview of Takasuke Takahashi in Satoru Okuaki, *The Great Kantō Earthquake and Koreans: Why Did a Tragedy Happen* (NHK Educational TV, 2016).

Conclusion

In the accounts of Japanese who experienced the Great Kantō Earthquake, they have clearly remembered the chaotic confusion, the fear of “Korean disturbance,” and *jikeidan*’s obsession to attack Koreans. Children’s essays illustrated that it was indisputably the most unforgettable memory. Nonetheless, as this study has shown, the state attempted to conceal the cruelty of the massacre in its official records and children’s essays. Applying modifications and omissions, the published version altered children’s essays and distorted their memories in the original record. The emphasis on the relief activities by the imperial family effectively led the narrative in the official reports to praise the government and military, along with the imperial family. Replacing descriptions of brutality against Koreans in children’s essays with the imperial photographs signified the promotion of imperialism and suggested the idea that the nation forgave the massacre in the name of patriotism and loyalty. Conversely, the personal memories emphasized traumatic experiences, which included tension and fear of warlike situations created by the martial law and frenzied *jikeidan*. Unlike the official records, the testimonies expressed disappointments on the negative consequences of the Japanese group consciousness. However, like the narrative in official records, a sense of guilt, remorse, and their responsibility for the justice of victims were virtually missing. The lack of efforts to consider the massacre as a problem created by them indicated that these individual memories tend to regard the massacre as a mere unfortunate accident in the past. While the tombstones and memorial monuments represent the deep compunction of the communities that were involved in the violence, the omissions of assailants, victims, or the nature of incidents in the inscriptions indicate that passive desire of Japanese to avoid responsibilities of lives taken by them.

It must be stressed that the dedications by the people from both sides of victims and assailants have generated certain results to record history of the massacre and attempted to redress painful injustices buried in history. Nonetheless, the way Japanese government and society in general have responded to this past is a retrograde attitude to the advancement of research

and acknowledgement and mourning process. The recent movement to re-write the history of Japanese imperialism in the education field has extended to the reinterpretation of the events, resulting in an omission of the term “massacre” in a supplementary reading material for metropolitan high schools.⁸³ The publications by the nonfiction writers advocating a disavowal of the massacre have created logic for public to justify the attack on Koreans in the name of self-defense. Despite the basis of these authors’ narratives lacking serious examinations of historical evidences, the public opinion inclines to victimize *jikeidan* against Korean “terrorists.”⁸⁴ Simultaneously, it is also true that many Japanese have neither knowledge nor opportunity for learning what had happened on the day of the earthquake, except from few sentences in school textbooks. Vague understanding among Japanese public has correlated with the government’s silence on the formal requests by the civil organizations. Japanese public and government’s deliberate avoidance to face the past and reckon the guilt has neglected the massacre and denied justice to the victims, even in the absence of direct censorship.

As an earthquake-prone nation, reminding people of the tragic past is crucial to prevent further human-instigated disaster during natural catastrophe. The diffusion of misinformation during natural disasters has increased in social media, and we have witnessed the unceasing negative expressions about ethnic groups in Japan, particularly Koreans and Chinese, in the recent decades. When rumors and misinformation spread in social media soon after the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake, false reports about stealing and

⁸³ Toshio Suzuki, “Historical Revisionism on the Great Kantō Earthquake in the Educational Field,” *Journal of Ohara Institute for Social Research* 668 (June 2014): 27.

⁸⁴ Miyoko Kudō, *The Great Kantō Earthquake: The Truth about “Korean Massacre”* (Tokyo: Sankeishinbun Shuppan, 2009); Yasuo Katō, *The Great Kantō Earthquake: There was No Korean Massacre!* (Tokyo: Waku, 2014). Nonfiction writer Miyoko Kudō and her husband, also a nonfiction writer, Yasuo Katō, published books that follow the government’s fabrication of the number of crimes by Koreans. They argue that Koreans had indeed plotted rebellions in the midst of the disaster; therefore, “massacre” was rather a counterattack by *jikeidan* by the means of self-defense.

vandalism by Koreans and Chinese resurfaced.⁸⁵ The vicious discriminatory comments including “Koreans are throwing poisons in wells” re-emerged during the 2016 Kumamoto earthquake.⁸⁶ Besides the recent rise of xenophobia, these examples have shown Japanese society’s continuing propensity for claiming victimhood, when there are true victims of the misled information. Remembering the 1923 massacre and reminding Japanese society of the consequences of discriminatory actions are essential to cultivate the public’s ability to take responsibility for the past and to make proper judgements and decisions during emergencies.

⁸⁵ Seung-koo Choi, “There Are People Who Post Discriminatory and Xenophobic Comments on Twitter,” *Nikkan Berita*, March 21, 2011, <http://www.nikkanberita.com/print.cgi?id=201103210018081>; Yukio Edano, “Chief Cabinet Secretary Press Conference” (Tokyo: Cabinet Public Relations Office, March 12, 2011), https://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11236451/www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201103/12_p.html.

⁸⁶ “Be Aware of False Tweets,” *The Sankei Shinbun*, April 15, 2016, <https://www.sankei.com/affairs/news/160415/afr1604150040-n2.html>; Kaoru Tashiro House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan, “Memorandum on Questions Regarding Korean and Chinese Massacre during the Great Kantō Earthquake” (190th sess., HC, Memo. 131, May 27, 2016).

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Troublesome Brotherhood: The Korean Volunteer Army and the CPC

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Abstract

In 1942, a small military force known as the Korean Volunteer Army was established in North China. It was composed of Korean revolutionaries and independence activists who had fled their homeland due to its colonization by Japan. For most of the Korean revolutionaries in China, the establishment of the Korean Volunteer Army was a critical juncture, and marked the point in time from which they worked in close cooperation with the Communist Party of China. The changing circumstances following the conclusion of the war against Japan, however, led the Korean Volunteer Army to diverge from the Communist Party of China, and this formed a challenge for the latter. This article tracks the short history of the Korean Volunteer Army, with a particular focus on the changing circumstances from the conclusion of the war against Japan until the impending civil war in Northeast China, and how these created and intensified tensions between the Korean and Chinese Communists. Likewise, it reveals the means and measures taken by the Communist Party of China in order to tackle this challenge, and to ensure the Korean Volunteer Army's adherence to the Party and its participation in the Civil War until its final stages.

Keywords:

China's Civil War, Communist Party of China, Korean Volunteer Army, Li Hong-gwang Detachment, Northeast China, War of Resistance against Japan

Troublesome Brotherhood: The Korean Volunteer Army and the CPC*

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Introduction

In early 1950, the newly established communist regimes in North Korea and China (in 1948 and 1949 respectively), negotiated repatriation of China's ethnic Koreans who had served in the People's Liberation Army (PLA).¹ Unlike earlier requests, such as in the spring of 1947,² when North Korea asked the Communist Party of China (CPC) to repatriate some, if not all, of the Korean troops serving in their army, this time was completely different due to the conclusion of China's Civil War (1945/1946-49). The new conditions in Northeast Asia, as discussed in studies of the Korean War, allowed China to repatriate its Korean troops as part of its procedure of downsizing the military, and at the same time, allowed North Ko-

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¹ Chen (1994): 88; Minnich (2005): 54.

² Baomiju, *Guoshiguan*, 002-020400-00034-114 (Apr. 22, 1947). According to Zhou Lijun, in 1947 North Korea asked the CPC to repatriate two Korean battalions from East Jilin, see: Zhou (2013): 33.

rea to step up its preparations for military confrontation on the peninsula.³ In total, according to some estimates the ethnic Koreans who served in the PLA numbered 60,000-70,000, while other estimates put the number even higher.⁴ While still controversial among scholars, mainly due to the lack of documentation, the prospect of North Korean direct intervention in the civil war might have enhanced the total amount of Korean soldiers that had participated.⁵ The core of these forces was repatriated to their homeland during 1949-50, while smaller components were sent earlier.⁶ Their repatriation to their liberated homeland after a long occupation by the Japanese Empire, marked the end of Korean participation in the Chinese communist revolution, which can be traced back to the time of the Northern Expedition (1926-28) and the Canton Uprising (1927).⁷

Whilst its total existence was relatively short, the history of the Kore-

³ See for example: Chen (1994): 87, and Halberstam (2017): 49. While there is still a debate whether North Korea had planned to launch the offensive that led to the outbreak of the Korean War or as Shen and Xia have argued, that North Korea was inclined to defend itself rather than attack the South—although I believe there are sufficient materials and studies that highlight it was a deliberate and planned action on North Korea’s side, it is still in line with the fact that following the Communist victory in China in 1949, North Korea desired the return of Korean troops in the PLA whereby it would enlarge its military and make it more prepared. See: Shen and Xia (2018): 21.

⁴ For sources that set the number of Korean troops in the PLA at around 60,000 by the end of China’s Civil War, see: Chen (1994): 110; Zhou (2013): 34. For similar estimates made by the GMD, see: Baomiju, *Guoshiguan*, 002-020400-00034-114 (Apr. 22, 1947), Du Yuming, *Guoshiguan*, 002-020400-00015-006 (Feb. 13, 1947). Some other sources and accounts have claimed greater numbers of Korean troops that participated in China’s Civil War, including the CPC’s Zhou Baozhong, who according to Lü Minghui had, in 1947, estimated the total number of Korean troops under the CPC’s command in Northeast China at as many as 250,000, see: Lü, (2013): 287. Other sources include intelligence reports made by the USA and the GMD, see: Cumings (1990): 363; Hou Sheng, *Guoshiguan*, 002-020400-00034-146 (Aug. 24, 1948); Zheng Jiemin, *Guoshiguan*, 008-010702-00044-004 (Oct. 9, 1947).

⁵ For more information regarding the issue of North Korea’s deployment of its forces to Northeast China during the civil war between the Guomindang and the Communist Party of China, see: Nisimov, “The Role of North Korea in China’s Civil War: The Soviet-led North Korean Assistance to the CPC in the Northeast Theater, 1946-1948,” *Journal of Chinese Military History* 9, no. 1 (March 2020).

⁶ Cumings (1990): 362; Hou Sheng, *Guoshiguan*, 002-020400-00034-146 (Aug. 24, 1948); Zhou, 2013, 33-34.

⁷ Lee and Scalapino (1972): 150-51, 170-71; Shi (1998): 52-54.

an Volunteer Army (KVA) extends over a vast geographical space and over East Asia's greatest wars of the mid-20th century. Its predecessor, the Korean Volunteer Corps (KVC; 朝鮮義勇隊 *Chaoxian yiyongdui*) came into being in Wuhan, Central China, October 1938, during the early stages of the War of Resistance against Japan;⁸ under its own embodiment from 1942 onwards, it took part in the Chinese Communist Revolution in North China, while continuing the struggle against Japan;⁹ and it was descended by other Korean units that were incorporated into the Chinese Communist armies in Northeast China (or Manchuria) during China's Civil War, parts of which continued as south as Hainan Island;¹⁰ and the predecessor of this army found itself later in its final struggle during the Korean War (1950-53) under the North Korean People's Army (NKPA).¹¹ Yet, in spite of accompanying such significant milestones in the history of East Asia and acting as one of the few international movements within China, the history of the KVA has evidently been understudied in the Western scholarship, and while it has received some attention in China and more so in South Korea, I argue that crucial aspects of the history of the KVA are barely understood or discussed, particularly those regarding its internal changes, but most importantly its relations with the CPC. This lacuna in the scholarship emanates first and foremost due to the deficiency of and limited access to documentation, and in particular valuable non-propagandic materials that can reveal what is hidden beneath the surface.

In distinction to former studies about the KVA, this article attempts to refute the former, rather optimistic convention that the KVA was a complying subordinate and that it was effectively controlled by its patron, the CPC. Rather, by exposing several incidents in the relations between the

⁸ Ma Yi 馬義, *Dangshiguan*, Regular record 515/45 (Dec. 1942); Yeom In-ho: 41; Yue Chaoxiang 岳朝相. "Women de zhanyou—Chaoxian yiyongdui," 我們的戰友—朝鮮義勇隊 [Our Comrades-in-Arms—The Korean Volunteer Corps.], *Chaoxian yiyongdui tongxun* 朝鮮義勇隊通訊 [The Korean Volunteer Corps' Newsletter], issue no. 10 (April 21, 1939): 4.

⁹ Kim (2017): chap. 1; Lee and Scalapino (1972): 178-79; Ma Yi 馬義, *Dangshiguan*, Regular record 515/45 (Dec. 1942); Shi (1998): 81-85; Yeom (2001): 142-48.

¹⁰ Cumings (1990): 362; Kim (2012): 229-31; Kim (2018): 25-26, 153-55;

¹¹ Chen (1994): 106-08; Kim (2017): chap. 5; Zhou (2013): 34.

CPC and the KVA following the conclusion of the War of Resistance against Japan and through the process of the Civil War in China, this article reveals the fragile and even volatile relations between the two, and the gradual deviation of the KVA from the CPC, and the aspiration of the former for greater autonomy from the latter. Therefore, this article draws the attention to several less known or entirely unknown incidents that had occurred during China's Civil War which reflect the complex relations between the CPC and its international unit. I argue that following the War of Resistance against Japan, a few factors contributed to the growing tension between the CPC and the KVA, which may be attributed to internal changes within the KVA such as its swelling number of members, its relocation to Northeast China, and other reasons such as disagreements about the way the war should be conducted, and conflicts of interests.

Such a new interpretation to the CPC-KVA relations was impossible had it been merely relying on materials and documents that were already in use for the last several years. Western scholarship on the KVA is scarce and in fact almost does not exist, while in recent years this unit has received greater attention by Chinese and South Korean scholars. Yet, the fact that primary sources regarding the KVA remain limited, has contributed considerably to the perception, both by Chinese and South Korean studies, that the KVA was a reliable subordinate unit to the CPC, that it had assisted to it in the times of the War of Resistance against Japan and China's Civil War, and that all these reflect the brotherhood and amicable relations between Chinese and Korean Communists.

Primary sources regarding the KVA remain limited in scope and time: as the South Korean scholar Yeom In-ho points out, the most comprehensive primary sources about the KVA are primarily propaganda materials published either by the KVA or the CPC, notably the "Korean Volunteer Corps' Newsletter" (朝鮮義勇隊通訊 *Chaoxian yiyongdui tongxun*), Chinese Communist newspapers, and other materials gathered and published by Japanese governmental apparatuses.¹² However, almost all of

¹² Yeom In-ho (2003): 38-40.

these sources are pertinent to the earlier period of the KVA, prior to the conclusion of the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-45). Therefore, the later part of the KVA and its participation in China's Civil War (1945/1946-49) lacks abundant sources, and due to that the main conception that rises from secondary literature about the KVA-CPC relationship at that time is of an amicable and cooperative one, highlighting their common struggle, but unaware of their conflicts and disagreements. Memoirs by leaders of the CPC Northeast Bureau and commanders of the Eighth Route Army, such as Peng Zhen, Wu Xiuquan, Xiao Jinguang, Zeng Kelin, and Lü Zhengcao—who had all operated at some point or another with the KVA in Northeast China—only rarely mention their existence, if at all.¹³ In his memoir, for example, Zeng Kelin refers to the KVA only twice: first, when his military district receive an order from Zhude to advance to the Northeast together with “Korean units”; and secondly, when he very ambiguously refers to the Tonghua Incident of March 1946, without mentioning other details than that “a Korean detachment” had suppressed a revolt attempt by Japanese remnants.¹⁴ While some of these memoirs acknowledge the KVA's participation in the Civil War in China alongside the CPC, it seems that on the whole they avoid raising the question of their relations.

As a result, a somewhat simplified representation is raised both in Chinese and in South Korean scholarship regarding the KVA-CPC relationship. In fact, the existent literature inclines to emphasize the cooperative relations between the KVA and the CPC in the Northeast Theater of 1945-48, their eradication of local bandits, their joint fighting against the GMD, and other activities with the local population.¹⁵ However, it

¹³ Lü Zhengcao (1997); Peng Zhen (1991); Wu Xiaoquan (2009); Xiao Jinguang (2012); Zeng Kelin (1997).

¹⁴ Zeng Kelin (1997): 79-80; 137.

¹⁵ See: Cui (1997): 48-62; Lü (2013): 282-92; Kim (2017): chap. 3; Kim (2012): 229-31; Yeom (2001): 314-24. These studies' discussions about the period of the civil war in Northeast China is limited to the cooperation between the KVA and CPC, the frequent reorganizations of the KVA units, their deployment in Northeast China, and the like. There are neither references nor implications to difficulties or strains in the relations between the KVA and the CPC, and the KVA mostly seems as a passive actor without independent thinking or aspirations.

fails—mainly due to the lack of available and external sources—to investigate and analyze the nature of the relations between the KVA and the CPC with different queries, such as: did both the KVA and the CPC have the same goals by the end of the war against Japan? How did the KVA’s shift to Northeast China and its subsequent expansion impact its relations with the CPC? What kind of impact had the encounter with local Koreans in Northeast China on KVA-CPC relations? And, did they have contrasting views regarding how the war and revolution should be conducted?

Drawing on intelligence and military reports of their archenemy—the GMD—I was able to unfold some of the incidents between the CPC and the KVA, the GMD’s attempts to shatter their alliance, and other differences between them that had burdened their relations. Therefore, by relying on external sources originated not within the CPC or the KVA, but by the military and intelligence apparatuses of the GMD, this article fills an important gap in the current literature.¹⁶ This article also tries to trace and explain some of the changes that occurred in the KVA following the conclusion of the war against Japan, and how these had influenced its relations with its benefactor.

With the conclusion of the war against Japan in August 1945, the intimate and reliable ties between the CPC and the KVA were beginning to unravel. Apparently, it was not clear to the KVA members whether they should stay in China with the CPC or return to their homeland in order to take part in political work. The KVA was sent together with the 8th Route Army to Northeast China and supposedly expected to return from there to Korea. However, by late 1945, only a small group of seventy to eighty of the most prominent cadres of the KVA was allowed to enter North Korea, while the rest of the KVA remained in Northeast China. Thus, the KVA was prevented from returning home, and was compelled to fight alongside the CPC in China’s Civil War. As it turned out, at this crucial point for both

¹⁶ This article relies mainly on research and analysis of archival sources in the Chinese language. Although a few secondary sources in Korean are cited in this article, I acknowledge that due to certain limitations such as time and access, additional sources in Korean were not used in this research.

the Chinese and Korean Communist revolutions, the hitherto amicable and stable relationship between the CPC and the KVA was put into test.

The Korean Exiles and the Chinese Revolution

Of the various Korean organizations that had operated in China prior to 1949, the KVA, made up of Korean revolutionaries and communists, became the main military apparatus fighting in the War of Resistance Against Japan in about 1942.¹⁷ Throughout its existence, the KVA was officially affiliated with the CPC and the Chinese Red Army, although *de jure* it had a certain level of autonomy. Assessing the nature of the relations between the CPC and the KVA is not a simple task, as information regarding the KVA remains largely scarce or incomplete. Chinese sources dealing with the KVA and other Korean units within the Chinese Red Army—and later the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—briefly summarize the development of these units, and while, on the one hand, they seem to emphasize their contributions to the War of Resistance Against Japan, to the victory of the Chinese Revolution and to the Civil War, on the other hand, they tend to avoid detailing their actions and relations with the CPC.

The aim of this section of the article is to succinctly describe the situation of the KVA prior to the conclusion of the War of Resistance against Japan and the commencement of the Civil War in China. The KVA came into being following a series of splits and unifications between a few Korean forces that had operated in South and North China.¹⁸ The first split occurred on July 4, 1938, when Ch’oe Ch’ang-ik (崔昌益, 1896-1957) and others, split from Kim Wŏn-bong (金元鳳, 1898-1958; aka Kim Yak-san 金若山), and formed their own organization, called the “Korean Youth War-time Service Corps” (朝鮮青年戰時服務團 *Chosŏn ch’ŏngnyŏn jŏnshi bongmu dan*).¹⁹ Due to interventions by the GMD and the CPC in an at-

¹⁷ Kim (2012): 229; Lee and Scalapino (1972): 175-78; Minnich (2005): 17-18; Shi (1998): 77-78.

¹⁸ Shi (1998); Han (2005); Yeom (2001); Cui (1997).

¹⁹ For names of Korean organizations, I have preferred to provide the Chinese/Hanja characters, followed by the Romanized name according to the McCune-Reischauer Romanization System.

tempt to reconcile this split, on October 10, 1938, the “Korean Volunteer Corps”²⁰ (朝鮮義勇隊 *Chosŏn ūiyong dae*) was established, and Kim Wŏn-bong was appointed its commander.²¹ Although it managed to remain a unified unit operating in the same region for a while, the old arguments regarding the location of operations continued to prevail, and from that time until 1941, it was under pressure from within and from without. Firstly, considerable parts of the unit were not satisfied with serving in South China, since many considered fighting against the Japanese Army more desirable as it was closer to their homeland. Secondly, the CPC worked on propaganda aimed at mobilizing the Koreans fighting in China proper in the goal of having them join their bases of operations in the north. The CPC let it be known that the prominent Korean commander Kim Mu-chŏng (金武亭, 1904-52) and his Korean unit had engaged in operations against the Japanese Army in North China. Moreover, it seems that in September 1940 Zhou Enlai, who was at that time in Chongqing, tried to influence the Korean Volunteer Corps from within in order to urge its members to move northward and reach the areas under CPC control.²²

Consequently, on several occasions, members of the Korean Volunteer Corps left South China in order to join fellow Koreans active alongside the CPC in North China. Thus, in 1939, Ch’oe Ch’ang-ik led a group of dissidents who joined the Korean revolutionaries in the north. Later, in June 1941, another group of about eighty members made its way to North China, thereby causing the Korean Volunteer Corps in South China to practically lose its main force; the dissidents were no longer affiliated with the Republican government in Chongqing, but with the CPC in Yan’an.²³

Following the growth in the number of Korean revolutionaries in the

²⁰ Note that the meaning of “*ūiyong*” (義勇) is “righteous and courageous,” however, as it is often translated as “volunteer” (for which “*Chiwŏn*” 志願 is the appropriate term) in the research literature, I use this name without change.

²¹ Kim and Wales (1941): 217-20; Lee and Scalapino (1972): 175-78; Pak (2007): 352; Shi (1998): 78-79.

²² Lee and Scalapino (1972): 177-78; Pak (2007): 354-55; Shi (1998): 78-80.

²³ Minnich (2005): 17-18; Lee and Scalapino (1972): 177-78; Lü (2013): 282; Pak (2007): 355; Shi (1998): 78-81.

areas under CPC control in North China, a reorganization of the Korean military organ under Kim Mu-chǒng's leadership took place. On July 7, 1941, the members of the former Korean Volunteer Corps, together with the members of Kim Mu-chǒng's political organization—the “North China Korean Youth Federation” (華北朝鮮青年聯合會 *Hwabuk Chosǒn ch'ǒngnyǒn yǒnhap'oe*)—merged their military force into a new unit called the “North China Detachment of the Korean Volunteer Corps” (朝鮮義勇隊華北支隊 *Chosǒn ūiyongdae Hwabuk chidae*). Pak Hyo-sam (朴孝三, years unknown) was appointed unit commander. In late 1942, the “Youth Federation” was renamed as the “Korean Independence Alliance” (KIA, 朝鮮獨立同盟 *Chosǒn dongnip tongmaeng*; aka “Korean Independence League”) and the former “Korean Volunteer Corps” became “The Korean Volunteer Army” (朝鮮義勇軍 *Chosǒn ūiyong kun*). Kim Mu-chǒng served as the commander of the KVA, and below him were his two deputy-commanders, Pak Hyo-sam and Pak Il-u (朴一禹, years unknown).²⁴

By the time of the establishment of the KVA, these Korean forces under Kim Mu-chǒng that were affiliated to the CPC were operating in the Taihang Mountain region in Shanxi province. There they were training their new rank and file who kept joining them in designated schools, and after constant reorganization their school was renamed to the “Korean Revolutionary Military and Political School” (朝鮮革命軍政學校 *Chosǒn hyǒngmyǒng kunjǒng hakkyo*) in late 1943.²⁵ The KVA, like its predecessor—the KVC, has mainly carried out propaganda tasks and infiltrations to the enemy's rear, attempting to arouse the Korean soldiers in the Japanese Army to act against their masters or to switch sides.²⁶ At any rate, although

²⁴ Lee and Scalapino (1972): 178-79; Lü (2013): 282; Pak (2007): 357-58; Shi (1998): 81-82.

²⁵ Lee and Scalapino (1972): 179; Shi (1998): 84.

²⁶ In its newsletter, the KVC had on several occasions published short stories from the frontline, where its detachments had operated or fought, see for example: Chaoxian yiyongdui 朝鮮義勇隊, “Ben dui xietong youjun sha kou,” 本隊協同友軍殺寇 [This unit killed an enemy in cooperation with the friendly forces], *Chaoxian yiyongdui tongxun* 朝鮮義勇隊通訊 [The Korean Volunteer Corps' Newsletter], issue no. 8 (April 1, 1939): 9; For a comprehensive explanation about the propaganda work conducted by the KVC, see: Li Da 李達, “Di'er qi Kangzhan Zhong Chaoxian yiyongdui yu dui di xuanchuan,” 第二期抗戰中朝鮮義勇隊與對敵宣傳 [The Korean Volunteer

it had participated in a few battles against the Japanese enemy, the KVA was limited in size and capabilities in order to serve as a fully-activated combat unit, and, as the CPC leadership soon realized, it was not worthwhile to send these Korean comrades to battle due to their potential in serving the Party in the future.²⁷

The KVA received its political and military instructions from the CPC, however, at the same time it was given a measure of autonomy, mainly an internal hierarchy of Korean revolutionaries at the top of which stood Kim Mu-chông. The Korean revolutionaries were permitted to maintain their own political and military organizations with Korean designations and to preserve their unique cultural and linguistic features. In late 1943, the CPC decided to pull the KVA back from the front line, as it understood that it would be better to protect its valuable leadership. By early 1944, the KVA made its way back to Yan'an.²⁸

To summarize, as long as the KVA was limited in terms of size and operations, and as long as it had a common enemy with the CPC – the Japanese Army, it is clear why it had maintained dependent, subordinate, and close relations to the CPC. In addition, its size and its close contact with the CPC guaranteed effective control and instruction of it by the CPC. But these factors were not to last for long: after Japan's surrender in August 1945, the KVA was dispatched to Northeast China, and thus it was operating farther from the central leadership of the CPC, and at the same time expanding its rank and file from the local Korean population that in most cases was unfamiliar with the CPC's lines and training. And as the war was

Corps and the propaganda toward the enemy in the 2nd stage of the War of Resistance], *Chaoxian yiyongdui tongxun* 朝鮮義勇隊通訊 [The Korean Volunteer Corps' Newsletter], issue no. 12 (May, 11, 1939): 1; For further information regarding the KVA in North China, see: Kim (2017): chap. 1; Lee and Scalapino (1972): 176-79; Pak (2007): 352-54, 358-59; Shen (2003): 187; Shi (1998): 78-85.

²⁷ CPC member Peng Zhen (1902-97), for instance, in his essay "On the tasks in the cities in the occupied zones by the enemy" of May 1945, mentions briefly the contribution made by the "Korean Independence Alliance" and implies its greater importance for the CPC in the future after the conclusion of the war against Japan. See: Peng Zhen (1991): 98. See also: Lee and Scalapino (1972): 179; See also: Lee and Scalapino (1972): 179.

²⁸ Pak (2007): 358-59; Shi (1998): 78-85; Yeom (2001): 79-82.

over, it was not clear to many Koreans and Korean Communists whether they still had a common enemy with the CPC, or in other words, it was not clear whether they should remain in China or return to Korea.

Adhering to Internationalism or Prioritizing the Fatherland?

“The red five-star flag of the People’s Republic of China is dyed with the red blood of the Korean martyrs” was reportedly said by Mao Zedong to Kim Il-sŏng in one of their conversations,²⁹ and conveys the message that the Korean comrades had made a significant contribution to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, and it can be inferred that this was true particularly with reference to the military struggle against Japan and later, the GMD. Chinese sources cite sayings of Chinese senior political and military leaders, such as Zhou Enlai and Zhou Baozhong,³⁰ who lauded the Korean comrades who had fought alongside them. Although relatively little is known about the scope of participation of the pro-CPC Korean forces in China, including the KVA, as more information is revealed regarding those forces, there is less doubt that they contributed significantly to the victory of the CPC in the Northeast Theater (1946-48).³¹ Aside from praising the Korean comrades, Chinese sources tend to simplify the com-

²⁹ Lü (2013): 1.

³⁰ For citations of Zhou Enlai and other prominent leaders of the CPC, see: Lü (2013): 1-3; For citations of Zhou Baozhong about the contribution of the Korean comrades in the resistance to Japan in Northeast China during the 1930s, see: Shi (1998): 70. In 1965 the Hunan People’s Publishing House published a short article dedicated to praising the Korean troops that fought alongside the Chinese Communists in Northeast China during the civil war. See: Hunan renmin chubanshe (1965): 366-69.

³¹ See for example: Lü (2013): 282-92. Military reports made by NRA officers, and particularly by Du Yuming, detail how the KVA and its affiliated units assisted the CPC in Northeast China. This includes massive mobilization of the Korean population in Northeast China to join the ranks of the KVA and other units or to support the war effort in other ways, as well as the KVA’s participation in crucial defensive and offensive campaigns. See: Du Yuming, *Guoshiguan*, 002-020400-00015-006 (Feb. 13, 1947); Du Yuming, Feb. 26, 1947, *Guoshiguan*, 002-090300-00162-255; Chen Cheng, *Guoshiguan*, 002-080200-00317-028 (Jun. 17, 1947).

plicated nature of the KVA and its relations with the CPC, and emphasize its faithfulness to the CPC, as if the relations were smooth and embodied ideal revolutionary comradeship.³² While some of these remarks are not far from the truth, these generalizations tend to cover up significant issues with regard to KVA-CPC relations.

One of the initial tensions to come up between the KVA and the CPC and which foreshadowed the approaching differences between the groups was due to the conclusion of the War of Resistance Against Japan in August 1945. In order to understand the differences between the period of war against Japan and the period of China's Civil War, which led to the tensions between the CPC and KVA, it is essential to highlight a few crucial points. First, in 1929, following instructions from the Comintern and its "one country, one party" policy, the Korean Communists operating in China had to dissolve their Korean Communist Party.³³ Consequently, they became members of the CPC, and followed their orders. For as long as they were operating in China, they had no organizational autonomy but were allowed to maintain their own designations. This, in fact, made them devoted to the Chinese Communist cause of fighting Japan on Chinese soil, and to contributing to the communist revolution there. As a result, their ultimate goal of liberating Korea from Japanese control and carrying out the revolution they envisioned in Korea had to take a back seat to supporting the CPC. This is a crucial point that has often been overlooked in earlier studies.

Second, while most of the Koreans affiliated with the CPC were, by 1941, very familiar with the Party's doctrines and policies, others who joined their ranks later, might not have been familiar with the CPC's prin-

³² Examples of such simplifications of the KVA's nature and inclination to portray it as a compliant body are extensive. Chinese sources often focus on the KVA's geographical distribution in Northeast China after 1945, with sporadic mention of its activities on the ground, and seemingly without referring to its relations with the CPC or the Northeast Bureau.

³³ The Comintern's "one country, one party" policy was urged since late 1927; however, it was carried out effectively in 1929. The Comintern was very dissatisfied with the rampant factionalism within the Korean Communist Movement and therefore, in December 1928 it ordered dissolution of the Korean Communist Party. See: Lee and Scalapino (1972): 149; Lee (1983): 113; Shi (1998): 54, 58.

ciples and guidelines.

Third, the experience of war was different for the Korean revolutionaries—both those who were CPC members in North China and particularly those who were operating underground in the Northeast—and the Chinese Communists. Practically all those Korean revolutionaries, at one stage or another, suffered from persecutions by the Japanese colonial authorities in their homeland, perilous struggles in Northeast China that were often followed by cruel military expeditions by the Japanese Army, not to mention the more than three-decade infamous and harsh colonization of Korea by Japan. All these definitely influenced the Korean revolutionaries, and anti-Japanese sentiments were quite prevalent at that time.³⁴ While for the Korean revolutionaries' ultimate goal was fighting Japan and liberating their homeland, it was, in fact, not the case for the CPC leadership, who understood that the War against Japan was only a preliminary stage before the real struggle for power in China with the GMD.³⁵ Lastly, as has already been pointed out in the previous section, throughout the period of the War of Resistance, the Korean Volunteer Army and its predecessor were limited both in size and in scope of combat operations.

Hence, when the War of Resistance Against Japan came to an end, these facts and differences surfaced and served to undermine earlier relations between the KVA and the CPC: The new circumstances were the result of the KVA's shift to Northeast China and the outbreak of the Civil War. The conclusion of the war against Japan had revived some of the questions that were temporarily put aside, such as the Korean Communists' role in the Chinese revolution: Now that the war was over, should they return to their homeland and carry out the revolution there, or should they

³⁴ On the Japanese colonization of Korea and the anti-Japanese sentiment in Korean society during the colonization period, see: Cumings (2005): 148-62, 174-84. For more information about anti-Japanese sentiment among Koreans in Northeast China prior to Japan's defeat, see: Lee (1983): 1-5, 111-13. The general inclination toward revenge and carrying out reprisals against Japanese civilians and military men following Japan's defeat in August 1945 by the local population in Northeast China is discussed in Mayumi Itoh's book "*Japanese War Orphans in Manchuria*." See: Itoh (2010): 15-24.

³⁵ Beevor (2012): 270, 466; Yang (2011): 324-26.

stay with their Chinese patrons in order to support their efforts in the imminent confrontation against the GMD? And, if their homeland was now liberated and a new Korean government was set up in Pyöngyang, should they maintain their membership in and allegiance to the CPC? These serious questions were quite probably very prominent in the minds of the Korean Communists.

Manchuria—Where All the Problems Started

Toward the end of WWII, the USSR joined the Allied forces against Japan, and launched a surprise attack during the night hours of August 9, 1945 on the outposts of the Japanese Kantō Army in Northeast China. Within a few weeks, the Soviet Army succeeded in occupying Northeast China and the northern half of the Korean peninsula.³⁶ Aspiring to take advantage of this opportunity, the CPC was set to march toward the Northeast. There, the CPC hoped, it could cement contact and cooperation with the Soviet Army and at the same time, guarantee its control of strategic points in the region while the GMD was far off in the South.³⁷ On August 11, 1945 Zhu De (朱德, 1886-1976)—commander-in-chief of the 8th Route Army, announced the “Seven Orders,” which outlined the general instructions and tasks for the Communist forces in North and East China in light of the anticipated struggle with the GMD. Zhu De’s 6th order instructed the deputy commanders of the KVA—Pak Hyo-sam and Pak Il-u—to lead their force and follow the marching units of the 8th Route Army to the Northeast. According to this order, the KVA was expected to fight alongside the 8th Route Army against the Japanese and “puppet” (former Manchukuo) armies, to mobilize the Korean population, and to take part in the liberation of Korea.³⁸ Estimates of the KVA’s size at that time vary, however, it seems reasonable that it included at least five hundred soldiers, and together with a

³⁶ Glantz (2003): 1-6, 24-33; Hasegawa, (2005): 189-91, 196-98.

³⁷ Zeng Kelin (1997): 78-80.

³⁸ Wang and He (2005): 285-90; Yan Xishan, *Guoshiguan*, 002-090300-00210-366 (Sep. 16, 1945).

few hundred Korean cadres from the KIA, about eight hundred to one thousand Korean comrades left for Northeast China by late September, 1945.³⁹

Following these orders, the KVA was intensively working on expanding its ranks. On the same day it received the 6th order, and on certain occasions in the following days, Kim Mu-chǒng called on the former Korean soldiers of the Japanese armies and other elements to join the KVA.⁴⁰ Along its way to the Northeast, the KVA continued little by little to expand its ranks, by joining up new Korean members, some of whom were also former underground guerilla warriors. By late October, 1945 the KVA arrived in Shenyang, where it incorporated local Korean units that had operated underground.⁴¹ According to ROC estimates, at this point the KVA had expanded its ranks to include as many as 1,800 members.⁴² On November 10, 1945, the members of the KVA convened in a Korean school in Shenyang for a military conference. In the conference Kim Mu-chǒng complied with the instructions given by the CPC Northeast Bureau, and declared a reorganization of the KVA into four detachments to be sent to

³⁹ The sources seem to differ in their estimates regarding the total number of Korean members in Yan'an at the end of the War of Resistance, both for the KVA and the KIA. Kim Dong-gil, Lü Minghui and Pak Ch'an-sǔng set the number at no greater than one thousand. On the other hand, Shen Zhihua provides an estimate of three thousand Korean members, which might include other Korean units in Northeast China around that time and not the core membership that set out from Yan'an, as other estimates of the KVA's size at the end of 1945 and following the incorporation of other units in the Northeast generally show. See: Kim (2012): 229; Lü (2013): 294; Pak (2007): 358; Shen (2003): 187-88.

⁴⁰ Shen, 2003): 187.

⁴¹ The foundation of the Korean force that was present in Shenyang prior to the conclusion of the war against Japan remains unclear. According to Yu Zhonglie, during 1945, when the war against Japan was not yet over, the CPC sent Han Ch'ǒng (韓青 years unknown) to Shenyang for underground tasks. Following the defeat of Japan, Han Ch'ǒng emerged with a small military organization of more than one hundred members strong, and it was later merged with the KVA when it arrived in Shenyang. However, according to Shen Zhihua's own account, Han Ch'ǒng was one of the leading Korean cadres who entered North Korea in October 1945, and after discussions with Kim Il-sǒng, returned to Shenyang in November together with a force of his own, which later merged with the rest of the KVA. See: Kim (2012): 229-30; Shen (2003): 188; Yu (2001): 71-72.

⁴² Guofu canjunchu, *Dangshiguan*, Special record 16/24.8 (Oct. 26, 1945).

north, east, and south Manchuria. At the same time, Kim Mu-chǒng also dispatched several Korean cadres to North Korea.⁴³

The conference concluded with the KVA's detachments ready to leave Shenyang and scatter in the Northeast. The 1st Detachment was assigned to Tonghua in south Jilin province; the 3rd to Harbin; the 5th was assigned to Yanji in east Jilin province; and lastly, the 7th Detachment was assigned to go to Jilin City.⁴⁴ It was estimated that around this time, circa November 1945, the KVA already included as many as 3,650 members, 2,000 of whom were in Shenyang at that time.⁴⁵ It thus shows how within two to three months the KVA had swollen conspicuously comparing to its time in Yan'an and North China. By about the end of 1945 all these detachments had arrived at their designated locations, and started mobilizing the Korean population to join their ranks, and carried out other tasks assigned to them, such as: propaganda campaigns for the CPC; organizing the Korean peasants and other social groups; fighting remnants of the Japanese and Manchukuo Armies and capturing their weapons; and, suppressing armed bandits and pro-GMD elements in Tonghua, Mudanjiang, Yanji, and other locations.⁴⁶

Meanwhile the KVA was gradually expanding by conscripting young Koreans from among the local communities and incorporating other local units, and by allowing former Korean troops from the Japanese and Manchukuo armies to join them. The decision to incorporate former Korean troops from enemy armies was sanctioned by the CPC. While this practice was in effect from the time the KVA was operating around Yan'an, it was now enhanced by the CPC's practical need to expand its military ranks in

⁴³ Cui (1997): 48; Shi (1998): 85; Zhou (2013): 32.

⁴⁴ The general description of the designations of the KVA's Detachments seems to match the Chinese source, however, it seems that there may be confusion between the designations of the 5th and the 7th Detachments, as Zhou's account differs from Lü and Shi. See: Lü (2013): 286; Shi (1998): 85; Zhou (2013): 32.

⁴⁵ Cui (1997): 48.

⁴⁶ Cui (1997): 49-50; Lü (2013): 288-92; Shi (1998): 85; Waijiaobu zhu Dongbei tepaiyuan gongshu, *Dangshiguan*, Special record 16/24.18 (Nov. 26, 1946); Yeom (2003): 146-58; Yu (2001): 71-73.

light of the upcoming struggle with the GMD.⁴⁷

Another important change took place in the core leadership of the organization. In December 1945, the KVA commander—Kim Mu-chǒng, together with some of the most prominent leaders of the KVA and the KIA, led a force from the KVA to North Korea. Their objective was to return to their homeland and to take part in the new regime’s political and military apparatuses, as had been declared both by the CPC and their own organization in the past, and as was aspired by many of the Korean revolutionaries. The CPC had definitely hoped that these senior members, who later constituted the “Yan’an faction” in North Korean politics, would construct positive and close relations between North Korea and the CPC. However, the Soviet Army in North Korea stopped this KVA marching force from entering into Korea at the border cities of Andong (today’s Dandong) and Shinūiju, and ordered the force to return to Northeast China.⁴⁸ Those allowed to enter North Korea were seventy to eighty of the most prominent leaders and cadres of the KVA and the KIA, including the commander, Kim Mu-chǒng himself, and others such as Kim Dubong (金科奉, years unclear; aka Kim Paek-yǒn 金白淵), Ch’oe Ch’ang-ik, Han Pin (韓斌, years unknown), and others.⁴⁹ This embodies the first two problems that arose during the interim period between the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan and China’s Civil War. One problem was the change in the unit’s composition, since a considerable part of its core senior leadership had returned to North Korea, while new, less-experienced, conscripts from the population or other units, lacking indoctrination and discipline, were added; the other problem was that many of the KVA members who wished to return to their homeland were prevented from doing so, and remained in Northeast China. As has been pointed out by a few sources, considerable

⁴⁷ Baomiju, *Guoshiguan*, 002-020400-00034-114 (Apr. 22, 1947); Cumings (1990): 358.

⁴⁸ According to Bruce Cumings, the Soviet authorities in North Korea wished to avoid violation of the agreement with the USA on their side by allowing the entrance of an armed Korean force into Korea, or were at least concerned about the possible publication of it to the American authorities in South Korea. See: Cumings (1981): 313.

⁴⁹ Chi and Wen (2000): 394; Minnich (2005): 25-28; Shen (2003): 187; Shi (1998): 314.

numbers of the Korean soldiers who fought in the Civil War even at later stages, expressed their desire to return to their homeland.⁵⁰

These first few changes had immediate implications for the KVA's functioning in Northeast China and its relations with the CPC, and especially as the Civil War broke out. A notable example is the case of the Tonghua Incident. Briefly, by early 1946, after Japan's defeat and the collapse of the Manchukuo puppet regime, many Japanese civilians and soldiers tried to escape the Soviet Army's attempts to capture them and use them for their own purposes. Hoping to get back to Japan via Korea, they had gathered in the city of Tonghua in south Jilin province, but were unable to continue fleeing due to the Soviet occupation of Korea. Several months prior, in October 1945, the CPC had succeeded in gaining control of the city with the help of the Soviet Army's presence there; the Soviets subsequently left in November.⁵¹ On December 20, 1945, the KVA's 1st Detachment arrived in Tonghua.⁵² The 1st Detachment was the main, or one of the main, CPC forces in Tonghua and south Jilin. By the time of the incident, it was reinforced by other Korean troops from other Detachments.⁵³ Meanwhile, the GMD had been trying to use some of its agents and pro-GMD elements in the city in order to make contact with former Japanese soldiers who were in hiding in order to revolt against the CPC and regain control of the city for the GMD.⁵⁴

On the night of February 3, 1946, the conspirators attempted to revolt against the CPC forces and to capture some of the main installations in the city such as, the military headquarters, administrative offices, the telegraph office, the city's airport, etc.⁵⁵ At the time of the incident, some of the CPC forces were out of the city, and the 1st Detachment which, by that point consisted of more than 5,000 troops, was responsible for defending the

⁵⁰ Kim (2012): 234; Zhou (2013): 33.

⁵¹ Kenji (1992): 241-42; Satō (1993): 17.

⁵² Lü (2013): 285.

⁵³ Cui (1997): 50.

⁵⁴ Cui (1997): 49; Kenji (1992): 246; Lü (2006): 163-64.

⁵⁵ Cui (1997): 50; Matsubara (2003): 190.

city.⁵⁶ The 1st Detachment and other CPC forces managed to suppress the revolt within a few hours, however, Japanese accounts of the incident emphasize the Korean units' cruelty toward and reprisals against the civilian and military population, which included mass murders of soldiers and civilians, and harassment of Japanese women, not only at the time of the incident but on the following days as well.⁵⁷ This went against the CPC's own position for three main reasons. First, a short time after the revolt was suppressed, the CPC issued an order to stop the counter measures against the conspirators,⁵⁸ therefore, if the Korean units did continue to make reprisals against the Japanese population, then it would have contradicted the CPC's orders. Second, the CPC's stance toward Japanese soldiers and civilians was clear from the conclusion of the war against Japan; that is, to incorporate skilled military men and at the same time, to make use of medical and technical personnel for its own sake.⁵⁹ Third, while suppressing

⁵⁶ Cui (1997): 51; Lü (2013): 285.

⁵⁷ Note that Chinese and Japanese sources are not in agreement with regard to the Communist forces' attitude toward the Japanese soldiers and civilians in Tonghua during and after the incident. Chinese sources, in general, describe the suppression of the revolt as successful, without mentioning other consequences following the revolt. In his book *Tonghua "er-san" shijian* (The "2-3" Tonghua Incident), Lü Minghui mentions that the Korean soldiers were particularly furious toward the Japanese rebels, because their nation suffered from harsh treatment and suppression by the Japanese Empire. In addition, several Japanese sources emphasize the Korean soldiers' role in attacking and harassing Japanese soldiers and civilians. See: Lü (2006): 1-5, 242-44; Matsubara, (2003): 195-98.

⁵⁸ Lü (2006): 244.

⁵⁹ On many occasions, the CPC invested great efforts in order to make the defeated Japanese soldiers turn their allegiance and assist the CPC. The CPC made use of Japanese Communists who were in Yan'an during the war against Japan, among them Nosaka Sanzō (野坂参三, 1892-93; aka Okano Susumu) was the most prominent, and for that matter, when the war with Japan was over as well. For more on that issue, see: Etter and Gillin (1983): 497-518, and Kenji (1992): 240-41. In his memoir, for instance, PLA general Wu Xiuquan mentions how the CPC made use of Japanese air personnel during the Civil War in order to develop its air force; see: Wu (2009): 147-48. Similarly, the GMD gathered information about some of the Japanese units that were left in China; a particular unit that had caught the GMD's attention was an aviation unit comprised of about 1,000 Japanese personnel in Tonghua, in March 1946. See: Junwuju, *Guoshiguan*, 002-090300-00158-174 (Mar. 4, 1946). Moreover, in their confessions, Japanese prisoners of war caught by the NRA related that they had served the Communist forces in several roles, such as medical personnel, stretcher bearers, logistics personnel, drivers, and other roles. See: Waijiaobu,

the revolt was essential for guaranteeing CPC control of Tonghua, unnecessary bloodshed and massacre of soldiers and civilians in the streets of Tonghua could have undermined the CPC's popularity among the people, and also among the Japanese themselves.⁶⁰ Hence, the KVA's conduct of the incident was not beneficial to the CPC cause, and the CPC had to figure out how to prevent such misconduct. The KVA's handling of the attempted revolt may have been a consequence of incorporating Korean troops from the outside, new conscripts who were not familiar with the CPC's agendas and guidelines, but it also reflected some of the Koreans' desire for revenge against the Japanese.

With the Civil War in Northeast China at full scale in spring 1946, the problems and tensions between the KVA and the CPC became more severe. Between March and May 1946, the Soviet Army was completing its final withdrawal from the region. This allowed Chiang Kai-shek and his commander of the NRA forces in the Northeast—Du Yuming (杜聿明, 1904-81)—to make further advances in the region and to put pressure on the Communist forces. By the end of May, the NRA succeeded in capturing the two central cities of Jilin province—Changchun and Jilin, and the smaller but strategic city of Siping.⁶¹ Consequently, the Communist forces in the Northeast—known at this time as the Northeast Democratic Allied Army (NDAA), which included the Korean Detachments as well, were split into two main forces: the bulk of the NDAA was located in Harbin and in North Manchuria, while a smaller force—consisting of the Third and Fourth Columns—was situated in South Manchuria and along the border with Korea.⁶²

At that point, however, George Marshall (1880-1959)—the US mediator for the Civil War between the GMD and the CPC, forced a cease-fire,

Guoshiguan, 020-022000-0030 (Mar. 1, 1946-Aug. 20, 1947).

⁶⁰ The CPC made great efforts during the Civil War—both in terms of propaganda and also of social policies—in order to establish a positive image and to win the common people's support, which was one of its key advantages over the GMD. See: Lary (2015): 50-55; Pepper (1999): 201-12.

⁶¹ Tanner (2013): 135-64; Wang and He (2005): 409-10.

⁶² Tanner (2015): 39-46.

which was eventually extended until October 1946.⁶³ After the cease-fire was lifted, the NRA sought to take advantage of the NDAA units' division, and to defeat those units that were situated in South Manchuria. According to Du Yuming's own reports, during this time the NRA forces in South Manchuria fought fiercely against the 1st Korean Detachment which, by this stage, was known as the "Li Hong-gwang Detachment" (LHD, 李紅光支隊) of the NDAA.⁶⁴ Reportedly, on several occasions, the NRA forces succeeded in inflicting heavy casualties on the Li Hong-gwang Detachment and other Korean units that were operating in the region, forcing them to abandon their positions and flee toward the borders. By late November, the LHD and other NDAA units evacuated Tonghua and fled to Ji'an on the border with Korea, in light of the impending NRA offensives.⁶⁵

Following these successes, the NRA units in South Manchuria launched an offensive campaign from January to March 1947 against the last main stronghold of the NDAA in South Manchuria—Linjiang. Although the NDAA was finally able to thwart the NRA's offensives through a combination of attacks from North Manchuria, throughout this campaign the NDAA units in the South suffered heavy casualties and difficulties, and it seems that the LHD and other Korean units became more and more embittered. Around this time, the GMD gathered intelligence information which indicated that the Korean forces within the NDAA were planning to leave for North Korea.

While CPC generals' and commanders' memoirs barely refer to the

⁶³ Ibid.: 39-40.

⁶⁴ The name "Li Hong-gwang" 李紅光 derives from a Korean guerrilla warrior in Northeast China, who was a commander in the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army (東北人民革命軍) and fought against the Japanese Army. Li Hong-gwang died in battle in 1935. I have chosen to differ from previous studies that transliterate the name as "Yi Hong-gwang" because the surname is pronounced as "Yi" in South Korea, unlike in North Korea and China where it is pronounced as "Li"; since both the person and the unit were operating in China, I refer to them as "Li." See: Jin, (1997): 2-3.

⁶⁵ Du Yuming, *Guoshiguan*, 002-090300-00146-109 (Oct. 31, 1946); Du Yuming, *Guoshiguan*, 002-090300-00147-028 (Nov. 27, 1946).

Korean forces affiliated to their armies, the GMD general Du Yuming had mentioned repeatedly skirmishes with various Korean communist units throughout his mission as commander of the NRA in Northeast China, as mentioned above. These and other reports reveal that the year 1947 was a very arduous and painful year for the KVA. In addition to their previous resentment and mixed feelings toward their Chinese comrades, and the fact that they were fighting another war not in their homeland while comprising a small part within the NDAA, the Korean units now suffered a series of defeats and heavy casualties by the hands of the NRA. According to Ye Xiufeng's (葉秀峰, 1900-90) report, feelings of hatred and probably of mistrust too marked the relationship between the Korean and Chinese Communists during this period, as the former felt they were purposely utilized by the latter to bear the burden of assuming more perilous tasks in fights in an unequal manner and to suffer from other forms of unequal mistreatment, such as inadequate weapons and clothes.⁶⁶

Another matter that implies the strains in the relations at that time, rises from an analytical document that had investigated the CPC relations with the Korean Communists issued by the ROC Ministry of National Defense. The document reveals several policies the CPC was willing to adopt in order alleviate the tensions with its Korean party members. According to one of its articles under the name “national equality,” the CPC was not only considering to grant the Koreans in China a unique status—but more importantly to the case of the KVA and the Korean Communists—to promote young Korean Communists in the military and party apparatuses, and to appoint more of them to positions of deputies. The same specific article clarifies that the CPC will do its utmost to end disagreements between the Chinese and the Koreans, and remove misunderstandings. In other words, it is clear that the Chinese and Korean Communists still suffered from thorny relations to that point, and it was highly probable that following the reorganizations of the Korean units and official abolition of the KVA in 1946, the Korean Communists resented their downgrading by their Chi-

⁶⁶ Ye Xiufeng, *Guoshiguan*, 002-080200-00322-065 (Nov. 11, 1947).

nese comrades.⁶⁷

The harsh situation of the Korean units was not the only reason for resentment and apparent plans to leave for North Korea. It should be noted that at that time, the CPC and North Korea entered into a long negotiation concerning repatriation of the Korean forces; however, it is not clear which factor was more dominant—the North Korean regime’s will, or the Korean forces’ own desire to leave the theater of war.⁶⁸ Nonetheless, there is another important factor that should be taken into account, the differences between the GMD and the CPC in their stance toward the Korean question. When the War of Resistance Against Japan ended, the CPC sought to use the Korean forces for their own benefit, both by gaining their support in the Civil War, and by establishing close relations with the developing regime in North Korea. Unlike the CPC, the GMD sought to repatriate the Koreans to their homeland.⁶⁹ The GMD was concerned about the prospect of Korean support being directed to the CPC in the Civil War and therefore, it was working to undermine the Korean units’ morale, with the hope of agitating them against the CPC or making them leave China. For that purpose, Du Yuming operated several special organizations composed of Korean agents that were sent to the areas under CPC control in order to infiltrate the Korean units. There, they undermined their morale and agitated against

⁶⁷ Guofangbu, (May 1947); Han fei yu Han gong guanxi jiantao. Special record 16/24.17. 中國黨文化傳播委員會黨史館.

⁶⁸ Baomiju, *Guoshiguan*, 002-020400-00034-114 (Apr. 22, 1947).

⁶⁹ The GMD’s post-WWII policy toward the Koreans who lived in China, and particularly toward those who lived in Northeast China, was in some aspects unsympathetic. While the ROC government made efforts and encouraged many of the Koreans in China to return to their country, there were some instances when this policy was followed by confiscation of property from the Korean population, especially in the Northeast. Consequently, ethnic conflicts between Koreans and Chinese also appeared in the post-WWII period. This attitude toward the Korean population in China by the ROC government might have been aroused by at least two main reasons. First, it is reasonable that following the shift of the core Korean revolutionaries in China to the side of the CPC by 1941, the Koreans fell out of favor with Chiang Kai-shek. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek’s attitude toward populations under Japanese occupation, and particularly those who lived in Northeast China, was distrustful. Cathcart (2012): 25-27; Jin Zongyue, *Dangshiguan* Special record 16/26.14 (Jan. 21, 1947); Kim, “The Chinese Civil War and the Ethno-genesis of the Korean Minority in Northeast China” (2014): 124-29; Pepper (1990): 175; Yeom (2003): 124-29.

the CPC. On one occasion, for instance, Du's agent succeeded in causing a small unit of the LHD, of about 350 men, to revolt against the CPC and to surrender to the GMD.⁷⁰

This period was a catastrophe for the CPC, due to the many setbacks and losses it had suffered not only in Northeast China, but also in the north, as the Communist capital—Yan'an, was captured by the NRA on March 19, 1947.⁷¹ It is noteworthy to disclose another incident that strained the relations between the CPC and its subordinate Korean units, which was reported to the GMD by one of Du Yuming's agents, who was appointed as Lee Ch'ön-u's (李天佑 years unknown) deputy.⁷² Lee Ch'ön-u, a Korean cadre, allegedly held several key roles in Harbin, including serving as Harbin's mayor, commander of Harbin's garrison unit, and commander of the Songjiang Military District (松江軍區). The episode can be referred to as the "Lee Brothers Incident."⁷³

This time the tension arose in North Manchuria—in Harbin, and not the South, when the commander of the NDAA—Lin Biao (林彪, 1907-71)—convened the senior cadres for an important meeting on March 28, 1947. At the meeting, the general situation of the Communists was surveyed, and in light of the serious setbacks and losses, it seems that the atmosphere of the meeting was despondent. Lin Biao contended that in spite of the predicament, the Communist forces must embrace an offensive stance. According to the report, Lee Ch'ön-u voiced his objection to Lin Biao's stance. Lee first complained that other cadres in the meeting could

⁷⁰ Du Yuming, *Guoshiguan*, 002-020400-00015-006 (Feb. 13, 1947); Du Yuming, *Guoshiguan*, 002-080200-00541-039 (Apr. 21, 1947); Du Yuming, *Guoshiguan*, 002-090300-00164-049 (Apr. 22, 1947).

⁷¹ Lew (2009): 62-77; Westad (2003): 148-55.

⁷² Not to be confused with a PLA senior commander at that time with the same name, Li Tianyou (李天佑, 1914-70).

⁷³ The GMD's intelligence reports claim that Lee Ch'ön-u held several prominent roles at the same time, however, this is difficult, if not almost impossible, to confirm. On the one hand, it seems suspicious or unlikely that one person simultaneously held several such prominent political and military roles. On the other hand, because of his part in the incident, there are no references to Lee Ch'ön-u in Chinese sources and therefore, there are no details about him at all.

not express their opinions regarding the current situation of the CPC; Lee continued and was resentful, saying that it was hopeless to count on Soviet aid, and that the pressure in the Northeast coming from the NRA was too great to thwart. Finally, he pointed out that following Yan'an's fall, the CPC might not have a chance to win and, in contrast to Lin Biao's own stance, said that the CPC must develop a new plan, or surrender. Subsequently, Lin Biao, who did not reply to any of Lee's points, charged him with serious accusations such as having the "mind of a reactionary" (*fandong zhi xin*), and added that each time Lee launched an attack on the enemy, he had failed. Therefore, Lin concluded and said that he must be punished in accordance with the law. Suddenly, Lee's twin brother who was also attending the meeting, and who apparently could not bear the humiliation his brother has just gone through, pulled out a gun and twice shot at Lin Biao's lower abdomen. Lin Biao's bodyguards executed him on the spot while Lee Ch'ön-u was taken away and was shot dead later on. Lin's bodyguards carried him to a hospital in the city's south, however, he could not receive adequate treatment there, and was rushed to the Jewish hospital of Harbin, where a foreign doctor (whose surname—"Golubev" 勾婁貝夫—suggests he was a Russian Jew) performed surgery.⁷⁴

Nonetheless, the incident was not over with the execution of the Lee brothers, nor with the medical treatment of Lin Biao. According to the reports, not only did the Communists in Harbin not report the incident, but in order to keep it quiet, they hid and buried the two brothers' bodies. It seems that the Chinese Communists were concerned about the Korean reaction to the incident, concerns that turned out to be correct once the Korean units in Harbin found out about the incident. According to one of the reports, after discovering the incident, the Korean units in Harbin considered reprisals against their Chinese comrades, but eventually sought the Soviet Army's mediation, which still had some sort of presence in the city.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Du Yuming, *Guoshiguan*, 002-080200-00541-039 (Apr. 21, 1947); Du Yuming, *Guoshiguan*, 002-090300-00164-049 (Apr. 22, 1947); Du Yuming, *Guoshiguan*, 002-090300-00166-250 (Jul. 2, 1947).

⁷⁵ Du Yuming, *Guoshiguan*, 002-090300-00166-250 (Jul. 2, 1947).

While other tensions and differences between the CPC and the Korean units might have arisen following this incident, the CPC was working not only on a strategy to reverse the situation in the theater of war, but also on securing unity within its military apparatus and Korean support for the war effort. Only by about the second half of 1947 and early 1948, did the CPC appear to be succeeding in achieving these aims.

Restoring the Status Quo Ante: Measures Taken by the CPC

The tensions and incidents in which the Korean units were involved definitely caught the attention of the CPC, and its political organ in the region – the Northeast Bureau. By 1947, the grave situation and development of the Civil War did not allow the CPC to brook disobedience, resentment, lack of discipline and in general, tensions that arose within its military and political organs. Not only could such tensions and incidents harm the CPC’s cause in the military arena, but could also harm its relations with North Korea – an important partner that greatly supported the CPC in the Northeast.⁷⁶ Neither could the CPC neglect the potential aid the local Korean population in the Northeast, which in 1947 amounted to approximately two million, could provide.⁷⁷ For these crucial reasons, the CPC sought to guarantee unity in its military, eliminate signs of resentment, and have its forces concentrate on the objectives and guidelines, as directed by the Party.

However, the CPC had to operate cautiously, without triggering further tension with respect to inter-ethnic relations between themselves and

⁷⁶ Lü Minghui discussed mainly the logistical support of North Korea to the CPC during the Civil War in Northeast China in his book, *Chaoxian zhiyuan Zhongguo Dongbei Jiefang zhanzheng jishi* (Record of the Korean Assistance in the War of Liberation of China’s Northeast). See: Lü, 2013. I have discussed North Korea’s military role and contribution to the Chinese Communists in the Civil War in the Northeast Theater in my article “The Role of North Korea in China’s Civil War: The Soviet-led North Korean Assistance to the CPC in the Northeast Theater, 1946-1948,” *Journal of Chinese Military History* 9, no. 1 (March 2020).

⁷⁷ Zheng Jiemin, *Guoshiguan*, 008-010702-00044-004 (Oct. 9, 1947).

the Korean comrades, or other tension that may have led to counterproductive results. As far as the sources can tell, there were no signs of purges or other harsh measures against recalcitrant Korean comrades. Just a decade earlier, Northeast China saw one of the most tense events in Sino-Korean relations, known as the “Minsaengdan Incident” (民生團事件, *Minsaengdan sagŏn*). From October 1932 to February 1936, the CPC’s Manchurian Provincial Committee carried out mass purges against its own Korean comrades in East Manchuria, due to fears of Koreans infiltrating from the former pro-Japanese Minsaengdan Movement, which maintained relations with Japan and Manchukuo, and generally had national or autonomous aspirations in the Jiandao/Gando region (today called Yanbian/Yŏnbyŏn). However, when the purges were over, the CPC realized that its reaction had been extreme, resulting in hundreds of purged Korean comrades, and a considerable decline in the number of the Korean members.⁷⁸ This incident constituted a negative crossroads in the relations between the Chinese and Korean Communists, and the CPC, which learned lessons from it and did not repeat such measures.⁷⁹

Instead, the CPC adopted several other “soft” measures in order to achieve its goals with reference to the Korean units. There are several indications that from early 1946 to mid-1947 the CPC was working on gradually tightening its control over the Korean units. One of the early measures taken by the CPC, which apparently took place from time to time, though consistently, throughout the Civil War, was the reorganization of the Korean units. While reorganizations in the NDAA also took place due to in-

⁷⁸ Lee and Scalapino (1972): 167-69; Park (2005): 201-07.

⁷⁹ It should be noted, however, that as Kim Sang Won has pointed out in his article, North Korean sources claim that in 1947 the CPC launched a Rectification Movement which also led to the dismissal of Korean cadres from the Party’s organs in the Northeast. North Korean sources claim that it consequently caused more tension between the Chinese and Korean Communists and that following their dismissal, many Korean cadres wanted to return to Korea. However, such claims of rectification and dismissal of Korean cadres at this time lack evidence in Chinese and Western sources. See: Kim, “The Chinese Civil War and Sino-North Korean Relations, 1945-1950” (2014): 105. The book by the North Korean authors Kil and Li, translated to Chinese and Japanese under different names (Chinese: 金日成与中国东北解放战争; Japanese: 中国国共内戦と朝鮮人部隊の活躍), mentions it as well. See: Kil and Li (2015): 158-60.

creases (or decreases) in the number of the troops in the units and for other reasons, the case of the Korean units seemed to be different from the start. First, following the Tonghua Incident, on February 10, 1946, the CPC's Northeast Bureau decided to rename the KVA's 1st Detachment as the "Li Hong-gwang Detachment." However, another important but gradual change occurred: the Li Hong-gwang Detachment was not part of the KVA anymore, but was under the direct command of the NDAA.⁸⁰ This rather seems as a tactic of *divide et impera*, securing the CPC's grip over the bulk of the Korean units. While the KVA itself was under NDAA command, this step was important as part of the CPC's gradual control over the Korean units.⁸¹ Later, on March 25, 1946, the CPC made another important step when its Northeast Bureau issued a document called "On the Plan for Temporary Organization of the Korean Volunteer Army" (*guanyu Chaoxian yiyong jun zan bian fangan*) which, in fact, dismissed the KVA.⁸² From that point on, the Korean comrades were all under the direct command of the NDAA, and no unifying Korean organization such as the KVA existed for the different Korean units or acted as an intermediary between the NDAA and the Korean units. This demonstrates the CPC's determination to guarantee its control and to prevent the Korean units from deviating from the Party's instructions. Nonetheless, it should be noted that even after the abrogation of the KVA, or the reorganization of the LHD in April 1948 into the Northeast Field Army (NFA, *Dongbei yezhan jun*; the successor of the NDAA) or its reorganization into the PLA's 166th Division after the LiaoShen Campaign (September-November 1948), both the GMD and the CPC still referred to them by their former designations.⁸³

Moreover, according to a document issued by the Northeast Bureau,

⁸⁰ Cui (1997): 51.

⁸¹ The CPC wished to cut off this chain of command and bring all the Korean units under direct NDAA command. Therefore, the LHD was removed first from the KVA, and came under the direct command of the NDAA, thereby making the KVA a redundant body. This gradual measure allowed the CPC to eventually dissolve the KVA.

⁸² Shi (1998): 85.

⁸³ Dai Pu, *Guoshiguan*, 008-010702-00037-001 (Nov. 28-Dec. 2, 1957); Lü (2013): 285; Zhou (2013): 32.

it was claimed that about two thousand Korean members of the former KVA—specifically referring to less senior-ranking (company or lower) soldiers and cadres—would leave for Korea. However, it is not clear how many did leave, if any at all. As has been mentioned, just three months beforehand, in December 1945, the Soviet Army refused to allow repatriation of the core force led by Kim Mu-chǒng, permitting only several dozen to enter North Korea. While this was, in all probability, due to the Soviet interest in maintaining the political and military order in North Korea under their own control and a cautious stance not to provoke the American authorities in South Korea, it might have also played in the CPC's favor, which did not wish to see a complete repatriation of its Korean troops at this stage. Instead, what seems to have been the CPC's solution to the problem of resentment or intention to return to Korea, was specific and partial repatriations of some Korean troops,⁸⁴ which did not threaten the entirety of the Korean forces; at the same time, it could alleviate the feelings of resentment and the stress in the rest of the Korean forces. Another means for solving the problem was through making agreements with North Korea which regulated the terms of repatriation of the Korean troops. While return of the troops was in North Korea's interest, the two sides agreed to extend their presence in Northeast China for the sake of assisting the CPC. However, it should be pointed out, allowing Korean soldiers to remain in China and gain experience there was also in North Korea's interest as part of its intention to secure its regime and aspire for unification at a later stage. Thus, from 1947 onwards, the CPC signed several agreements with North Korea concerning the repatriation of the Korean troops, and it succeeded in guaranteeing that most of them would stay until the last phases of the Civil War in the Northeast.⁸⁵ And, as has been shown above, in 1947 the CPC also considered to promote young Koreans in its party and military apparatuses to positions of deputies, thus reestablishing trust be-

⁸⁴ Baomiju, *Guoshiguan*, 002-020400-00034-123 (Aug. 2, 1947); Shen (2003): 189-90.

⁸⁵ Baomiju, *Guoshiguan*, 002-020400-00034-114 (Apr. 22, 1947); Dai Pu, *Guoshiguan*, 008-010702-00037-001 (Nov. 28-Dec. 2, 1957); Lin Cang, *Guoshiguan* 002-080200-00322-064 (Nov. 14, 1947).

tween the two sides and assuaging former tensions.

A very important measure taken by the CPC was indoctrinating and training some of the Korean troops, particularly those with military backgrounds outside the CPC. This was the case for many of the Korean troops who were incorporated into the KVA in late 1945 and early 1946 from the former Japanese and Manchukuo armies, and possibly also the Korean guerillas who went underground during the Japanese occupation of the Northeast and were isolated from the CPC. While the CPC was in need of additional conscripts, preferably with military experience, it had to guarantee their loyalty to the Party, and to reeducate them regarding the Party's principles. Therefore, following their incorporation, the Korean soldiers with some military background were sent to CPC political and military institutions responsible for their indoctrination and training. Some of these troops were later shifted to defense units or to other assignments in the rear.⁸⁶

However, not only these Korean troops with dubious pasts went through this kind of process. In spring 1946, for instance, following its reorganization from the KVA 1st Detachment, the LHD launched a general education and training campaign for the Korean cadres in South Manchuria. During their studies, the Korean cadres familiarized themselves with the Party's political and social principles. Later, in September 1946, a military-political school was established in Fusong (撫松) in South Manchuria, modeled after Yan'an's University of Resistance to Japan.⁸⁷ As a result, all these measures enabled the CPC to ensure the Korean troops' loyalty to the Party, and improved their functioning on the battlefield by the second half of 1947. Thus, when Du Yuming reports on the dispatch of Korean agents to agitate among the Korean Communist troops in spring 1947, he mentions that the Korean cadres were indoctrinated by the CPC, and that his agents encountered difficulties in agitating them, implying that this task be-

⁸⁶ Baomiju, *Guoshiguan*, 002-020400-00034-114 (Apr. 22, 1947); Guofangbu (May 1947); Han fei yu Han gong guanxi jiantao. Special record 16/24.17. 中國民黨文化傳播委員會黨史館.

⁸⁷ Cui (1997): 60-64.

came harder than before.⁸⁸

Conclusion

The relations between the Korean and Chinese Communists were not always stable and harmonious, as was often depicted, but were rather turbulent in their later phase. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Korean revolutionaries affiliated with the CPC maintained close and special relations with their Chinese comrades. Due to their small numbers, and at the same time, the prospect of their political significance, the Korean revolutionaries conducted limited operational tasks. With the conclusion of the war against Japan, the CPC had soon found itself facing a serious challenge with respect to the impending civil war with the GMD. As a result, the KVA was ordered to follow the Eighth Route Army to the Northeast. While some of the members of the KVA hoped to return to their homeland, in effect, the KVA remained in the Northeast and made preparations for the upcoming struggle. However, as has been shown, the changing circumstances with respect to the KVA's geographical location, its internal composition, its aspirations and other differences with the CPC following the conclusion of the war against Japan, along with the subsequent commencement of the civil war, led to tension between the KVA and the CPC.

The KVA went through significant changes following its arrival in Northeast China, which were also due to the new challenges faced by the CPC. By spring 1946, and with the approval of the CPC, the various detachments which by this point comprised the KVA, were allowed to incorporate former Korean troops from the Japanese and Manchukuo armies and at the same time, were encouraged to conscript young Koreans from the local communities in the Northeast. The Korean detachments succeeded in expanding their manpower considerably and rapidly. However, by allowing Koreans with past service in other armies or guerrilla units, and others with no familiarity with the Party's social and political principles,

⁸⁸ Du Yuming, *Guoshiguan*, 002-020400-00015-006 (Feb. 13, 1947).

the detachments suffered from growing lack of discipline and distance from the Party. In addition to the resentments and deteriorating military and political discipline, the NRA's devastating offensives in South Manchuria from late 1946 to early 1947 orchestrated by infiltrations of Korean GMD agents into the NDAA's Korean units, led to a pivotal point in the already sensitive relations between the CPC and its Korean units. Whether as a result of the KVA's gradual alienation from the CPC or because of other reasons, another important factor that had intensified the strains in the relations was the Korean units' alleged mistreatment by their Chinese counterparts.

By early 1947, tensions and several incidents between the CPC and the KVA had occurred, and in light of the CPC's predicament on the battlefronts in North and Northeast China, and the concern that the CPC was losing its control over the KVA, the CPC had to take quick and efficient measures with regard to its Korean force. It also had to revise its treatment toward the KVA and assure it some sense of equality in order to maintain their cooperation. One of the CPC's first approaches to solving the problem was to reorganize the Korean units. This was quickly followed by the dismissal of the KVA as a confederating body, resulting in the NDAA's direct control over the Korean units. This measure, however, was only partly successful: while the CPC guaranteed that the KVA will be closer to NDAA command structure, it had led to resentments by the KVA members such as loss of autonomy and the lack of higher positions in the military and the Party. Second, the CPC had tried to regulate the repatriation of some members of the former KVA. This was successfully achieved as a result of agreements and cooperation with North Korea. Third, the CPC promoted the political indoctrination and training of the Korean units, particularly those that came with previous military experience, but generally for all those not familiar with the Party's doctrines. Some were sent to serve in defense units or under other designations in the rear. And last but not least, it had revised its former stance toward Korean members in its military and Party apparatuses and allowed their promotions. Therefore, unlike what was emphasized in previous studies, the KVA was not merely a subordinate – as if almost passive – unit within the Chinese Communist forces, but

rather, it time and time again resented its lower status and aspired to acquire a more equal status like the rest of the Chinese units. Altogether, these measures succeeded in preventing the KVA from deteriorating into a state of chaos, and at the same time, ensured the CPC's control over the Korean units until the conclusion of the Civil War and their final repatriation by 1950.

The story of the KVA is one of great challenge for the CPC, which required that it act cautiously with awareness of international and ethnical sensitivity and at the same time, so as to guarantee its success in the Civil War. Yet, it is also a story of two-fold achievements: the first is the CPC's victory in having won the Korean revolutionaries' support during the war against Japan, while the GMD seemed not only to have lost this match, but to have lost a potentially supportive group in the Northeast during the Civil War; the second achievement was the CPC's success in overcoming the problems and challenges that arose during the Civil War in the Northeast, without harming its relations with the Korean actors in the region: the KVA, the Korean population in Northeast China, and North Korea.

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Articles (Translated)

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Trip to the Jianzhou)

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Recovery of the Travel Route between Joseon Korea and the Jianzhou Jurchens during the Imjin War: Drawing on the *Geonju gijeong dogi* 建州紀程圖記 (Illustrated Account of a Trip to the Jianzhou)*

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Introduction

The settlements of the Jianzhou Jurchens had centered around Xinbin County 新賓縣 and Huanren County 桓仁縣 of Liaoning Province 遼寧省 as well as Ji'an City 集安市 of Jilin Province 吉林省. Their geographical locations and strength of power resulted in more frequent contacts, either friendly or hostile, with Joseon Korea and Ming China than any other Jurchen forces. Both Joseon and the Ming took much interest in collecting information and intelligence about them, leaving substantial accounts on them in the *Joseon wangjo sillok* 朝鮮王朝實錄 (Veritable records of the Joseon dynasty), the *Ming shilu* 明實錄 (Veritable records of the Ming dynasty), the *Muan dongyi ji* 撫安東夷記 (Accounts on the pacification of

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** Chinese and Korean place names are Romanized following *Pinyin* and Korean government system respectively. Exceptionally, however, the names of Koguryo's historical remains in China's territory are pronounced into Korean and Romanized accordingly, yet are indicated by prefixing the possessive, 'Koguryo's': for example, Koguryo's Onyeo Mountain Fortress 五女山城. The Jurchen or Chinese place names written in literary Chinese by Sin Chung'il are also rendered into Korean and Romanized accordingly, yet are indicated by single quotation marks: for example, the tributary stream of Gayaji 加也之川.

eastern barbarians), and the *Imun* 吏文 (Diplomatic correspondence between the Ming and Goryeo or Joseon). Drawing on these sources, a great number of researches have been published regarding the Jianzhou Jurchens' political institutions, social structure, and customs. Yet, their settlement areas and transport/communication routes with Joseon and the Ming have received little scholarly attention.

It is well known that Nurhaci 奴爾哈赤 (1559-1626) was based in Fe Ala 佛阿拉 in present-day Xinbin County of Liaoning Province when he began subjugating neighboring Jurchen tribes. The headmen of the Jianzhou confederacies prior to Nurhaci had been settled not only in the Fe Ala region but also in the area of Koguryo's Onyeosanseong Mountain Fortress 五女山城 in present-day Huanren County, as well as in the border area of Hoeryeong 會寧 as far as Hamgyeong Province of Joseon. In other words, the headquarters of the Jianzhou Jurchens could not but vary according to their own necessities or external pressure from Joseon and the Ming.

Given the frequent shifts of the power base of the Jianzhou Jurchens, geographical information regarding their settlements collected by Joseon and the Ming differed substantially depending on the period. As a result, the later records, largely based on earlier information without updating them in a firsthand manner, had given confusion to the policy makers of Joseon and the Ming. Even, present researchers also have encountered difficulty in accurately finding the settlements of the Jianzhou Jurchens due to the complex nature of such historical records. Nevertheless, at least one source provides primary information about the transport/communication routes between Joseon and the Jianzhou Jurchens. That is the *Geonju gijeong dogi* (hereafter, the *Dogi*) 建州紀程圖記 (Illustrated Account of a Trip to the Jianzhou), written by Sin Chung'il 申忠一 (1554-1622), who visited Fe Ala in person from the twelfth month of 1595 to the first month of 1596 during the Imjin War (1592-98). Since the timing of Sin's visit coincided with the rise of Nurhaci's power, this eyewitness account of the Jurchen strongman and his power base has absorbed much scholarly interest.

Shortly after the *Dogi* came to light in 1936, the first study of the text was published by Inaba Iwakichi in 1937 and was followed by Yi Inyeong's study in 1939. These studies are of a preliminary nature, briefly

outlining the context and the contents of the *Dogi* as well as its author's official career and family background, and roughly tracing his route from the Manpo 滿浦 garrison on the Yalu River to Fe Ala. In addition, they sought to find out formative elements of the Eight Banners (*Bagi* 八旗) by examining the layout and positions of buildings/households as well as the personnel of the Fe Ala Fortress.¹

Inaba Iwakichi, when he arrived in Xinjing 新京 (present-day Changchun 長春) as a professor at Kenkoku University 建國大學 in 1937, conducted careful field research of the Xingjing 興京 area.² Remarkably, he conducted an archaeological excavation and a survey of some building remains. Further, he attempted to simulate Sin Chung'il's travel routes on a modern map. Though some sections of the routes in his simulation call for question, the mapping of them was a pioneering effort. It has been through the efforts of Japanese scholars that the *Dogi* has been regarded as an indispensable source for understanding the rise of Nurhaci. Drawing on the information regarding the size of the Jurchen villages provided by the *Dogi*, Hatada Takashi estimated the entire size of the households and the population in the context of the formative years of the Eight Banners system.³ Abe Takeo illustrated economic aspects of the Eight Banners in the formative years by analyzing farmland tenure patterns and corvée burdens.⁴ Ejima Hisao employed a socioeconomic perspective by utilizing the *Dogi*.⁵ In par-

¹ Inaba Iwakichi, "Shin Chūichi shokei kyū bi zuki" 申忠一書啓及び圖記 [Sin Chung'il's report and illustrated account], *Seikyū gakusō* 29 (1937); Yi Inyeong, "Sin Chung'il eui *Geonju gijeong dogi* e dachaya" 申忠一の建州紀程圖記에 대하여 [Study on Sin Chung'il's *Geonju gijeong dogi* (Illustrated account of a trip to Jianzhou)], *Jindan hakbo* 10 (1939); Yi Inyeong, *Hanguk Manju Gwangyesa eui yeon'gu* 韓國滿洲關係史의 研究 [Study on relations between Korea and Manchu] (Seoul: Eulyu Munhwasa, 1954).

² Inaba Iwakichi, *Kōkyō Nidōkashi Kyūrōjō* 興京二道河子舊老城 [Fe Ala Fortress at Erdaohezi in Xingjing] (Xingjing: Kenkoku Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1939).

³ Hatada Takashi, "Manshū hakki no seiritsu katei ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu" 滿洲八旗の成立過程に関する一考察 [A Study on the Formative Process of the Manchu Eight Banners], *Tōa Ronsō* 2 (1940).

⁴ Abe Takeo, "Hakki niru no kenkyū" 八旗ニルの研究 [Study on the Eight Banners], in *Shōtaishi no kenkyū* 清代史の研究 [Study on the Qing Era] (Sōbunsha, 1971).

⁵ Ejima Hisao, "Minmatsu Manshū ni okeru gaishan no sho keitai" 明末滿洲におけるガシヤ

ticular, he classified the *gašan* (Jurchen settlements) into four categories and illustrated their similarities and differences according to the *Dogi*. Mitamura Taisuke attempted to delineate the jurisdiction under the control of Nurhaci, based on the *Dogi*.⁶ His study is worthy of note because it used the Manchu language to identify place names and pinpointed their modern locations.⁷

Meanwhile, long after Yi Inyeong's study, Korean scholars began to use the *Dogi* from the late 1990s. Yu Jiwon, exploring the capital cities of the Later Jin period, used the *Dogi* to examine the multifold aspects of the Fe Ala Fortress, such as its landscape, structure, housing complexes of Nurhaci and Šurgaci (his younger brother) 舒爾哈齊, hierarchies, and major features.⁸ Kim Seonmin's nuanced analysis of the triangular relations among Joseon, the Later Jin, and the Ming benefited from using the *Dogi*.⁹ Chinese scholars also have shown interest in the *Dogi* since the 2000s. Liu Guangming examined Sin Chung'il's perception of the Jurchen people.¹⁰

ンの諸形態 [Forms of Jurchen Settlements in Manchuria in the Late Ming], *Shien* 32 (1944); Ejima Hisao, "Ejiche to tokuso—Shinchō bokkōki no sakai keizaishi teki gaiguan" 勅書 (エジエへ)と屯莊 (トクソ)—清朝勃興期の社會經濟史的概観 [Imperial Patents and Settlement Farms: Survey of Socioeconomic History of the Rising Era of the Qing Dynasty], *Sei Nihon Shigaku* 2 (1952).

⁶ Mitamura Taisuke, "Chōsen soku shiryō yori mita Shinsho no kyōiki" 朝鮮側史料より見た清初の疆域 [Territory of the early Qing Seen through Joseon's Historical Materials] *Chōsen gakuho* 21/22 (1961); "Shinsho no kyōiki shoku: Shin Chūichi no Kenshū kitei zuki o chūshin toshite" 清初の疆域續—申忠一の建州紀程圖記を中心として [Territory of the Early Qing (sequel): Focusing on Shin Chūichi's *Geonju gijeong dogi* (Illustrated account of a trip to Jianzhou)] *Chōsen gakuho* 36 (1965).

⁷ Yet, almost exclusive reliance on Manchu language for identifying place names led occasionally to arbitrary assumptions.

⁸ Yu Jiwon, "Nureuhachi hunggi sigi doseong e natanan Man/Han munhwa eui sangho jakyong" 누르하치 興起時期 都城에 나타난 滿·漢文化의 相互作用 [Interactions of Manchu and Han Chinese Culture Manifested in the Jurchen Capital Cities during the Period of Nurhaci's Rise to Power], *Myeong Cheong sa yeon'gu* 22 (2004).

⁹ Kim Seonmin, "Myeongmal Yodong pyeongyeong jiyek eul dulleossan Myeong/Hu Keum/ Joseon eui sanggak gwan'gye" 명말 요동 변경지역을 둘러싼 명-후금-조선의 삼각관계 [Triangular Relations between Ming, Later Jin, and Joseon Surrounding the Late Ming Liaodong Borderland], *Jungguksa Yeon'gu* 55 (2008).

¹⁰ Liu Guangming, "Jianzhou jicheng tuji zhongdi Zuzhenren xingxiang" 建州紀程圖記中的女真人形象 [Conditions of Jurchen People in the *Geonju gijeong dogi* (Illustrated account of a trip to the Jianzhou)], *Dongjiang xuekan* 2004-04 (2004).

Diao Shuren gave significance to Sin Chung'il's mission in reopening the diplomatic relations, cut off for some time, between Joseon and the Jianzhou Jurchens.¹¹

Last, Pamela Kyle Crossley has taken a new approach to Qing history by regarding Sin Chung'il as an astute outside observer whose account in the *Dogi* witnessed formative elements of the Eight Banner system. Crossley depicted vividly power relations between Nurhaci and Šurgaci by examining their housing structure and arrangement as well as Sin's attitude towards them, as described in the *Dogi*.¹²

The previous studies have shown three fields of academic interest. First, they have focused on the *Dogi*'s value as a primary source. Second, they have paid attention to structural dimensions of the Fe Ala Fortress, such as its layout and arrangement of buildings and installations, especially comparing the housing complexes of Nurhaci and Šurgaci. Third, they have tried to determine the formative elements of the Eight Banners by exploring the social structure and the customs of the Jianzhou Jurchens, described in the *Dogi*.

These studies have mainly made use of the *Dogi* whose diagram captures the housing complexes of Nurhaci and Šurgaci. Yet, few scholars have been interested in the travel routes of Sin Chung'il's mission except for Inaba Iwakichi and Mitamura Taisuke whose mapping works contradict each other. Further, Korean scholars to date have not shown serious interest in the routes, leaving accurate or close mapping of the travel/communication routes between Joseon and the Jianzhou unavailable.

The travel route Sin Chung'il's party took to reach Fe Ala can be divided into two portions in modern simulation. He made the journey first from Manpo 滿浦 along the Xinkai Stream 新開河 up to its junction with the Hun River 渾江; thence, he traced upstream the Fu'er River 富爾江 and

¹¹ Diao Shuren, "Zhaoxian shichen suojian di fengjian shehui—jianlun Houjin jianguo qian yu Zhaoxian di quanxi" 朝鮮使臣所見的 建州社會-兼論 後金建國前 與朝鮮的關係 [Feudal Society Seen by Joseon's Emissary, and the Pre-Later Jin's Relations with Joseon], *Manzu yanjiu* 2011-02 (2011).

¹² Pamela Kyle Crossley, *The Manchus* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002).

followed downstream the Suzihe Stream 蘇子河 to reach eventually Fe Ala. This study takes a place named ‘Naha’ 羅下 in the *Dogi* (present day area of Beidanzixiang 北甸子鄉), where Sin’s party spent the night of the twenty fifth day of the twelfth month of 1595, as the midway point that divides the whole course of the trip into two portions, and attempts to simulate the major place names that appeared in the *Dogi*¹³ to their present-day locations. For this purpose, Google Earth is chiefly utilized because it clearly delineates mountain ridges and systems of rivers and streams. The distance travelled each day is marked in red line on the respective Google Earth map. In addition, Chinese cultural relics gazetteers (*wenwuzhi* 文物志) are also used to associate the major travel points with historical remains. Besides, since recent construction of reservoirs and highways have resulted in topographic changes, a Manchuria map of 1:100,000 scale (hereafter as the Manchuria Map) published in 1935 by the Japanese authorities is referred to in order to see what given regions looked like around that time. And the *baidu* maps (www.map.baidu.com) are consulted to confirm the current place names in Chinese. By so doing, this study aims to have a deeper understanding of the travel/communication routes between Joseon and the Jianzhou Jurchens, as represented by Sin Chung’il’s rare and firsthand travel account, i.e., the *Dogi*. This rather unique approach to Joseon’s foreign relations will help rediscover the country’s northern borderlands.

Route from Manpo 滿浦 to the Hun River 渾江

By marking mountain ridges, rivers, and roads with different colors,¹⁴ writing down place names along the travel routes, and adding descriptive notes worth mentioning, as shown in Sin Chung’il’s Map 1, the *Dogi* pays tribute

¹³ This study mainly utilizes the *Geonju tamjeonggi chuk* 建州探情記軸 [Account on exploring the Jianzhou in scroll] preserved in the Guksa Pyeonchan Wiwonhoe 국사편찬위원회 [National History Compilation Committee], though it seems to be the most latest version of the *Dogi*. The URL (<http://library.history.go.kr/dhrs/dhrsXIFViewer.jsp?system=dlibd&id=SJ0000015573>) was accessed on July 26, 2020.

¹⁴ Sin Chung’il marked mountain by dark color, waterway by blue, and road by red.

to one important purpose of the trip, namely spying on a potential enemy's territories. The place names and the topographical drawings from the *Dogi*, supplemented by the accounts on historical remains, can be used as clues in recovering the travel routes of Sin Chung'il's mission. The main focus here is on the travel route from Manpo 滿浦 on the Yalu River through the Xinkai Stream (Xinkai 新開河) and the Hun River (Hunjiang 渾江) to the mouth of its tributary, or the Fu'er River (Fu'erjiang 富爾江).

Sin's Map 1 indicates Sin's party's travel route of the first day (the twenty-second day of the twelfth month, 1595). When compared with modern maps, the *Dogi* fairly well represents the mountain ridges and the River courses. On the map, Hwangseong 皇城 marked with a walled fortress sign indicates Koguryo's Gungnaeseong 國內城—the earlier walled capital of Koguryo—which is located at present-day Ji'an City (Ji'an shi 集安市). As has been well known, the shape of Gungnaeseong is rectangular,



Sin Chung'il's Map 1. Travel Route of the First Day (the Twenty-second Day of the Twelfth Month) from the Manpo Garrison (Manpojŏn 滿浦鎮) on the *Geonju tamjeonggi chuk* 建州探情記軸 (Account on exploring the Jianzhou in scroll)

and its basic layout runs parallel to the course of the Yalu River (K. Apnokgang 鴨綠江),¹⁵ as correctly depicted in Sin Chung'il's Map 1.

On the *Dogi* are marked the mountain passes of Chayuryeong 車踰嶺 and Ipa 梨坡 that led to other destinations as well as the tributary streams of Gayajicheon 加也之川 and Guranghapcheon 仇郎哈川. On the twenty-second day of the twelfth month of 1595 (the first day of the journey), Sin's party commenced the journey by crossing the Yalu River at Manpo 滿浦, proceeded down along the riverside, and passed Hwangseong 皇城. Then, they crossed the Gayaji Stream 加也之川, at the place named Guranghapdong 仇郎哈洞, turned the direction towards the Guranhap Stream 仇郎哈川, and went up the stream to the place named Japidong 者皮洞 where they spent the night.

According to the current maps, Manpo City 滿浦市 has expanded into two districts, and is now devoid of the garrison fortress referred to as Manpojin 滿浦鎮 in Sin Chung'il's Map 1, from which Sin Chung'il crossed the Yalu River. In order to point to Manpojin in the present city, one may well refer to an earlier map including the location of Manpojin. Fortunately, the Manchuria map of 1:100,000 scale published in 1933 clearly reveals the location of Manpojin, which was still identifiable at that time, as shown in Manchuria Map 1. The Manpojin corresponds to the present Manpo railway station 滿浦驛.

On Sin Chung'il's Map 1, the Emperor's tomb (Hwangje myo 皇帝墓) and Bi 碑 (stele) refer to the Tomb of the Koguryo General (Janggung chong 將軍塚) and the Stele of Koguryo King Gwanggaeto (Gwanggaeto daewang bi 廣開土大王碑) respectively.¹⁶ The mountain pass, referred to as Geosihanggogae 巨柴項古介 on Sin Chung'il's Map 1, was connected to

¹⁵ Yeo Hogyu, *Koguryo seong I—Apnokgang jungsangnyu pyeon* 高句麗城 I—鴨綠江中上流篇 [Walled Fortresses of Koguryo I: Middle and Upper Reaches of the Yalu River] (Seoul: Gukbang gunsa yeonguso, 1998), 54.

¹⁶ Jo Beopjong, "Koguryo Gungnaeseong eui gonggan gwa Gwanggaeto wangneung—Jido wa neungbimun eul jungsim euro" 고구려 국내성의 공간과 광개토왕릉—지도와 능비문을 중심으로 [Inner Space of the Gungnae Fortress of Koguryo: Focusing on the Maps and the Inscriptions of the Stele], in *Gwanggaeto daewang bi eui jaejomyeong* 광개토왕비의 재조명 [Reexamination of the Stele of King Gwanggaeto] (Seoul: Dongbuga yeoksa jaedan, 2013).



Manchuria Map 1. Manpo jin 滿浦鎮 on the Manchuria Map of 1:100,000 Scale

these remains, and today is passed by the G303 highway that links Ji'an 集安 to Tonghua 通化. Following this highway and turning toward the northeast midway leads to the Lin River (Linjiang 臨江). According to the *Dogi*, the Jurchens of the Ipa 梨坡 region took this route to surrender to Joseon, suggesting that the route had been conventionally used by the Jurchen residents of the Tonghua and the Lin River regions.¹⁷

Sin Chung'il did not use this route but crossed the Gayaji Stream 加也之川 and went up the Guranhap Stream 仇郎哈川 from the place named Guranghapdong 仇郎哈洞. There, they crossed the mountain passes of Guranghapryeong 仇郎哈嶺 and Mancharyeong 蔓遮嶺, and went down the Mancha Stream 蔓遮川. To trace the Sin's route, the Gayaji Stream 加也之川 corresponds to present-day Tongguo Stream (Tongguohe 通溝河) which flows right to the west of the Koguryo Gungnaeseong Fortress 國內城 in Ji'an City. As shown in Google Earth 1, the mountain ridges to the west of the Tongguo Stream can be also found to the west of the Gayaji Stream 加

¹⁷ The route had been as old as the ancient Koguryo era, connecting Ji'an and Tonghua even after a thousand years later.

也之川 in Sin Chung'il's Map 1. As is well known, moving up the Tongguo Stream five kilometers leads to the Koguryo Hwando Mountain Fortress 丸都山城.

Instead of going upward to the direction of the Hwando Mountain Fortress, Sin Chung'il went southwestward down the Yalu River to the place named Guranghapdong 仇郎哈洞 (present-day Maxianxiang 麻線鄉), at which point he turned to the north. Given that the place of Guranghapdong 仇郎哈洞 was located east of the junction of the Yalu River and the Guranhap Stream 仇郎哈川, and west of the mountain sides that lay west of the Gayaji Stream 加也之川, it is highly likely that the place of Guranghapdong 仇郎哈洞 corresponds to present-day Maxianxiang 麻線鄉.

The *Dogi* states that Sin's party passed the place named Guranghapdong 仇郎哈洞, and spent the night at the place called Japidong 者皮洞 on the first day (the twenty-second day of the twelfth month). Then, where is the present-day location of Japidong 者皮洞? On Sin Chung'il's Map 1, that place seems to lie in front of the junction of the Guranhap Stream 仇郎哈川 springing from the mountain pass of Mancha 蔓遮嶺 to the Yalu River



Google Earth 1. Travel Route of the First Day (the Twenty-second Day of the Twelfth Month) and Its Main Points (Edited by the Author)

and the stream from the Hwando Mountain Fortress 九都山城. On the basis of this topographical information and with the aid of Google Earth, Japidong 者皮洞 seems to correspond to what is now the Banzaigou 半載溝 area. The area must be a strategic point for the Jianzhou Jurchens, living in the present-day Huanren 桓仁 area, to pass through in their raid against the Joseon garrison Manpojin Fortress 滿浦鎮, using river crafts (*japisŏn* 者皮船) made at the region. Sin Chung'il mentioned that Japidong 者皮洞 where he spent the night of the twenty-second day was located fifty *ri* 里—approximately twenty kilometers¹⁸—away from Manpojin 滿浦鎮. The distance of Sin's calculation is almost equal to that (twenty one kilometers) of Google Earth from Banzaigou to Manpo. In sum, the travel route of the first day (the twenty-second day of the twelfth month) is marked on Google Earth 1.¹⁹

On the twenty third day of the twelfth month (the second day of the journey), Sin's party traveled up present day Maxian Stream (Maxianchuan 麻線川) northward to present-day Dabanha (Dabanchacun 大板岔村), then crossed present-day Xiaoban Pass (Xiaobanling 小板嶺) referred to as the pass of Mancharyeong 蔓遮嶺 by Sin, and went down along the Mancha Stream 蔓遮川, as shown in the left side of Sin Chung'il's Map 1. The stream in point named Manchacheon 蔓遮川 cannot be other than present-day Xinkai Stream (Xinkai 新開河), as Yi Inyeong also mentioned, because no other route can reach the Huanren 桓仁 region. This definition can be corroborated by the topological shapes depicted in the *Dogi* and relevant maps.

However, with respect to the present location of the Mancha Pass 蔓遮嶺 whence Sin's party traced down the Xinkai Stream or the Mancha Stream, Inaba Iwakichi, Yi Inyeong, and Mitamura Taisuke all presume it as present-day Daban Pass (Dabanling 大板嶺) instead of the Xiaoban Pass (Xiaobanling 小板嶺).²⁰ If Sin's party crossed present-day Daban Pass,

¹⁸ The metric distance of Korean ten *ri* 十里 varies, but here that of four kilometers is adopted.

¹⁹ The travel route marked Google Earth 1 does not represent the exact course of Sin's travel but its approximation.

²⁰ Yi Inyeong, *Hanguk Manju gwan'gesa eui yeon'gu* (1954), 263; Inaba Iwakichi, "Shin Chūichi

they most probably should descend to the present-day Erwangouzi 二灣溝子 area to join the course of the Xinkai Stream there. Yet, this route does not correspond to the route Sin's party followed after crossing the Mancha Pass 蔓遮嶺, as depicted in the right encircled part of Sin Chung'il's Map 2 wherein three streams join. After the Mancha Pass, Sin's party traced down the Xinkai Stream or the Mancha Stream, and went through the river basin that was first joined by the Dangsihap Stream 唐時哈川, and then afterward by the Maleulgeo Stream 末乙巨川, according to Sin Chung'il's Map 2. In addition, as pointed out by Gi Gyeongryang, the Dabanling route means a detour of around twenty kilometers.²¹

Moreover, it should be noted that a descriptive note of the *Dogi* states that “[I]n the vicinity of the Mancha Pass 蔓遮嶺 lies a shrine (*chongsa* 叢祠) to which Jurchen passersby never fail to pay respect.” Inaba Iwakichi assumed the shrine to be the monument inscribed with the merit of Guanqiu Jian 毋丘儉.²² This monument, dedicated to the Wei general Guanqiu Jian who had invaded Koguryo in 244 C. E., has been said to be discovered at the Xiaoban Pass (Xiaobanling 小板嶺), as indicated in Google Earth 2. Based on the connectedness of the monument and the Xiaoban Pass, it can be argued that Sin's party also went through the Xiaoban Pass which had been frequented ever since Koguryo in order to go to the Xinkai Stream.

The Mancha Stream 蔓遮川 flows northwestward and is joined by a stream, named the Bueulga Stream 夫乙家川 in the *Dogi*, that runs in the vicinity of present-day Zhongxingcun 中興村. This area is currently submerged under the reservoir of Shanjiazi 三家子 but marked by the first ap-

shokei kyū bi zuki” (1937), 5; Mitamura Taisuke, “Shinsho no kyōiki shoku: Shin Chūichi no Kenshū kitei zuki o chūshin toshite” (1965), 98; Inaba identified the Mancha Stream 蔓遮川 as present-day Weisha Stream 葦沙河 in his article of 1937, but changed it to present-day Xinkai Stream 新開河 without an explanation in his book of 1939. See Inaba Iwakichi, *Kōkyō Nidōkashi Kyūrōjō* (1939), 52.

²¹ Gi Gyeongryang, “4 segi Koguryo ‘Namdo·Bukdo’ eui silche wa geu seonggyeok” 4세기 고구려 ‘南道·北道’의 실체와 그 성격 [Real state of Koguryo’s ‘Southern and Northern roads’ and Their Characteristics], *Han’guk munhwa* 73 (2016), 73.

²² Inaba Iwakichi, *Kōkyō Nidōkashi Kyūrōjō*, 51.




Sin Chung'il's Map 2. Travel Route of the Second Day (the Twenty-third Day of the Twelfth Month)



Google Earth 2. It Shows the Travel Route of the Second Day and Main Points (Edited by the Author)

pearance of two Jurchen households (*hoga ijwa* 胡家二座) in the *Dogi*.




Yeo Hogyu's Map. Present-Day Location of the Mangpa Pass 望波嶺
(Janghang 獐項 in Sin Chung'il's Map)

Advancing northward only one kilometer led to a mountain pass named Janghang 獐項. After crossing the pass, Sin's party followed the stream to a village named Goyeonggu 古營丘 wherein the stream made sharp turns two to three times, corresponding to its course shown in modern maps.

The *Dogi* carries important information about the passage of Janghang and the Goyeonggu village in that “[F]rom Janghang to the village is only six to seven *ri* long, yet the passage is hemmed in by mountains and densely forested.”²³ The passage of Janghang may well correspond to Koguryo's passage (*gwanae* 關隘) of the Mangpa Pass 望波嶺. Its modern descriptions corroborate Sin's description that the valley of the Xinkai Stream 新開河 becomes narrow from this point with steep cliffs on both

²³ The original texts reads: “一自獐項至部落上端幾六七里許 多山阻隘樹木稠密.”



Manchuria Map 2. Janghang 獐項 Area on the Manchuria Map of 1:100,000 Scale

sides as high as sixty meters.²⁴ The Mangpa Pass had been a strategic point located en route from the Hun River through the Xinkai Stream upward finally to Ji'an, the site of Koguryo's early capital.²⁵ The sharply bended course of the stream, as drawn in Sin Chung'il's Map, matches what is drawn in Yeo Hogyu's Map. Therefore, the present-day route along the passage, taken by Sin Chung'il, has been as ancient as Koguryo.

Passing through the narrow passage of Janghang, Sin's party came out into a plain, or what is now Huangweizicun 荒歲子村. On the *Dogi* is drawn a hillock called Goyeonggu 古營丘, a strategic point of defense and transportation. The *Dogi* states that the elderly here remembered the sta-

²⁴ Jilinsheng wenwuzhi biansuan weiyuanhui, *Ji'anxian wenwuzhi* 集安縣文物志 [Cultural Relics Gazetteer of Ji'an County] (Changchun: Jilinsheng wenwuzhi biansuan weiyuanhui, 1983), 76-78.


²⁵ Yeo Hogyu, *Koguryo seong I—Apnokgang jungsangnyu pyeon*, 105-08. Present-day location of the Mangparyeong 望波嶺 passage is quoted from the map in Yeo Hogyu, *Ibid.*, 106.



Sin Chung'il's Map 3. Travel Route of the Third and Fourth Day (the Twenty-fourth Day and the Twenty-fifth Day of the Twelfth Month)

tioning of the Joseon armies some time earlier. Since the Joseon expeditions started from Manpo to attack the present-day Huanren area three times—in 1433 (the fifteenth year of King Sejong), 1437 (the nineteenth year of King Sejong), and 1467 (the thirteenth year of King Sejo)—and most probably stationed on the elevated site of Goyeonggu, the Jurchen residents there could have the memory of the Joseon armies. Sin's party spent the night of the second day (the twenty third day of the twelfth month) at such an important strategic point.

On the twenty fourth day of the twelfth month, (the third day), Sin's party left the hillock called Goyeonggu 古營丘, and moved towards the north. They went past four Jurchen villages of five to fourteen households along the Xinkai Stream, went over the pass of another Janghang 獐項, and reached a village in Mancha where they spent the night. This second Janghang may well correspond to the Duling Pass 度嶺 because the bending of the stream and the direction of mountain ridges, as shown in Sin Chung'il's



Google Earth 3. Travel Route of the Third and Fourth Day (The Twenty-fourth Day and the Twenty-fifth Day of the Twelfth Month) and Its Main Points

Map 3 are identical with the topographical features of the area, as shown in Google Earth 3.

The sizable Mancha village with 120 or so households might be located in present-day Caiyuanzhen 財源鎮. Remarkably, the head of this fairly large village was a female named Chogi 椒箕 (transcribed as ‘초기’ in the Korean alphabet in the *Dogi*, and as ‘초기’ in another edition). Obeying the order from Nurhaci, she held a banquet for Sin Chung’il together with Dongholahu 童好羅厚 and Dongmangjahap 童亡自哈 soon after Sin arrived at Fe Ala on the third day of the first month of 1596.²⁶ Sin Chung’il may have felt a need to write down her name in the Korean alphabet to mark the novelty of the female chieftain.

Meanwhile, Sin Chung’il noted that the Mancha village—the site for the third night—was “one *sik* 息²⁷ and twenty *ri* 里” or fifty *ri* (approximately twenty kilometers) away from a village named Choburak 初部落 (i.e., the hillock of Goyeonggu 古營丘)—the site for the second night. This distance fairly well corresponds to that measured on Google Earth from

²⁶ The original text reads: “初三日 酋胡 童好羅厚童亡自哈女酋椒箕請臣設宴. 奴酋所教云.”

²⁷ One *sik* equals thirty *ri*, hence “one *sik* and twenty *ri*” equals fifty *ri*.

present-day Huangweizicun 荒歲子村 (i.e., Choburak 初部落) to the present-day place of Caiyuanzhen 財源鎮 (i.e., the Mancha village). Inaba Iwakichi, however, identified Choburak 初部落 with the present-day place of Taishangzhen 台上鎮 to the north of present-day Huangweizicun 荒歲子村.²⁸ His identification cannot be supported on the ground that the topographical features of present-day Taishangzhen 台上鎮 do not match well with those of Choburak 初部落, as depicted in the *Dogi*, and the distance between present-day Taishangzhen 台上鎮 and present-day Caiyuanzhen 財源鎮 (i.e., the Mancha village) is thirteen kilometers, much shorter than the distance Sin Chung'il thought he traveled on the third day.²⁹

On the twenty fifth day of the twelfth month (the fourth day), Sin's party moved northwestward from the Mancha village until they reached the junction of present-day Xinkai Stream and present-day Hun River 渾江, then referred to by Sin Chung'il as the Pajeo River 波猪江. Significantly, he noted the location of an earthen fortress to the north of the river junction, calling the area by the name of Wanggya 왕가 in the Korean alphabet. The Wanggya was a Korean transcription of the Manchu pronunciation of Wanggiya, which in turn was transcribed as Wanyan 完顏 in Chinese—the Wanyan tribe 完顏部 which then was incorporated into the Jianzhou Jurchens.

Since the earthen fortress (toseong 土城) was associated with the Wanyan tribe, scholars have been interested in its present location. Two theories have been in disagreement regarding the present-day location of this earthen fortress. Wada Kiyoshi 和田清 put its location at the upstream of the Hun River to the direction of Tonghua 通化, thus further removed from the river junction, wherein Sin Chung'il marked its location. This was because Sin had to put its location near the river conjunction due to the

²⁸ Inaba Iwakichi, “Shin Chūichi kōteizu yo gendai jitsusokuzu taishō” 申忠一行程圖 與 現代實測圖 對照 [Sin Chung'il's Travel map, Compared with the Modern map Based on Actual Measuring], in *Kōkyō Nidōkashi Kyūrōjō* 興京二道河子舊老城 [Fe Ala Fortress at Erdaohezi in Xingjing] (Xingjing: Kenkoku daigaku shuppanbu, 1939).

²⁹ Mitamura also located 'Choburak' 初部落 to present-day Huangweizicun 荒歲子村 because of distance difference. See Mitamura Taisuke, “Shinsho no kyōiki shoku: Shin Chūichi no Kenshū kitei zuki o chūshin toshite,” 102-03.

limited space on the north margin of the scroll.³⁰ Inaba Iwakichi, however, charted its location near the remains of an old fortress in present-day Bawangcun 霸王村, thus near the river junction as Sin did in his map, citing its actual representation of topographical features.³¹ Mitamura Taisuke at first accepted Wada's theory³² but later agreed to Inaba's theory in consideration of the actual topographical features.³³

I am of the same opinion with Inaba that the earthen fortress had been located near Koguryo's Paewangjo Mountain Fortress 霸王朝山城. Since the *Dogi* placed it before the river junction, surrounded by two mountain ridges, the earthen fortress may well be situated at present-day Bawangcun 霸王村, Caiyuanzhen 財源鎮, and Ji'an City 集安市. Currently, the earthen fortress is not extant but a stone mountain fortress called Paewanjo sanseong 霸王朝山城 is found there. It is not improbable that the earthen fortress in question had actually existed.

One important clue to this earthen fortress can be found in County Gazetteer of Ji'an (*Ji'an xianzhi* 集安縣志). The gazetteer, published in 1930, states regarding the earthen fortress (Tuchengzi 土城子) that "[I]t had previously remained on the riverside near Bawangzhao 八王朝 (i.e., Paewangjo), but was submerged under water and sand. The large stones of a few yards at the site were carted away by villagers to build their houses, leaving no remains there."³⁴ Thus the earthen fortress had received both natural and man-made damage only to disappear. Since the site was only about one kilometer or so away from the Xinkai Stream, it is highly probable that Sin Chung'il, who traveled along the stream, may well have wit-

³⁰ Wada Kiyoshi, "Manshū shobu no ichi ni tsuite" 滿洲諸部の位置について [Study on the locations of Tribes in Manchu], in *Tōashi kenkyū (Manshū hen)* 東亞史研究 (滿洲編) [Study of East Asia History: Manchuria] (Tokyo: Tokyo kokuritsu shoin, 1954), 578.

³¹ Inaba Iwakichi, *Kōkyō Nidōkashi Kyūrōjō*.

³² Mitamura Taisuke, "Chōsen soku shiryō yori mita Shinsho no kyōiki."

³³ Mitamura Taisuke, "Shinsho no kyōiki shoku: Shin Chūichi no Kenshū kitei zuki o chūshin toshite."

³⁴ The original text reads: "土城子... 在八王朝江岸 被水冲埋沙中 舊露大石數丈 後為鄉人造屋鑿取 無存矣." See Liu Tiancheng 劉天成, "Guji" 古跡 [Historical Remains], in *Ji'an xianzhi* 輯安縣志 卷 1 [Jian County Gazetteer, section 1] (1930).

nessed the earthen fortress and included its location in his map.

The Paewangjo Mountain Fortress 霸王朝山城 dates back to the Koguryo period, and was built at the river junction of the Hun River and the Xinkai Stream, which served a crucial point along the route from the Huanren 桓仁 area to Ji'an 集安.³⁵ It is highly likely that an earthen fortress might well be constructed at such a strategic point along the travel route. As a matter of fact, a cluster of earthen walled sites can be found today in its vicinity, such as Koguryo's Hagoseongja Fortress 下古城子城 in Huanren City, Koguryo's Nahap Fortress 喇哈城 in Beidianzixiang 北向子鄉, and Koguryo's Donggo Fortress 東古城 in Guchengzhen 古城鎮.

The *Dogi* noted that the then head of the Paewangjo Mountain Fortress 霸王朝山城, Li Dadou 李大斗, together with four generals led 1,000 strong to fight against Nurhaci but ran away. The account can be confirmed in *Qing Taizu shilu* 清太祖實錄 (Veritable record of the Qing emperor Taizu) and understood as a part of the subjugation campaigns by Nurhaci over the Jianzhou Jurchens. It is worth noting that Li Dadou and his generals could gather around them a sizable force of 1,000 strong in revolt against Nurhaci. It can be known that the area, centered around the fortress, had been under the control of a force hostile to Nurhaci and could afford sufficient economic resources enough to rally such a large number of soldiers. Moreover, the area had been a target of a series of Joseon campaigns during the eras of King Sejong, King Sejo, and King Seongjong. Therefore, the Paewangjo Mountain Fortress 霸王朝山城 had been an important strategic point since Koguryo times, but also remained a stronghold of the Jianzhou Jurchens during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.³⁶

Sin's party moved up the Hun River from its junction with the Xinkai

³⁵ Yeo Hogyu, *Koguryo seong I—Apnokgang jungsangnyu pyeon*, 97-104; Yang Sicun, "Hwanin mit Jip'an doeupgi Koguryo seong gwa bangeo chegye yeon'gu" 桓仁 및 集安 都邑期 高句麗 城斗 防禦體系 研究 [Study of Koguryo's Fortresses and Defense System during the Period of the Hwanin and Ji'pan Capital], *Yeongnamhak* 24 (2013).

³⁶ Bak Jeongmin, "Jeong Geonju haenggun dogi reul tonghan Seongjong dae Geonjuwi jeongbeol eui jaeguseong" 征建州行軍圖記를 통한 성종대 建州衛 정벌의 재구성 [Reconstruction of the Campaign against the Jianzhou Commandery Using the *Jeong Geonju haenggun dogi* (Illustrated record of the expedition against the Jianzhou Jurchens)], *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 99, 142-43.

Stream and crossed the river near a stream pronounced as Yisodacheon 伊所多川 in the *Dogi*, which is located between present-day Jiangkoucun 江口村 and Laoxuetangdonggou 老學堂東溝, as shown in Google Earth 3. After crossing the Hun River, Sin's party followed up present-day Fu'erjiang River 富爾江, a tributary of the Hun River, towards the present-day area of Beidianzi 北甸子, yet the *Dogi* also marked the shorter route going up the Yisodacheon Stream and passing mountain ridges which Sin used in his return journey to Joseon.

Sin's party moved up along the Fu'er River, and spent the fourth night (the twenty fifth day of the twelfth month) at the place named Naha 羅下. The *Dogi* noted that the chief of Naha was Dongniguri 童尼求里 and he raised fifty horses for battle use. The route Sin Chung'il used there has been submerged by the construction of the Huanren Dam. Yet by consulting the Manchurian Map and other modern maps, Naha can be placed around present-day Beidianzixiangcun 北甸子鄉村.

Inaba and Mitamura also placed Naha around present-day Beidianzi 北甸子. Considering the sound value of Naha, its proximity to the Koguryo's Onyeo Mountain Fortress 五女山城, and its distance from the Mancha village—the place for the third night—Mitamura associated Naha with Koguryo's Nahap Fortress 喇哈城 in Beidianzi region. Since the current location of this fortress is the right-hand side of the Hun River at the point of present-day Wanlongbeicun 彎龍背村 of Beidianzixiang, it exists further south of Naha indicated in the *Dogi*.³⁷ The *Dogi* noted that there existed a famous stone fortress to the “southwest” of a village in Niguri 尼求里 of Naha, which must be the Onyeo Mountain Fortress. The Nahap Fortress cannot be identified as the place of Naha because it is found on the same latitude as the Onyeo Mountain Fortress which the *Dogi* indicated to be in the direction of the “southwest” not the west of the place of Naha.

³⁷ Dongbuk'a yeoksa net 동북아역사넷 [Northeast Asian History Network] (<http://contents.nahf.or.kr>).



Sin Chung'il's Map 4. Travel Route of the Fifth Day (the Twenty-sixth Day of the Twelfth Month)

Route from the Fu'er River 富爾江 to Fe Ala 佛阿拉

On the twenty fifth day of the twelfth month of 1595 (the fourth day), Sin's party began to trace the Fu'er River upward towards Fe Ala. Another well-used route since the times of Koguryo from the Hun River to Fe Ala passed through the present-day city of Huanren 桓仁 and the Liudaogou 六道溝 area. That route had been used by Yi Minhwan 李民寔 when he had been taken as a war prisoner at the Simha 深河 battle (i.e., Sarhu 薩爾滸 battle).³⁸ Instead, Sin chose to follow the Fu'er River upstream.

On the twenty-sixth day of the twelfth month (the fifth day), Sin's party moved north, crossed the river at present-day Shengjiadayuancun 盛

³⁸ Yi Minhwan, *Chaekjung illok* 柵中日錄 [Daily Record while within the Wooden Stockades (as a captive)]. This document has been translated by a reading club of medieval historical materials (Jungse saryo gangdokhoe 중세사료강독회) in the Korean History Society (Hanguk yeoksa yeon'guhoe 한국역사연구회), as *1619 nyeon simha jeonjaeng gwa poro suyongso ilgi: Chaekjung illok* [*Chaekjung illok: Sarhu 薩爾滸 Battle of 1619, and Daily Record in the Camp of War Prisoners*] (2014).

家大院村, and passed a hill of present-day Jiangjiajie 姜家街. They crossed the river once more, passed through a place named Budogu 夫都求 (present-day Laoheibeicun 老黑背村), and passed over a mountain pass named Bieulhanryeong 非乙漢嶺 in the vicinity of present-day Xinjiangcun 新江村. Coming down from this mountain pass led to a flat land named Bieulhanpyeong 非乙漢坪, as can be found in Google Earth 4.

After passing through the flat land of Bieulhanpyeong and moving northwestward, the *Dogi* showed that two paths branched at the place named Jamiha 者未下. The upper path traced a stream named Ueojechon 于於諸川, passed over a mountain pass named Hodoryeong 胡都嶺, and followed down a stream named Gyorocheon 喬老川 to join again the Fu'er River. The lower path continued to follow the Fu'er River. Inaba adopted the upper path whereas Mitamura adopted the lower path. Inaba roughly drew the upper path starting from present-day Guchengzhen 古城鎮 to the north and passing over present-day Qingling Pass 慶嶺 to move northwestward.³⁹ On the other hand, Mitamura assumed a village in Wanggolchi 王骨赤 as present-day Zhaojiadayuan 趙家大院 opposite to Guchengzhen where Sin's party passed over present-day Gaonian Pass 高年嶺 to follow the Fu'er River.⁴⁰

It is Inaba's estimation that sounds more convincing. Considering the structure of the mountains and the river system, the place named Jamiha 者未下 in the *Dogi* can be placed near present-day Dongguchengzicun 東古城子村. In Jamiha, according to the *Dogi*'s note, the "twenty-five Jurchen households were placed" and Wanggolchi 王骨赤 was the chief of that village. The place with "ten Jurchen households placed" along the Fu'er River seems to be present-day Xiguchengzicun 西古城子村. This area, encompassing Koguryo's Donggo Fortress 東古城 and Seogo Fortress 西古城, must have been hospitable for human residence as early as Koguryo. Moreover, the area has been a key point along the travel route

³⁹ Inaba Iwakichi, "Shin Chūichi kōteizu yo gendai jissokuzu taishō."

⁴⁰ Mitamura Taisuke, "Shinsho no kyōiki shoku: Shin Chūichi no Kenshū kitei zuki o chūshin toshite," 110-16.



Manchuria Map 3. Area Covering from Jamiha 者末下 to Gyoro 喬老


from Xinbin County 新賓縣 through the Fu'er River and the Xinkai Stream to Ji'an.⁴¹

⁴¹ Yeo Hogyu, *Koguryo seong I—Apnokgang jungsangnyu pyeon*, 167-69.

Sin's party chose to trace the Ueoje Stream upward from the place of Jamiha. In present-day simulation, they would pass through Guchengzhen 古城鎮, Guaimozi Chaoxianzuzhen 拐磨子朝鮮族鎮, and Hedaxian 鶴大線 in succession. A village on the *Dogi* with twenty households controlled by a Jurchen chief of Dongajibu 童阿之夫 can be either one of the latter two places. Sin's party turned northwest from present-day Chaluzicun 岔路子村 to move up a mountain route, passed over the Qingling Pass 慶嶺, and descended to present-day Shuanglazi 雙砬子村. In the *Dogi*, the Hodoryeong Pass 胡都嶺 can be present-day Qingling 慶嶺, and the fifty-households village of Gyoro 喬老, where the Gyoro Stream 喬老川 joined the Fu'er River, can be present-day Shuanglazi 雙砬子村.

The lower path following the Fu'er River, as indicated by Mitamura, has survived in the form of a present-day highway along the river. In the *Dogi*, the lower path appears to be shorter in distance than the upper path passing over the mountain pass of Hodoryeong. However, its actual distance is longer, as can be seen in Manchuria Map 3, because it has many bends. As a matter of fact, measuring the respective distance on Google Earth produces twenty-one kilometers for the upper path of Hodoryeong and twenty-eight kilometers for the lower path of the Fu'er River. It is highly feasible that Sin Chung'il also used the shorter path of Hodoryeong; well trodden by the contemporary people at that time. In addition, the Manchuria Map highlighted the path by bold line, as shown by Manchurian Map 3, enhancing the likelihood of its common use. Above all, Sin himself mapped the path of Hodoryeong in the *Dogi* to mark his travel course, as shown in Sin Chung'il's Map 4.

For the twenty-sixth night of the twelfth month (the fifth day), Sin's party sojourned at the Gyoro village, three *sikjeong* or ninety *ri* (approximately thirty six kilometers) away from Naha, where they stayed for the previous night, according to Sin's estimation. In fact, the lower path along the Fu'er River measures forty-three kilometers while the upper path of Hodoryeong measures thirty six kilometers, corresponding to Sin's estimation. The village was headed by Dongadu 童阿斗. And, according to Sin's



Google Earth 4. Travel Route of the Fifth Day (the Twenty-sixth Day of the Twelfth Month) and Its Main Points

note,⁴² from this village to a village in Dongsibeolyi 童時伐伊 at the close proximity of the headquarters of Fe Ala, the Jurchen residents were requisitioned to work at the headquarters and leave only a few men and women to each household. The *Dogi* stated that male members of households were recruited from the villages of a three to four nights' journey from Fe Ala to perform either labor or military service there on a rotation basis.⁴³ Since the Gyoro village was three nights' journey from Fe Ala, its residents were also recruited for labor or military service.

On the twenty-seventh day of the twelfth month (the sixth day), Sin's party moved northward, passed by the junction of a tributary stream named Hwanghacheon 黃家川 to the Fu'er River—the present-day area of Xiangshuihezixiang 響水河子鄉—, and passed over a mountain pass

⁴² Original text reads: “一自此部落 至童時伐伊部落 家家只留守直男女若干名 其餘以過歲事 歸於奴酋城云。”

⁴³ Original text reads: “役軍則三四日程內部落 每一戶 計其男丁之數 分番赴役。”

named Janghang 獐項, and turned northwestward to pass over another mountain road named Mijihang 彌只項. These two mountain ways seem to be located in the mountainous area of present-day Xishancun 西山村 and Zhuanshuihucun 轉水湖村. Today, travelers may well choose the highway line of Wangshuangxian 旺雙線 to go to the area of Wangqingmenzhen 旺清門鎮. Nonetheless, the Manchuria Map marked a small road passing over the mountain pass of Qianshiling 欠石嶺 equivalent presumably to Mijihang in the *Dogi*; other maps also marked the road in point. Therefore, it can be known that in the past at least until the 1930s travelers had chosen to use the Qianshiling Pass.

In the vicinity of Mijihang was located the Koguryo's Jeonsuho Mountain Fortress 轉水湖山城 which belonged to a chain of mountain fortresses located along the middle and upper reaches of the Fu'er River.⁴⁴ It can be argued that the contemporary travel routes and defensive structures along the Fu'er River showed a remarkable continuity with those used during the time of Koguryo.

After passing over the Qianshiling Pass, Sin's party moved northward almost parallel to the present-day highway of Wangshuangxian, and passed by several small villages to arrive at a village named Sahanae 沙河乃. The Sahanae village was a sizable village with clustered households numbering one hundred. At the foot of a mountain that eventually connected to Fe Ala, Sin's party made their first encounter with the wooden stockades (*mokchaek* 木柵). To locate the Sahanae village in a present-day map, it is advisable to examine the river system around that area. In the *Dogi*, the main stem waterway was joined by a stream recorded as Walmicheon 曰彌川 from the north, and by a stream recorded as Guracheon 仇羅川 from both sides. The river junction area of present-day Wangqingmenzhen 旺清門鎮 has a close approximation of such a river system.

The *Dogi* mapped the Gura Stream joining the Fu'er River prior to the Walmi Stream. However, in their simulations in Manchuria Map 4, the latter joins the river before the former. The ridge of the mountain at the

⁴⁴ Yeo Hogyu, *Koguryo seong I—Apnokgang jungsangnyu pyeon* 45.



Sin Chung'il's Map 5. Travel Route of the Sixth Day (the Twenty-seventh Day of the Twelfth Month)

foot of which stood the wooden stockades extends towards the Fu'er River, corresponding to the mountain ridge, as shown in Google Earth 5. Hence, I locate the Sahanae village in present-day Jiangdongcun 江東村 next to Wangqingmenzhen 旺清門鎮, and locate the wooden stockades west of Ji-angdoncun that sits upward at the junctions of the Walmicheon Stream and the Gura Streams.

The Walmi Stream appeared to be short in the *Dogi*. But the Walmicheon simulation in Manchuria Map 4 appears to be extended given its upward direction leading up to either present-day Liuhe 柳河 or present-day Tonghua 通化. Even today, the area of Wangqingmenzhen 旺清門鎮 serves an important travel route toward these places, just as it had been an important strategic point since Koguryo.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Mitamura Taisuke, "Shinsho no kyōiki shoku: Shin Chūichi no Kenshū kitei zuki o chūshin



Manchuria Map 4. The Junctions of the Walmi Stream 日彌川 and the Gura Stream 仇羅川

According to the *Dogi*'s note, north of the Fu'er River ran a travel route that led to the Yehe 如許 tribes by a five nights' journey to the north. In modern simulation, the route passes present-day Liuhe and measures 300 kilometers in length up to the Yehe Fortress 叶赫城—once a power base of the Yehe tribes—in the present-day location of Yehemanzuzhen 叶赫满族镇 in the district of Tiedongqu 鐵東區 in Sipingshi City 四平市 in Jilin Province. Hence, Sin's information is quite reliable.

The travel route north of the Fu'er River could be used by the Jurchen tribes such as the Hada 哈達 and the Hoifa 輝發 to attack against the Jianzhou Jurchens based on Fe Ala. As a matter of fact, in 1593 (the twenty-sixth year of King Seonjo) a force of nine allies including the four Hülun

 toshite," 116-18; Gi Gyeongryang, "4 segi Koguryo 'Namdo·Bukdo' eui silche wa geu seonggyeok," 244-45.

tribes 扈倫四部, the Hada, and the Yehe mounted an attack against Nurhaci. Nurhaci might well have reinforced the defensive facilities like wooden stockades and smoke towers (*yeondae* 烟臺). The *Dogi* did testify the increasing frequency of such facilities from the area of present-day Wangqingmenzhen.

Passing the area of Wangqingmenzhen, Sin's party traced upward a stream recorded as Wangchicheon 王致川, and crossed over a hill with a smoke tower (*yeondae* 烟臺). The site of the smoke tower might be placed near the present-day tunnel of the S10 highway across the Wangqingmen rest area. In fact, a signal-fire station of Beishan 北山 is currently in place,⁴⁶ and the *Dogi* marked the crossing over of the mountain ridge in the vicinity of that smoke tower. Soon afterwards, a village of forty or so households appeared, which could be located at present-day of Jiumen Chaoxianzu Cun 舊門朝鮮族村. The route passing through the village can be today's S104 high line of Shentongxian 沈通線, that heads toward Xinbin 新賓.

Over the wooden stockades installed on the mountain ridge just behind present-day Jiumen Chaoxianzu Cun, began a different river system from the Wangchi Stream. The *Dogi* marked the mountain ridge as a watershed ridge, in which the wooden stockades were installed. This route had been a well-beaten track from the area of Xinbin to the Fu'er River. Hence, it is likely that the Jianzhou Jurchens might well have installed the wooden stockades to defend the strategic point. Moreover, the two sites of smoke towers⁴⁷ in rather close vicinity along the route suggests that the area was a center of travel, and had much of strategic value.

Sin's party traced down a stream marked as Dongsanggaecheon 同相介川, which was joined by a stream marked as Imgotacheon 林古打川, which, for its part, ran through the present-day place of Dongchangtai 東昌台, or present-day Nanfengmigoucun 南蜂蜜溝村. Currently, the junction of two

⁴⁶ Guojia wenwu ju, ed., *Zhongguo wenwu dituji (Liaoning fence xia)* 中國文物地圖集(遼寧分冊 下) [Collection of Maps of Chinese Cultural Relics: Liaoning Section, vol. 2] (Xian ditu chubanshe, 2008), 133.

⁴⁷ The *Geonju tamjeonggi chuk* 建州探情記軸 had one, but the other versions had two.

streams has been submerged by the construction of the Hongsheng 紅升 Reservoir but the Manchuria Map showed a narrow valley there instead. These two streams were upper tributaries of the Suzi River 蘇子河.

Sin's party traced down the Suzi River before they spent the night of the twenty-seventh day of the twelfth month (the sixth day) at a village named Dongduichihap 東豆伊致哈, which can be placed around the area of Hongshengxiang 紅升鄉 given its topography and distance. The mountain ridge next to the Dongduichihap village, which ended with the smoke tower, can be identifiable in Google Earth 5. The *Dogi* reported that the village in point was two *sikjeong* and ten *ri* or seventy *ri* (approximately twenty eight kilometers) away from the Gyoro village (for the night before), and two *sikjeong* or sixty *ri* (approximately twenty four kilometers) away from Fe Ala. In a present-day estimation, the former distance is about thirty three kilometers while the latter distance is about twenty nine kilometers, thus roughly corresponding to Sin's estimation.

On the twenty-eighth day of the twelfth month (the seventh day), Sin's party traced the Suzihe Stream further down. Soon afterwards, however, they turned southwest to take a mountain route at a place named Huji 厚之, which can be placed at present-day Baiqicun 白旗村. From that place to Fe Ala, which can be placed around present-day Erdaohezicun 二道河子村 of Yonglingzhen 永陵鎮, the common route is to take the present-day highway of S10 or S104 (Shentongxian 沈通線), that passes through the present-day autonomous county of Manchus in Xinbin (Xinbin Manzu zizhixian 新賓滿族自治縣). The route, following down the Suzihe Stream, is smooth and accessible. Hence, since the times of Koguryo, the well-beaten paths of that route had connected from Fushun 撫順 to Yonglingzhen to Wangqingmen to the Suzi Stream to the Fu'er River to the Xinkai Stream to Ji'an 集安, or from Fushun to Yonglingzhen to Wangqingmen to Tonghua to Ji'an.⁴⁸


⁴⁸ These routes may well date from the time when Former Yan (Qian Yan 前燕) invaded Koguryo in the early fourth century (342 C.E.), and had been referred to as south and north routes, the accurate course of which is still controversial. Regardless of the controversy, many scholars have acknowledged the existence of such routes. For more information on these routes, see Gong



Google Earth 5. Travel Route of the Sixth Day (the Twenty-seventh Day of the Twelfth Month) and Its Main Points

A question may arise: why did Sin Chung'il not take a more familiar and smooth route even though the mountain route passing over the Hono Pass 胡老嶺 and the Sori Pass 小里嶺 must have been covered with snow in the winter season? It should be kept in mind that Sin's party was escorted by Jurchen chiefs such as Dongnyeoelgo 童女乙古 and Dongpyakeunggo 童悛應古, who might well have directed the Joseon party at the behest of Nurhaci or by their own discretion. They would not display any feeling of distrust towards the most recent official Joseon visitors whose main mission was to spy on the transportation routes and defense conditions of their host, that is, the Jianzhou Jurchens.

Seokgu, "Koguryo wa Moyong Yeon eui jeonjaeng gwa geu euimi" 고구려와 모용 '연'의 전쟁과 그 의미 [Significance of the war between Koguryo and the Murong Yan 慕容燕], *Dongbuka yeoksa nonchong* 15 (2007): 77-78; Jeong Woncheol, "Koguryo Namdo·Bukdo wa Koguryo sanseong eui chukseong" 고구려 남도·북도와 고구려 산성의 축성 [Koguryo's Southern and Northern Roads and Its Construction of Mountain Fortresses], *Donguk sahak* 30 (2011): 8-12; Gi Gyeongryang, "4 segi Koguryo 'Namdo·Bukdo' eui silche wa geu seonggyeok," 245-47.



Sin Chung'il's Map 6. Travel Route of the Seventh Day (the Twenty-eighth Day of the Twelfth Month)

In modern simulation, from the present-day Hongshengxiang area (for the night of the twenty-seventh day of the twelfth month) to present-day Baiqicun, the distance is only two kilometers but was dotted with five villages with two to forty households. Just as the defense facilities such as wooden stockades and smoke towers increased in number from the present-day area of Wangqingmenzhen 旺清門鎮, so did the number of villages increas from the present-day area of Hongshengxiang 紅升鄉.

The *Dogi* noted that Nurhaci had previously resided for ten years in a village of forty households, headed by Donggaga 童加可, in the present-day city district of Xinbin County 新賓縣.⁴⁹ The early Qing records such as *Manzhou shilu* 滿洲實錄 (Manchu veritable record) and *Qing Taizu shilu* 清太祖實錄 (Veritable record of the Qing emperor Taizu) also stated that six ancestors of Nurhaci had resided around the present-day area of

⁴⁹ The original text reads: “胡家四十餘座 首胡童加可 一奴酋世居此部落 今移林吉打十年云.”

Yongling 永陵 in Xinbin County. Recent field research has discovered a number of fortress remains, such as Wenjiayao nanshan chengzhi 温家窯南山城址 and Daziying chengzhi 達子營城址, which appear to have been used during the era of Nurhaci.⁵⁰

The importance of the Suzihe 蘇子河 Valley in transportation and defense had been recognized since ancient times, as manifested by a significant number of historical remains of Koguryo, the Han Dynasty, and the Jin Dynasty.⁵¹ It seems that the present-day region of Xinbin County had been not only clustered with concentrations of Jurchen villages under Nurhaci's control, but also fortified with smoke towers, wooden stockades, and fortresses. Hence, it is probable that Nurhaci and Jurchen leaders did not want to reveal their defense installments in the close vicinity of their headquarters to Sin's party, and ordered Dongnyeoelgo and Dongpyakeunggo to take the mountain route from present-day Baiqicun instead of following the river valley.

Sin's party took a southwest turn at Huji 厚之 and crossed over a mountain pass named Honoryeong 胡老嶺. The previous studies identified the mountain pass as the one named Huoluoling 伏洛嶺 in the Manchuria Map,⁵² which can be placed at a certain mountain pass along the route from present-day Mamahuoluocun 媽媽伏洛村 through Donggou 東溝 to present-day Dakuaidecun 大塊地村. A place marked as *hoga ijwa* 胡家二座 (two Jurchen households) in the *Dogi* can be placed in present-day Dakuaidecun that was depicted to join the Suzi River shortly thereafter.

Sin's party traced the unnamed stream upstream and crossed over a mountain pass named Soriryeong 小里嶺 to head toward a stream named Soricheon 小里川. As Inaba argued, the Sori Stream might well be rendered as Suoerkehe 索爾科河 or Shoulikou 首里口 in Qing Taizu shilu 清太

⁵⁰ Zhang Deyu et al., "Ningguta yu Liuzucheng kaobian" "寧古塔"與六祖城考辨 [Illustration of 'Ningguta' and the Fortress of Six Ancestors], *Liaohai wenwu xuekan* 1996-01 (1996).

⁵¹ Guojia wenwu ju, ed., *Zhongguo wenwu dituji (Liaoning fence xia)*, 132-35.

⁵² Inaba Iwakichi, "Shin Chūichi kōteizu yo gendai jitsusokuzu taishō"; Mitamura Taisuke, "Shinsho no kyōiki shoku: Shin Chūichi no Kenshū kitei zuki o chūshin toshite," 126-29. Both agreed to Sin's travel course from here to Fe Ala via 'Soriryeong' 小里嶺 and 'Soricheon' 小里川.



Google Earth 6. Travel Route of the Seventh Day (the Twenty-eighth Day of the Twelfth Month) and Its Main Points

祖實錄 (Veritable record of the Qing emperor Taizu) and *Qingshi gao* 清史稿 (Draft history of the Qing).⁵³ Then, through their modern simulation, the Sori Pass, located at the headwater of the Sori Stream, can be present-day Duanshu Pass 楸樹嶺. Even though Sin Chung'il could not use the primary route along the Suzi River, it appears that he made an effort to map the flow of the river while passing over the Hono Pass and Sori Pass. As a result, he could get a rough perspective of the rivers and mountains of the region without examining them at close distance. After passing over the Sori Pass, Sin's party must have come down to the up the Sori Stream, which might sit near the present-day area of Dayang 大央. Following this stream and passing by a number of village clusters, Sin Chung'il finally arrived at the headquarters of Nurhaci at Fe Ala, ready to engage in the negotiations with the Jurchen parties, for which he was dispatched.

Conclusion

Many scholars have shown interest in Sin Chung'il's account of the jour-

⁵³ For a detailed explanation, see Inaba Iwakichi, *Kōkyō Nidōkashi Kyūrōjō*, 21-25. Mitamura also was in agreement with Inaba as to the linguistic origins of 'Soriryong' 小里嶺.

ney to Fe Ala to meet Nurhaci, the rising leader of the Jianzhou Jurchens. Nonetheless, little attention has been paid to his travel routes except for the studies by Inaba Iwakichi and Mitamura Taisuke. Their estimated routes are in disagreement with each other in many aspects, and are not simulated into a modern map. The question of how Sin Chung'il made his way has not been answered sufficiently.

One can think of four principal cases of the route from Manpo to the contemporary location of Fe Ala in the late sixteenth century. First, from Ji'an one can follow the Weishahe Stream 葦沙河 to reach Tonghua, proceed eastward to Wangqingmenzhen, and thence go on along the Suzi Stream to reach Fe Ala. Second, from Ji'an one can cross over the Xiaobanling Pass 小板嶺, follow the Xinkai Stream until its junction with the Hun River, trace upstream the Fu'er River, and travel alongside the Suzi Stream to reach Fe Ala. Third, from Ji'an one can cross over the Xiaobanling Pass 小板嶺, follow the Xinkai Stream until its junction with the Hun River, then come out in the direction of Huanren, and proceed northward in the direction of Liudaogou. Last, from Ji'an one can follow downstream the Yalu River to Liangshuizhen 凉水鎮 to turn northward, pass through Erdaodianzi 二道甸子 to reach Huanren, and pass by Liudaogou to reach Fe Ala. Taking shorter paths may well produce more cases of routes.

In order to delineate more accurately the routes Sin Chung'il took in his round trip, this study pursues new methods of using such maps as Google Earth and Manchuria Map, referring to Chinese cultural relics gazetteers, and examining mountain ridges, river systems and historical remains depicted in his account. Through this process, the travel routes between Joseon and the Jianzhou Jurchens around the time of the Imjin War (1592-98) can be recovered.

Having received King Seonjo's order to meet Nurhaci for negotiating current issues, Sin Chung'il arrived at Manpo on the twenty first day of the twelfth month of 1595 (the twenty-ninth year of King Seonjo). The next day, Sin's party crossed the Yalu River near present-day Manpo Station. They followed down the Yalu River westward, turned northwest at the present-day place of Maxianxiang 麻線鄉, and spent the night of the twenty-second day of the twelfth month at what is now the Banzaigou 半載溝 area.

On the twenty third day, Sin's party crossed over the Xiaoban Pass 小板嶺 (Mancharyeong 蔓遮嶺 in the *Dogi*), and moved northwestward along the Xinkai Stream 新開河. On their way, they passed by the Koguryo's narrow passage of Mangparyeong gwanae 望波嶺關隘 (Janghang 獐項 in the *Dogi*) and spent the night at present-day Huangweizicun 荒歲子村 (Goyeonggu 古營丘 in the *Dogi*). On the twenty fourth day, they proceeded northward and spent the night at present-day Caiyuanxiang 財源鄉 (the Mancha village in the *Dogi*). On the twenty fifth day, they followed the Xinkai Stream northwestward to its junction with the Hun River 渾江. Sin Chung'il mentioned that an earthen fortress (*toseong* 土城) had existed near Koguryo's Paewangjo Mountain Fortress 霸王朝山城. By now the earthen fortress has disappeared, yet Ji'an County Gazetteer (Ji'anxian zhi 輯安縣志) in 1930 indicated its remains, thereby lending credibility to Sin's note. His party crossed the river, and spent the night at the present-day place of Beidianzixiang 北甸子鄉 (Naha 羅下 in the *Dogi*) in Huanren County 桓仁縣.

From the twenty-sixth day, Sin's party traced the Fu'er River 富爾江 upstream towards Fe Ala. They crossed the river at present-day Shengjiadayuancun 盛家大院村, and crossed over a mountain hill in the present-day place of Jiangjiajie 姜家街. Thence, they passed through present-day Laoheibeicun 老黑背村 and Guamozichaoxianzuzhen 拐磨子朝鮮族鎮 nearby Dongguchengzicun 東古城子村 (Jamiha 者未下 in the *Dogi*) in Guchengzhen 古城鎮, crossed over present-day Qingling 慶嶺 ('Hodoryeong' 胡都嶺), and came down to present-day Shuanglazi 雙砬子村 to spend the night at the place named Gyoro 喬老 in the *Dogi*. On the twenty-seventh day, they proceeded northward to pass through the present areas of Xiangshuihezixiang 響水河子鄉 and Wangqingmunzhen 旺清門鎮, turned to the direction of Xinbin County at present-day Jiumen Chaoxianzu Cun 舊門朝鮮族村 across the Wangqingmen rest area of the S10 highway. They spent the night at the present-day place of Hongshengxiang 紅升鄉. On the twenty-eighth day, Sin's party followed downstream the Suzi Stream 蘇子河, turned abruptly at present-day Baiqicun 白旗村 (Huji 厚之 in the *Dogi*) to take a mountain route. Thereafter, they crossed over the mountain pass named Honoryeong 胡老嶺 in the *Dogi*, passed through present-day Dakuaidacun 大塊地村, crossed over present-day Duanshuling 椴樹嶺, came

down to present-day Dayang 大央, and followed down the stream named Soricheon 小里川 in the *Dogi* to reach Fe Ala at the end.

The significance of recovering the route journeyed by Sin Chung'il is not limited to identifying one particular route between Joseon and the Jianzhou Jurchens during the Imjin War (1592-98). Considering the fact that the headquarters of the Jianzhou Jurchens had remained around the Xinbin and Huanren regions for about two hundred years, recovering the route in point is to determine the well-established travel and communication route between Joseon Korea and the Jianzhou Jurchens for an extended period. Moreover, the routes taken by Sin Chung'il in his round-trip journey can provide crucial reference points together with historical records prior to his trip in reconstructing past routes used by Koreans and Jurchens between the middle-reach towns of the Yalu River such as Manpo, Chosan, and Byeokdong in Joseon as well as the Jurchen headquarters in Xinbin and Huanren. One possibility is to illustrate the expedition routes against the Jianzhou Jurchens used four times during the eras of King Sejong, King Sejo, and King Seongjong.

Remarkably, as demonstrated above, Sin Chung'il's routes were dotted with a number of historical remains which had been in place since Koguryo, such as the monument inscribed with the merit of Guanqiu Jian 毋丘儉記功碑, the narrow Mangpa Passage 望波嶺關隘, the Paewangjo Mountain Fortress 霸王朝山城, the Jeonsuha Mountain Fortress 轉水湖山城, the Baekgi Fortress 白旗城, and the Fe Ala fortress itself. Hence, it can be known that Sin's routes were closely overlapped with those used during Koguryo, and that many of Koguryo's historical sites had still been in use even at the time of Sin's travel in the late sixteenth century. In sum, it can be argued that the meaning of Sin Chung'il's travel routes may well go beyond their value for serving specific purposes in given periods, and play a key role in rethinking the borderlands of Joseon Korea inseparable from the historical geography of Koguryo.

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The Politics of Rituals in Early Qing: Manchu-Mongol Relations through Rituals

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The Politics of Rituals in Early Qing: Manchu-Mongol Relations through Rituals*

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Introduction

During Nurhaci's reign, the Later Jin's relations with the Inner Mongolian tribes, including the Inner Khalkhas and the Khorchins, was complex and unstable in the sense of wavering between cooperation and enmity. At that time, the Later Jin was yet to gain predominance over the Mongols. Ligdan Khan of the Chahars remained undiminished from his alliance with the Ming dynasty and the Later Jin was yet to solidify its friendship with the Khorchins who dominated eastern Inner Mongolia. Nurhaci's policy toward the Inner Mongolian tribes foremost aimed at securing allies, which is why the Later Jin formed a generally equal alliance with such tribes.

However, Hong Taiji began to seize the upper hand in the relations which his predecessor Nurhaci established with the Mongols. He joined forces with the Mongols to counter the Chahars and the Ming dynasty, gain an advantage over the Khorchin leader Ooba, and lead expeditions. He brought Mongol tribal leaders and troops, if indirect, under his military command and appointed some Mongol tribal leaders as governors (Ma.

* This article is translated from the Korean manuscript originally published in *Sachong* 史叢 93, 2018: 155-93.

jasak). Also, in 1636, the first year of the Chongde era, Hong Taiji dispatched government officials to each Mongolian tribe to restructure the tribes into companies (Ma. *niru*) so as to more effectively mobilize Mongol troops and tighten the Manchus' political hold on the Mongols. Hence, during Hong Taiji's reign, particularly around the fourth to the fifth year of the Tiancong era when the Manchu regime launched an all-out war against the Chahars and the Ming dynasty, the scales tilted toward the Manchus in terms of their relations with the Mongols.

For the above reasons, many scholars focused their research on the policies and frameworks Hong Taiji adopted toward the Inner Mongolian tribes. While exploring Qing laws involving the Mongols, Shimada Masao examined the military command issued to the Mongols under Hong Taiji's reign, and through an in-depth analysis of Shimada's findings, Kusunoki Yoshimichi studied the process through which Hong Taiji broadened his influence over the Mongols by issuing military commands.¹ Tayama Shigeru looked into the creation of banners (Ch. *qi*, Ma. *gūsa*) and the organization of companies (Ma. *niru*) in Mongolia prior to Hong Taiji's reign while studying the league and banner (Ch. *mengqi*) system and the governor (Ma. *jasak*) system which the Qing dynasty installed in the Mongol region.² Da Lizhabu, Guo Chengkang, and Oka Hiroki also examined the creation of leagues and banners and noted the fact that in 1636 government officials of the Later Jin were dispatched to Inner Mongolian tribes for that very purpose and appointed banner generals (Ma. *niru janggin*) to the Eight Banner System.³

¹ Shimada Masao, *Shinchō mōko rei no kenkyū* [A Study on Rules for Mongols in the Qing Dynasty] (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 1982); Kusunoki Yoshimichi, *Shinsho tai Mongoru seisakushi no kenkyū* [A Historical Study on Policies Toward Mongols in the Early Qing] (Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin, 2009).

² Shigeru Tayama, *Qing dai Menggu shehui zhidu* [The Social Structure of the Mongols in the Qing Dynasty], Pan Shixian, trans. (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1987). Originally published as *Shin jidai ni okeru mōko no shakai seido* (Tōkyō: Bunkyo Shoin, 1954).

³ Da Lizhabu, "Qing chu nei zhasake qi de jianli wenti" [The Jaska System's Establishment in the Qing Dynasty], "Qing chu dui Menggu youyi sanwanhu de zhengceji qi beijing" [The Thirty Thousand Mongol Right Wing Household Policy and Its Background in the Early Qing Dynasty], "Qing chu 'waifan Menggu shisan qi' zakao" [Various Contemplations on the 'Thirteen Outer Mongolian Banners' in the Early Qing Dynasty], in *Ming Qing Menggushi lungao* (Beijing:

Changes in the Manchu-Mongol relations manifested not only in political and military aspects, but also in the rituals carried out between the Khan of the Later Jin and the Mongol tribal leaders. By and large, rituals at a national level represent an intense combination of political ideas and power structures on the ground that the main purpose of the rituals is to illustrate hierarchy embedded in that combination. Similarly, international rituals can reflect the distribution of power between nations. When a leader or an envoy visits from a foreign country, the manner in which s/he is treated not only indicates how the country is perceived, but also imparts its stature.⁴ The Manchu regime prior to entering the Shanhai Pass in 1644 was no exception. The way Nurhaci and Hong Taiji handled the Mongol nobility changed in tandem with changes in political circumstances and their perception of the Mongol nobility. The rituals, held between Nurhaci and the Mongol nobility, demonstrated friendship and alliance rather than a hierarchy between them. In contrast, as Hong Taiji began to exercise dominance over Mongol tribal leaders, rituals between them gradually developed into a formula, which became hierarchical, and increasingly emphasized the authority of the Khan of the Later Jin.

In this line, the changes in the rituals that the Manchus held with the Mongols inform us of the process through which Hong Taiji strengthened his influence over the Inner Mongolian tribes and redefined his relationship with their leaders. Early Manchurian sources such as the *Old Manchu Chronicles* (Tongki fuka sindaha hergen i dangse), the *Old Manchu Archives* (Fe Manju dangse), and the *Early Manchu Archives of the Imperial Historiographical Office* document in detail the rituals carried out when the Khan of the Later Jin met with Mongol tribal leaders. Such

Minzu chubanshe, 2003); Guo Chengkang, “Huang Taiji dui Monan Menggu de tongzhi” [Hong Taiji’s Rule over Monan Mongolia], *Zhongyang minzu xueyuan xuebao*, no. 5: 3-9 (1987); Oka Hiroki, *Shindai Mongoru meiki seido no kenkyū* [A Study on the Mongol Banner System in the Qing Dynasty]; Kusunoki, *Shinsho tai Mongoru seisakushi no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Tōhō shoten, 2007).

⁴ James Hevia’s study on the British ambassador George Macartney’s meeting with the Qianlong Emperor clearly acknowledges the fact that rituals are symbolic, cultural acts and bear substantive, political meaning. James L. Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995).

sources include descriptions about welcoming rituals the Later Jin performed when Mongol tribal leaders visited, the form of greeting such leaders exchanged with the Khan of the Later Jin, the type of banquet held for such occasions, and the kinds of gifts bestowed or offered as tribute. The sources reveal that the form of rituals between the Khan of the Later Jin and Mongol tribal leaders changed over time, implying that their perception of each other and the dynamics of their relationship also had changed. Those rituals can serve as important clues that are as meaningful as politics, military affairs, and diplomacy in studying the changes in the Manchu-Mongol relations during the early years of the Qing dynasty.

Aware of this potential, Du Jiayi briefly examined descriptions in early editions of the Manchu Archives (Ch. *Manwen dangan*) regarding the act of embracing practiced between the Khan of the Later Jin, the Mongol nobility, and Manchu lords (*beile*). Du stressed the political significance by analyzing the changes in the act of embracing prior to 1644.⁵ More recently, Li Zhiguo launched a comprehensive investigation into the Manchu-Mongol relations to reexplore rituals diachronically from those between the Ming dynasty and Jurchen tribes to those between the late Qing court and the *fanbu* (藩部), or the feudatories in the west and the northwest of the Qing empire. Li also categorized rituals into several different types, such as “rituals involving physical action” or “rituals involving the exchange of gifts” to examine the meaning, assigned to each type of ritual over time, and identify the political significance behind the order of Qing rituals.⁶

Through historical research on early Qing court rites and music, Qiu Yuanyuan finds that such rites and music, based on Manchu and Mongol customs prior to 1644, did not merely imitate those of the Ming dynasty but later developed into rites and music unique to the Qing court. Li’s research reevaluates the previous understanding that the court rites and music

⁵ Du Jiayi, “Cong ruguan qian dangankan manzu baojian lisu” [A Review of Archival Records on Manchu Etiquette and Customs Prior to 1644], *Lishi dangan*, no. 2 (1998): 81-83.

⁶ Li Zhiguo, *Qingdai fanbu binli yanjiu: Yi Menggu wei zhongxin* [A Study on Qing Hospitality Rituals Toward Outer Feudatories: With a Focus on the Mongols] (Huhehaote: Neimenggu daxue chubanshe, 2014).

of the Qing dynasty were an extension of those of the Ming dynasty and locates the viability of the Manchu streak running through Qing court rites and music.⁷

Highlighting the way the Qing emperor used rituals and exchanged gifts to integrate Inner Asians into his empire, Dorothea Heuschert-Laage determined that *Lifanyuan* (理藩院), the office in charge of administering the outer regions, played an important role in formalizing and institutionalizing the personal relationships the Qing emperor had with Inner Asian leaders.⁸ Heuschert-Laage pointed out how the Manchurian sources' documentation of gifts which the Khan of the Later Jin exchanged with the Mongol nobility shifted from recording what the Khan received to what the Khan bestowed. Such a shift, according to Heuschert-Laage, can be interpreted as a narrative device to emphasize the Qing emperor's beneficence and generosity and thereby portray the emperor as a benefactor and an omnipotent figure.

Along this line, this paper seeks to examine the changes that occurred in the Later Jin's political and military relations with the Mongols through rituals between the Khan of the Later Jin and the Mongol tribal leaders. It also argues that the rituals between the Qing royal family and the nobility of outer feudatories resulted from merging and modifying Manchu traditions and Chinese customs instead of merely imitating Ming rituals. In so doing, this paper will chart a historical process in which on top of Ming practices Inner Asian elements and the Mongols' political relations with the Later Jin had a major influence upon the formation of rituals the Qing court kept with its northern feudatories.

This paper first examines how Nurhaci's diplomatic relations with the Mongol tribal leaders materialized into certain rituals inseparable from the political circumstances under Nurhaci's reign in search for the Inner

⁷ Qiu Yuanyuan, *Qing qianqi gongting liyue yanjiu* [Court Rites and Music in the Early Qing] (Beijing: Shehuikexue wenxian chubanshe, 2012).

⁸ Dorothea Heuschert-Laage, "From Personal Network to Institution Building: The Lifanyuan, Gift Exchange and the Formalization of Manchu-Mongol Relations," *History and Anthropology* 25, no. 5 (2014): 648-69.

Mongolian tribes as indispensable allies. Next, this paper analyzes changes in rituals under Hong Taiji's reign when he realigned the Manchu-Mongol relations with a view of expanding his influence as the Khan of the Later Jin. Finally, this paper examines the investiture rites in 1636 with a focus on how the hierarchy between the Manchu royal family and the nobility of Inner Mongolian tribes was reshaped through a new set of rites and how this development reflected the power structure of the Qing empire in Northeast Asia.

Rituals and Relations with the Mongols under Nurhaci's Reign

Manchu greeting customs can be classified into the act of inquiring after someone (請安禮) or the act of embracing (抱見禮). The former was practiced widely among the sovereign, his subjects, bureaucrats, and common Manchu bannermen (Ch. *qiren*) even after 1644. The latter gradually fell out of practice due to lack of elegance and was only performed on rare occasions between a Manchu ruler and his subjects.⁹ Embracing each other's waist or shoulders was allowed as a friendly greeting between equals regardless of their gender. Because it blurred hierarchy and accepted physical contact between males and females, the act of embracing, considered inappropriate from a Confucian perspective, was replaced by bowing on both knees or kowtowing.¹⁰

The act of embracing, commonly practiced in Manchu society prior to 1644, symbolized a firm alliance between the Later Jin and the Mongol

⁹ Du, "Cong ruguan qian dangankan manzu baojian lisu," 81. The act of embracing or *tebeliyeme acambi* was a Manchu custom of greeting one another with an embrace as a gesture of intimacy. The form of embracing differed depending on the status of the people taking part in the ritual. One form was to embrace the waist or draw closer to embrace the shoulders. The other was for the junior to kowtow to and embrace the legs of the senior. Compared to embracing while kneeling, simply embracing was a gesture of intimacy between equals. Embracing was a common way of greeting among Manchus that disappeared around 1644 or by the middle of the Qing dynasty due to the Han Chinese culture's influence. Wei Ze, "Manzu de baojianli" [The Manchu Ritual of Embracing], *Manyu yanjiu*, no. 1 (2007): 90-94; Li, *Qingdai fanbu binli yanjiu*, 63.

¹⁰ Li, *Qingdai fanbu binli yanjiu*, 62-63.

tribal leaders. Securing allies was a priority for Nurhaci as he established the Later Jin and competed for dominance with the neighboring Jurchen and Mongol forces. These political and diplomatic circumstances of the Later Jin can be seen from the rituals of hospitality the Later Jin held for Mingan Taiji of the Khorchins, who was the first Mongol to enter into a matrimonial alliance with the Manchu regime.

Along with the four Haixi Jurchen tribes, Mingan Taiji of the Khorchins attacked Nurhaci and suffered humiliating defeat. He nevertheless managed to form friendly relations with the Later Jin by marrying his daughter to Nurhaci. Before meeting with Nurhaci in person, Mingan Taiji sent his sons over to the Later Jin to maintain friendly relations.¹¹ And when the news reached the Later Jin that Mingan Taiji was on his way to meet Nurhaci in the first lunar month of 1617, Nurhaci brought his wife, brothers, and children as far as twenty-four miles outside his castle and camped there for two days in order to personally greet Mingan Taiji.

Upon Mingan Taiji's arrival, Nurhaci "greeted him with an embrace" (Ma. *tebeliyeme acambi*). Whereas Mingan Taiji's sons were said to have "kowtowed when they were received in audience" (Ma. *hengkileme acambi*) by Nurhaci, Mingan Taiji was embraced while on horseback, which means that Nurhaci treated him as an equal.¹² Nurhaci had Mingan Taiji stay for thirty days during which he held a small banquet every day and a larger banquet every other day. Nurhaci also gave all sorts of gifts, including forty households and forty suits of armor, as well as other goods including silk and hemp. When the time came for Mingan Taiji to leave, Nurhaci traveled seven miles outside his castle and camped there overnight to bid Mingan Taiji farewell.¹³

The greeting, banquets, and gifts Nurhaci prepared for Mingan Taiji

¹¹ *Manbun Rōtō* [The Secret Chronicles of the Manchu Dynasty], Manbun Rōtō Kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Tōyō Bunko, 1955-63), trans., vol. Taizu 4: 48-49, the ninth and tenth lunar months of 1615.

¹² *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizu 5, the first lunar month of 1617, 76-77; *Da qing lichao shilu* [Veritable Records of the Qing Manchus] (Taipei: Taiwan huawen shuju yinxing, 1964), vol. 4: 145-46, the first lunar month of 1617.

¹³ *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizu 5: 76-77, the first lunar month of 1617.

demonstrated the utmost respect a Manchu khan could show to a Mongol leader. Moreover, it was unprecedented for Nurhaci to personally travel twenty-four miles outside the castle to greet a guest or seven miles outside the castle to bid a guest farewell. Nurhaci showed such preferential treatment toward his father-in-law Mingan Taiji because it was his first visit to the Later Jin. More than anything, the rituals of hospitality held for the head of the Khorchins clearly illustrate how desperately Nurhaci sought allies shortly after establishing the Later Jin.

The *Old Manchu Chronicles* (滿文老檔) offers a detailed description about Mingan Taiji's visit to the Later Jin after his previous participation in the battle in which nine tribes, including the Khorchins and the four Haixi Jurchen tribes, joined forces to attack Nurhaci.

. . . The Mingan beile previously joined the clans Yehe, Hada, Ula, Hoifa, Mongol, Sahalca, and Sibe to go to war with the Great Genggiyen Han, and upon their defeat, he was forced to escape on an unsaddled horse without his pants. Twenty years later, he sent his daughter to the Great Genggiyen Han. In 1617, the sixth year since sending his daughter and the twenty fifth year since his defeat in the joint attack, he himself paid a visit.¹⁴

Since Mingan Taiji was the first among the Mongols to become in-laws with Nurhaci after being defeated by him, Mingan Taiji's visit was an opportunity for the Later Jin to advertise its matrimonial alliance with the Khorchins. Hence, a propaganda effect may have been what Nurhaci had in mind as he gave exceptional treatment to Mingan Taiji.

Apart from the Khorchins, the Five Khalkhas were other Mongol tribes that directly acknowledged the expansion of the Later Jin's influence. Also referred to as the "Inner Khalkhas" or the "Five Otoy Khalkhas," these five tribes were led by the descendants of Alchu Bolad, the fifth son of Dayan Khan who united eastern Mongolia in the late fif-

¹⁴ *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizu 5: 77, the first lunar month of 1617.

teenth century. The Five Khalkhas consisted of the Jarud, Baarin, Onggirat, Bayaud, and Öjjiyed; each of them maintained different relations with Nurhaci at different times. As the Later Jin took over the Liaodong Paninsular, which included some areas of trade for the Ming dynasty such as the Chang'an Fort and Guangning, the five tribes ran into difficulties in securing supplies from Ming China. These difficulties caused them to either grow hostile toward Nurhaci or develop friendly relations with him.

Among the Five Khalkhas, the Bayaud were relatively early in forming friendly relations with Nurhaci. Enggeder, the eldest son of the Bayaud leader Darhan Baturu, visited Nurhaci and presented him with twenty horses in 1605. In the twelfth lunar month of the following year, Enggeder dedicated the title of Kundulen han (恭敬汗) to Nurhaci on behalf of the leaders of the Five Khalkhas.¹⁵ In 1617, Nurhaci had Princess Sundai, the daughter of his brother Šurhaci, marry Enggeder. The Bayaud Enggeder thereby became a member of the Manchu royal family as an efu (額駙), or son-in-law of the Khan. Bayaud leaders succumbed to the Later Jin one after the other from 1621 onwards. Sanggarjai, Enggeder's third younger brother, surrendered to the Later Jin in the third lunar month of 1623, and four months later, Enggeder also announced his intent to become a vassal of Nurhaci, saying that he had "come to depend on Genggiyen Han."¹⁶

Upon his surrender, Nurhaci bestowed Enggeder with 434 men from the Pinglu Fort. Among the men, Enggeder was to select those without a criminal record and capable of communicating in Chinese in order to organize them into ten households and form a manor. Nurhaci also had horns and shells blown to welcome or bid farewell to Enggeder and Princess Sundai whenever traveling back and forth between their manor and the Later Jin. On the first day of the first month of 1624, when Enggeder efu led Mongol nobles with the title of *taiji* (臺吉) to offer their New Year's greetings to Nurhaci, their turn to kowtow to Nurhaci came immediately after

¹⁵ Goryeo Daehakkyo Minjong munhwa yeonguwon Manjuhak senteo Manju sillok yeokjuhoe, trans., *Manju sillok yeokju* [An Annotated Translation of the Veritable Records of the Manchus] (Seoul: Somyeong chulpan, 2014), 138; *Da qing lichao shilu* 3, 123-24.

¹⁶ *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizu 57: 833-34, the seventh month of 1623.

Nurhaci's son Daišan who held the title of *amba beile* (大貝勒), or grand lord.¹⁷ Their turn to kowtow usually came after the lords (*beile*) of the Manchu royal family, but that day, they were placed ahead of all the *beile* of the Manchu royal family except for Daišan. Once Enggeder and the Mongol *taijis* finished paying their respects to Nurhaci, Enggeder was seated next to Daišan and Enggeder's younger brother Manggūltai was seated next to Hong Taiji, implying that the two brothers were treated on terms equal to the four *amba beiles* of the Manchu royal family.¹⁸

Part of the reason Nurhaci granted such privileges to Enggeder as well as the Bayaud leaders who accompanied him was to win over other Mongol forces. Nurhaci sent letters to persuade the leaders of Bayaud tribes yet to become vassals of the Later Jin, announcing that they would be able to enjoy the glory of "living in a tall house with many households under their control." Nurhaci also urged them to honor their pledge and join forces with the Later Jin to attack Ming China, accusing some Bayaud leaders of breaking their pledge and assisting Ming China.¹⁹ Nurhaci thus utilized the surrender of Enggeder's family to encourage other leaders of the Five Khalkhas to make peace with or surrender to the Later Jin.

During the reigns of Nurhaci and Hong Taiji, the key figure in the Later Jin's relations with the Mongols was Ooba Khung Taiji, an influential leader among the Khorchins, particularly the Khorchin Right Wing.²⁰ Ooba entered into an alliance with the Later Jin near the end of Nurhaci's reign, and as Nurhaci's son-in-law, Ooba was ranked as an equal to Nurha-

¹⁷ *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizu 60: 881, the first lunar month of 1624.

¹⁸ *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizu 60: 901-03, the first lunar month of 1624.

¹⁹ *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizu 43: 632-34, the twenty-second day of the first lunar month of 1623.

²⁰ The Khorchins were led by the descendants of Jo'chi Qasar, a brother of Genghis Khan. Genghis Khan enfeoffed his three younger brothers with the Da Hinggan Range (Da Xing'an Ling), which is why they are often collectively referred to as the "Three Princely Houses of the Eastern Regions." The second younger brother Jo'chi Qasar was enfeoffed with a territory that expanded between the Ergune River, Hulun Lake (Hunlun Nuur), and Hailar River. The descendants of Jo'chi Qasar led several tribes including the Muumingyan, the Aru Khorchin, the Dörben keüked, and the Urad. The Khorchins mentioned in this paper refer to the nomadic Non korcin around the Nen River basin. Da Lizhabu, *Ming dai Monan Menggu lishi yanjiu* [A Historical Study on Monan Mongols During the Ming Dynasty] (Hailar: Nei Menggu wenhua chubanshe, 1998), 142-43.

ci's sons. Ooba therefore saw himself as equal to Hong Taiji even after his enthronement. Hong Taiji, on the other hand, sought to subdue Ooba in order to dictate joint forces with the Mongols.²¹ Rituals reflected the difference between Nurhaci and Hong Taiji in their attitude toward Ooba as well as the changes in the Later Jin's relationship with the Khorchins.

Ooba initially did not consider an alliance with the Later Jin until he suddenly had to seek for help around 1625 when threatened by Ligdan Khan of the Chahars. Ooba knew that an alliance with a representative of both the Khorchin Left Wing and the Right Wing such as himself would be an opportunity for the future of the Later Jin. The rituals, set for Ooba, did show the utmost respect for the leader of an ally on equal terms with the Later Jin.

On the sixteenth day of the fifth lunar month of 1626, Nurhaci learned that Ooba was coming to visit and sent his sons Manggūltai beile and Hong Taiji beile to greet Ooba. At Zhonggucheng (中固城), which was under the jurisdiction of Kaiyauncheng, the two Manchu grand lords met and embraced Ooba. Five days later, then, Nurhaci visited a Tangse shrine, kowtowed there, and headed to a tent pitched about two miles outside the castle to sit and wait for Ooba's arrival. When Ooba knelt before Nurhaci and tried to embrace him while kowtowing, Nurhaci rose from his seat and stepped forward to embrace Ooba. Apart from Ooba, all the other Mongol *taijis* performed the act of kowtowing before Nurhaci.

When Ooba set out toward home on the tenth day of the sixth lunar month after spending nearly one month in the Later Jin, Nurhaci brought his sons and court officials along to camp overnight to send off Ooba. Nurhaci traveled as far as Nanqi (南邱) in Puhecheng (蒲河城) to the north of Shenyangcheng (審陽城) before returning to his palace; he ordered his

²¹ For Korean language research papers on the relations between the Later Jin and Ooba of the Khorchins, refer to Noh Ki-shik, "Hong Taiji eui ban Rikdan Manmong yeonmaeng hwakdae wa iyong" [The Expansion of the Manchu-Mongol Anti-Liqdan League and Hong Taiji's Exploitation], *Junggukhak nonchong*, no. 13 (2000): 167-98; Kim Sung-soo, "17 segi cho Manmong gwangye wa naeryuk Asia: Manju-Horeuchin Monggol gwangye reul jungsim euro" [Manchu-Mongolian Relationship During the Early Seventh Century: Focusing on the Manchu-Khorchin Mongol relations] 82 (2013): 61-92.

sons Daišan and Amin to accompany Ooba until Tielingcheng (鐵嶺城). The fact that Nurhaci passed away only two months after Ooba left for home suggests that, despite his failing health, Nurhaci exerted himself in welcoming and sending off Ooba. Also, as for Ooba's request, Nurhaci betrothed Ooba with Junje Gege, the daughter Nurhaci had adopted from his brother Šurhaci.²²

Unlike the way he treated his father-in-law Mingan *beile*, Nurhaci ranked and treated Ooba on terms equal to his sons. Nevertheless, Nurhaci could not turn a blind eye on the authority Ooba possessed as a Khorchin leader. Ahead of his meeting with Ooba, Nurhaci sent his sons Manggūltai and Hong Taiji to greet Ooba. Keeping in mind the fact that Ooba represented both wings of the Khorchins, Nurhaci personally went two miles outside his castle to welcome Ooba whom he embraced instead of allowing Ooba to kowtow. Such treatment hints that the Later Jin and the Khorchins formed an alliance as equals at the time.

Meanwhile, the privileges Nurhaci extended to Ooba were different from those extended to Enggeder of the Five Khalkhas. Enggeder and Ooba were sons-in-law to Nurhaci but the manner in which they were received implies that they were of different status in the eyes of the Later Jin. From the moment Enggeder, the son of a Bayaud leader, was dispatched to make peace with the Later Jin, he kowtowed to Nurhaci. Although Enggeder rose in rank according to custom after his submission to the Later Jin, he was treated as an equal to the offspring of Nurhaci. Ooba, on the other hand, was embraced by Nurhaci himself instead of being allowed to kowtow to him. The fact that Nurhaci personally sent Ooba off at the end of his visit demonstrated a more tight political alliance between the Later Jin and the Mongols as well as ordinary in-laws.

The rituals which Nurhaci conducted with Inner Mongolian tribal leaders wholly reflect the power dynamics at play between the Later Jin and the Mongols at the time. During the reign of Nurhaci, the Later Jin was in rivalry with Ming China and oscillating between alliance and enmity

²² *Da qing lichao shilu*, vol. 8: 401-07, the fifth lunar month of 1626.

with Inner Mongolian tribes. Securing the Manchu-Mongol alliance was definitely crucial to the Later Jin's survival. Nurhaci employed the act of embracing to show that he was in an equal and intimate relationship with Mongol leaders who were friendly toward the Later Jin, thereby strengthening the alliance. Once Hong Taiji became the Khan of the Later Jin, the Manchu regime began to gain dominance in its relations with the Mongols and this change in the Manchu-Mongol alliance affected the procedure and format of the above rituals.

Changes in Meeting Rites during the Tiancong Era

The process through which Hong Taiji strengthened his influence over the Inner Mongolia and redefined his relationships with the Mongol leaders can be explored through changes in rituals. The Manchu court prior to 1644 had been taking Manchu traditions into consideration to establish standards and procedures for rituals. The way Nurhaci and Hong Taiji treated the Mongol nobility changed according to the Later Jin's circumstances as well as their perception of and political ties with the Mongol nobility. The Mongol nobility's perception of the Later Jin can be also detected from the rituals they performed.

From 1627 when Hong Taiji's reign began, what emerged was a new ritual tradition in which to mix the act of embracing with the act of bowing on both knees.²³ When the tribal leaders of the Aohan and Naiman who had been under the command of the Chahars led their people to submit themselves to the Later Jin in the seventh month of 1627, Hong Taiji traveled two miles with *beiles* across the Liaohe River at Durbi to welcome his new subjects.²⁴ Hong Taiji offered to embrace the Aohan and Naiman leaders, but the leaders refused and chose to kowtow upon their audience with

²³ Li, *Qingdai fanbu binli yanjiu*, 64.

²⁴ *Manmunnodang yeokju* [An Annotated Translation of the Old Manchu Chronicles], Goryeo daehakgyo Minjongmunhwa yeonguwon Manmunnodang yeokjuhoe, trans. (Seoul: Somyeong chulpan, 2017), vol. Taejong 1: 146; *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizong Tiancong 7: 89, the fourth day of the seventh lunar month of 1627.

the Khan. Instead of remaining seated as the leaders kowtowed, Hong Taiji rose and stepped forward to embrace them as an expression of respect.²⁵ This meeting ritual that combined embracing with kowtowing, or bowing on both knees, thus conveyed both the authority of the Khan and the respect he wished to show to the Mongol leaders who would surrender to the Later Jin.

On the first day of the twelfth month of 1627, when Dorji Ildeng Taiji of the Alakchuote (阿拉克綽特部) under the Chahars' command led his wife, children, and people to submit themselves to the Later Jin, he knelt and kowtowed from afar alongside his followers and then approached Hong Taiji to kneel and kowtow again before embracing him.²⁶ This case involved a combination of bowing on both knees and embracing with the addition of two kowtows, one from afar and another further up close to the Khan.

Such ritualistic changes that began to occur from the first year of the Tiancong era echoed the Khan's rise to a dominant position in the Manchu-Mongol relations after having maintained an alliance of equals during Nurhaci's reign. As the tribes under the command of Ligdan Khan of the Chahars surrendered to the Later Jin one after the other, the Manchu regime was able to solidify its grip over the Inner Mongolian tribes. By then, the Mongol nobility from tribes, surrendering to the Later Jin, were no longer able to gain a rank equal to the Manchu khan Hong Taiji.

Unlike smaller tribes that succumbed to the Later Jin, the Khorchins were able to retain an equal relationship with the Later Jin as a major political and military ally, at least until the early years of Hong Taiji's reign. There was, of course, a certain degree of tension surrounding the Later Jin's dominance over the Inner Mongolian tribes at the beginning of the Tiancong era, but through marriage ties with the Manchu royal family, the Khorchins managed to settle as the most loyal outer feudatory of the Qing

²⁵ *Manmunnodang yeokju*, vol. Taejong 1: 146-49; *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizong Tiancong 7: 89-91, the fifth day of the seventh lunar month of 1627

²⁶ *Manmunnodang yeokju*, vol. Taejong 1: 176; *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizong Tiancong 8: 108, the first day of the twelfth month of 1627.

dynasty.²⁷ This status of the Khorchins during the early stage of Hong Taiji's reign can also be attributed to the internal power structure of the Manchu regime at the time. While Nurhaci was alive, Hong Taiji was but one of the four *amba beiles* alongside his brothers Daišan, Manggūltai, and Amin. Even after his enthronement, Hong Taiji had to share his power with the other three *amba beiles*. The fact that his brothers Daišan, Manggūltai, and Amin sat beside Hong Taiji facing south as government officials kowtowed to them at rituals proves that Hong Taiji's power had been far from absolute in the Tiancong era.²⁸

Hong Taiji's relations with Mongol tribes was another testament to his insecure political status shortly after his enthronement. In specific, Hong Taiji's clash with the Khorchin leader Ooba had a significant impact on the Manchu-Mongol relations for the rest of Hong Taiji's reign. As a son-in-law of Nurhaci, Ooba considered himself as equal in rank to Nurhaci's sons including Hong Taiji who later became the Khan of the Later Jin. Ooba's withdrawal of troops without orders from Hong Taiji was what sparked the conflict between Hong Taiji and Ooba but the underlying cause

²⁷ The Inner Khalkhas were on the verge of dissolution from attacks by both the Later Jin near the end of Nurhaci's reign and Ligdan Khan of the Chahars. The Jaruds who were hostile toward the Later Jin sought refuge with the Chahars whereas most of the Inner Khalkhas migrants headed to Khorchin territory. Ooba sent a letter to Hong Taiji for orders on how to deal with the Baarins and Jaruds who surrendered to the Khorchins, but secretly asked whether the migrants could settle down at an area lying between the Later Jin and Khorchin territories. Meanwhile, Hong Taiji sent a message to Khorchin tribal leaders, asking them to meet Šendu and his parents who were among the Jaruds that surrendered to the Khorchins. Refer to "Letter by Tüsiyetü Qayan to Hong Taiji regarding the Bavarin and Jaraxud tribes" and "Letter sent by Hong Taiji to the nobles of the Nayun Qorč'in urging them to build a fortress" in Nicola Di Cosmo and Bao Dalizhabu, *Manchu-Mongol Relations on the Eve of the Qing Conquest: A Documentary History* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 38-39, 144-45. Once he subdued Ooba, Hong Taiji eagerly accepted Inner Khalkha migrants, which proves that those migrants had previously been a source of tension between the Later Jin and the Khorchins. *Manmunnodang yeokju*, vol. Taejong 1: 318-21; *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizong Tiancong 14: 191-93, the twelfth lunar month of 1628.

²⁸ *Manmunnodang yeokju*, vol. Taejong 1: 5; *Manbun rōtō*, Taizong Tiancong vol. 1, the first day of the first lunar month of 1626. ". . . daci manju gurun i doru hengkilere de, amba beile, amin beile, manggūltai beile be, ilan beile be ahūn seme kunduleme han i juwe ashan de tebuhe, yaya bade inu han i adame tebure dabala, fejile teburakū bihe, . . ." [Out of respect for the elder brothers of the Khan, the *amba beiles* including Amin beile and Manggūltai beile were seated on either side of and never beneath the Khan according to Manchu customs.]

was rooted in the difference between their perceptions of each other.²⁹ From Hong Taiji's viewpoint, he had to subdue Ooba in order to gain dominance over Inner Mongolia. Ooba eventually did capitulate against Hong Taiji's hardline approach. The royal court ritual, held to receive Ooba when he came to the Later Jin to ask for a pardon, reveals the change in his relationship with Hong Taiji.

The year after Ooba withdrew troops at his own discretion, he had an audience with Hong Taiji in the first lunar month of 1629. Accompanied by the three *amba beiles* Daišan, Manggūltai, and Amin as well as other *beiles*, Hong Taiji traveled two miles outside his castle to greet Ooba. What was different from their previous meetings was the fact that on this occasion Ooba knelt before embracing Hong Taiji. Such a greeting was not meant for equals but for a hierarchical relationship. Compared to embracing, which was a gesture of intimacy between equals, adding the stage of kneeling prior to embracing signified the superiority of Hong Taiji to Ooba.³⁰ By receiving from Ooba the treatment which his father Nurhaci had declined, Hong Taiji made a statement to the outside world that the Khorchins were no longer equals to the Later Jin. Ooba's authority as a representative of the Khorchin Left Wing and Right Wing continued to be recognized thereafter but his relationship with Hong Taiji changed after Ooba began to kowtow to the Manchu khan.

After Ooba's submission, Hong Taiji declared a Manchu-Mongol joint attack on the Ming dynasty in the tenth lunar month of 1629, which prompted the Inner Mongolian tribes to convene at a designated meeting point. The following excerpt is from the *Old Manchu Chronicles* that offers a detailed description about the rituals at the time when Khorchin nobles, including Ooba, met with Hong Taiji and the Manchu nobles.

On the fifteenth (of the tenth lunar month), twenty-three *beiles* including Tūshiyetu Khan (Ooba) of the Mongol Khorchins and . . . led their

²⁹ Kusunoki, *Shinsho tai Mongoru seisakushi no kenkyū*, 117-18.

³⁰ *Qing Taizong shilu* [Veritable Records of Emperor Taizong] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), vol. 5, the fourth day of the first lunar month of 1628.

troops to meet with the Khan. Upon their arrival, the Khan came half a mile out with two *amba beiles* and several *taijis* in order to greet them. They dismounted from their horses and kneeled three times and kowtowed three times for each kneel toward the southern sky. Everyone thereafter proceeded into the tent where the Khan sat at the center. The two *amba beiles* were seated on either side of the Khan. The *taijis* were seated beside each *amba beile*. Tüshiyetu Khan and his (Mongolian) *beiles* dropped to their knees and kowtowed. Tüshiyetu Khan then approached to kowtow to and embrace the Khan. He thereafter exchanged kowtows and embraces with the two *amba beiles*. He went on to exchange kowtows and embraces with the *taijis* from the eldest to the youngest. Khongor mafa and the leaders under his command were next to step forward to kowtow to and embrace one by one the Khan, the two *amba beiles*, *taijis*, the Chahar *beiles*, (Inner) Khalkhas *beiles*, Barin *beiles*, and Jarud *beiles*. When the greetings were completed, Tüshiyetu Khan and Khongor mafa offered the Khan and the two *amba beiles* the distilled spirits they had brought. Tüshiyetu Khan and a Tumei *beile* were then seated on the right side. Khongor mafa was seated on the left side. The remaining *beiles* were assigned to sit on either side.³¹

As above mentioned, Ooba was the first to bring his nobles forward to pay his respects by kowtowing to and embracing Hong Taiji and then exchanging kowtows and embraces with the two *amba beiles*. This was followed by an exchange of greetings between the Mongol and Manchu nobles in the order of eldest to youngest, which suggests that apart from the Khan of the Later Jin, there was no difference in rank between the Manchu and Mongol nobles. Seating Ooba on the right and Khonggor mafa on the left can be understood as a means to maintain a balance between the representatives of the Khorchins' Right Wing and Left Wing.

As the Later Jin proceeded to a full-fledged war against the combined

³¹ *Manmunnodang yeokju*, vol. Taejong 1: 384-87; *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizong Tiancong 17: 233-34, the fifteenth day of the tenth lunar month of 15, 1628.

Mongol forces, the Chahars, and the Ming dynasty around 1631, the procedure of kowtowing to Hong Taiji began to grow complex and formulaic. On the sixth day of the fourth lunar month of 1631, Sun Dureng of the Ongniuds, Ooba and Khongor of the Khorchins, and the leaders of the Aru Mongols had an audience with Hong Taiji. The nobles under Sun Dureng's leadership knelt and kowtowed once from afar and when Sun Dureng stepped forward and knelt, Hong Taiji rose to receive his kowtows. When Sun Dureng knelt for the third time, Hong Taiji also knelt, kowtowed, and embraced Sun Dureng. Hong Taiji then remained seated as the nobles of Sun Dureng offered their kowtows. The Aru Khorchin leader Dalai Cuhur and his nobles went through the same procedure to present themselves to Hong Taiji.

Sun Dureng was a leader and doyen of the Ongniuds, which is why Hong Taiji stood to receive his second kowtow and joined him on his third kowtow to express mutual respect. Apart from kowtows by tribal leaders, Hong Taiji remained seated while other Mongol nobles or aristocrats kowtowed, drawing a hierarchical distinction among Mongol nobles.³² This format of greeting was also applied to the Khalkha nobles' audience with Hong Taiji a few days later on the ninth day of the fourth lunar month when the nobles of the Khorchins, the Dörben keüked, and other Mongol tribes entered into a covenant.³³

A few months earlier on the twenty-second day of the second lunar month, when Khongor *beile* of the Khorchins came to visit the Manchu royal court, Hong Taiji traveled three and a half miles with two *amba beiles* as well as a group of *taijis* and court officials in order to greet him. When Khongor *beile* and his entourage knelt and kowtowed once from afar, Hong Taiji and his *beiles* faced them and knelt to receive their greeting. When Khongor *beile* and his entourage drew closer to kneel, kowtow, and embrace, Hong Taiji rose and bent his knees to return their embrace.

³² *Manmunnodang yeokju*, vol. Taejong 1: 810-13; *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizong Tiancong 37: 497-98, the sixth day of the fourth lunar month, 1630.

³³ *Manmunnodang yeokju*, vol. Taejong 2: 818; *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizong Tiancong 37: 502, the ninth day of the fourth lunar month of 1630.

This was followed by an exchange of kneeling, kowtowing, and embracing with Daišan, Manggūltai, and the other *beiles* in the order of the eldest to the youngest.³⁴ Khongor of the Khorchins was not only Nurhaci's father-in-law, but a brother to the Khorchin chief Manggus who was Hong Taiji's father-in-law. Then, Hong Taiji showed respect for him as an elder by kneeling to receive Khongor's first kowtow and rising from his seat and bending his knees to receive Khongor's second kowtow.

The way Hong Taiji received Khongor seems more intimate and respectful than the way he treated the Ongniud leader Sun Dureng. Hong Taiji even made an exception by personally traveling three and a half miles to greet Khongor. Apart from the twenty-four-mile trip Nurhaci made to greet Mingan Taiji, the Khan of the Later Jin usually traveled one mile or two and a half miles to greet Mongol nobles or princesses. Hong Taiji's treatment of Khongor had therefore resulted from the marriage ties and political collaboration the Later Jin formed with the Khorchin Left Wing and Right Wing.³⁵

In 1631 when kneeling and kowtowing thrice while approaching the Khan from afar began to settle as the standard format of kowtowing, Hong Taiji issued a military command with several Mongol tribes to launch an expedition against Ligdan Khan of the Chahars. This military command, established through a 1631 covenant between the Mongol tribes and the Later Jin, placed the Mongol troops and leaders under the Manchu khan's command, indicating that the Later Jin was in the early stages of gaining legal control over the Mongol tribes. As the Manchu khan's authority grad-

³⁴ *Manmunnodang yeokju*, vol. Taejong 2: 778-80; *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizong Tiancong 35: 477-78, the twenty-second day of the second lunar month of 1630.

³⁵ Amba mama was a key figure in the intimate marriage ties between the Later Jin and the Khorchin Left Wing. Amba mama and her daughter-in-law Ajige mama visited the Later Jin/Qing ten times over the seventeen years of Hong Taiji's reign and six of those visits were made in the Chongde era after Hong Taiji proclaimed himself emperor. The rituals during their visits and the imperial gifts they were bestowed with will be covered in detail through future studies. For in-depth studies on the marriage ties between the Manchu royal family and the Khorchin Left Wing as well as the roles Amba mama and Ajige mama played, refer to *Du Jiaji, Qing chao Man Meng lianyin yanjiu* [A Study on Manchu-Mongol Marriages in the Qing Dynasty] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2003), 4-13; Kusunoki, *Shinsho tai Mongoru seisakushi no kenkyū*, 93-100.

ually pervaded the subjugated Inner Mongolian tribes, the procedure of rites grew complex and heavily hierarchical. Such rites varied depending not only on hierarchy, but on a Mongol noble's political prominence and level of intimacy with the Manchu khan. For instance, some Mongol leaders only kowtowed to the Khan once from afar mainly because they were powerless and their relations with the Later Jin were far less intimate.

According to Li Zhiguo's classification, there were two types of rites when the Mongol nobility were granted an audience with Hong Taiji during the Tiancong and Chongde eras.³⁶ One was the rites held when he met with the Khorchin nobility. When Hong Taiji came out to greet a Khorchin noble and his entourage, they would kowtow to Hong Taiji from a distance and step closer to offer their second kowtow, upon which Hong Taiji and his *beiles* would rise from their seats. Hong Taiji would then acknowledge their third kowtow by facing them to kneel, bow, and embrace his guests. A Mongol noble would thus kneel thrice and kowtow thrice each time he kneeled whereas Hong Taiji would only kneel once to offer a single kowtow.

There were other types of rites applied to the nobility of other Mongol tribes attending the Manchu royal court for an audience. A Mongol noble and his entourage would bow once to Hong Taiji from a distance and then the Mongol noble would approach the Khan alone to kowtow once and embrace the Khan's knees. The fact that Hong Taiji does not kowtow back and allows his knees instead of his waist to be embraced suggests that the Mongol nobles who engaged in this type of rites belonged to a status lower than those who engaged in the first type of rites. These procedures and formats that started since the Tiancong era gradually developed to accentuate the Manchu khan's authority and draw a distinction among Mongol tribes based on their political and military relations with the Later Jin.

Meanwhile, visiting the Later Jin, the Mongol nobility would first hold a meeting rite with the Khan, exchange greetings with the Mongol royal family, and pay their respects according to a certain order and proce-

³⁶ Li, *Qingdai fanbu binli yanjiu*, 65-66.

ture. As the examples mentioned above indicate, age rather than rank determined the order in which the Mongol nobility and the Manchu royal family paid their respects to each other. To put it differently, the procedure of such rites did not seem to reveal the Manchu royal family's superiority over the Mongol nobility. The greeting rituals between the Manchu *beiles* and the Mongol nobility later evolved into a set of meeting etiquettes called *xiangjianyi* (相見儀) during the Qing dynasty. *Neiwai wanggong xiangjianyi* (外王公相見儀) refers to a set of meeting etiquettes defined for meetings between the nobility of outer feudatories and the Qing royal family and nobility.

For instance, if a *waifun qinwang* (外藩親王), an outer feudatory prince of the first rank, visits a *nei qinwang* (內親王), a son or brother of the Qing emperor, the *nei qinwang* emerges from his quarters and descends the stairs to greet the *waifun qinwang*. With the *nei qinwang* standing on the left and the *waifun qinwang* standing on the right, the two proceed through the inner gate side by side and enter the host's quarters. The host stands to the east facing west while the guest stands to the west facing east to kneel twice and kowtow thrice to each other with each kneel. After exchanging greetings, the guest is seated on the west side while the host is seated on the east side. Upon concluding their meeting, the guest kneels and kowtows once, which the host thereafter replicates. Then the host accompanies the guest down the stairs to see the guest off.

If the visitor is a *waifun junwang* (外藩郡王), an outer feudatory prince of the second rank, a Manchu *nei qinwang* does not descend the stairs to greet his guest. The host waits outside his quarters to usher the guest inside once the guest reaches the top of the stairs. Inside, the guest kneels twice and kowtows thrice with each kneel and the host replies by kneeling once to kowtow thrice. When a *waifun qinwang* visits a *beile* of the Manchu royal family, the *beile* waits outside his door to greet his guest and allows the guest to cross the threshold ahead of himself. With the guest standing on the west side and the host standing on the east side, they each kneel once to exchange three kowtows. When the guest is ready to leave, the host helps the guest rise from his seat and accompanies the guest out-

side to see him off.³⁷

Meeting rites between the Manchu and the Mongol nobility were classified according to rank. The Manchu *beiles* and Mongol nobility were basically equal as per the rules of rites, but in actuality, their status was not entirely equal. The titles the Mongol nobility were bestowed with during the Qing dynasty were *heshuo qinwang* (和碩親王 Ma. *hošoi cin wang*), *duoluo junwang* (多羅郡王 Ma. *doroi giyūn wang*), *duoluo beile* (多羅貝勒 Ma. *doroi beile*),³⁸ *gushan beizi* (固山貝子 Ma. *gūsa beise*), *zhenguo gong* (鎮國公 Ma. *gurun-be dalire gung*), *fuguo gong* (輔國公 Ma. *gurun-be aisilara gung*), *taiji* (臺吉 Ma. *tayiji*), and *tabunang* (塔布囊). *Taiji* and *tabunang* were of equal rank and subdivided into the first rank, the second rank, the third rank, and the fourth rank.³⁹

Junwang was ranked below *qinwang*, which is why a Mongol *waifun junwang* was treated with less courtesy than a Mongol *waifun qinwang* when visiting a Manchu *nei qinwang*. As the host, a *nei qinwang* did not have to descend the stairs to greet a *waifun junwang* and knelt and kowtowed half as many times as the guest(s) finished kneeling and kowtowing. A *beile* was also ranked below a *qinwang* thus a Manchu *nei beile* was expected to treat a Mongol *waifun qinwang* as his superior. The level of courtesy was thus determined by rank, not by ethnicity. Yet, when a Manchu *nei qinwang* met a Mongol *waifun qinwang*, the *waifun qinwang* was expected to kneel and kowtow ahead of the *nei qinwang* even though the two were of equal rank and exchanged the same number of kowtows. This rule demonstrated that *waifun qinwangs* were of a status lower than that of *nei*

³⁷ 欽定大清會典 卷 34, 「禮部」, 「儀制清吏司」 相見禮條.

³⁸ The titles 和碩親王, 多羅郡王, 多羅貝勒 have each been transliterated according to their Manchurian pronunciation as *hošoi cin wang*, *doroi giyūn wang*, and *doroi beile*. The “i” in *hošoi* and *doroi* stands for the preposition “of” so *hošoi cin wang* can be understood as the *cin wang* of *hošo* and *doroi giyūn wang* or *doroi beile* can be understood as the *giyūn wang* or *beile* of *doro*. In Manchurian, *hošo* means corner, angle, or direction, but in Mongolian, it can be translated as *otoy*, a nomadic, social unit equivalent to the military unit *qi* (旗). The *hošo* used in titles given during the Qing dynasty is therefore assumed to be of Mongolian origin. *Doro* means duty, morality, ruling ethic, or politics.

³⁹ The titles *taiji* and *tabunang* are equal in rank. Only the Tümeds and the Kharchins had *tabunangs* while other Inner Mongolian tribes had *taijis*.

qinwangs.⁴⁰ Hence, while the Manchu royal family and the Mongol nobility may have been assigned the same titles, the Manchu royal family was recognized as superior in rank to the Mongol nobility.⁴¹

Both rites, dictated by rank, and the Manchu royal family's superiority over the Mongol nobility began to be defined from the Shunzhi era, but their origin can be traced back to 1636 when Hong Taiji established the Qing dynasty. As soon as he ascended to the throne as emperor, Hong Taiji devised a ranking system for the Manchu royal family and the Mongol nobility. What characterized the Mongol outer feudatories under Qing rule was the fact that through the ranking system their leaders became incorporated into the Qing order. Titles given to Qing imperial family members were also bestowed upon the leaders of outer feudatories to draw them into a single imperial hierarchy. Hence, in addition to the administrative, legal, and military control the Qing empire exercised over its outer feudatories, the ranking system was a means to govern such feudatories through their leaders.

Having been nominated as emperor by the Manchu, Mongol, Han Chinese nobility and officials, Hong Taiji bestowed the Mongol nobility with Manchu titles to begin absorbing them into the power structure of his imperial regime. In the tenth month of 1636, detailed instructions were announced on how a *heshuo qinwang* (Ma. *hošoi cin wang*), *duoluo junwang* (Ma. *doroi giyūn wang*), or *duoluo beile* (Ma. *doroi beile*) was expected to treat court officials and the rescripts they delivered, which were all aimed at underlining the Qing emperor's authority.⁴² Also, detailed rules were is-

⁴⁰ Oka Hiroki, "Shinchō kokka no seikaku to Mongoru ōkō" [The Characteristics of the Qing Dynasty and Mongol Princes], *Shiteki*, no. 16 (1994): 55-56.

⁴¹ According to records on *bīngke qīnglǐsī* (賓客清吏司) and *wānghuì qīnglǐsī* (王會清吏司) in the *Lifanyuan* (理藩院) section of *Da Qing huidian* (大清會典), specifically across the Kangxi (康熙), Yongzheng (雍正), and Qianlong (乾隆) versions of *Da Qing huidian*, the following hierarchy was established in the tenth year of the Shunzhi era: a Mongol *cin wang* was beneath a Manchu *cin wang*, a Mongol *giyūn wang* was beneath a Manchu *giyūn wang*, a Mongol *beile* was beneath a Manchu *beile*, a Mongol *beise* was beneath a Manchu *beise*, and a Mongol *gong* was beneath a Manchu *gong*.

⁴² *Manmunnodang yeokju*, vol. Taejong 4: 2126-30; *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizong Chongde 31: 1336-39, the sixteenth day of the tenth lunar month of 1636.

sued on how to handle weddings between the Manchu royal family and the Mongol nobility as well as their expenses.⁴³ The Mongol nobility thus began to be subjected to rites dictated by rank.

There was no rule stipulating that the Mongol nobility were ranked below the Manchu royal family but the disparity did grow apparent over the Chongde era based on the way the seats were arranged when the Manchu and Mongol nobility gathered together to attend a banquet or offer holiday greetings to the emperor. The order of bowing to the emperor was fixed: the Manchu royal family and court officials went first, followed by the Mongol nobility, and then the Han Chinese. The order among the Mongol nobility for bowing to the emperor was determined by the rank of their individual title. As leaders of outer feudatories invested by the Qing emperor, the Mongol nobility were no longer guests but standard participants in Qing rituals alongside the Manchu nobility and the Han Chinese officials.

Meeting rites between the Manchu *beiles* and the Mongol nobility were documented in detail in Manchu historical sources composed prior to 1644 as a narrative device to underscore the Manchu khan's authority over the Mongol nobility. Records of Nurhaci's reign feature how cordially the Khorchin nobility, including Mingan Taiji, were treated as allies whereas records of Hong Taiji's reign primarily highlight the "generous advantage" extended to the Inner Mongolian tribal leaders. Records of Hong Taiji's meetings with the Mongol nobility reveal how the ritual performances paved the way for a hierarchy of power with the Qing emperor at the top and the Manchu royal family, court officials, and nobility of outer feudatories below him.

The Political Significance of the 1636 Investiture Rites

In the third lunar month of 1636, forty-nine *beiles* of sixteen Mongol tribes visited the Later Jin to dedicate a title to honor the Khan.⁴⁴ And on the

⁴³ *Manmunnodang yeokju*, vol. Taejong 1: 2130-49; *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizong Chongde 31: 1339-51, the sixteenth day of the tenth lunar month of 1628.

⁴⁴ *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 28, the twenty-second of the third lunar month of 1636.

eighth day of the fourth lunar month, missives in Manchurian, Mongolian and Han Chinese nominating Hong Taiji as emperor were presented to Hong Taiji by 1) Dorgon, a *hošoi beile* of the Bordered White Banner, 2) Badari, a Tüshiyetu jinong efu, and 3) Kong Youde, a military commander (*duyuanshuai* 都元帥).⁴⁵ A few days later, Hong Taiji headed to the Temple of Heaven with Manchu, Mongol, and Han Chinese officials in order to hold a ritual to worship heaven, mark his enthronement as emperor, and proclaim the empire as Great Qing (*Da Qing* 大清) and the era name as Chongde (崇德). The Khan of the Later Jin thereby gained legitimacy to rule over the Manchus and Mongols in the Great Qing State (*Daiqing gurun* 大清國).

The enthronement ceremony on the eleventh day of the fourth lunar month, 1636 clearly displayed the Qing Empire's power structure that placed Hong Taiji at the pinnacle and consisted of power groups including members of the imperial family, the Mongol nobility as well as Mongol and Han Chinese officials. And such power groups had to be ranked in order for them to form a structure. Therefore, the first task Hong Taiji undertook as the Qing emperor was to perform investiture rites that bestowed titles on the Manchu, the Mongol nobility, and the Han Chinese officials. Such rites represented the Inner Mongolian tribal leaders' integration into the Qing court's framework of power.

Shortly after his enthronement on the eleventh day of the fourth lunar month, Hong Taiji bestowed titles on the Manchu royal family and the Mongol nobility on the twenty-third day.⁴⁶ Badari, the son of the Khorchin Right Wing leader Ooba, was given the title *hošoi tüshiyetu cin wang* while the Khorchin Left Wing leader Ukšan was given the title *hošoi joriktu cin wang*. The title *hošoi cin wang* was also given to Ligdan Khan's son Ejei also called *gurun i efu* as a son-in-law of Hong Taiji. Būteči, the Khorchin

⁴⁵ *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 28, the fourth lunar month of 1636, 己卯條.

⁴⁶ Qing titles can be grouped into those given to the Manchu imperial family, meritorious retainers, and the Mongol nobility. The rank of titles given to each group followed an identical hierarchy: *hošoi cin wang* (和碩親王), *doroi giyün wang* (多羅郡王), *doroi beile* (多羅貝勒), and *gūsa beise* (固山貝子). This framework was created early on through the investiture rites held in 1636.

Right Wing leader Ooba's brother, was invested with the title *doroi jasaytu giyūn wang*, and Manjusiri, a brother of the Khorchin Left Wing leader Ukšan, was invested with the title *doroi baturu giyūn wang*. To Hvng baturu of the Naimans the title *doroi darhan giyūn wang*, to Sun Dureng of the Ongniuds the title *doroi dureng giyūn wang*, and to *gurun i efu* Bandi of the Aohans the title *doroi giyūn wang* was given. As an elder of the Khorchin Left Wing, Khongor was titled *bingtu wang* while Dung Daicing, a brother of Sun Dureng of the Ongniuds, was titled *doroi darhan daicing*. Ömbu of the Dörben keüked was titled *doroi darhan joriktu*, Gurushiyab of the Kharchins was titled *doroi dureng*, Shamba of the Tümeds was titled *doroi darhan*, and Genggel of the Tümeds was titled *doroi hiya beile*. In addition, various rewards were bestowed upon the nobles of each Mongol tribe.⁴⁷

In total, three were given the title of *hošoi cin wang* and five were given the title of *doroi giyūn wang*. The titles of *bingtu wang*, *doroi darhan daicing*, *doroi darhan joriktu*, *doroi during*, *doroi darhan*, *doroi hiya beile* were honorary rather than formal titles. Among the fourteen men who were invested with a title, five of them were Khorchin nobles who all received high ranking titles. According to Kusunoki Yoshimichi, *bingtu wang* was not a formal title but can be considered as identical in rank to other titles that included the character *wang* (王) instead of *doroi*, *darhan*, or *daicing*.⁴⁸ Bestowing such high-ranking titles upon Khorchin leaders reflects how firm their ties had been with the Later Jin.

Besides the Khorchins, leaders of the Aohans, Naimans, Ongniuds, Dörben keükeds, Kharchins, and others were also invested with titles. Such leaders were all Borjigin nobles who were descended from Genghis Khan. As such, Hong Taiji had bestowed titles to the nobility of both the Aisin Gioro and the Borjigins. The reason Hong Taiji gave the title *hošoi cin wang* to Ligdan Khan's son Ejei was not only because Ejei married his daughter Princess Makata with the title *gurun i gungju*, but because he ac-

⁴⁷ *Manmunnodang yeokju*, vol. Taejong 3: 1619-21; *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizong Chongde 9: 1014-21 the twenty-third day of the fourth lunar month of 1636.

⁴⁸ Kusunoki, *Shinsho tai Mongoru seisakushi no kenkyū*, 171, 182.

knowledgeed Ejei's legitimacy as a direct descendant of Genghis Khan.

Hong Taiji thus sought to gain legitimacy for his rule over the Mongols by having a direct descendant of the Yuan imperial family as his son-in-law. As a *gurun i efu*, Ejei was granted the privilege of being invested with *hošoi cin wang*, a title of the first rank within the Manchu imperial family. Bandi of the Aohans was also a *gurun i efu* from marrying Hong Taiji's eldest daughter. The Khorchin nobles, who were given these titles, had marriage ties with members of the Manchu imperial family including Hong Taiji himself. Hence, the investiture rites of the Manchu and Mongol nobility were in a sense meant to display their firm political and military alliance as well as their familial ties formed through marriage.

A few days later on the twenty-seventh day of the fourth lunar month, Hong Taiji respectively gave the titles *ginggun ijishūn wang* (恭順王), *gūnin ijishūn wang* (懷順王), and *bodohonggo ijishūn wang* (智順王) to the Ming generals Kong Youde (孔有德), Geng Zhongming (耿仲明), and Shang Kexi (尚可喜) who surrendered to the Qing dynasty.⁴⁹ Other Han Chinese officials were also promoted commensurate to their contributions. Whereas the investiture rites for the Manchu imperial family and the Mongol nobility were held on the same day, the Han Chinese were excluded from such rites and bestowed with titles on a different day. Kusunoki Yoshimichi pointed out that the investiture rites were fairly characteristic of a Chinese dynasty but the Qing governance framework, stemming from such rites, featured "North Asian" traits.

The North Asian framework, Kusunoki Yoshimichi previously mentioned, refers to an Inner Asian power structure that revolves around a Khan and consists of the royal family, aristocrats, and the troops under their command. In the case of the Qing dynasty, the structure was concentric with Hong Taiji and the three banners under his direct command at the center, surrounded by the Manchu *beiles* and the five banners under their control. The Manchu-centered formation was supported by Mongol tribal lead-

⁴⁹ *Manmunnodang yeokju*, vol. Taejong 3: 1633-36; *Manbun rōtō*, vol. Taizong Chongde 9: 1023-25, the twenty-seventh day of the fourth lunar month of 1636.

ers and the outer banners they governed. This structure tends to have been ideologically reinforced through the investiture rites for the Manchu and Mongol nobility.⁵⁰

There are several different discussions with respect to the Qing order but they commonly acknowledge its stratification. In other words, the framework had a dual structure: a Chinese dynastic structure with the emperor at the core encircled by the central government, regional governments, tributaries, and trading partners on the one hand and a governance system revolving around the Khan who is surrounded by the imperial family, eight banners, outer feudatories, and governors (Ma. *jasak*) on the other.⁵¹ When stating the purpose of holding investiture rites, Hong Taiji mentioned that he “draws no distinction between inner (Ch. *nei* 內) and outer (Ch. *wai* 外) and considers them as one,” indicating that the outer Mongol nobility was as much a core component of the Qing order as the inner Manchu imperial family.⁵² The Han Chinese, however, were given non-

⁵⁰ Kusunoki, *Shinsho tai Mongoru seisakushi no kenkyū*, 173.

⁵¹ Kataoka Kazutada, “Chōga kitei kara mita shinchō to gaihan, chōkō koku no kankei” [The Qing Dynasty System through Policies toward Its Outer Feudatories and Tributaries], *Komazawa shigaku*, no. 52 (1998): 259-61.

⁵² Kusunoki, *Shinsho tai Mongoru seisakushi no kenkyū*, 173. Kusunoki Yoshimichi examined Manchu records on the emperor’s enthronement in 1636 included in Vol. 11 of *Manwen guoshiyun-dang* (滿文國史院檔) housed at the Chinese First Historical Archives (中國第一歷史檔案館). The records had been kept in the same box as Vol. 10 of *Manwen guoshiyun-dang* that contained the records related to the ceremony for Hong Taiji’s enthronement as emperor that Ishibashi Takao examined. The records related to Hong Taiji’s enthronement ceremony are filed under the Manchurian title *Fulgıyan singgeri aniya duin biyai de narhūn bithe han be amba soorin toktobuha tangse*, which can be translated as “A Secret (or Detailed) Record of the Khan’s Enthronement as Emperor in the fourth lunar month of 1636.” The records offer details regarding the Qing emperor’s enthronement ceremony but do not mention anything regarding the process through which Hong Taiji became appointed as emperor. That process has been documented in a separate book, which Ishibashi Takao referred to as *Chongde yuannian fengwang beile shu* (崇德元年封王貝勒書). Since the original source is inaccessible, the quoted phrase is a requote from Kusunoki Yoshimichi’s paper/book. Through *A Secret (or Detailed) Record of the Khan’s Enthronement as Emperor in the fourth Lunar Month of 1636*, Ishibashi Takao analyzed the circumstances under which Hong Taiji transformed from the Khan of the Later Jin to the emperor of the Qing dynasty and the process through which the emperor gained power within a multi-ethnic state. Ishibashi Takao 石橋崇雄, “清初の皇帝權の形成過程—特に”丙子四年四月<秘録>登ハシ大位檔”にみえる太宗ホンタイジの皇帝即位記事を中心として—” [The Formation of the Power of the Early Qing

standard titles through investiture rites that were carried out separately, which implies that they were peripheral to the North Asian framework upon which the Qing order was grounded.⁵³

After the 1636 investiture rites, kneeling thrice and kowtowing nine times settled as a standard greeting ritual for the Mongol nobility when they met the Qing emperor. This switch from the act of embracing, which signaled a more equal and friendly relationship, meant that the Mongols submitted themselves to the Khan of the Later Jin and became integrated into the Manchu regime's power structure. The rituals, practiced during the transition from embracing to kneeling and kowtowing, suggests that the Manchu regime gradually transformed its Mongol allies into its outer feudatories (Ma. *tulergi golo*). Rituals in early Qing therefore not only reflected changes in its external relations but served as a means to visually expand and reproduce the authority of the Khan/Qing emperor. And the definitive among such rituals was the enthronement ceremony and investiture rites in 1636.

Conclusion

At the time when Hong Taiji succeeded Nurhaci as Khan, eight *beiles* were jointly overseeing the state affairs of Aisin gurun, which made it impossible for any one of the *beiles* to arbitrarily exercise power. To keep other *beiles* in check and take exclusive control over the state, Hong Taiji remodeled central organs after the Ming system and appointed Manchus, Mongols, and Han Chinese outside the imperial family as government officials.⁵⁴ Still, there were powerful *beiles* dominating each banner (Ma. *gūsa* 旗) and taking part in a stable council that continued to determine state af-

Emperors: The Significance of the Ascension of Hong Taiji as Emperor of the Da-Qing Empire According to the Manchu Archives, Fulgiyan Singgeri Aniya Duin Biya (i) DE (Narhun Bithe) Han Be Amba Soorin Toktobuha Tangse], *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 53, no. 1 (1994): 98-135.

⁵³ Kusunoki, *Shinsho tai Mongoru seisakushi no kenkyū*, 174.

⁵⁴ Liu Xiaomeng, *Yejin burageseo Manju gukgaro* [From a Jurchen Settlement to a Manchu State], Lee Hun, Lee Sun-ae, and Kim Seon-min, trans. (Seoul: Pureun yeoksa, 2013), 394-424.

fairs. Under such circumstances, external factors such as battling with the Chahars and the Ming dynasty and establishing relations with Mongol tribes played a crucial role as Hong Taiji strove to gain dominance. And during this period, the Manchu-Mongol relations underwent changes at an unprecedentedly new phase.

Under Nurhaci's reign, the Inner Mongolian tribes interacted with the Later Jin on fairly equal terms that allowed a certain degree of compromise. However, after Hong Taiji ascended to the position of Khan, the balance of power shifted to the Later Jin. Hong Taiji had the Manchus join forces with the Mongols, designated the Chahars and the Ming dynasty as their common enemy, and secured an advantage over the Khorchin Right Wing leader Ooba. Such changes in the Manchu-Mongol relations subsequently altered rituals involving the Inner Mongolian tribes in a way that would more prominently display Hong Taiji's authority. Meeting rites between the Manchu khan and the Mongol nobility grew standardized and hierarchical. A stark example of this new phase was the ceremony for Hong Taiji's enthronement as the Qing emperor. The embraces Nurhaci exchanged with Mongol nobles reflected how the Later Jin was in desperate need of allies. The act of kowtowing, then, was introduced to meeting rites as Hong Taiji began to dominate Inner Mongolian tribes and after the investiture rites in 1636, the act settled down in the form of three kneels and nine kowtows.

Through rituals, the Manchu regime attempted to visually highlight the Khan's superiority over the Mongol nobility and create a hierarchy among Mongol tribes to differentiate them based on their relative political importance. For instance, the Khorchins were an important ally to the Later Jin, but Hong Taiji's attitude toward its left wing and right wing was different. As leader of the Khorchin Right Wing, Ooba served as the representative of both wings to form intimate political and military relations with the Later Jin since Nurhaci's reign. However, from Hong Taiji's perspective, Ooba had to be subdued in order to increase his own influence over the Inner Mongolian tribes. To check Ooba, Hong Taiji strengthened his marriage ties with Manggus of the Khorchin Left Wing and displayed his intimacy with Manggus' family through rituals. After withdrawing his troops

without Hong Taiji's consent, Ooba eventually succumbed to pressure from Hong Taiji and personally traveled to Shenyang to kneel and embrace Hong Taiji's knees, viz., a gesture that symbolized his recognition of the Manchu khan's superiority.

In the process of monopolizing power, Hong Taiji actively recruited officials among the Han Chinese to refer to the Ming dynasty's institutional practices in reforming his own government. The investiture rites for the Manchu imperial family, Mongol nobles, Han Chinese generals, and empresses and royal concubines as well as the rules for greeting envoys, established around the time of Hong Taiji's enthronement ceremony, resembled Han Chinese traditions. These series of rituals and rules were further standardized and refined beyond 1644. Yet, rather than simply imitating the rites of the Ming dynasty, the Qing dynasty shaped them in more detail according to Manchu cultures, traditions, and politics instrumental to its relations with the Mongols.

As the Manchu regime redefined its relations with the Mongols, rituals not only reflected the dominance the Khan of the Later Jin gained over the Mongols, but also visually contributed to the expansion and reinforcement of the Khan's authority. The ritual of offering three kneels and nine kowtows served as a means to widely declare that the Manchu khan stood at the pinnacle of a political structure that encompassed both the Manchus and Mongols. The Manchu imperial family and the Mongol nobility were expected to take part in rituals in the order of seniority so as to demonstrate that the Manchus and the Mongols belonged to the same family. Meanwhile, such rituals revealed a distinct hierarchy among the Mongol nobles depending on their political importance and the level of intimacy with the Khan of the Later Jin, viz., a refined political ideology embedded in the new rituals at that time.

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Debates over Military Use of Koreans before and after the March First Independence Movement

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Debates over Military Use of Koreans before and after the March First Independence Movement*

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Introduction

World War I is considered to have significantly impacted all countries around the globe in regard to their politics, economies, societies, militaries, cultures, and philosophies. Japan was no exception. In particular, two trends affected the ruling order of Imperial Japan. First, as the empires of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottomans dissolved after their defeats and post-war settlements, the drive for independence, spurred by Vladimir Lenin's and Woodrow Wilson's proclamation of national self-determination, rose worldwide among colonized peoples. Second, imperial nations, such as Britain and France, mobilized local people and material resources from their colonies in India, Indochina, and Africa for their war efforts.¹ Follow-

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¹ The Japanese army also seems to have been interested in mobilizing people and resources from its colonies. For instance, the Special Military Investigation Committee (臨時軍事調査委員), which had been formed in September 1915 to research World War I, requested resident military officers stationed in western countries to collect information on the war in September 1918. The information that they requested included "the types and formations of colonial troops, especially those comprised of different races, and their values." See "The Submission of Full Accounts




Figure 1. King Yeongchin, Lee Eun, and Commander of the Korea-Stationed Japanese Forces, Matsukawa Toshitane (*Maeil Sinbo*, January 20, 1918, 3)

ing the end of World War I and in the wake of colonial Korea’s March First Independence Movement (hereafter, March First Movement), Japan also sought to reshuffle its imperial institutions including the army.

The Japanese forces stationed in Korea were the physical foundation for Imperial Japan’s rule of colonial Korea. Research on these forces has mainly been concerned with either their institutional formation along with its name changes to *Hanguk juchagun* (韓國駐劄軍) (lit., Korea-Stationed Forces) during the Russo-Japanese War to *Joseon juchagun* (朝鮮駐劄軍) (lit., Joseon-Stationed Forces) and then to *Joseon-Gun* (朝鮮軍) (lit., Joseon Forces), or the role of the *Joseon-Gun* (hereafter, KSJF, an abbreviation of Korea-Stationed Japanese Forces, to avoid confusion with native Korean or Joseon troops) in the suppression of resistance and independence movements in Korea while being in the vanguard of Japan’s conti-

 on Duties” [業務願未書提出の件] (The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, JACAR Ref. C03025405000, Image no. 92 [歐受大日記], Taisho thirteenth year [大正13年・3冊之内其3], Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies).

mental invasion in wartime.²

This study, however, explores the Imperial Japanese troops in Korea from a different angle by focusing on how the KSJF sought to use Koreans for military purposes as a means to facilitate Korea's assimilation to Japan before and after the March First Movement. In order to examine this issue, this article looks into the KSJF's thoughts on the military use of Koreans in the early days of the annexation,³ the KSJF's and its commander Utsunomiya Tarō's (宇都宮太郎) pre- and post-measures regarding the March First Movement,⁴ debates within the Japanese army over the military use of Koreans, and how all of these issues were later reflected in the volunteer recruit and conscription systems of Korean enlistees.⁵

Keeping in view the KSJF's dual role in colonial Korea as the main agent of repression of the Korean independence movement and as a facilitator of the 'assimilation' policy regarding the Koreans, this article inquires into (1) how the Japanese army discussed the military use of Koreans and the reinforcement of the KSJF on this account, and (2) how the March First

² Examples of such research are, Sin Ju-back and Chung Young-hwan, trans., "Chōsengun gaishi" [A history of Korea-stationed Japanese forces], in *Guntai to Seiboryoku: Chosen hanto no 20-Seiki* [Military and sexual violence: The 20th century of the Korean Peninsula], ed., Song Youn-ok and Kim Young (Tokyo: Gendai Shiryo Shuppan, 2010); Seo Min Gyo, "Kankoku chusatsugun no keisei kara Chōsen-gun e: Josetsu shidan no tanjō" [From the Formation of the Korea-Stationed Forces to Joseongun: The Birth of Permanently Stationing Forces], in *Chiki no Naka no Guntai* [The troops in the region], ed., Sakamoto Yūichi, vol. 7, *Teikoku shihai no Saizensen, Shokuminchi* [The Frontline of Imperial Rule, a Colony] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2015); and Anzako Yuka, "Chōsen ni josetsu saretā dai ichikyu-shidan to dai ni-shidan" [The Permanently Stationed Japanese Army in Korea—the nineteenth and second Divisions], in *Sakamoto Yūichi*, vol. 7.

³ Park Choengho, "Kindai Nihon," 233; Lee Hyung-sik, "Joseon heonbyeong saryeonggwan Tachibana Koichirō and mudantongchi: Tachibana Koichirō ilgilul jungsimuro" [Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Military Police in Korea Tachibana Koichirō and Military Rule: With a Focus on Tachibana Koichirō's diaries], *Minjok munhwa yeongu* [Korean Cultural Studies] 57 (2012): 292-98; Lee H. *Chōsen sōtokufu*, 42-45.

⁴ Kira, "Utsunomiya Tarō Kankei shiryō," *Shisō* 46 (2005); Kim Dong-Myung, *Jibaewa Jeohang*, 42-49; Kira and Miyamoto, 解題 大正時代中期の宇都宮太郎: 第四師団長・朝鮮軍司令官・軍事参議官時代, in *Nippon rikugun* 3, Utsunomiya Tarō Kankei shiryō Kenkyūkai, ed. Miyamoto, "Utsunomiya Tarō to Chōsen shihai," in *Kindai Nihon*, ed., Yasuda and Cho (2010).

⁵ Tobe, "Chōsen chuton Nippongun," 399-405.

Movement affected the Japanese army's view. Various historical documents and records of that period, however, indicate that the KSJF sought aggressively to use Koreans for military purposes from around the time of the annexation and that its endeavor became more obvious amid the shock of the March First Movement. This article also points to the fact that the KSJF's request for troop reinforcements were intended not only to consolidate its military control of Korea but also to prepare for hiring Koreans for the Japanese army. However, the Japanese Army Central was consistently reluctant to make a move. Let us start with two opposing stances regarding use of Koreans for military purposes in the Japanese army.

The Japanese Army's View of Native Troops before the Annexation of Korea

Japan achieved its first colony on foreign soil, Taiwan, after its victory in the war with Qing, which ensued from 1894 to 1895. Immediately after the Qing-Japan War and the subsequent conquest of Taiwan, a member of Department Three of the General Staff, Akashi Motojiro (明石元二郎), surveyed Taiwan, French Indochina, and Thailand, accompanying the deputy department head of the General Staff, Kawakami Sōroku (川上操六), from October 1896 to January of the following year. This expedition aimed to research France's colonial policies and Akashi particularly stated that one of his set goals was to research "the regimentation and training of native soldiers and the proportion of the French officers involved in these tasks."⁶

Based on his research during this survey trip, Akashi wrote "Opinions on Taiwan Survey Trip (J. Taiwan-to shinsatsu iken 臺灣島視察意見)," in which he proposed to hire colonial Taiwanese as native troops:

⁶ In addition to the matter of native soldiers, Akashi also included in his goals to investigate the nature, training, weapon provision, and age of village guard corps (護郷兵), comprised of locals that France organized, trained, and gave weapons for protecting their own villages. Refer to Murata Yasusada, ed., *Akashi Taishō Etsunan Nikki* [General Akashi's Vietnam Diary] (Tokyo: Nikkō Shoin, 1944), 133.

It is necessary to employ natives for military purposes. Experience so far has proven that deploying elite troops from the homeland not only costs an enormous amount of money but also can cause many soldiers to fall ill who are not accustomed to the local climate. Therefore, we have to employ native soldiers to aid our troops and seek to reduce the burden on the state coffers.⁷

Having learned from bitter experience in the conquest war of Taiwan,⁸ Akashi was advising Imperial Japan to recruit Taiwanese to the army and have them aid the occupying Japanese troops so as to save on deployment costs and prevent the loss of forces from endemic diseases. Drawing from the precedents of Western empires, he argued for organizing native troops so that Japan could “eliminate harmful natives by natives” without sending elite Japanese troops to clamp down on “herds of local rebels and bandits,” thus adopting the ‘divide and rule’ strategy against the colonized people.⁹

At the same time, Akashi was also aware of the risks of having Taiwanese in the Japanese army. He cautioned that the ratio of natives to Japanese soldiers was the most important matter:

The smaller number of Japanese troops than that of the native soldiers will undermine the authority of the former, and furthermore can lead to questioning the capability of the Empire. . . . Therefore, we must equip the Japanese troops to overpower the native soldiers and assign only Japanese in commanding positions to control them. If we do thus, native units will be undoubtedly useful to us.¹⁰

⁷ Akashi Taisho Etsunan Nikki, 162. Henceforth, in all citations, editorial comments are marked in square brackets, and all year specifications follow the western calendar.

⁸ Japan landed its troops in northern Taiwan in May 1895 after the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty but ended up losing over 10,000 soldiers by March of the following year due to the fight against fiercely resisting natives and local illnesses (Yūichi Sakamoto, *Teikoku Shihai*, 17-18).

⁹ Akashi Taisho Etsunan Nikki, 162-63.

¹⁰ Ibid., 162.

Then, what did Akashi estimate to be the ideal number of troops in Taiwan and the ratio between Japanese and Taiwanese soldiers? Most of all, he emphasized keeping three mixed brigades in order to quell local resistance with an insufficient police force and to defend Taiwan on their own in an emergency.¹¹ Then he proposed recruiting Taiwanese into the military from late 1897, with a detailed plan as follows:

Each infantry brigade shall hire 500 native infantrymen in December 1897. If its outcome is satisfactory, then it should continue to recruit 500 natives every year. . . . By increasing the number of native soldiers, we can reduce the deployment of soldiers from the homeland . . . thus by the sixth year, the imperial army in Taiwan will consist of 3 Japanese infantry regiments—9 battalions (a ratio of one Japanese regiment per brigade)—and 3 native regiments—that is, one native regiment per brigade. Hence, each defense infantry brigade in Taiwan will comprise one regiment of Japanese soldiers and one regiment of native soldiers.¹²

As shown above, Akashi proposed that each infantry brigade be comprised of one Japanese regiment and one Taiwanese regiment, reaching a total one-half Japanese and one-half Taiwanese in the army by the sixth year of recruiting Taiwanese soldiers. The Taiwanese units were advised to be led by Japanese officers while cavalry, artillery, and engineering units to be comprised solely of Japanese. Still, his proposal of organizing the occupying army with nearly the same numbers of Japanese and Taiwanese soldiers was considerably bold given the continuing local resistance at that time.¹³

¹¹ Ibid., 164-65. However, the troops in Taiwan were gradually reduced to two mixed brigades in 1902 and then to two infantry regiments (= one brigade) in 1907.

¹² Ibid., 167.

¹³ Masami Kondō points out in his article “Chōheirei” that Governor-Generals of Taiwan, Nogi Maresuke (乃木希典) and Kodama Gentarō (兒玉源太郎) made a few attempts at using Taiwanese for military purposes such as forming “village guard corps” (non-Han Taiwanese only) and recruiting “volunteer soldiers” (Han Chinese only) with an aim of implementing the conscription policy in the future, but they were all stopped in 1903. This failure, according to Kondō, provided grounds to believe that the conscription of natives was premature.

Having managed to win the Russo-Japanese War from 1904 to 1905, Japan established a Resident-General in the Korean Empire (hereafter, Korea) and made it a protectorate. In 1907, Japan ousted Emperor Gojong for having sent secret envoys to The Hague Peace Conference and disbanded the Korean military. In consequence, “righteous army” activities surged in Korea. Akashi was posted in the commander position of the military police in Korea in October 1907. In a letter to Army Minister Terauchi Masatake (寺内正毅) in May 1908, Akashi requested the deployment of more military police from Japan to clamp down on Korean righteous army soldiers and made a proposal to recruit a sufficient number of Koreans as military police assistants under the Japanese military police.¹⁴

In order to enhance the capability of quell and defense, we should have the Korean government cover the expenditure to hire about 4,000 Koreans to aid the clamp-down agency. . . . My plan is to have one Japanese military policeman monitor with two Korean assistants following the examples of other countries, which are generally maintaining the ratio of two natives to one homeland soldier. However, we will not apply the conscription law to the Koreans but instead will recruit volunteers in order to have as many Korean civilian gunners apply as possible. We will also emulate the European system of hiring natives in their colonies (Akashi Motojirō’s letter to Terauchi Masatake, dated May 3, 1908).¹⁵

Akashi hoped Koreans to play in the assistant role of military police by way of adopting the Western model that utilized natives for military pur-

¹⁴ In 1907, the actual number of military policemen stationed in Korea amounted to 797 (all Japanese) in total. By the next year, however, the number of Japanese military policemen nearly tripled to 2,398 and 4,234 Korean military police assistants were added, resulting in 6,632 military police personnel all together, nearly eight times more than the previous year. See Matsuda Toshihiko, “Kaisetsu Chōsen kenpei-tai shoshi” [A Brief History of Military Police in Korea with Comments and Analyses], in *Chōsen Kenpeitai Rekishi* [The History of Military Police in Korea], Chōsen Kenpeitai Shireibu, ed. (Reprint, Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 2000), vol. 1: 4.

¹⁵ *Terauchi Masatake ate Akashi Motojirō Shokan* [Akashi Motojirō’s letters to Terauchi Masatake], Shōyūkurabu Shiryōchōsashitsu et al., ed. (Tokyo: Shōyū Kurabu, 2014), 20-21.



Figure 2. Akashi Motojirō, Commander of the Japanese Military Police in Korea, Attending the Graduation Ceremony of the Military Police Assistants (*Maeil Sinbo*, June 1, 1913, 1)

poses. He further encouraged recruiting “civilian gunners,” including disbanded Korean soldiers, to curb the combat capacity of the righteous army and to divide the Koreans for the benefit of the imperial ruler.¹⁶ This proposal of Akashi was fundamentally identical to the native military units proposed in his Taiwan report.¹⁷

However, Akashi thought that the ratio of Korean assistants versus Japanese military policemen should be two to one while the ratio of native soldier to Japanese soldiers one to one in Taiwan. Akashi seemed to assume that Koreans could be controlled with a smaller number of Japanese.

¹⁶ Akashi cited to then Resident-General of Korea, Itō Hirobumi (伊藤博文), the following three advantages of installing the Korean military police assistant system and succeeded in obtaining his approval: ① It can expand the capacity of the military police at a low cost; ② The Korean assistants can be utilized as interpreters for the military police; ③ It will absorb some portion of the disbanded Korean troops, thus weakening the righteous army. See *Chōsen Kenpeitai Rekishi*, vol. 1, 227.

¹⁷ For more discussion on the formation of the military police assistant system and its implications, see: Lee Sung-hee, *Kankoku Heigō*, 95-108; Matsuda, *Nihon no Chōsen*, 54-57.

The rationale for this judgment is not clear but Akashi enclosed an article cut from *The Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun*, which claimed, “The Japanese military police are enjoying an unexpectedly good reputation and trust in Korea.”¹⁸ This optimistic perception of the Korean reactions toward Japan and its military police might have been the reason behind his thought regarding the higher native force proportion in Korea.

However, Korean and Japanese bureaucrats in Korean Internal Affairs and the National Police Department went against Akashi’s Korean military police assistant project and instead insisted on hiring them as regular police. Akashi refuted this idea in that “disregarding the ratio between Japanese and Koreans in the military will end up exponentially increasing the potential danger” and that having Korean assistants work under the Japanese military police “will make it easier to watch and supervise” them.¹⁹ As in his plan of hiring Taiwanese soldiers, this refutation shows that Akashi put importance on the ratio of Japanese versus Korean soldiers to watch and control the armed Koreans in the Japanese military.

By this time, Japan had greatly expanded its imperial domain by acquiring Russian sovereignty in South Manchuria and South Sakhalin and seizing Korea as a protectorate after its victory in the Russo-Japanese War. However, the Japanese army was suffering severe financial strain due to its immense wartime expenditures and had to balance the wartime budget for the war with Russia and the military budget for the imperial rule over its expanded territory.

During this critical time after the Russo-Japanese War, Tanaka Giichi (田中義一) took charge of the practical affairs of Japan’s army reform to emerge as the new leader of the Chōushūbatsu (長州閥) in the army. He sent a letter to Terauchi in August 1905, while serving as a staff officer in the Manchuria State, and argued for the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria as soon as the peace treaty with Russia was signed. Then he urged

¹⁸ This is from the same letter, dated May 3, 1908 (*Akashi Shokan* 22), and the news article, entitled “*Nihon kenpei no kōhyō* (日本憲兵の好評),” which means ‘Praises for Japanese military police,’ was dated March 22.

¹⁹ Akashi’s letter to Terauchi, dated May 8, 1908, *Akashi Shokan* 24.

Japan to “take a utilitarian stance and give priority to economic interest” and to protect its rights and interests in Manchuria and Korea by stationing a large force there at Qing’s expense. Regarding the postwar armaments against Russia, he strongly advised Japan to “concentrate on substantiality rather than expansion without any random investment in massive careless expansion.”²⁰ Thus, Tanaka placed importance on economics in the postwar policy of Japanese army armament and the policy on the continent.

While the Ministry of Army and the General Staff were in dispute over the level of the postwar armament, Tanaka wrote “Writings of Random Thoughts” 隨感雜錄 from April to July 1906 and suggested a broad postwar policy. When Terauchi and Yamagata Aritomo (山縣有朋) received the proposal, Yamagata immediately requested Tanaka to compose a national defense policy draft and this draft became the foundation of the imperial defense policy formulated in April 1907.²¹

In his proposal “Writings of Random Thoughts,” Tanaka suggested a few measures to contrive the expenses necessary to maintain and expand the postwar armament. Those measures included downsizing each division headquarters, economizing clothing, reducing the number of officer horses, and ceasing the medal annuity to active officers, as well as “reorganizing the troops stationed in Korea.”

The issue that requires of us the most thorough consideration is whether we need to maintain the current volume of armaments in Manchuria and Korea. . . . The troops stationed in these areas [the south and west of Korea] do not have any strategic value [against Russia] but are solely for the purpose of maintaining the security of Korea. Then the cost of the two deployed divisions almost amounts to that of four homeland divisions, and most of the cost should be covered by the budget of the

²⁰ Terauchi Masatake’s letter to Tanaka Giichi, dated August 29, 1905, “Terauchi Masatake Sekigakari bunsho” [Terauchi Masatake documents] (The Modern Political and Constitutional History Collection of the Japanese National Diet Library), 315-18.

²¹ Kitaoka, *Nippon Rikugun* 9.

Korean government other than that of the Japanese army.²²

What Tanaka argued here is that the duty of the Japanese troops in Korea was essentially to prepare for war with Russia and that maintaining public order within Korea should be the responsibility of its Resident-General or the police. On this premise, he proposed that Japan reorganize the Korea-stationed troops from two divisions to one mixed brigade for “the purpose of military operations” and one weak division of volunteers financed by the Korean government, “special troops for political purposes,” or alternatively to one division should the former suggestion not be feasible.²³ Ultimately, the Japanese army reduced its forces in Korea to one division in February 1907, thereby saving on its military budget and instead building two new divisions.

Furthermore, Tanaka insisted that the Korean government shoulder the entire cost for occupying Japanese forces since they were maintaining order in lieu of the Korean government. He claimed, “The Korean army, which cannot even maintain order and peace in its own territory, should be dissolved and its budget must finance our forces in Korea.” However, he was opposed to employing Koreans for military purposes as the British Empire did with native Indians for the following reasons:

From what I have heard, the Korean government plans to invite a few of our infantry officers as advisors and have them reshape their troops. . . . This kind of palliative measure will be a source of trouble in the future and anyone who knows the unique character of the Koreans, apt

²² Tanaka Giichi, *Writings on Random Thoughts* 『隨感雜錄』 (*Tanaka Giichi Kankei Bunsho* [Tanaka Giichi documents], vol. 7 (The Modern Political and Constitutional History Collection of the Japanese National Diet Library, Original copy in Yamaguchi Prefectural Archives): 210-11. Since this document is very long, I have included the page numbers in the Japanese Parliament Library for convenience. There are many parts that have been modified and written over in this document. This modified version was transcribed by Kurono Taeru in April 1995 and October 1997. “Tanaka Giichi Chusa shuki,” *Suikan zatsu roku*, vols. 1-2 田中義一中佐手記『隨感雜錄』第一・二回, *Kaigunshi kenkyū* vols. 3-4 『海軍史研究』第3・4号.

²³ Tanaka Giichi, *Random Thoughts*, 213.

at sneaky and sly tricks in the least, will not be deluded into adopting the British system of employing native Indian soldiers. We must proceed to disband the Korean army immediately and seize Korea's military sovereignty so as to prevent future trouble and establish the foundation of our reign.²⁴

While Akashi proposed hiring Koreans as assistants to Japanese military police to crack down on Korean resistance fighters, Tanaka opposed the military use of Koreans, claiming it a “delusion” to keep order within the peninsula. Tanaka's opposition was grounded on the following three reasons: (1) his prejudice of “the unique character of the Koreans”; (2) his conviction of disbanding the Korean army to be the groundwork for colonizing Korea in the future; and (3) his consistent emphasis on finances concerning armament and continental expansion after the Russo-Japanese War.

As discussed so far, Akashi proposed using Taiwanese and Koreans for military purposes following the examples of Western empires in order to reduce the cost of maintaining occupying forces and to divide the locals against themselves. Nevertheless, he was also aware of the risk of arming and accepting the colonized locals under the Japanese military. Therefore, according to his reinforcement plan, Japan should keep three mixed brigades, comprised of an equal number of Japanese and Taiwanese soldiers in Taiwan, and increase the presence of military police in Korea at a ratio of two Korean police assistants per one Japanese military policeman. On the other hand, Tanaka, devising military strategies during the Russo-Japanese War and planning armament policies as a crucial figure in the Army Central, did prioritize the economic and military rationality. Thus, he strongly believed that the Japanese troops stationed in Korea, unable to conduct military operations against Russia, needed to be cut and that the Korean troops, incapable of maintaining order within their own country, were simply a source of potential trouble to be stamped out. In addition, he ada-

²⁴ Ibid., 212.

manly rejected the idea of accepting Koreans in the Japanese military due to his prejudice against the Koreans.

The KSJF's Stance on the Military Use of Koreans before and after the March First Movement

In August 1910, Japan finally colonized Korea through an annexation treaty. Colonial Korea was still left with three groups of soldiers and para-soldiers. The first group was 760 of the last members of the Korean Empire's military, who had remained even after the troop disbandment in 1907 for the purpose of guarding palaces or conducting ceremonies for the Korean imperial house, but ultimately the entire organization had been abolished in 1909. Then, they were officially labeled *Joseon gunin* (hereafter, *Joseon soldiers*); some of them assigned to the headquarters of Japan's occupying forces or to the military police and some were absorbed into the Korean infantry or cavalry units. The second group was the cadets trained by Japanese specialists commissioned by the Korean Empire in 1909. After the annexation, 33 of them completed Japanese military academy training in 1914 to 1915 and were appointed second lieutenants in the Japanese army where they were called *Joseonin Janggyo* (hereafter as *Joseon officers*).²⁵ The third group comprised approximately 4,500 military police assistants to the Japanese military police. They were stipulated to be treated similarly to army privates or to corporals and receive uniforms almost identical to those of military police sergeants.

Immediately after the annexation, as pointed out in previous studies, high-ranking Japanese officers stationed in Korea were optimistic—at least outwardly—regarding the process of Korean assimilation into Japan colonial rule and the possibility of enforcing conscription on the colonial Koreans in the future. The rationale behind this optimism was the presence of the *Joseon soldiers* and Korean military police assistants. For instance,

²⁵ For an overall explanation on the *Joseon soldiers* and *Joseon officers*, see Lee Kidong, *Bigeukui Gunindeul*, 19-28.




Figure 3. Korean Cadets Graduating from the Japanese Military Academy in the 27th Class after the Annexation (*Maeil Sinbo*, June 19, 1915, 3).

Akashi, military police commander of Korea created the position of military police assistant, expressed his optimism on ‘assimilating’ the Koreans by stating that “Korean military police assistants and police assistants have all progressed so much that they now appear hardly distinguishable from Japanese military police or regular police at first glance. Furthermore, their mindset has become similar to that of the Japanese.”²⁶ Tachibana Koichirō (立花小一郎), chief of the Japanese occupation forces in Korea, also voiced his optimism to cite the example of Korean laborers during the Qing-Japan War: “The Koreans are by no means unsuitable for soldiers. Indeed, they must be cultivated and prepared to be loyal and honorable Japanese soldiers in the future.”²⁷ Iguchi Shōgo (井口省吾), commander of the *Joseon-Juchagun* or Japanese occupation forces in Korea, was yet another example of these optimists. He said, “[Korean soldiers] show excellent performance and are not dangerous at all, as some would think. They are very obedient and rigorously follow the military rules. Koreans are highly promising as soldiers. They will excel particularly in the transportation corps.”²⁸

In particular, Iguchi inspected the Korean infantry several times while serving in Korea as commander of the occupation force from January 1915 to August 1916 and professed his satisfaction with the outcome. In April 1915, for example, he reported his assessment of the Korean infantry as “being remarkably good” after inspecting it for the first time.²⁹ In February 1916, he inspected the infantry again with an attendant from Japan and praised the Korean soldiers for “answering his attendant’s questions clearly and fluently enough to surprise all.”³⁰

²⁶ “Chōsen hito dokaron to meishi” [The Assimilation Policy and Prominent Korean Figures], *Chōsen* 45 (November 1911): 3.

²⁷ Tachibana Koichirō, “Gunjijo yori mitaru Chōsen minzoku” [The Korean People Seen from the Military], *Chōsen oyobi Manshū* [Korea and Manchuria] 75 (October 1913): 14.

²⁸ Kyokuhōsei 旭邦生, 「井口軍司令官を訪ふ」, *Chōsen oyobi Manshū* [Korea and Manchuria] 94 (May 1915): 9.

²⁹ Iguchi Shōgo Nikki Kankōkai, ed., *Iguchi Shōgo Nikki* [Iguchi Shōgo Diary], vol. 4 (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2018): 301 (entry dated April 9, 1915).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 402 (February 13, 1916).

Through his experience with Korean soldiers, Iguchi saw great potential for using Koreans for military purposes and sought to implement this view. After returning to Japan as Deputy Director for Military Affairs, he made the following suggestions in October 1916 to Hasegawa Yoshimichi (長谷川好道), the new Governor-General of Korea:

1. Have grace to provide official posts for Korean officers
2. Move forward quickly with the pension law for Korean officers
3. Allow Koreans to apply to be cadets
4. Conscript Koreans to serve mandatorily as transport privates for a short period of time—this will bring no harm but gains only.³¹

The “Korean officers” in Iguchi’s suggestions as above refer not to the *Joseon officers*, graduated from the Japanese military academy, but to the remaining officers of the Korean Empire. Iguchi asked that their status be improved by providing them government posts and pensions. In addition, he advised having the Japanese military academy open to Koreans as in no. 3 and hiring Koreans as transport privates under the supervision of Japanese transport soldiers similarly to the Korean assistants of the Japanese military police as in no. 4. It is noteworthy that he suggested a short-term mandatory service but not a volunteer recruitment of Koreans here. He was likely trying to lay the groundwork for a full-fledged conscription for the future by successively producing Korean officers and imposing a short-term mandatory service on Koreans.

The strongest advocate for the military use of Koreans was Utsunomiya Tarō. He was a senior member of the Uehara faction (上原派)³² and was appointed Commander of the KSJF in July 1918. Being conscious of

³¹ Ibid., 475 (October 26, 1916).

³² The Uehara faction led by Uehara Yūsaku (上原勇作) from Satsuma was a minor group centered in the General Staff Office in the Japanese army at that time. Its main objectives were (1) breaking down the dominance of the Chōshū Clique; (2) strengthening the General Staff Office; and (3) promoting an aggressive continental policy. For further discussions, see Kitaoka, *Nippon Rikugun*, 74-77.

‘racial competition’ with western nations since the Qing-Japan War, he promoted the federation or the coalition of Japan, Qing, and Korea to ‘save’ Asian peoples.³³ Utsunomiya had been acquainted with numerous Koreans including graduates of the Japanese military academy and political exiles.³⁴ In addition, he had extensive knowledge of colonial India and Egypt thanks to his working experience in London as an officer attaché.³⁵

When arriving in Korea as the new commander in August 1918, Utsunomiya was greeted by the *Joseon soldiers* to whom he was close.³⁶ Having grasped the conditions of *Joseon soldiers* in their country and their usefulness, he managed to obtain overall approval on the military use of Koreans through meetings with Tanaka Giichi, the Minister of the Army of the Hara Takashi (原敬) Cabinet on his trip to Tokyo in November.³⁷ Accordingly, he sent a letter to Tanaka in January 1919 and recommended the following implementations:

1. Form border guard units comprised of Koreans.
(Allow application, long-term service, wife accompaniment, retirement grant, and pension.)
2. Form a Korean royal guard unit.
3. Hire *Joseon officers* as military aides-de-camp to the imperial family or in the Imperial House.
4. Hire *Joseon officers* as aides-de-camp or in our military headquarters. Consider raising their wages.
5. Provide the remaining Imperial Korean soldiers with official posts.³⁸

To compare Utsunomiya’s proposal with Iguchi’s, first, it can be noted that

³³ Miyamoto, “Utsunomiya Tarō to Chōsen shihai,” 158-63.

³⁴ Ibid., 166-67.

³⁵ Kira and Miyamoto, 「解題 大正時代中期の宇都宮太郎: 第四師団長・朝鮮軍司令官・軍事参議官時代」, 13.

³⁶ *Utsunomiya Diary*, vol. 3: 134 (August 10, 1918).

³⁷ Ibid., 185 (December 13, 1918).

³⁸ Ibid., 198-99 (January 6, 1919).

Utsunomiya also recognized the necessity of improving the treatment of the *Joseon soldiers* by providing incentives such as official posts or conferment of decorations. Second, Utsunomiya pursued a more aggressive use of the existing *Joseon officers*. Third, he suggested employing Koreans in actual military functions such as border guards, not just assistants to transport soldiers as suggested by Iguchi. In particular, hiring Koreans as royal guards or aides-de-camp to the imperial family was a very bold idea in that it meant allowing Koreans to enter Japan's Imperial House, the heart of the empire's governing body. On the other hand, different from Iguchi, Utsunomiya did not consider any long-term plan for successively producing Korean officers or imposing conscription on Koreans.

Two months after his proposal had been submitted, however, the March First Movement broke out. Utsunomiya reinforced six more infantry battalions and 300 more infantry military policemen from Japan and ordered a complete clampdown on the uprising, resulting in a great number of casualties, as happened in the Jeamri massacre. Ironically, though, the March First Movement inspired him to assert even more intensely the necessity of military use of Koreans as a means to expediate the 'assimilation' and to reinforce the KSJF for this goal.

On May 14 1919, Tanaka telegraphed Utsunomiya to request "unreserved opinions" regarding "the reform of the governing policies of Korea and administrative system of the Government-General, and other necessary institutional reforms."³⁹ Three days later he submitted "Chōsen jikyoku kanmi (朝鮮時局管見) [View on the current situation of Korea]," which he claimed to be solely from his "personal opinions without consulting anyone including the chief of staff." In the report, Utsunomiya ruled out the independence or the autonomy of Korea but specified the ultimate goal in Korea to be its total 'assimilation' to Japan, which would include the enforcement of the Japanese constitutions in Korea.

To this end he proposed a number of measures such as the lowest level of local self-government, transfer of central power to local governments,

³⁹ Ibid., 253 (May 14, 1919).

replacement of military police with regular police, and inducement of Japanese immigration, as well as the following suggestions regarding military use of Koreans:

7. Install some Koreans (volunteers only for the time being) in at least 5 divisions of the Japanese troops . . . It may be inevitable in the long-range future to gradually enforce the conscription draft of Koreans (on a limited scale at the beginning, of course) once the Japanese constitution is fully implemented in Korea. To prepare this future, I recommend showing Koreans the hope that they can serve in our military if they want and especially organizing a few small military units comprised of Korean volunteers for a while (not immediately though) in order to allocate current and future commissioned Korean officers.⁴⁰

Here, Utsunomiya demanded increasing the number of occupying troops from the current two divisions to six or even ten divisions in colonial Korea. He argued that five divisions would not be an excessive number to station in Korea in order to secure control of Korea amid the turbulence of the March First Movement and to “counterbalance the Korean troops that must be installed in the future.” He also claimed that all empires were making use of natives for military purposes and that no empire would succeed without being able to do so. Finally, he stressed the importance of forming Korean troops, comprised of volunteers, to prepare for future conscription draft, show Koreans that Japan would not consider them to be dangerous or alien to the empire, and create positions for future Korean officers.

As a rationale for stationing 5 divisions of Japanese troops in Korea, Utsunomiya argued for the need to “counterbalance” Korean troops, which indicates that he also took the ratio of Japanese versus Koreans within the

⁴⁰ Utsunomiya Tarō, “Chōsen jikyoku kanmi” [View on the Current Situation of Korea (pictures)] (May seventeenth, 1919), *Saitō Makoto Bunsho* [Saitō Makoto Documents], Document no. 104-3 (The Modern Political and Constitutional History Collection of the Japanese National Diet Library).

military into consideration. Nevertheless, his estimation was considerably different from the ratios that Akashi had proposed for the Japanese vs. Taiwanese soldiers and Japanese military police vs. their Korean assistants.

With five divisions of Japanese troops stationed in Korea, it should be ensured that Korean troops not exceed five mixed brigades (given the size of the Korean population, around this number of troops will have to be drafted in Korea once the imperial constitution takes full effect here.) or smaller than that (in the far future, though). In other words, the ratio of two Japanese soldiers to one Korean soldier seems adequate, which is the inverse ratio of British to native soldiers in India.⁴¹

In the report to Tanaka, Utsunomiya advised the Japanese military to station at least double the number of Japanese soldiers as that of Korean soldiers by limiting the number of Korean troops to five mixed brigades for the equal number of Japanese army divisions in Korea. This proposition contrasted with the ratio of British versus Indian soldiers, set as one to two, and Akashi's suggestion of a one-to-one ratio between Japanese and Taiwanese soldiers. Utsunomiya rationalized his ratio by explaining that India was a multiethnic and multicultural nation with no powerful neighbor, thereby presenting thoroughly different conditions from Korea. However, the overpowering proportion of Japanese soldiers in his proposal unveils the dent that the March First Movement had made to his confidence in the Japanese rule of Korea and the assimilation of the Koreans to Japan.

This proposal by Utsunomiya was actually reflected in the official report of the KSJF. In July 1919, the General Staff of the KSJF submitted a written opinion entitled "The Causes of the Upheaval, Challenges in Governing Korea, and Armament" to the Ministry of the Japanese Army. This report, read by the minister of the Japanese Army, contained a creation of four independent guard units (a total of 12 infantry battalions—that is, a size of one division) in Korea only to guard the borders and maintain order,

⁴¹ Utsunomiya Tarō, "Chōsen jikyoku kanmi."

in addition to two existing divisions, and incorporate Korean troops into those guard units.

2. It is required to incorporate Korean troops into the independent guard units and have them serve guard duties. We must create Korean military units (for now, just as mercenaries) in order to make Koreans feel the burden of defending and guarding Korean territory and give the *Joseon officers* jobs. Hiring Korean soldiers is also necessary to prepare for the future conscription draft. We recommend having two to three new companies of Korean soldiers in a garrison of guards but gradually increase their number.⁴²

This report has a number of shared points with Utsunomiya's proposal. Both argued for the need of Korean troops in order to have them share military experience with Japanese, provide job opportunities for the *Joseon officers*, and prepare for the future conscription draft. However, an independent guard garrison comprised an average of 3 infantry battalions (12 companies), thus reinforcing 2 to 3 more companies of Korean soldiers in the garrison would render the ratio between Japanese and Korean soldiers to change from 4:1 to 6:1. This indicates that the March First Movement led the Japanese military to ensure an overpowering number of Japanese soldiers to watch and control Korean soldiers while slowly increasing the number of Korean soldiers.

The KSJF took an optimistic view regarding both colonial Koreans' assimilation to Japan and military use of them immediately after the annexation. Therefore, Iguchi and Utsunomiya proposed training more Korean officers, hiring Korean soldiers through volunteer recruitment or a temporary draft, and even deploying Koreans as royal guards or aides-de-camp, thereby opening the Imperial House to colonized subjects. Although aggressively crushing the March First Movement, the KSJF also realized the

⁴² 「騷擾の原因及朝鮮統治上注意すべき件並軍備に就いて」(July 14, 1919, The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, JACAR Ref.C06031106200, Image no. 68-69, 「朝鮮騷擾事件關係書類」大正8年乃至同10年・共7冊其4, vol. 7, Book 4, Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies).

desperate need for the ‘assimilation’ of Koreans, which propelled them to propose Korean military units. This accommodative vision went in concert with a blueprint for a reinforcement of the KSJF and Japan’s complete rule of Korea.

The Japanese Army Central’s View on Military Use of Koreans

In contrast with the KSJF, the Japanese Army Central was skeptical about military use of Koreans from the beginning of the annexation. They had no plan to accept Koreans into the Japanese military academy or to improve the treatment of the *Joseon soldiers*. Neither did they have any intention to create Korean military units nor to increase the presence of Japanese forces in Korea.

From the end of the Meiji era to the Taishō era, stationing two additional divisions in Korea was a political issue. Japan set an armament goal to rearrange 25 army divisions and organize a fleet of 8 battleships and 8 armored cruisers after the Russo-Japanese War. This strengthening of war potential became the source of rivalry among the cabinet, the army, and the navy over the budget and the hegemonic competition between the army and the navy. In particular, the army had been demanding the deployment of two more divisions in Korea in light of the Xinhai Revolution in late 1911, but the request was not accepted. Because of this, the Army Minister Uehara Yūsaku (上原勇作) resigned in the following year, which brought the entire resignation of the Saionji Kinmochi (西園寺公望) cabinet. This incurred public resistance toward the army and the Chōshū Clique and led to the Taishō Political Crisis. Thus, it was not until 1915, after the First World War had broken out, that two more divisions of troops were finally deployed to Korea by the Okuma Shigenobu (大隅重信) cabinet.

In November 1912, just before the bill for a deployment of two more divisions to Korea was ultimately rejected by the cabinet, the Japanese army distributed the document “Reasons for Increasing Two More Divisions (二師團増設理由書)” to all cabinet ministers. What is significant here is that the Japanese army gave prominence to a changing external defense

environment, such as Russia's new Siberian double-track railroad in addition to the new Heilong River line and China's chaotic situation resulting from the Xinhai Revolution, as the main rationale for the need of an additional deployment to Korea. Regarding the situations in Korea proper, they underscored the higher expenses of the current rotational deployment of one division and the logistical infeasibility of dispatching the troops stationed throughout the peninsula to keep order at the initial stage of war with Russia. The plan to accept Korean soldiers in the Japanese military was not included among the reasons.⁴³ This indicates that deploying two additional divisions in Korea was based solely on a strategic consideration against Russia on the part of the Japanese Army Central, not on a policy matter of governing Korea.

Turning to the matter of producing Korean officers successively, a young Korean man was found to apply to one of Japan's provincial military preparatory schools in December 1915. Notified by the Keijo Municipal Government (京城府) [i.e., present-day Seoul] of this news, the KSJF asked the Ministry of Army about how to handle this matter and received the following answer:

(We won't be receiving any Koreans as cadets for the time being. Should there be an applicant, please reject his application without offending him.) Based on this policy, no Korean or Taiwanese has been so far accepted to our military academy and the Inspectorate General of Military Training shares our opinion. (The natives currently in our military or academies are special cases and cannot be generally applied.)⁴⁴

⁴³ 「二師團増設理由書」(November 23, 1912), The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, JACAR Ref.C14061034400, 「二個師團増設理由書 同所要額調」Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies). This document has been printed by the Bureau of Military Affairs in the Ministry of Army. For reference, the letter that Army Minister Uehara Yusaku sent to Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi around the same time and the memoir by Tanaka Giichi, in which the background of Uehara's sole resignation was explained, provide similar rationales (Takakura, ed., *Tanaka Giichi Denki jō*, 490-93; 506-17).

⁴⁴ 「朝鮮人の幼年學校生徒志願に關する件」(The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, JACAR Ref.C02030726800, Image no. 2, 「大日記甲輯」Taisho fourth year, Class 1 & 2, Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies).

The Ministry of Army affirmed that there had been no precedence of accepting Koreans or Taiwanese as cadets and that it had no plan of doing so for some time. They drew the line at the Korean second lieutenants, commissioned and assigned already at military units, and the *Joseon officers*, attending Japanese military academies, as exceptions that had been negotiated through a ‘special discussion’ in the process of the annexation of Korea. As above seen, the Japanese Ministry of Army had no intention to produce Korean officers successively by educating Koreans in their military academies. Nevertheless, they were requested to reject the application “without offending him” and encrypted the parenthesized messages in the above quote, which means that they attempted to avoid provoking the sensitivity of the Koreans.

The Army Central had the same approach to the *Joseon soldiers*. As was discussed in Section 3, Iguchi and Utsunomiya, who were the commanders of the KSJF, appealed to the Minister of Army to provide the *Joseon soldiers* with official posts, decorations, and pensions for the betterment of their conditions. In November 1915, the Japanese Government-General of Korea submitted to the Ministry of Army a legislative bill to enact a pension program for the *Joseon soldiers* and military police assistants.⁴⁵ But the Army Ministry reduced it to an imperial edict for the provision of simpler aid for bereaved families for the following reasons:

The *Joseon soldiers* are a relic of a transitional period and their existence has not been acknowledged as an essential body for the defense of the empire. . . . Moreover, since the *Joseon soldiers* will gradually diminish along with the *Joseon officers* whose number is declining by years, it is not deemed necessary to secure their future specifically as legal rights. A substantial aid program, supporting their future livelihood

⁴⁵ 「朝鮮軍人憲兵補助員の恩給法制定に関する件」(The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, JACAR Ref.C02030884000, Image no. 28-40, 「大日記甲輯」Taisho eighth year, Class 3, Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies). Those who argued for adopting a pension system for the *Joseon Soldiers* were Terauchi Masatake, Governor-General of Korea, and Akashi Motojiro, former Commander of the Japanese military police in Korea (Image no. 26-27).

and hence preventing their desertion, is deemed sufficient for the convenience of governance.⁴⁶

As a matter of fact, the *Joseon soldiers* were meant to be a device to stage Japan's annexation of Korea as a merger of 'equal' partners and Japan's respectful treatment of the Korean imperial house and had been retained on the pretext of guarding palaces and performing Korea's imperial ceremonies. The Ministry of Army regarded them as a 'relic of a transitional period,' saw no military value in them, and had no plan to supplement new officers. Accordingly, the aid program for the *Joseon soldiers* was not a long-term support program to facilitate the maintenance of their abilities by providing them with a livelihood even after their retirement but merely a conciliatory measure to more easily control Korea by preventing their defections.

As explained in Section 3, just before the March First Movement Utusnomiya consulted with Army Minister Tanaka about military use of Koreans and obtained an overall approval. Even after the breakout of the movement, he continued to advocate for forming Korean military units in his report of "Chōsen jikyoku kanmi (朝鮮時局管見) [View on the current situation of Korea]," written at the request of Tanaka. Later on, they continued to cooperate on current issues surrounding the *Joseon soldiers* and *officers* in addition to the March First Movement.

First, they abolished discrimination against the *Joseon soldiers* in terms of official posts, rewards, promotions, wages, and pensions. Moreover, they accepted the *Joseon officers* as Japanese army officers in the Japanese military. Some *Joseon officers*, affected by the March First Movement, left the Japanese army and joined the independence movement.⁴⁷ Thus, Japan brought back *Joseon officers* in Japan to Korea and utilized them for the governance policy of Korea and promoted them as a symbol of 'equal' treatment and 'assimilation' of Koreans. Finally, the Mil-

⁴⁶ 「朝鮮軍人憲兵補助員の恩給法制定に關する件」(Image no. 20). The imperial edict was enacted in July 1918 to provide aid for the *Joseon soldiers* and their bereaved families.

⁴⁷ Lee Kidong, *Bigeukui Gunindeul*, 28-31.

itary Police Assistant System was reformed as Auxiliary Military Police under the order of the Ministry of Army and officially became part of the Japanese army with legitimate promotion and pension programs.

Despite all these concerted efforts, they did not always agree on the reinforcement of the KSJF for this assimilative project. Utsunomiya met Tanaka on his trip to Tokyo in September 1919 and, with the same rationales in “Chōsen jikyoku kanmi [View on the current situation of Korea], appealed to him for sufficient armaments in Korea and asked for more troops from Japan if installing Korean military units was not feasible.⁴⁸ Assuming that he had gained approval from Tanaka, he persuaded new Governor-General Saitō Makoto (齋藤實) to submit a bill of claim to Prime Minister Hara Takashi, requesting the reinforcement of the armaments in Korea by “either raising substantial troops in Korea or, if that is not feasible, deploying some more homeland divisions to Korea.”⁴⁹

Meanwhile, Hara received an unenthusiastic response from Tanaka, which was “[T]he substantiality of the current divisions in Korea has already been calculated and reflected in the 1920 budget, so I think it is enough as it is now,”⁵⁰ and delivered this message to Saitō.⁵¹ In fact, the 1920 army budget ultimately counted only the cost of maintaining the existing number of troops in Korea by including only the plan of advancing the completion date of stationing two more divisions by one year and having some deployed troops join the KSJF in order to clamp down on the March First Movement.⁵² Utsunomiya continued insisting on five divisions to station in Korea⁵³ but it was ultimately not accepted.

⁴⁸ *Utsunomiya Diary*, vol. 3: 305 (September 15, 1919). Utsunomiya also visited Prime Minister Hara Takashi and made the same request. (Hara Keiichirō, ed., *Hara Takashi Diary*, vol. 5 (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1965): 145 (September 17, 1919).

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 336, 340-41 (November 26 and December 4-5, 1919).

⁵⁰ Hara Keiichiro, ed., *Hara Takashi Diary*, vol. 5, 187 (December 9, 1919).

⁵¹ Hara Takashi's letter to Saito Makoto, dated December 21, 1919 (*Saito Makoto Bunsho*, Document no.1265-2).

⁵² Rikugunshō, ed., *Ji Meiji 37th year Taishō 15 nen Rikugeunshō enkakushi furoku* 『自明治三十七年至大正十五年 陸軍省沿革史 附錄』 (Tokyo: Gannando Shoten, 1968), 365-67.

⁵³ According to his diary (*Utsunomiya Dairy*, vol. 3: 381), Utsunomiya invited all the division

As mentioned above, Utsunomiya took a successive production of future Korean officers for a *fait accompli* and underlined the creation of Korean military units in order to provide employment for those Korean officers. In fact, he seemed to have requested the Army Central to open Japanese military academies to Koreans. However, in May 1920, after he met Vice-Minister of Army Yamanashi Hanzō (山梨半造), he wrote in his diary, “[T]he matter of Korean officer cadets has not been solved.”⁵⁴ This contrasted with the Japanese Navy, which decided to accept Koreans as navy cadets to its navy academy in January 1921, referring to the drastically changing “situations in Korea” and “surrounding state of affairs” since the March First Movement.⁵⁵

Furthermore, since the March First Movement Japan formed a view of the Koreans as being dangerous and exhibited hesitation in using them for military purposes. In April 1921, when the Japanese government legislated the extended military pay act for Japanese soldiers to include Korean military police assistants, the Imperial House of Representatives Committee asked the following questions to Yamanashi while evaluating the draft:

Kimura Gon’emon (木村權右衛門) (Member of the House of Representatives, Independent): “I would like to ask a question. Does the Auxiliary Military Police hire Japanese?”

Yamanashi Hanzō (Government Official): “It hires Koreans. It is extremely difficult to guard the borders without knowing the Korean language.”

Kimura Gon’emon: “Do they receive any military training?”

commanders of the occupation forces in Korea as well as the chief of staff of the KSJF to a dinner party on March 21, 1920 and persuaded them to support him “in regard to the reinforcement of troops in Korea (a proposal of 60 battalions submitted to the Army Minister in May last year).” One division consisted of 12 infantry battalions, thus “60 battalions” amounted to 5 divisions.

⁵⁴ *Utsunomiya Diary*, vol. 3: 400 (May 17, 1920).

⁵⁵ However, it seems that no Korean navy cadet was commissioned after all. For more details, see “Chōsenjin o seitonisaiyō no ken” 「朝鮮人ヲ生徒ニ採用ノ件」, in *Kaigun seido enkaku 12* 『海軍制度沿革 12』, Kaigun daijin Kanbo, ed. [Minister of the Navy] (Tokyo: Kaigun Daijin Kanbo, 1940), 476.

Yamanashi: “We are providing them with three-month special training.”

Kimura Gon’emon: “Are we training Koreans?”

Yamanashi: “We hire Koreans and then train them for their duties as military police.”⁵⁶

The House of Lords Committee asked similar questions such as whether military police assistants were Japanese or Koreans, whether Koreans would be hired as military police assistants, and whether Korean assistants would be given military training.⁵⁷ While the memory of the March First Movement was still vivid, the news of Koreans trained in Imperial Japan must have disconcerted the parliamentary members. Combined with this negative view of Koreans, their pre-existing economic and military objectives seem to have made the Army Central more hesitant in regard to military use of Koreans.

As discussed so far, the Army Central did not argue for stationing two divisions in Korea as part of the policy of governing Korea immediately after the annexation. Also, it did not see the need to open its military academies to Koreans or improve the conditions of the *Joseon soldiers* despite ongoing requests from the KSJF. Although Tanaka was generally cooperative with Utsunomiya on measures dealing with the March First Movement, he was not enthusiastic about the latter’s proposals, such as training more Korean officers, creating Korean military units or reinforcing the KSJF to counter-balance Korean soldiers. The reasons behind his reluctance can be summarized as follows: (1) economic and military preparations for a potential war after the Russo-Japanese War, (2) the political burden of increasing armaments amid the global atmosphere of disarmament after World War I, and (3) anxiety of having Koreans in the Japanese mili-

⁵⁶ 「第四回帝國議會衆議院委員會議錄 大正九年法律第十號中改正法律案外一件」(First meeting, March 9, 1921, 1, The Japanese National Diet Library Digital Collection of Imperial Japan’s minutes).

⁵⁷ 「第四回帝國議會貴族院委員會議事速記錄 大正九年法律第十號中改正法律案外一件」(First meeting, March 15, 1921, 2, The Japanese National Diet Library Digital Collection of Imperial Japan’s minutes).

tary amid the shock of the March First Movement. After the March First Movement, the *Joseon soldiers*, *Joseon officers*, and Korean military police assistants were eventually all incorporated into the Japanese army. But their numbers remained fairly fixed.

Conclusion

So far we have explored the discussions on military use of Koreans within the Japanese army with a focus on the conflicting stances of the KSJF and the Army Central from the time of the annexation to the post-March First Movement. The KSJF was eager to utilize Koreans for military purposes; in fact, Utsunomiya argued in favor of hiring Koreans in the Japanese military as a means to accelerate the Koreans' assimilation to Japan two months after the March First Movement took place. However, the Japanese Army Central did not accept his proposals of forming military units comprised of Korean volunteers, increasing the number of Japanese troops in Korea, and producing Korean officers successively. Furthermore, since the negative perception of the Koreans emerged in Japan due to the March First Movement, using Koreans in military roles did not proceed for awhile.

Here, I would like to summarize how the two parties came to form different positions on this matter and how the matter unfolded subsequently. First, Akashi, Iguchi, and Utsunomiya, all of whom commanded military police or armies stationed in Korea, did not hesitate to adopt the western empires' examples of employing native troops. While working in Korea and having contact with the locals, they probably had seen the potential value of Koreans as human resources. They took the lead in advocating for military use of Koreans, demanding the reinforcement of Japanese troops in Korea, and supporting the enforcement of conscription upon the Koreans. Even though the ratio of soldiers was rearranged to ensure the definite superiority of Japanese soldiers to Korean ones in number after the March First Movement, they believed that the need for Korean troop units and additional Japanese forces in Korea was more legitimate due to the Movement.

On the other hand, Tanaka from the Army Central had a different

stance from the three people above. The immediate objective of the Japanese military at that time was preparing strategies and armaments for the possible revenge of Russia following the Russo-Japanese War. To accomplish this objective, Tanaka focused on the political, economic, and military needs of the homeland, taking the national budget and the domestic political environment into consideration. Therefore, according to Tanaka, military use of Koreans was not a means to advance their assimilation to Japan but a final-stage objective after the assimilation was accomplished sufficiently to implement conscription in Korea. Moreover, he was more concerned with the cost of stationing several divisions in Korea and the logistical disadvantages of mobilizing them in case of war. He also paid great attention to the rising public opinion concerning disarmament in Japan after World War I.

These two opposing stances regarding the military use of Koreans continued. First, Governor-General of Korea Saitō Makoto requested Prime Minister Yamamoto Gonbe (山本權兵衛) to send an additional division to Korea.⁵⁸ The Institution Investigation Committee, newly installed to reform the Japanese army, advised the transfer of a division from Japan to Korea. Army Minister Ugaki Kazushige (宇垣一成) of the Katō Takaaki (加藤高明) cabinet denied it due to the lack of sufficient budget.⁵⁹ Saitō again requested the additional deployment of an infantry division or a cavalry brigade to Ugaki in July 1925 but it was rejected again.⁶⁰

Military schools were also not fully open to Koreans. As previously explained, the Japanese navy decided to accept Korean navy cadets in January 1921. However, it was not until December 1924 that the army finally decided to accept the applications of Koreans and Taiwanese. At the same

⁵⁸ *Chōsen ni rikugungeiryoku zōka o yōsuru ken ni fusōri Daijin ni gushin no ken* 「朝鮮に陸軍兵力増加を要する件に付總理大臣に具申の件」 (The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, JACAR Ref.C03022597400, Mitsudai nikki 「密大日記」, Taisho twelfth year, Book 4, Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies).

⁵⁹ Takasugi, *Ugaki Kazushige* 27 and 32.

⁶⁰ 「朝鮮に常設師團増加の意見」 (The Japan Center for Asian Historical Record, JACAR Ref. C03022721700, 「密大日記」, Taisho fourteenth year, Book 4, Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies).

time, it was instructed to “apply a strict screening and limit the number at the discretion of the administration” with regard to colonial applicants. In fact, Korean applicants were not accepted under the name of tough competition.⁶¹ Only the former Korean royalty members and their school peers were accepted to the Japanese military academy and Korean army officers were not produced any longer for the time being.

Finally, we will look into the matter of Korean infantry units. In December 1926, the KSJF appealed to the Ministry of Army to give Korean infantrymen the same level of training as Japanese infantrymen in order to test Koreans’ military capabilities in preparation for conscription or recruitment but its appeal was rejected.⁶² In July 1929, the KSJF was opposed to disbanding the Korean infantry forces on the grounds (1) that they had been retained for the sake of showing respect to the imperial house of Korea, (2) that retired Korean soldiers had been contributing to the harmony of Japanese and Koreans, and (3) that they could be utilized as reserves or interpreters. It also wanted to appoint Korean officers, who graduated from the Japanese military academy, as deputy commanders of the units.⁶³ However, the Korean infantry unit was disbanded in April 1931 to save military expenses after the death of King Sunjong. The dispute between the KSJF and the Army Central over the military use of Koreans was not settled until

⁶¹ 「朝鮮人学生陸軍軍医依託志望の件」(The Japan Center for Asian Historical Record, JACAR Ref. C01003853200, Image no. 6-7, 「密大日記」 Showa fourth year, Book 2, Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies); 「朝鮮人台湾人を陸軍武官候補者に採用の件」(The Japan Center for Asian Historical Record, JACAR Ref.C02031211800, Image no. 4, *Dainikki koshū* 「大日記甲輯」, Taisho 14th year, Class 2, Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies).

⁶² *Chōsen ni rikugungeiryoku zōka o yōsuru ken ni fusōri Daijin ni gushin no ken* 「朝鮮歩兵隊訓練向上に関する内議の件」(The Japan Center for Asian Historical Record, JACAR Ref. C01003726500, Image no. 3-7, *Mitudai nikki* 「密大日記」, Showa 2nd year, Book 2, Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies). Regarding this matter, the Recruiting Division of the Bureau of the Military Affairs in the Ministry of Army attached its opinion to the report that imposing military service on the Koreans was not appropriate when their assimilation to Japan had not been yet accomplished and they were not yet given suffrage and that it was also too early from the military perspective.

⁶³ 「朝鮮歩兵隊存置に関する意見の件」(The Japan Center for Asian Historical Record, JACAR Ref. C01003881700, 「密大日記」, Showa fourth year, Book 4, Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies).

the mid-1930s. Eventually, Korean graduates from the Japanese military academy were fully accepted from 1937 when the Special Order of Army Volunteers to recruit Korean volunteers was enacted in February 1938. In fact, a new war with a foreign country offered a new motive for military use of Koreans in colonial Korea and beyond.

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Conference Report

The Conference on “The Afrasiab Palatial Murals and Korea-Uzbekistan Relations”

April 17, 2019 Samarkand

The Afrasiab palatial murals, which were painted in the 7th century kingdom of Sogdiana during the reign of King Varhuman, are of high historical and cultural value with their portrayals of various foreign envoys around the king and of the life of that time. In particular, the two figures in the west wall painting, who are wearing *Jowooguan*, feather-decorated hats, and carrying *Hwandudaedo* swords, have been speculated as being ancient Koreans. The Northeast Asian History Foundation (henceforth, NAHF) has conducted a digital restoration project since 2013 on the Afrasiab palatial murals in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, creating 2D and 3D restoration copies and a video clip subtitled in eight languages (i.e., Korean, Uzbek, English, Russian, French, Chinese, Japanese, and Spanish) and showing them online and at local museums.

On April 17, 2019, the NAHF and the Samarkand Museum of History and Culture held a joint academic conference entitled “Afrasiab Palatial Murals and Korea-Uzbekistan Relations” upon South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s visits to three Central Asian countries in the same month.

The first session began with the presentation by G. Axadova, researcher at the Institute of Archaeology of Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences

² The original title for this book is *Taepyeonghan byeonbang: Goryeo ui dae Georan oegyo wa geu sosan* (태평한 변방: 고려의 황거란 외교와 그 소산) published by Gyeongin Munhwasa (Paju) in 2018, and this review is translated from the Korean manuscript originally published in *The Journal of Korean Medieval History* (한국중세사연구), issue 57, May 2019: 311-24.

on the restoration and repair of the ceremonial hall of Afrasiab Varkhuman Palace, followed by NAHF researcher of ancient and medieval history of Korea Ko Kwangeui's briefing on the digital restoration process of the Afrasiab palatial murals. Then Mustafkulov, Director of the Afrasiab Museum, discussed the relations between Sogdiana and Korea in reference to the Afrasiab murals, and Professor Jung Hosub of Hansung University presented historical evidence on the *Jowooguan*-wearing figures in the murals based on his paper entitled "The Ancient Koreans in the Afrasiab Palatial Mural in Samarkand."

In the second session, Professor Ah-Rim Park of Sookmyung Women's University reviewed the relations between Korea and Uzbekistan via the examination of ancient art, and Marina Reutova, the Head of the Uzbekistan Institute of Archeology, discussed the Afrasiab wall paintings and their restoration problem. In addition, Seong-Je Lee, NAHF head researcher on ancient and medieval history of Korea, investigated Koguryo's diplomatic history in his presentation entitled "The Relations between Koguryo and the Turkic Northern Tribes." Finally, researcher of the Uzbekistan Institute of Archaeology Mirza Akhmedov introduced the murals discovered in Bukhara, a strongpoint of the Silk Road along with Samarkand.

We are publishing all four articles by the Korean scholars presented at the academic conference in an attempt to contribute to the better understanding of historical and cultural exchanges between Uzbekistan and Korea and to further contemporary exchanges and cooperation between the two countries.

The Digital Restoration of the Afrasiab Palatial Mural

—
Kwangeui KO

Northeast Asian History Foundation

Introduction

On Afrasiab Hill of Samarkand, Uzbekistan is located a wall painting that reveals the culture and the history of the Sogdians, who played an important role in the development of the ancient Silk Road. The mural on the wall of Room 1, Section 23, which was accidentally found during road construction in 1965, has a particular significance for understanding the geopolitical situations of 7th-century East Asia.¹

The mural portrays a royal parade of King Varkhuman, envoys from various countries, hunting and boating, archers on the bank of a river, and a variety of fish. Judging from the international relations of that time, it is highly probable that the two figures on the right end of the front wall, who are wearing feather-decorated hats, *Jowooguan* (鳥羽冠), and swords with rings on the heads of their hilts, *Hwandudaedo*, were Koreans.

The painting is heavily damaged. The upper part of the wall and the ceiling had already collapsed at the time of the discovery, leaving only about 2 meters of the mural from the ground. The mural was moved and is currently being displayed in the Afrasiab Museum. Although a copy of the

¹ Л. И. АЛЬБАУМ, ЖИВОПИСЬ АФРАСИАБА, ТАШКЕНТ, ФАН (1975).

painting was made in 1965, it has been pointed out that its depiction is not detailed enough, with some images even being omitted, to restore the original picture of the painting. Also, the maintenance and the conservation conditions are not optimal, such that, despite the efforts of the Uzbek government and relevant international agencies, it is inevitable that the mural will be further damaged.

In July 2013, South Korea's Northeast Asian History Foundation and the United Historical-Architectural and Art Museum in the Samarkand State of Uzbekistan signed an academic collaboration agreement and began a restoration and conservation project for the mural.² The project resulted in significant accomplishments, including the production of 2D digital restoration copies of the entire mural from 2013 to 2015, the production of a 3D video clip with multilingual subtitles, the establishment and operation of a video-viewing room in the Afrasiab Museum, the installation of conservation equipment for the mural in the exhibition room, the production of a restoration replica of the parts of the west wall that depict the envoys and the figures in letter-engraved clothes, and its exhibition at the National Museum of Korea.

This presentation briefly describes the processes engaged in and outcomes achieved by the project for the digital restoration of the Afrasiab palatial mural and the production of relevant video materials.

High-Definition Shooting

To prepare for the production of a copy of the palatial mural, the team used

² The project team was supervised by Kwangeui KO, Ph.D., from the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and it consisted of historians, archeologists and art historians, including Yong Suh, a painter as well as a professor at Dongduk Women's University; Bit Shin, a cultural heritage photographer; Kwonwoong Lim, Ph.D., the Director of the Joongang Conservation Center for Cultural Heritage; Sungyun Jung, a researcher; Jikio Kim, the Director of the Technology Research Institute for Culture and Heritage (TRICH); and Jin-ho Park, a researcher from the Korea Culture Technology Institute. The research team consulted with local experts such as Samaridin Mustafkulov, the Director of the Afrasiab Museum; and Marina Reutova, the Head of the Department of Chemical-Technological Research and Restoration at the Academy of Sciences, Republic of Uzbekistan Institute of Archeology.




Figure 1. Merging the Segmental Images of the Mural

a CANON EOS 5D MARK 3 camera body with a CANON 85mm lens under two monotype 600-watt strobe lights with umbrellas. A color checker passport was also used to reproduce the colors of the original painting accurately.

The mural in the Afrasiab Museum could not be captured in a single

shot due to its size, with a width of 1,100 cm and a height of 250 cm. We thus split each wall horizontally into 8 bands and vertically into 18 bands (while the eastern wall was vertically split into 16 bands due to the door it includes), thereby creating 560 segments. Each segment measures 61cm x 32cm, and the sides of each of them had an overlap of 30% with neighboring segments. A laser inclinometer and a telemeter were used to ensure an equal and consistent vertical and horizontal segmentation, minimizing possible image distortions.

The shots of the four walls were then sorted into four categories, and they were subsequently transformed into various formats: small JPEG files for quick views, raw files for high-definition revisions, and images of major details and of the entire walls. After adjusting the colors of the photos, we merged the eight segments of each vertical section into a column, and then merged two adjacent columns into another wider column, then these wider columns into yet wider columns and so on until we obtained each of the four entire wall paintings in a single image file, resulting in a high-definition photo, or digital copy of the mural.

Forensic Analysis

Component Analysis of Pigments

The pigments used in the mural could be discerned by the naked eye into six color categories: green, red, yellow, blue, white, and black. We first shot previously designated points on each wall—27 on the east wall, 24 on the south wall, 31 on the west wall, and 14 on the north wall—and color patches for comparison. Then, we analyzed the components of the pigments of each pre-designated point with a portable X-ray fluorescence spectrometer (P-XRF), measured the chromaticity with the CM-700D, and examined the conditions and characteristics of the layers of the painting with a digital stereoscopic microscope.




Figure 2. Pigment Analysis Locations (West Wall, W-20~W-31)

Table 1. Components of Red Color, Estimated Pigments, and Chromaticity

Analyzed Point	Chromaticity			Major Components	Estimated Pigments
	L*	a*	b*		
W-1	35.56	9.04	15.00	Ca, SiO ₂ , Hg, Pb, Al ₂ O ₃ , Fe ₂ O ₃	cinnabar
W-8	57.46	16.13	30.05	Ca, SiO ₂ , S, MgO, Al ₂ O ₃ , Fe ₂ O ₃	ocher
W-10	58.60	13.54	28.41	Ca, SiO ₂ , S, MgO, Al ₂ O ₃ , Fe ₂ O ₃	ocher
S-9	53.56	16.71	21.86	Ca, SiO ₂ , S, MgO, Al ₂ O ₃ , Fe ₂ O ₃	ocher
S-10	45.19	21.06	23.01	Ca, S, SiO ₂ , Fe ₂ O ₃ , Al ₂ O ₃ , P ₂ O ₅	ocher
S-12	45.17	20.84	23.47	Ca, S, SiO ₂ , Fe ₂ O ₃ , Al ₂ O ₃ , P ₂ O ₅	ocher
S-14	39.90	25.10	18.81	Hg, SiO ₂ , Ca, Al ₂ O ₃ , W, Pb, S	cinnabar
S-18	43.43	18.80	19.89	Ca, SiO ₂ , S, MgO, Fe ₂ O ₃ , Al ₂ O ₃	ocher
S-22	34.26	22.02	25.87	SiO ₂ , Ca, S, Fe ₂ O ₃ , Al ₂ O ₃	ocher
N-9	35.14	21.99	19.42	SiO ₂ , Ca, Hg, Al ₂ O ₃ , S, Fe ₂ O ₃	cinnabar
N-11	32.90	14.37	17.87	SiO ₂ , Fe ₂ O ₃ , Ca, Al ₂ O ₃	ocher
N-13	38.22	11.96	22.21	SiO ₂ , Ca, S, Al ₂ O ₃ , Fe ₂ O ₃	ocher

In terms of the components of the pigments, the analysis determined the following: the red pigment was largely comprised of hematite (Fe₂O₃), or, at points such as W-1, S-14 and N-9, it was constituted by a mixture of cin-

nabar (HgS) and minium (Pb₃O₄). In the yellow pigment, a high proportion of Fe₂O₃, a major component of ocher, was detected, suggesting that it was produced with the use of ocher from Afrasiab Hill. The blue pigment was determined to contain high proportions of such elements as SiO₂, Al₂O₃ and MgO, components of lapis lazuli ((Mg, Fe⁺²)Al₂(PO₄)₂(OH)₂), which is produced in abundance in Central Asia. The white pigment seems to be a chalk- or clam shell powder-based limestone mixture. At the points S-19, S-23 and E-R13, a high volume of zinc (Zn) was found. The examination of a set of photos and digital stereoscopic microscope images identified a white pigment layer on the plastered image of a swan on the southern wall, which is presumed to have been produced during a conservation process since its major component zinc oxide (zinc white; ZnO) is a modern compound. Conventional black pigments contain carbon. However, since the P-XRF we used did not detect light elements whose atomic numbers were lower than 15, we failed to determine the elements contained in the black pigment. But recent research on pigment component analysis suggests that it is probable that the black pigment was made from vegetable or animal carbon.

Video Zoom Microscope Analysis

A video zoom microscope (VZM) was employed for a precise component analysis, which is impervious to the obstructions of substances applied on the paintings during conservation treatments.

Due to the time constraints of the project, the team decided to concentrate on the images of Korean envoys on the seriously damaged western wall, instead of all four walls. As most of the pigment layers—with the exception of the swords and the belts of the envoys and parts of the background—had peeled off, it was essentially impossible to determine the figures precisely. We first divided this section of the mural into 140 segments for photographic purposes, and magnified each photographed segment 7-fold with the VZM in order to unearth obscured pigments.

Upon digitalizing the data acquired by these means via Adobe Photoshop CS5, we restored the outlines of images by connecting areas in which

the dots that indicated the remaining traces of pigments were most densely clustered.

Digital Tracing

We attempted a surface restoration of the Afrasiab palatial mural based on the information acquired through the high-definition digital tracing and forensic analyses.

By overlapping the high-definition digitally traced copy produced by the photographic crew and the hand-painted copy produced in 1965, we were able to compare them, thereby firstly, identifying errors in the current images, and secondly, identifying the further damaged parts, which used to be perceptible in the hand-painted copy.

The restoration was carried out based on the comparison between the old copies and the new copies and on the data such as the components and chromaticity of the pigments and the outlines of the envoys, garnered through the forensic analyses. But restoring lines, images, and colors that have been too seriously damaged to be detected by the unaided eye requires an unusual set of skills, thus highly trained painters should be employed, as they are best placed to interpret a mural painted by another group of painters who lived more than 1,300 years ago.

For printing purposes, POPYRUS300, the French paper, was used as it accurately reflected the texture of the painting. Due to the large size of the image files, the photo of each wall was printed on roughly 10 sheets of paper, which were later amalgamated. Two hard copies of the final product were printed, one of which is now stored at the Northeast Asian History Foundation and the other at the Afrasiab Museum.

While the restored copy is based on digital technologies, human painters also played indispensable roles in restoration. In this respect, the accomplishment should be seen as the result of a novel method of replication based both on conventional techniques and the cutting-edge technologies of modern times.



Figure 3. West Wall (Before Restoration)



Figure 4. West Wall (After Restoration)



Figure 5. Ancient Korean Envoys
(Before Restoration)



Ancient Korean Envoys
(After Restoration)

Replica Production

The reproduction of the mural adopted art techniques that are employed in the actual painting of murals. We selected the Korean envoys wearing *Jowooguan* in the northern section of the west wall and the people with engraved Sogdian words in its southern section as the main objects for the replica.

Through the component analyses of the pigments and the wall itself, the latter being an integral element of every mural, we had already ascertained that the wall was made of ocher from Afrasiab Hill, mixed with grains of sand.

In fabricating a wall for a mural, the first priority is the choice of an appropriate substance that can adequately support the weight of the clay to be plastered on the wall. Hence, we selected a honeycomb board, as it is light but resistant to deformation. We affixed a sheet of jute to the surface of the board, on which two layers of ocher, similar in its makeup to that from Afrasiab Hill, were plastered and dried.

When the wall was completed, we commenced the application of the restored copy of the mural to it. The replication team made an initial conté sketch on the rear side of the printed mural, which was then pressed onto the wall. Based on the sketch—now on the wall—the team line-drew an outline with hair pencils with reference to the relevant data. Next, in order to replicate the mural, we used ash-gray pine-soot tusche, manipulating the strength and moisture level of the brushes as necessary.

The coloring was carried out with the aim of replicating the properties and chromaticity of the mural's pigments as accurately as possible—with the exception of our using artificial powder pigments instead of natural lithic pigments of the sort employed in the mural. This exception was motivated by the consideration that powder pigment is more effective in replicating the color-fadedness of the original, and its being more economical and compatible with our limited budget.

Finally, comparing each and every corresponding aspect of the replica and the digitally restored mural, we believe we have reproduced details as minute as peelings-off and hairline cracks, thereby bringing what is ef-



Figure 6. The Replica of the Mural in the Central Asia Section at the National Museum of Korea

fectively another Afrasiab palatial mural into existence over 1,300 years after the advent of the original. The replica of the restored copy is currently on display on the main board in the Central Asia section at the National Museum of Korea.

3D Digital Image Restoration

The 3D digital image of the Afrasiab palatial mural, produced by means of advanced digital media technologies, offers the mural site and its walls in the form of virtual reality so as to give viewers an indirect but vivid experience of the mural.

There are only scant records on the structure of Afrasiab Palace and the locations of its murals, except for a single planar ordnance map produced upon its discovery, which sparsely illustrates approximately thirty rooms and their dividing walls. Thus, we attempted to acquire further information on the palatial site based on 3D broadband scanning of the architectural remains of the entire site. Using the Trimble TX5, the image we scanned is significant as a source of precise numerical and visual data on the surface of the Afrasiab palatial site, which we were able to utilize in measuring various objects and in drawing a blueprint.

In addition, a collection of older blueprints generated at the time of the excavation and another set of scanned data derived from architectural remains found in the building with the mural and satellite photographs were amalgamated in overlapping layers, and matched at 47 points on the



Figure 7. Restored 3D Image of the Interior of the Afrasiab Palace

walls. Based upon this, we could locate Room A-1, where the mural is situated, as is indicated by the blueprints, and specify the planar form of the old palace. Moreover, the first aerial drone photograph of the Afrasiab historic site is of special significance in that it captured its sublimity and beauty, which had never been seen from the ground.

Finally, for the 3D digital image restoration project, we developed a variety of contents for a website, a promotional video clip and virtual reality (VR) applications, which are currently available on the website of the Northeast Asian History Foundation and on YouTube.

On April 1, 2015, the Northeast Asian History Foundation and the Afrasiab Museum exchanged the final outcomes of the project and established a video-viewing room in the museum. The video clip is subtitled in eight languages (i.e., Korean, Uzbek, English, Russian, French, Spanish, Chinese, and Japanese), imparting the beauty of the Afrasiab palatial wall painting and the histo-cultural significance of the Silk Road.

► **Website on the Afrasiab Wall Painting**

- <http://contents.nahf.or.kr/goguryeo/afrosiab>

▶ **Video Guide of the Afrasiab Wall Painting**

- English: <https://youtu.be/HuuHrNQugt4>

- Korean: <https://youtu.be/6vYTtY6hQPc>

Conclusion

Concluding this presentation, we will discuss the significance of this digital restoration project of the Afrasiab palatial mural.

Primarily, the digital restoration project gave impetus to devising new methods of restoring cultural properties of historic significance, which draw upon such technologies as high-precision photography and actual-size image merging, analysis and chromaticity measurement of pigments, stereoscopic microscope analysis, and infrared and ultraviolet examinations. This provided us with opportunities to learn about and experience the various techniques needed to study murals of historic importance. This project establishes a new paradigm for the conservation and utilization of cultural heritage artefacts by establishing “digital copying” as another genre of art that draws on computer graphics, as well as for the conduct of forensic analyses through the use of high-tech devices.

It is also significant in that it achieved the purpose of copying a cultural artefact to the fullest possible degree thanks to high-definition photography and detailed data acquired via forensic analyses. The old copy that was produced upon the mural’s discovery in 1965 did not depict the entire mural and failed to capture the figures and colors accurately. By contrast, the new digital copy, as it represents the original “just as it appears,” renders itself a highly useful reference material, which we believe any further work on or analysis of the mural must take stock of.

Furthermore, a great deal of information on the mural itself has been analyzed and recorded, even if belatedly, one-half century after it was unearthed. The database that was developed during the analyses of the mural can be utilized for future research on cultural artefacts throughout the world, and not simply in the Silk Road region.

The use of cutting-edge digital technologies have made the Afrasiab palatial mural more accessible to the public than ever. Its replica is current-

ly on display at the National Museum of Korea, and in the form of a digital restoration copy at the National Museum of India in New Delhi as well as on the Web, all of which raises the awareness of the value of the Afrasiab wall painting.

We expect that the Northeast Asian History Foundation and the Afrasiab Museum's project will continue to contribute to deepening our understanding of the Silk Road's history and culture, and of the history of civilization in general.

The Relations between the Sogdians and Gokturks Manifest in the Afrasiab Palatial Murals

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Ah-rim PARK

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Introduction

The Sogdians, who painted the murals in Afrasiab Palace in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, have been extensively researched as the symbolic agent of the West Regions' (*Xiyu*) cultural transmission in East Asia for a long time.¹ However, as exemplified by the Afrasiab murals, the golden era of Sogdian art was in the 6th-8th centuries, and thus it is not easy to explain the Central Asian elements in ancient Korean art that were already present in fourth-century Anak Tomb No. 3 in North Korea in connection with Sogdian art.

Against this backdrop, the significance of ancient Koreans' image in the 7th century Afrasiab murals and the nature of Central Asian art culture exhibited in ancient Korea and China can be analyzed by means of exam-

¹ Guitty Azarpay, *Sogdian Painting: The Pictorial Epic in Oriental Art* (University of California Press, 1981); Annette L. Juliano and Judith A. Lerner, *Monks and Merchants* (New York: Asia Society, 2001); De La Vaissiere, Etienne, *Sogdian Traders: A History*. Ward, James trans. (Brill, 2005); B. I. Marshak and N. N. Negmatov, "Sogdiana," in *History of Civilizations of Central Asia: The Crossroads of Civilizations, A. D. 250 to 750*, Ahmad Hasan Dani, B. A. Litvinsky ed., (Unesco, 1996): 237-81; Kwon Young-pil 권영필 et al., *Jungang Asia-sok-ui Koguryoin Baljachwi 중앙아시아 속의 고구려인 발자취* [The Footmarks of Koguryo People in Central Asia] (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2008), 13-59.

ining the trends of art culture that had been transmitted east and west along the Uzbekistan region since long before the creation of the Afrasiab wall paintings. Moreover, research on the evolvement of third-fourth century Central Asian reliefs and murals, which had been created shortly before Koguryo tomb murals, reveals that the Central Asian culture of reliefs and murals, as well as the Chinese culture of pictorial stones and murals in the Wei-Jin period, provided abundant cultural resources to inspire Koguryo tomb murals. An investigation of Central Asian-style tomb murals developed in northern regions will help overcome the spatiotemporal limitations of previous analyses of Sogdian art traditions, which are still fixed at the 6th-8th century Afrasiab murals.²

Ascribing the Central Asian influence on Koguryo tomb murals obscurely to the West Regions raises a dilemma while presenting Dunhuang Grottoes' murals and Uzbekistan's Afrasiab murals as evidence of cultural interactions, since the Afrasiab murals including the image of Koreans were painted later than the golden era of Koguryo murals—that is, the fifth-sixth centuries. Important to note here is that the Northern Nomadic Civilization, which gave birth to Koguryo's mural culture, had formed far prior to the fourth-fifth centuries A.D., when Koguryo murals began to appear. The civilization had developed since the 7th-8th centuries B.C. during the time of the Huns and Scythians, upon the foundation of a travel route that had enabled the spread of Scythian culture east and west and human and cultural transmission by the westward and southward movements of the Huns, and then it reached and encompassed Koguryo, which adopted its mural culture.³

The Central Asian culture represented by the Sogdians should be approached on the basis of a comprehensive understanding of Eastern and Western cultures disseminated by the inhabitants and visitors of Sogdiana, not as a dissemination of Sogdian culture. The interpretation of so-called

² Park Ah-rim 박아림, *Koguryo Gobunpyeokhwa Eurasia-lul Punda* 고구려 고분벽화 유라시아 문화를 품다 [Koguryo Tomb Murals Embracing Eurasian Culture] (Seoul: Hakyonmunhwasa, 2015).

³ Ibid.

“Westerners” (*Xiyuren*) and the culture of the Western Regions as a cultural body of a fixed region in a fixed period, cannot reconstruct the spatiotemporal links between Koguryo’s international exchanges and the Central Asian influence displayed on Koguryo murals. However, if the Central Asian culture, often equivocally associated with Sogdian culture, is understood as a continuum of the Central Asian civilization inherited from Scythian and Hun culture, the places and times are connected without any spatiotemporal contradictions.

The Afrasiab murals in Uzbekistan, created in the 7th century, are an accumulated outcome of art cultural exchanges between east and west, which had been led by the Sogdians as a medium and symbol of transmission since Anno Domini. The murals have been also the symbolic monument of the countries involved in the formation of the civilization encompassing the Northern Grasslands and Central Asia, such as Sogdiana, the Gokturk empires, China, and Koguryo.

Two probable routes of exchange between ancient Korea and Uzbekistan have been suggested by previous studies on the Afrasiab palatial murals.⁴ The first one is along the Chinese Oasis Road during the periods of the Northern, Sui, and Tang Dynasties. A variety of artefacts from the periods, such as tomb murals and stone reliefs with Central Asian-style character designs, Central Asian-style accessories and glassware unearthed from tombs, and Sasanian silver coins and Byzantine gold coins, all evince the cultural exchange between east and west from/through ancient Uzbekistan to ancient China.⁵

The second probable route that connected Sogdiana and Koguryo is the Gokturk route, a non-Chinese route through the Grasslands. Although substantial research, based on textual records, has been conducted on ex-

⁴ Kwon Young-pil 권영필 et al., *Jungang Asia-sok-ui Koguryoin Baljachwi* 중앙아시아 속의 고구려인 발자취 [The Footmarks of Koguryo People in Central Asia] (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2008): 13-59.

⁵ Rong Xinjiang, “Sogdians Around the Ancient Tarim Basin,” in Matteo Compareti, Paola Raffetta, Gianroberto Scarcia, *Erān ud Anērān Studies Presented to Boris Il’ič Maršak on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday* (Cafoscara, 2006): 513-24; Park Ah-rim (2015); Kwon Young-pil et al. (2008): 385-461.

changes between Koguryo and the Gokturks,⁶ a concrete reconstruction of Koguryo's art cultural exchanges with the Gokturks and as far as the Sogdians is not easy, considering the paucity of remains and artefacts from the 6th-8th century Gokturks in the Mongolian region.

Kageyama Etsuko, who has investigated the influence of Chinese art on the Afrasiab murals, argues that the murals had adopted the idiosyncratic images of foreign envoys in Chinese murals⁷ since those envoys resemble figures in tomb murals and stone statues in the Zhaoling and Qianling Mausoleums of the Tang Dynasty. Boris Marshak, on the other hand, suggests that the Chinese emperor and princess in the Afrasiab murals might have referred to scroll paintings imported along with silk from China.⁸ Matteo Compareti also compares the hunting scene in Afrasiab's north wall painting with Tang's tomb of Li Shou, Han's stone reliefs from Northern Shaanxi, and Sasanian paintings of hunting, while attempting to link the mural's boating scene on the river with China's Dragon Boat Festival.⁹

However, Tang's tomb murals and stone statues in the Zhaoling and Qianling Mausoleums, which are mostly located in Xi'an, Shaanxi, are

⁶ Lee Seong-je 이성제, "Koguryo-wa Tureukeu-gye bukbangseryeok-ui gwangye" 高句麗와 튀르크계 北方勢力의 관계 [The Relationship between Koguryo and Turkic Northern Powers], *Studies on Koguryo and Balhae* 고구려발해연구 52 (2015): 149-71; 이정빈 Lee Jeongbin, "570-nyeondae huban~580-nyeondae jeonban Yoseojiyeok-ui jeongse-wa Koguryo-ui daeogwangye" 570년대 후반~580년대 전반기 요서지역의 情勢와 고구려의 대외관계 [The Situations in the Liaoxi Region and Koguryo's Foreign Relations in the Late 570s to the Early 580s], *Journal of Northeast Asian History* 동북아역사논총 (2014): 285-314.

⁷ Kageyama Etsuko 影山悦子, "Samarukando hekiga ni mi rareru Chūgoku kaiga no yōso ni tsuite—Chōsen hito shisetsu wa varukumān-ō no moto o otozureta ka" サマルカンド壁画に見られる中国絵画の要素について—朝鮮人使節はワルフマーン王のもとを訪れたか— [On the Elements of Chinese Paintings Found in Samarkand Murals—Did Korean Envoys Visit King Varkhuman?], *Seinanajia Kenkyū* 西南アジア研究 [Southwest Asian Studies] 49 (1998): 17-33; Kageyama Etsuko, "A Chinese way of Depicting Foreign Delegates Identified in the Paintings of Afrasiab," *Studia Iranica* 25 (2002): 313-27.

⁸ Boris Ulyich Marshak, "Le Programme Iconographique des Peintures de la 'Salle des Ambassadeurs' à Afrasiab (Samarkand)," *Art Asiatiques* 49 (1994): 5-20; Kwon Young-pil et al. (2008), 49.

⁹ Matteo Compareti, "The Paintings Concerning Chinese Themes at Afrāsīyāb," *New Elements on the Chinese Scene in the "Hall of the Ambassadors" at Afrāsīyāb along with a Reconsideration of "Zoroastrian" Calendar*, Libreria Editrice Cafoscarina (2007): 11-32.

dated close to or later than the Afrasiab murals. Moreover, Ge Chengyong argued that the stone statues in the Zhaoling Mausoleum might have been influenced by the Gokturks.¹⁰

Meanwhile, the configurations of the west and north wall paintings of Afrasiab Palace exhibit noticeable akinness to the pictorial program of Sogdian stone reliefs found in the Northern and Sui of China as well as to the arrangement of stone statues in Gokturk memorial complexes remaining in Mongolia. Thus, it is more plausible to assume that the Afrasiab murals were not simply the product of Tang art's influence on Sogdian art but the outcome of interactions and incorporations with the cultures of the Northern Grasslands and Central Asia, wherein the Sogdians and the Gokturks could have played the role of the principal agents of art exchange between east and west.

The Afrasiab murals may have referred to Tang's art models, but their themes and compositions might well have been influenced by the portraits of Sogdian tomb occupants engraved on stone reliefs during the Northern and Sui Dynasties of China. The designs carved on sarcophagi, which Sogdian tomb occupants must have custom-ordered, seemingly followed the format of Chinese funerary art; however, they actually reveal a conspicuous combination of Sogdian funerary customs, blending of Sogdian and Gokturk cultures, and traits of the northern nomads. The iconography on Sogdian sarcophagi display the art culture of the nomadic tribes in the Northern Grasslands, reflecting the exchange between the Sogdians and the Gokturks, which could not be or have not been found in the original habitats of the Sogdians, yet.

The following sections provide a preliminary investigation of the Sogdian Afrasiab murals, which were created while interacting with or influenced by Tang and the Western Gokturk Khanate, from the perspective

¹⁰ Ge Chengyong (葛承雍) argues that the Six Steeds of Zhaoling Mausoleum, which sculpted Gokturk steeds associated with the Gokturks' high-ranking officer titles, depict the Gokturk funerary customs and religious practices, which were closely linked to the Gokturks' religion of Zoroastrianism (Yu Hyangyang 유향양 & Chu Gyosun 추교순, *Jungguk Dangdae Hwangjereung Yeongu* 중국 당대 황제릉 연구 [A Study on Tang Emperors' Mausoleums] (Seogyongmunhwa사 경문화사, 2012): 50-51).

of tripartite exchanges of art culture among the Sogdians, Gokturks, and Chinese. In other words, instead of the view that they were influenced by Chinese paintings and sculptures,¹¹ they are investigated in terms of how the art culture that was transmitted and incorporated via the international network of the Sogdians, the Gokturks, China's Northern and Tang Dynasties, and Koguryo, was manifest in the Sogdian wall paintings. The remains of Gokturk memorial complexes in Mongolia, Sogdian stone reliefs found in China were created before or close to the Afrasiab murals. Ancient Sogdian murals discovered in Uzbekistan were mostly painted in the 7th to 8th centuries, and thus the comparison with the Sogdian relief sculptures in China will help reconstruct the development of Sogdian murals prior to the 7th-8th centuries. In addition, historical records report that Gokturk memorial shrines were decorated with wall paintings of the lives of the deceased, such as victories in wars,¹² but no wall paintings are left there. Therefore, comparisons of the Afrasiab murals, which reveal the relationship between the Gokturks, Sogdians, and Sino-Sogdian stone reliefs, will provide supplementary information for the reconstruction of Gokturk shrines.

Wall Paintings on the North and South Walls in the Afrasiab Palace and Sino-Sogdian Stone Reliefs

As of April 2019, the explanation board for the drawings of the murals in the exhibition room of the Afrasiab Museum specified the horse rider depicted large in the center of the north wall as Emperor Gaozong of Tang (Figures 1 and 2). This specification, however, needs to be reconsidered since the figure is not clearly identifiable due to heavy exfoliation on the relevant part. Moreover, the overall design of the scene matches more with the context of hunting scenes in the Sogdian stone reliefs of the Northern

¹¹ Mao Min 毛民, "The Art of Chinese Influence at the 'Hall of Ambassadors in Afrasiab,'" *Turfanological Research* 吐鲁番学研究, vol. 2, *Tulufan Xue Guoji Xueshu Yantao Hui Lunwen Ji* 吐鲁番学国际学术研讨会论文集 [Proceedings of the International Symposium on Turfan Studies] (Shanghai Lexicographical Publishing House, 2016): 444-50.

¹² "Tujue chuan" 突厥傳 [The Gokturks], *Zhou Shu* 周書, Book 50; "Tujue chuan" 突厥傳 [The Gokturks], *Sui Shu* 隋書, Book 84.



Figure 1. The Restored Drawing of the Wall Painting on the North Wall of the Afrasiab Palace



Figure 2. The Wall Painting on the North Wall of the Afrasiab Palace

and Sui Dynasties or scenes of fighting with animals in the Varakhsha murals, rather than with the context of Tang Emperor Gaozong, who bestowed the investiture of Kangju governor on Sogdian King Varkhuman.

There are not many Tang tomb murals with a hunting scene, and the horse rider designated as Emperor Gaozong in the hunting scene of the Afrasiab mural appears more similar to the images of men hunting or fighting with animals carved in the stone reliefs excavated from the tombs of




Figure 3. The Hunting Scene in the Tomb of An Qie



Figure 4. The Hunting Scene in the Tomb of Shi Jun




Figure 5. The Hunting Scene in the Tomb of Yu Hong

An Qie (or An Jia), Shi Jun (or Master Shi), and Yu Hong, which display distinct traits of Sogdian culture (Figures 3, 4, and 5). The images of fierce fighting between humans and animals are the main theme of the Varakhsha murals displayed in the State Museum of Art in Samarkand, Uzbekistan and in the Hermitage Museum in Saint Petersburg, Russia (Figure 6).

The Sogdian stone reliefs in China, whose major themes were a banquet or hunting, were created from the late 6th to early 7th centuries, hence earlier than the Afrasiab murals. Originally, the designs of Sogdian pictorial stones had developed blending native Sogdian culture, Chinese funerary culture, and Northern Nomadic culture,¹³ and thus it is probable that blended and incorporated mixtures of those three cultures were present when the Afrasiab murals were painted during the period in which Kangju was under the influence of the Western Gokturk Khanate and Tang.

The Sogdian tombs that have been discovered in China include the Tombs of Shi Jun and An Qie in Xi'an, Shaanxi; the Tomb of Yu Hong in Taiyuan, Shanxi; the Shi family cemetery in Guyuan, Ningxia; and Tomb No. 3 in Yanchi, Ningxia.¹⁴ The tomb occupants belonged to so-called

¹³ Rong Xinjiang 荣新江, "Su te yu tujue yi su te shiguan tuxiang de xin yinzheng" 粟特与突厥—粟特石棺图像的新印证 [New Evidence on Sogdian and Turkic Sarcophagus Images], *Zhongguo Zhongguo Yu Su Te Wenming* 中古中国与粟特文明 [Medieval China and Sogdian civilization] (三联书店, 2014), 373.

¹⁴ Xi'an shi wenwubaohukaoguyanjiuyuan bian 西安市文物保护考古研究院 编, *Beizhoushijunmu* 北周史君墓, Wenwuchubanshe 文物出版社, 2014; Shanxisheng Kaoguyanjiusuo 山西省考古研究所, *Taiyuansuiyuhongmu* 太原隋虞弘墓, Wenwuchubanshe 文物出版社, 2005; Shanxisheng Kaoguyanjiusuo 陕西省考古研究所, *Xi'an Beizhouanjiamu* 西安北周安伽墓, Wenwuchubanshe 文物出版社, 2003; Ningxiahuizuzizhiqu Bowuguan 宁夏回族自治区博物馆, "Ningxia yanchitangmufajuejianbao" 宁夏鹽池唐墓發掘簡報, *Wenwu* 文物, no. 9, 1988; Annette L. Juliano, Judith A. Lerner, *Monks and Merchants: Silk Road Treasures from Northwest China* (Harry N. Abrams, 2001); Jung Wanseo 정완서, "Jungguk-eseo balgyeondeon sogeudeuin mudeom misul jaegochal—sogeudeuin seokjanggu dosang-ul jungsim-uro" 중국에서 발견된 소그드인 무덤 미술 재고찰—소그드인 석장구 도상을 중심으로 [Reexamining Sogdian tomb art in China with a Focus on the Images on Sogdian Sarcophagi], *A Study on Central Asia* 중앙아시아연구 15 (2010): 327-50; Park Ah-rim 박아림, *ibid.*, 354-70; Annette L. Juliano, "Chinese Pictorial Space at the Cultural Crossroads," Matteo Comparati, *ibid.*, 293-315; Park Ah-rim, "Jungguk Yeonghahoejokjachiigu-ui gowonsudangmyo-wa yeomjidangmyo byeokhwa-ui seokgak yeongu" 중국 영하회족자치구의 고원수당묘와 염지당묘 벽화와 석각연구 [The Wall Paintings and the Stone Reliefs of the Sui-Tang Tombs in Guyuan and the Tang Tombs in Yanchi in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region of China], *The History of Asian Art* 동양미술사학 8 (2019): 93-119.



Figure 6. Hunting Scene, Red Hall, Varakhsha, The State Museum of Art in Uzbekistan

“Nine Sogdian Surnames (昭武九姓),” which had originated from Anguo (currently Bukhara, Uzbekistan), Shiguo (Kesh or Shahr-i Sabz, Uzbekistan), Kangju (Samarkand, Uzbekistan), and Heguo (Kushania, Uzbekistan). Exotic non-Chinese themes and designs of banquets, hunting, and Zoroastrian funerary rituals were engraved on house-shaped stone sarcophagus, and stone beds. Similar images of the hunting scene on the painting of the north wall of Afrasiab Palace can be found among the Sogdian stone reliefs of the Northern Dynasties of China, particularly on the tombs of An Qie, Shi Jun, and Yu Hong.

An Qie was from Wuwei, Gansu and settled in Xi’an. He worked as a *sabao* (萨宝) or a caravan leader who managed Sogdian immigrants, and died in 579. Shi Jun was also a *sabao* in Lanzhou, Gansu, and died at 85 in 579. His wife, whose surname was Kang, is assumed to be an immigrant from Samarkand. He is known only for his last name since his Chinese given name has been erased in the tomb epitaph. Yu Hong was from the city of Yuhelin, Yugu. Although he was not a Sogdian, under the order of

the Khan of Rouran, he traveled to Persia, Tuyuhun, and the Northern Qi as an envoy, and settled in the Northern Qi, which was later incorporated into the Sui. He worked as a *sabao* till his death in 592, aged 59.

The An Qie Tomb used a stone bed surrounded by a screen, while the Yu Hong Tomb and the Shi Jun Tomb used a house-shaped stone sarcophagus. Although their shapes imitated traditional Chinese timber-framed buildings and furniture, the engraved images on the stone surfaces exhibit entirely exotic traits of Central Asian art culture.

The An Qie stone bed in the Shaanxi History Museum has pictorial carvings on the back, left, and right sides of the stone screen. The back side of the screen consists of 6 pictorial stone panels, while the left and right have 3 panels each. From left to right, the carved images show a procession of horse riders and an oxcart, hunting, and an outdoor banquet on the left-side panels; then an outdoor banquet, a party at a vineyard and hunting, a man and a woman having a banquet, a scene of an oath of allegiance, an outdoor banquet, and another outdoor banquet on the back side of the screen; and finally, hunting, an outdoor banquet, and an outing on an oxcart on the right-side panels.¹⁵ On the left of the banquet scene with the man and woman—who are tomb occupants—and on the bottom of the vineyard party, there is an image of the Sogdian tomb occupant overwhelming a ferocious wild beast with an arrow, which is similar to the hunting design on Sasanian silverware. The scenes of outdoor parties and an oath of allegiance indicate vibrant relations between the Sogdians and Gokturks.¹⁶ Interestingly, the oath scene, in which Sogdians and Gokturks are having a meeting on horses, is an almost identical representation with the royal investiture ceremony on Sasanian reliefs. Above the roof of the house where the Sogdians and Gokturks gather is carved the Zoroastrian symbol of the sun and moon.

The house-shaped stone sarcophagus of the Shi Jun Tomb (or the Tomb of Master Shi or the Tomb of Wirkak) in the Xi'an Museum has the

¹⁵ Jung Wanseo 정완서 (2010), 332.

¹⁶ Refer to Rong Xinjiang (2014, 373-78) on the lively exchange between the Sogdians and Gokturks depicted on Sogdian stone carvings.

images of the following densely carved on its exterior and base: the main deity of Zoroastrianism (Ahura Mazda), hunting, banquet, outing, caravan, ritual, and ascension to heaven. On the exterior wall of the chamber is depicted the tomb occupant's ascension to heaven as he crosses the Zoroastrian Chinvat Bridge over a flower-blooming river. This image is comparable to the boating scene over the lotus-blooming river in the Afrasiab north wall painting.¹⁷ The front and back of the base are decorated with various monsters, and each edge has carvings of spread-winged angels. The left and right sides of the base have various hunting scenes, either on foot or on horse. In particular, in the hunting scene on the left side, where a caravan is also depicted, two horse riders are aiming at a ferociously attacking tiger and lion from left and right, a reminder of beast-fighting scenes on the stone reliefs of the Yu Hong Tomb.

Yu Hong's sarcophagus at the Shanxi Provincial Museum has the carvings of horse-riding, outdoor party, horse-riding party, hunting, vineyard party, and ritual ceremony. The back and right sides have three hunting scenes, in which Sogdians and Gokturks riding elephants or camels are suppressing predators such as a lion with swords or bows and arrows. Under the scene of the tomb occupant couple having a banquet, there is a scene of two men fighting with two lions, each of which is swallowing the head of the man in the front. While such a brutal depiction of hunting was rare in China, similar hunting images were frequent on Sasanian silverware, which suggests that the tomb occupant, who had visited Persia as an envoy, zealously adopted the Central Asian-style designs, including those of the Sasanians.

The main figure in the hunting scene on the Afrasiab north wall, which has been restored in a drawing, differs from Tang's hunting images in terms of the iconography and arrangement of surrounding figures; it is more similar to the images on Sogdian stone reliefs in the Northern and Sui Dynasties, which emphasized the ferocity of animals and the movement of hunters. The Afrasiab murals' dynamic portrayal of hunting is also quite

¹⁷ Mao Min 毛民 (2016), 444-50.



Figure 7. The Wall Painting on the North Wall of the Afrasiab Palace



Figure 8. The Right Side of the House-Shaped Stone Sarcophagus from the Tomb of Shi Jun

different from the famous Sogdian hunting image in the Panjikent wall paintings,¹⁸ in which the posture of the horse rider and the horse is relatively static. Thus, Afrasiab's north wall hunting scene could be an incorporation of Tang-style attire and revived Sasanian hunting image or could be a result to a certain extent of influence from the Sogdian stone reliefs of the Northern and Sui Dynasties, which might have been reintroduced to Sogdiana, perhaps through China.

The bridge-crossing scene on the right side of the stone chamber in the Shi Jun Tomb can be compared with the boating scene of a lady in Chinese garments on the lotus-blooming river (Figures 7 and 8). The bridge of the Shi Jun Tomb has been interpreted to be Chinvat Bridge, which the deceased is believed to cross after death in Zoroastrianism. If the lady in the boating scene on the Afrasiab north wall was not a portrayal of a real Chinese princess, then the scene could be actually depicting a rite of passage that Zoroastrianism assumes that the deceased would undergo. All of the murals in the Afrasiab Palace are generally analyzed as depictions of Zoroastrian funerary rituals and the Nauruz festival;¹⁹ however, it is difficult to clearly explain the reasons for having the figures on the north wall wear Chinese attire and for arranging hunting and boating scenes on the same wall.

A procession and a ritual shrine painted on the south wall of Afrasiab are frequent themes of Sogdian stone reliefs in China. Here it is necessary to pay attention to the configurational resemblance between Sino-Sogdian stone reliefs and the Afrasiab murals. Parade images on Sino-Sogdian stone reliefs often include exotic animals such as elephants and camels, not just commonly seen horses. Also, a chief priest wearing a padam (i.e., a white mouth veil that a Zoroastrian priest wears) performing a rite at a Zo-

¹⁸ Davide Ciafaloni, Geri Della Rocca de Candal, "Sasanian Traditions in Sogdian Paintings: Hunting and Fighting Scenes" *Parthica*, 13 (2011): 111-29; Matteo Comperti, "The Painted Vase of Merv in the Context of Central Asian Pre-Islamic Funerary Tradition," *The Silk Road* 9 (2011): 26-41.

¹⁹ Frantz Grenet, "What was the Afrasiab Painting about?," *Royal Nauruz in Samarkand: Proceedings of the Conference Held in Venice on the Pre-Islamic Paintings at Afrasiab*, *Rivista degli studi orientali Nuova Serie* 78, Supplemento no. 1 (2006): 43-58.

roastrian altar can often be found on those pictorial stones. In addition, three figures carved on the right side of the house-shaped stone sarcophagus of the Yu Hong Tomb are holding funerary utensils toward a building that appears to be a tall altar. Likewise, in the south wall painting of Afrasiab, a shrine with a tall altar, where three figures are standing, is painted on the far left; a priest wearing a padam is in the center of the parade; and the parade has people riding elephants and camels. The image of the Zoroastrian priest and fire altar in the An Qie and Shi Jun Tombs are similar to the Zoroastrian fire altar as well as the priest and the worshiper in the Sogdian painting (6th-7th centuries) in the Bukhara Museum, which indicates the practice of Zoroastrian rituals in China at that time. The seated figures at the Zoroastrian fire altar scene in the Bukhara painting are wearing glamorously-patterned garments and swords and displaying similar characteristics to the figures depicted in the banquet scenes of Sogdian murals in Uzbekistan and the stone statues found in Gokturk memorial complexes in Mongolia.

The images in Sogdian tombs of the Northern and Sui Dynasties in China are estimated to have been created by local Sogdian artists who had the 'Sogdian painting copies' of the images.²⁰ However, the murals remaining in southern Uzbekistan and northern Tajikistan, which were the original lands of the Sogdians, were created mostly in the 7th-8th centuries, and thus the subjects and depictions of prior Sogdian wall paintings can be reconstructed by investigating the funerary art established by Sogdian immigrants to China, who had continuously communicated with their native Sogdian land. This approach to Sogdian art will help shed light on the intricate cultural transmissions between the East and the West at that time.

Wall Painting on the West Wall in the Afrasiab Palace and Stone Statues in Gokturk Memorial Sites

The west wall painting of Afrasiab draws different interpretations from

²⁰ Kwon Young-pil et al. (2008), 21.

scholars depending on the restored copies of the exfoliated part on the upper center.²¹ According to one of the reconstructions of the scene in which the damaged part is restored as portraits of Sogdian King Varkhuman and the Khan of the Western Gokturk Khanate, the west wall painting can be interpreted as a portrayal of a banquet hosted by King Varkhuman and the Western Gokturk Khan and the reception of foreign envoys. The north and south walls of the Afrasiab Palace have depictions of hunting and procession. The procession scene on the south wall can be interpreted as a funerary procession toward the Sogdian shrine on the left while the horse rider in the center of the north wall painting is often viewed as Tang Emperor Gaozong and the lady on the boat on the left as a Chinese princess.

If all of the Afrasiab murals are analyzed as the pictorial program consisting of banquet and reception as well as hunting and parade, then they are similar to the typical funerary pictorial program in Koguryo and in the Chinese Han, Wei, Jin, and Northern Dynasties. The common themes and iconography that appear in most sarcophagi of the Sogdian tombs from the Northern and Sui Dynasties were an outdoor banquet, an outing on horses, man and woman at a banquet, hunting, and a memorial ritual as well.

The Gokturks are also recorded as having had funerary art traditions, in which they would the deceased by painting his life events, such as a battle scene, on the interior walls of the shrine in the memorial site. However, no Gokturk shrine building has been left in any of the memorial complexes. One possible way to reconstruct Gokturk shrines is by referring to the Afrasiab palatial murals by the Sogdians, who had close relations with the West-

²¹ Albaum, *New Afrasiab Paintings* (Strany i narody Vostoka, X, Moscow, 1971); Albaum, *Afrasiab Painting* (Tashkent, 1975); Azarpay, *The Sogdian Painting: The Pictorial Epic in Oriental Art* (Berkeley, 1983); Belenitsky, Bentovich, and Bolshakov, *The Medieval Town of Central Asia* (Leningrad, 1973); Boris I. Marshak, "The Miho Couch and the Other Sino-Sogdian Works of Art of the Second Half of the 6th Century," *Bulletin of Miho Museum*, no. 4 (2004): 16-31; Guitty Azarpay, "The Afrasiab Murals: A Pictorial Narrative Reconsidered," *Silk Road* 12 (2014): 49-56; Boris Y. Stavisky, "Once more about Peculiarities of the Sogdian Civilization of the fourth-tenth Centuries," Matteo Compareti (2006): 571-82; Sergey A. Yatsenko, "The Late Sogdian Costume," Matteo Compareti (2006): 647-80.

ern Gokturk Khanate at that time. Currently, the only remaining painting from Gokturk shrines is of the horse rider on a roof tile from Bilge Kahn's shrine.

The investigation of the remaining Gokturk memorial sites and stone statues in Mongolia, Altai, Tuva, Kazakhstan, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China reveals that the configuration of their memorial complexes and stone statues transformed and developed from the First to the Second Turkic Empire.²² The remaining memorial complexes and stone statues built during the First Gokturk Empire are the Bugut Memorial Complex in Bugut Sum, Arkhangai Aimag in Mongolia (circa. the 580s), and the Xiaohongnahai Stone sculpture in Zhaosu County, Xinjiang (circa. 599-604). Those remaining from the Second Gokturk Empire are the Shiveet-Ulaan Memorial Complex (assumed to be the tomb of Ilterish Khan [r. 682-92]) in Orkhon Sum, Bulgan Aimag; Bilge Tonyuquq Memorial Complex (720); Kul-Tegin (r. 684-731) Memorial Complex (732) in Khosho Tsaidam, Arkhangai Aimag; Bilge Kahn (r. 716-34) Memorial Complex (735); Kul-Chur Memorial Complex at Ikh Khushuut in Delgerkhaan Sum, Tuv Aimag; and Ongiin Gol Memorial Complex (731-32) in Uyanga Sum, Uvurkhangai Aimag.

The Bugut Stele, which was moved from the original memorial complex to the Tseterleg Museum in Arkhangai Aimag, is assumed to have been constructed during the reign of Taspar Khan (r. 572-81).²³ The stele, supported by a tortoise-shaped platform, is a mixture of Sogdian and Gokturk cultures, having Sogdian inscriptions on its body, and a wolf, a symbol of the Gokturk founding myth, carved on its top. The Bugut Memorial

²² Park Ah-rim 박아림, Nancy S. Steinhardt, and L. Erdenebold, "6-8 segi mongol chowon-ui jesayujeok-gwa seokinsang yeongu," *Central Asian Studies* 중앙아시아연구 23, no. 2 (2018): 143-68; Amartuvshin Ch. and Badma-oyu B., *Stone Statues of Mongolia* (2016): 35-158 & 160-61; Toshio Hayashi, "On the Origin of Turkic Stone Statues," *International Journal of Eurasian Studies* 歐亞學刊 1 (商務印書館, 2011): 181-98; Ren Baolei 任宝磊, "Xinjiang diqu di tujué yicun yu tujué shi di yanjiu" 新疆地区的突厥遗存与突厥史地研究 [A Study on Turkic Relics and History in Xinjiang] (PhD diss.m, Xibe University 西北大學, 2013).

²³ Cengiz Alyilmaz, "On the Bugut Inscription and the Mausoleum Complex," *Matteo Compareti* (2006), 51-60.



Figure 9. The Head of Kul-Tegin Stone Statue




Figure 10. Bilge Khan Stone Statue, National Museum of Mongolia



Figure 11. Stone Statues in the Spirit Path at Qianling, Xi'an, China

Complex has many “balbals” (i.e., a Turkish word for anthropomorphic menhirs) erected inside and outside the earthen ramparts, but no stone statues have been discovered so far. Xiaohongnahai Stone Man, which is presumed to be the statue of Nili Khan (r. 587-99) of the Western Gokturk Empire, is wearing a sun-moon-decorated hat and a belt with his chalice-holding hand close to his chest. While his back is engraved with eight waist-long queues of braids (辮髮), his legs have twenty lines of Sogdian inscription. Like this statue, the Gokturks depicted on Sino-Sogdian stone reliefs, the statues of Gokturk *fanchen* (藩臣) (i.e., vassals of different ethnic stock) in the Zhaoling and Qianling Mausoleums, and the Gokturks in the Afrasiab murals are all portrayed with a similar style of hair and hat. The transition of languages can be also noticed in the inscriptions of Turkic stone stele: Sogdian letters were inscribed in the memorial stele and stone statues created in the late 6th century, whereas Gokturk tamgas were used in the 7th century stele, and Chinese letters in the 8th century stele. The close relationship between the Sogdians and the Gokturks, displayed by the use of the Sogdian language in Gokturk memorial stele, is also confirmed

by the late 6th century Sogdian stone reliefs with Gokturk figures unearthed in China.

Compared with those of the First Gokturk Empire, the memorial complexes of the Second Empire have a consistent structure: a shrine in the center, a sarcophagus built with four panels in the back, and a stone stele on a tortoise-shaped platform in the front. Inside the shrine, there are seated statues of the commemorated couple (man and woman), while its outside is occupied by rows of standing or seated men and women statues. At the entrance of the shrine, animal statues such as lions or sheep were also erected. The entire memorial complex is surrounded by earthen ramparts and moats. Gokturk-particular balbals were usually erected in front of the east gate in a several-kilometer-long row, although some are found inside the complex. On the stele, balbals, and stone statues can be found tamgas that represented Gokturk tribes.

The Shiveet Ulaan Memorial Complex has 11 stone humans, 8 stone lions, 4 stone sheep, and a stele. The smaller than life-size stone humans are mostly wearing Gokturk attire and holding some objects in their hands (e.g., a chalice). Most of them have lost their heads or legs, thus making it difficult to identify their entire shapes accurately. In Bilge Tonyuquq's Memorial Complex, there are 8 stone humans and 289 or more balbals (in a stretch of 1.3 km). Stone sculptures in the Memorial Complex of Kul-Tegin consist of 10 human figures, either seated or standing, two stone lions, two stone sheep, and a large number of balbals. In addition, the head sculpture of Kul-Tegin (42.4 cm in height) and the face of his wife's head sculpture have been found (Figure 9). Bilge Khan's Memorial Complex has been found with 8 stone humans, 2 stone lions, 2 stone sheep (86.5 cm high x 52 cm long; 64 cm high x 72 cm long), and a number of balbals. Bilge Khan's statue (95 cm high x 95 cm wide) and his wife's statue without their head parts are currently on display in the National Museum of Mongolia in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (Figure 10). Kul-Chur's Memorial Complex in Delgerkhaan Sum, Tuv Aimag hosts 8 stone humans, 2 stone lions, 2 stone sheep, and 165 balbals (in a stretch of 1 km). Meanwhile, the largest number of stone statues have been found in the Ongot Memorial

Site in Altanbulag Sum, Tuv Aimag with a total of 28 statues.²⁴

With stele forms having distinct dragon-shaped head parts and tortoise-shaped platforms and with human and animal statues arranged at the façade, the Gokturk memorial complexes that have been discovered so far appear to follow the style of Chinese mausoleums. However, they differ from contemporary Chinese mausoleums built in the Northern Dynasties and the Tang Dynasty (Figure 11), especially in the following aspects: the placement of decoratively patterned sarcophagi behind shrines; smaller sizes of human and animal statues at the façades of shrines than those of the contemporary Tang's; different numbers of each type of statues; and the existence of seated human statues, which Chinese mausoleums did not have. The iconic image of a seated figure holding a chalice was also expressed in Gokturk rock carvings and reliefs and has been considered a stylistic portrayal of a Central Asian in Sino-Sogdian stone reliefs and in the murals from the Northern Dynasties, which demonstrates that this characterization of Central Asians, shared by both Gokturk and Sogdian art cultures, was passed down and became manifest in the stone statues in the Gokturk memorial complexes.

The similarities in terms of a human figure representation among the stone sculptures of Gokturk memorial complexes, the Afrasiab murals, and Sino-Sogdian stone reliefs are as following: mixing both standing and seated figures, the posture of sitting on the ground either by crossing legs or kneeling, the way of holding the chalice with two fingers, and splendid patterns on the garments of important seated figures.

The human stone statues on the façades of Gokturk memorial complexes are either seated or standing, but since most of them have been moved from their original places and have damaged heads or legs. Thus, it is difficult to restore their original arrangements. Tang's stone statues of civil and military officials in 18 mausoleums, including Zhaoling and Qianling, are life-size or larger-than-life and arranged in line on both sides of the passage to the tomb, whereas Gokturk human statues are smaller and

²⁴ Toshio Hayashi (2011), 221-40.

less imposing. Most human stone statues remaining in the Shiveet Ulaan Memorial Complex are holding various objects in their hands, and each of their collars was designed slightly differently, which indicates that they portray subjects or attendants serving the shrine master or tomb occupant. The main figures are seated inside the shrine while a group of seated or standing statues are placed outside the shrine, which differs from the way that human stone statues are arranged in the spirit path in front of the mausoleums of the Northern, Sui, and Tang Dynasties of China. Rather, this arrangement reminds us of Afrasiab's west wall painting, in which Gokturks and foreign envoys are sitting or standing in rows in front of a seated King Varkhuman and Western Gokturk Khan.

The posture of sitting on the ground with crossed legs or kneeling and the manner of holding a chalice in the right hand or both hands are the important characteristics identifying Gokturk stone statues. In particular, the manner of using the thumb and the index finger to hold a chalice resembles the finger posture of Buddhist statues, which suggests the influence of Sogdian Buddhism.²⁵ Hayashi Toshio claims that the hand and leg posture of Gokturk human stone statues resulted from the influence of human images in Sogdian wall paintings.²⁶ This chalice-holding posture is similar to human figures depicted in banquet scenes of Sogdian and Ephtalian murals and silverware. In addition, they are similar to the banquet image in Loulan tomb murals in Xinjiang from the Wei-Jin period and the seated portrait of the tomb occupant in the lacquer coffin painting in Guyuan, Ningxia. It is assumed that the portraits of tomb occupants in the Loulan and Guyuan paintings were influenced by the Central Asian type of human figures. A similar depiction of a human figure is also found on the west niche of the front chamber in Koguryo's Gamshinchong Tomb (the

²⁵ Dovdoïn Baiār, *Mongol Seokinsang-ui Yeongu* 몽골석인상의 연구 [A Study on Mongolian Stone Statues]. Park Won-gil 박원길 trans. (Seoul: Hyeon, 1992), 34-41.

²⁶ Hayashi Toshio, "Sogdian Influences Seen on Turkic Stone Statues Focusing on the Fingers Representations," *Matteo Compareti* (2006), 245-59; Hayashi Toshio 林俊雄, "Sogdian Influence on the Stone Statues of the Old Turks: Focusing on the Fingers Representations" 突厥石人に見られるソグドの影響—とくに手指表現に焦点を当てて—, *Soka University Jinbun Ronsyu* 創価大学人文論集 5 (1993): 27-44.

Niche Sprit Tomb), and thus this iconic design of human figures can be concluded to be a product of cultural exchanges between east and west. The reason for the earlier appearance of this iconography in China and Koguryo than in Sogdian murals and Gokturk stone statues is probably that the expression of a human figure portrait of royals and nobles developed from the Kushan Empire, which had already occupied the extensive territory including the south of Uzbekistan in the beginning of Anno Domini, were inherited by Sogdian artists. Then this Central Asian-style of human representation could have evolved and transformed during the Han Dynasty and spread to Loulan and Datong regions in the Wei-Jin and Northern Wei periods of China.

The tomb occupants or shrine masters, exquisitely sculpted in the round and placed in the shrines of Gokturk memorial complexes, are hard to find as a sculptural form in the funerary art of the Wei-Jin, Northern, Sui, and Tang Dynasties of China. A round-sculpted head of a tomb occupant is discovered in Kul-Tegin's Memorial Complex while the body part without a head is found in Bilge Khan's. Although no statue of the tomb occupant has been found at the Shiveet Ulaan site, it is possible that there used to be one, considering that a seated statue of a commanding figure wearing a splendid flower-patterned costume with a chalice in hand has been discovered at similar topographical sites—the Shiveet Tolgoi and Khugnu Tarni Memorial Complexes.

The Shiveet Tolgoi Memorial Complex in Khashaat Sum, Arkhangai Aimag used to have an intact stone man with his head still attached (160 cm tall), but it has disappeared from the site.²⁷ Judging from the remaining photograph, the stone man was holding a chalice in his right hand and had floral patterns carved on his entire body like the sculpture at the Khugnu Tarni site. The Khugnu Tarni Memorial Complex in Burd Sum, Uvurkhangai Aimag has a seated statue of a man in a splendid flower-patterned garment in front of a stone-mound tomb.²⁸ Like those stone statues from both

²⁷ Amartuvshin Ch. and Badma-oyu B. (2016), Figure 17.

²⁸ Amartuvshin Ch. and Badma-oyu B. (2016), Picture 126.

sites, Gokturk stone statues sculpted in the round are likely to be portrayed as wearing glamorously patterned garments as are the figures in the Afrasiab murals, although such splendid decorations have been abraded and have nearly disappeared.

A portrait of a tomb occupant is often found either in wall paintings or in relief sculptures of Chinese funerary art, but erecting a round-sculpted statue of the main figure in an exquisitely patterned garment in front of a sarcophagus or a stone-mound tomb was uniquely Gokturk. Placing a number of seated or standing statues in front of that main statue is another difference from Chinese mortuary architecture. Furthermore, arranging numerous balbals, which is often in the form of human statues with only simplified faces and hands, in memorial complexes seem to have inherently developed in Gokturk culture, which might have been derived from the deer stone tradition of the Northern Grassland nomads. It is probable that the overall pictorial program of the west wall painting of the Afrasiab Palace which is composed of the portraits of a Sogdian king and a Gokturk king as well as the Sogdians, the Gokturks, and the foreign envoys surrounding the kings might have foreshadowed or represented a unique format of stone sculptures at a Gokturk ritual complex in the Northern Grasslands.

Conclusion

As has been investigated and presented so far, the Afrasiab murals represent not simply Sogdian culture but a comprehensive art culture created by mutual exchanges of cultures among the Sogdians, Gokturks, and Sino-Sogdians. The components of the entire Afrasiab murals are similar to those of Sino-Sogdian stone reliefs, while their depiction of people, as well as Gokturk stone statues, particularly in terms of seated figures and hand postures, is similar to the iconic characterizations of Central Asian people that were shared by Koguryo and the Wei-Jin, Northern, Sui, and Tang Dynasties of China. The significance of the Afrasiab murals can be reassessed if the focus is laid on their relationship with Gokturk art. If more Gokturk memorial sites and stone statues are discovered in the future and, hence, reveal a clear picture of the Gokturks' culture of art and architecture, then research on art

cultural exchanges among the Gokturk states, Sogdiana, China, and even Koguryo will be further advanced. In this regard, it is essential to study Gokturk art in relation to the Sogdians since the Sogdians from West Turkestan dominated the Silk Road stretching from China in the east to the Byzantine Empire and Sasanian Dynasties in the west, in cooperation with the ruling class of the Gokturks. Therefore, the themes and designs of the Afrasiab murals at Samarkand and the Varakhsha murals at Bukhara in Uzbekistan as well as the Pendjikent murals in Tajikistan must be closely investigated and compared with the Gokturk art and the Sino-Sogdian art as considering the spacial configuration.

Ancient Koreans in the Afrasiab Palatial Mural in Samarkand

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Summary

The image of ancient Koreans wearing headgear decorated with feathers (*Jowooguan* 鳥羽冠) has been found in various parts of Asia, including Koguryo's tomb murals, medieval Chinese paintings of foreign envoys, Buddhist murals in the Mogao caves at Dunhuang, archaeological artefacts, and even in the Afrasiab palatial mural in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The figures wearing feathered headgear are of great interest to Korean history and have been frequently used as evidence to support the view that ancient Koreans' sphere of movement was not limited to the Korean peninsula but extended to China, to the Silk Road, and even as far as to Central Asia. They have been interpreted as evidence of ancient Koreans who traveled to China, to Dunhuang, and even to the so-called "Western Regions" (regions West of China, such as the kingdoms of medieval India and Central Asia) and directly interacted with local peoples.

As assumed by many in Korean historical circles, the paintings of figures wearing feathered headgear could be portraits of real Koreans visiting those regions, but it is also possible that they were renderings of the locals' worldview and perceptions of contemporary Koreans. The Koreans in the Afrasiab wall painting have the appearance of typical Koguryo people, judging from comparisons of various records. The painting is of particular

significance since it is the first and only verified image from Central Asia of ancient Koreans. It is a valuable resource that attests to the presence of Koreans in world history, by showing that Sogdiana (Kangguo, Kor. Kangguk 康國; also Kangju, Kor. Kanggō 康居), the medieval Central Asian state centered on Samarkand, was aware of Koreans and Korea, Koreans, although located more than 8,000 km away. In addition, Sogdiana regarded Koguryo as an important state in its contemporary geopolitical context. Thus, it is probable that the peoples of both nations communicated with and traveled to each other's countries for various purposes. Through this process they accumulated information about each other. If this was the case, their exchanges were more likely for commercial and cultural purposes than diplomatic, political, and military ones.

The debate over whether the Koguryo envoys in the Afrasiab mural were actually dispatched to Sogdiana has not been settled yet, but it cannot be denied that Sogdiana considered Koguryo as representing the eastern end of its known world. Headgear decorated with feathers and swords with ring pommels (*hwandu taedo* 環頭大刀) must have impressed Sogdians as particular features of the Koguryo people, which distinguished those ancient Koreans from all peoples in its world.

Deviating from previous Korean analysis of the Afrasiab mural that interprets the figures wearing feathered headgear as evidence for direct linear interaction between the two peoples, it can be approached as an important resource shedding light on the ancient Sogdian people's worldview and perception of ancient Korea and Koreans. That is, the focus of research can shift from tracing ancient Koreans' sphere of movement to understanding how others perceived ancient Korea and Koreans based on the information acquired through direct and indirect interactions. In the case of the Afrasiab mural, in particular, it is necessary to pay attention to the worldview of Sogdiana, which used to be in Samarkand, represented in the painting. In the Sogdian worldview, Koguryo people, who were ancient Koreans, were the people who wore feathered headgear and were portrayed as such at the eastern end of the mural, thereby manifesting their identity via the representation of others.

Introduction

The image of ancient Koreans wearing headgear decorated with feathers (*Jowooguan* 鳥羽冠) has been found in various parts of Asia, including Koguryo's tomb murals, medieval Chinese paintings of foreign envoys, Buddhist murals in the Mogao Caves at Dunhuang, archaeological artefacts, and even in the Afrasiab palatial mural in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The figures wearing feathered headgear are of great interest to Korean history and have been frequently used as evidence to support the view that ancient Koreans' sphere of movement was not limited to the Korean peninsula but extended to China, to the Silk Road, and even as far as to Central Asia. They have been interpreted as evidence of ancient Koreans who traveled to China, to Dunhuang, and even to the so-called "Western Regions" (regions West of China, such as the kingdoms of medieval India and Central Asia) and directly interacted with local peoples. In this paper, by "Korea" I mean the early Korean state of Koguryo 高句麗 (trad., 37 B.C.E.-668 C.E.), primarily, and to a lesser extent the other early states on the Korean peninsula that were influenced by Koguryo, such as Paekche 百濟 (trad., 18 B.C.E.-660 C.E.) and Silla 新羅 (trad., 57 B.C.E.-935 C.E.), as well as Parhae 渤海 (698-926), which controlled a large portion of Koguryo's old territory after the demise of the ancient state.

Various fields of scholarly endeavor have produced extensive research of Afrasiab's figures wearing headgear decorated with feathers. These scholarly fields include archaeology, history, and art history. Although providing multifaceted analyses, the primary research interest has generally lain in identifying the nationality—in other words, whether the images were from Koguryo, Paekche, Silla, or Parhae. In addition, there have been efforts to trace direct contact between Korea and not just China but also countries along the way of the Silk Road and in Central Asia. Such an approach has particularly prevailed in Korean research circles, which, grounded in nationalism, focuses on providing evidence for ancient Koreans' extensive ventures to the Central Plain, to Dunhuang along the Silk Road, and as far as Central Asia. This can be considered a linear, Korea-centered approach to the matter. However, this painting of people wearing

headgear decorated with feathers is also an important resource that sheds light on the ancient people of Sogdiana's worldview and perception of ancient Korea and Koreans. Thus, research should also focus on how Sogdians perceived ancient Korea and Koreans based on the information formed via direct and indirect interaction.

In this regard, research on figures wearing feathered headgear should transcend the trend of tracing ancient Koreans' ventures and direct interactions in the relevant regions. In the case of the Afrasiab mural, in particular, it is necessary to pay attention to the worldview of Sogdiana, which was centered on ancient Samarkand, represented in the painting. Bearing this in mind, this essay examines the ancient Koreans depicted in the Afrasiab palatial mural.

Figures Wearing Feathered Headgear and Ancient Koreans

Headgear decorated with feathers are also found in ancient Egyptian and Roman records; but Korean-style feathered headgear likely originated in Scythian culture, which was widespread among northern peoples in Siberia, the Western Regions (Central Asia and India), and the Central Plain (Chinese cultural sphere), including the Huns (Xiongnu 匈奴). Examples of Scythian feather-decorated headdress are, one found in the Ice Maiden site in Pazyryk, Siberia (ca. fourth century B.C.E.); an officer hat—likely the headgear of a Saka tribal chief—unearthed from the Issyk Kurgan burial mound in Kazakhstan (ca. fifth-third centuries B.C.E.); the image of a Chinese-style feathered headgear on a Han dynasty stone relief in the Central Plain; an officer hat from the Loulan excavation site (ca. second century B.C.E.-third century C.E.); and an officer hat, estimated to be a Hun king's, from the Arosi excavation site (Western Han period, 202 B.C.E.-8 C.E.). Feathered headgear was worn by people in the Central Plain region even in later times; but, at some point, feathers became generally regarded as the distinctive headdress adornment that characterized ancient Koreans.

Many written records in China and Korea attest that feathered head-



Figure 1. People Wearing Feathered Headgear in the Ssangyŏngch'ong 雙楹塚 Tomb Mural




Figure 2. People Wearing Feathered Headgear in the Muyongch'ong 舞踊塚 Tomb Mural

gear was generally a typical style of Koguryo. That the people of Koguryo adorned their hats with feathers was described with clarity and specificity, and 120 remaining Koguryo tomb murals also provide detailed images of people sporting feathered headdress.

In addition, many historical paintings in China, such as “tribute-bearing paintings” (*zhigongtu* 職貢圖), depictions of the distribution of Buddhist bone relics, and the murals in the Buddhist caves at Dunhuang, which project the Chinese worldview of that time, evince that the figures wearing feathered headgear were from Koguryo. The wall painting featuring figures wearing feathered headgear in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, is a very valuable resource in that it is the first and only verified image of ancient Kore-

ans in Central Asia. These ancient Korean figures wearing feathered headgear have the appearance of stereotypical Koguryo people, which was repeatedly and realistically described in many Chinese resources and, hence, must reflect deeply ingrained perceptions of Koguryo people by contemporary Chinese. Therefore, it will not be a stretch to interpret the images of figures wearing feathered headgear in China and Central Asia to be their meme for depicting Koguryo people and/or ancient Koreans.

Studies on historical Chinese paintings, such as the *Illustration of a Royal Meeting with Tribute-Bearers* (*Wanghui tu* 王會圖)—a type of “tribute-bearing painting” attributed to the early Tang painter, administrator, and politician Yan Liben 閻立本 (ca. 600-73)—which depicted envoys from Koguryo, Paekche, and Silla, account for the view that figures wearing feathered headgear were seen as emissaries from Koguryo. This account is closely linked to the general perception of ancient Koreans in written records. In other tribute-bearing pictures, people sporting feathered headgear were described as Koguryo envoys. This portrayal of Koguryo envoys continued in the *Illustration of Envoys Bearing Tribute to the Liang Court* (*Liang zhigongtu* 梁職貢圖) and paintings of royal meetings with tribute-bearers. This evidence indicates that feathered headgear was regarded as the distinctive feature of Koguryo envoys and, thus, a figure wearing a headdress decorated with feathers was an iconic image of the Koguryo people.



Figure 3.
Koguryo Envoy in the *Illustration of a Royal Meeting with Tribute-Bearers*.



Figure 4. Paekche Envoys in the *Illustration of Envoys Bearing Tribute to the Liang Court* and *Illustration of a Royal Meeting with Tribute-Bearers*



Figure 5. Silla Envoy in the *Illustration of a Royal Meeting with Tribute-Bearers*

Ancient Koreans in the Afrasiab Palatial Mural

The Afrasiab murals were painted on all four walls in a room. The paintings on the south, west, and north walls are relatively recognizable, but the one on the east wall is heavily damaged. The mural on the south wall depicts a royal parade consisting of King Varkhuman (ca. 640-70) and his royal guards on horses, the queen on an elephant, and women on horses, followed by some people on camels and a number of white geese. On the first row of the west wall painting, King Varkhuman sits with Göktürk people on his left and right; on the second row, twenty-one people are depicted; and on the third row, there are forty-two people, thirty of whom seemed to be Sogdian aristocrats and servants, while the remaining twelve seem to be foreign envoys. In the painting on the north wall, a noble woman who seems to be Chinese is boating with maids and musicians in one part, and envoys from Tang 唐 China and/or Karakhoja (Gaochang, Kor. Koch'ang 高昌) were hunting together with Sogdian people in another part.

Although the murals generally portray the real life and culture of the Samarkand region of that time, some mystical and abstract images are included as well. For example, the heavily damaged east wall has an image related to the myth of Krishna. Also, it is dubious that the boating scene on the north wall depicted a real-life event, considering various mystical elements in the background. Another example is from the mural on the west wall, which is the central painting among the murals. It depicted foreign envoys offering tributes or bowing as though praying to King Varkhuman on the west wall. Judging from the Sogdian inscription on the clothes of the characters, the main content of the painting seems to be the conversations of King Varkhuman with the Sogdian special envoy Pukarzate and with a special envoy from Chach (Tashkent). Although there are other emissaries from different countries in the same scene, the focus is on those from Sogdiana and Chach. This painting is not realistic, since it would be hard to imagine a situation where all those envoys were assembled at the same place at the same time. Therefore, the image is more likely a representation of the Sogdian worldview and perceptions of its neighbors than a real episode.

The painting on the west wall features figures wearing feathered headdress. It is generally assumed that the scene depicts situations of the mid-7th century, although many scholars have suggested various dates: V. Livshits, 640 C.E.; M. Mode, 649 C.E.; KIM Wonyong and CHOE Kwang-shik, the mid-7th century, when King Varkhuman obtained the investiture of the governor of Sogdiana from the Tang emperor; KWON Young-pil, 651-57 C.E.; ANAZAWA Wakou, mid-7th century before 660 C.E.; F. Grenet, 660 C.E.; S. A. Yatsenko, 662 C.E.; CHŎNG Suil, right before 666 C.E.; B.I. Marshak, 666 C.E.; L.I. Al’Baum, late 7th century; NOH Taedon, late 7th century; LEE Jaesung, July 662 or April 663-75, which was the last year of the reign of King Varkhuman of Samarkand.

The most popular opinion in Korean historical circles is that the image of the Koguryo envoys in the west wall mural depicted actual Koguryo envoys sent to Sogdiana. Then a collateral assumption would be that all the foreign envoys in the same scene with King Varkhuman of Sogdiana and the khan of the West Göktürk Khanate, actually visited Sogdiana. In 650 C.E., around the time of the scene, Tang incorporated Samarkand of Sogdiana and other neighboring states into a self-rule system (*jimi*, Kor. *kimi* 羈縻, lit. “loose reign”), though in formality only, thereby transferring the suzerainty of the region from the West Göktürk Khanate to the Tang dynasty. In addition, Koguryo was engaged in a long but intermittent period of war with Tang in the mid-7th century. In this geopolitical backdrop, would Koguryo be able to deploy its envoys from its capital P’yŏngyang to Sogdiana, located 8,000 km away? If so, what would be the purpose, and what benefits would it gain from this deployment?

Some scholars speculate that the two Koguryo envoys with feathered headdresses and swords with ring pommels were sent to Samarkand in order to contain or check Tang and/or to build diplomatic and commercial ties with the Göktürks and the Sogdians. Some also suggest that the mural depicted the investiture of Varkhuman as the governor of Sogdiana, a ceremony attended by envoys from various countries. Another speculation is that Koguryo sent its envoys to Samarkand in pursuit of a new alliance against Tang after failing to form an alliance with the Tiele 鐵勒 of Mongolia. Others even argue that the figures wearing feathered headdress were in

fact envoys from Silla or Parhae; but the general consensus is that they were Koguryo envoys.

If Koguryo in the Far East really had deployed envoys as far as to Samarkand, Sogdiana might have considered it an opportunity to expand its trade network to a new region to gain commercial benefits, and thus they must have welcomed those guests. The envoys would travel the route from Koguryo, passing through one of the regions of Shiwei 室韋, Mohe 靺鞨 (Kor. Malgal), or Khitan 契丹, then across the Steppe Road (Caoyuanlu 草原路), which crossed Mongolia east and west, and reaching the Orkhon River and Selenga River. They would have continued westbound, climbing over the Altai Mountains, then passing Dzungaria (Jungaria) and Zetysu (Semyrechie), which lies between modern-day Kirgizstan and Kazakhstan, and finally arriving at Samarkand, Sogdiana. To complete this journey, it would be necessary to obtain cooperation from the locals along their route, but it is not certain whether Sogdians provided guides and/or the locals were cooperative. However, this route was an international passage that both nations could use when necessary.

On the other hand, it is questionable that Koguryo in the mid 7th century actually deployed envoys to Sogdiana to contain or restrain Tang. Thus, it has been suggested that the mural adopted a widespread iconic image of Koguryo envoys from China instead of depicting their actual visit to Samarkand, based on the comparisons of figures wearing feathered headgear in Chinese tribute-bearing paintings and other historical records, the murals in Dunhuang caves, and Afrasiab murals. Regardless of whether it is an iconic image adopted from China or a depiction of the information acquired through direct contact with Koguryo people, it does not change the fact that the mural image expresses the Sogdian worldview and perception of ancient Koreans. In the mural, the envoys from Central Asian regions such as Afghanistan or Tashkent, and those from Tang or Karakhoja (Gaochang), stood in the center while the Koguryo envoys were placed at the periphery of the painting. This could be a symbolic rendering of the idea of Sogdian people about Koguryo being a nation representing the eastern end of their world. As the mural is a conceptual and symbolic representation of the Sogdian worldview, its portrayal of Koguryo people is a valu-

able record to help understand Sogdiana's perception of ancient Korea and Koreans.

Except for feathered headgear and swords with ring pommels, which were generally regarded as distinctive features of the dress of Koguryo people, the attire of the Koguryo envoys in the Afrasiab mural is rather more generic representative of Koguryo. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate how those Koguryo envoys became part of the Afrasiab mural. There are most likely two possibilities. The first possibility is that Sogdiana adopted the iconic image of Korean envoys disseminated from the Tang capital Chang'an 長安 (present-day Xi'an) or Dunhuang in China to Central Asia and used it for the mural. Given that King Varkuman was appointed Governor of Sogdiana in the 650s, during the reign of Tang emperor Gaozong 唐高宗 (649-83), it is probable to assume that Tang's worldview influenced that of Sogdiana. The second possibility is that Sogdiana had contact with Koguryo while closely interacting with China and the Göktürks, and thus acquired information about Koguryo people. From their experience with Koguryo people, feathered headdresses and swords with ring pommels could be ingrained in the collective memory of the Sogdian people, and the deep-rooted image was expressed in the mural painting, which depicted Koguryo people as representing the east end of their world.

There are diverse perspectives in interpreting the Afrasiab palatial murals in Samarkand. From the perspective of world history, the mutual perceptions and interactions between ancient Koreans and the Sogdian people should receive their due attention, but research must be handled with more balance and objectivity, avoiding unilateral, nationalistic, and linear biases.

Conclusion

The figures wearing feathered headgear in the Afrasiab mural could be a portrayal of ancient Koreans who visited Samarkand, or they could be an iconic projection of the Sogdian worldview and perception. Comparison of many resources indicates that the ancient Koreans in the Afrasiab painting

share the idiosyncratic or conventional depiction of Koguryo people. The mural has particular significance, as it includes the first and only image of ancient Koreans found in Central Asia, which attests to the presence of Koreans in world history. Sogdiana, which was located in Central Asia, 8,000 km away from Korea, was aware of ancient Korea and Koreans and perceived Koguryo as an important nation in its contemporary geopolitics. The two nations must have communicated and acquired information about each other, and it is possible that their peoples even visited each other. Their encounters were likely more commercial and cultural on the whole than political, diplomatic, or military.

As discussed before, it is unclear whether Koguryo envoys were actually deployed to Sogdiana, but the Afrasiab palatial mural indisputably evinces the presence of Koguryo in the worldview of Sogdiana as a nation representing the east end of their world. To the Sogdian people, feathered headdress and swords with ring pommels were the most impressive and distinctive features that set Koguryo people—that is, ancient Koreans—apart from other neighbors in the world.

The figures wearing headgear decorated with feathers in the Afrasiab palatial wall painting must be interpreted synthetically after carefully examining the issues, such as geopolitical situations, involving Koguryo, its neighbor Tang, the Tiele, the Göktürks, and Sogdiana; problems that might occur while traveling the Göktürk route; and a close analysis of the mural itself. Only the thorough investigation of these issues will facilitate an accurate understanding of the painting in the relevant historical context.

Turkic Northern Tribes and Koguryo in the Early 650s: Reflection on the Circumstances of Koguryo Envoys in the Afrasiab

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Introduction

The Afrasiab palatial murals were discovered in 1965 during road construction at the palace site in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. There were two figures on one of the discovered murals, who wear hats decorated with two feathers and carry swords. They have been presumed to be ancient Korean envoys, but some questions still remain unanswered. Exactly where did they come from, and does the depiction represent historical facts?

Regarding the first question, I do believe that they were envoys from Koguryo. Nevertheless, I do not agree with those who propose the hypothesis that they were sent to Samarkand in Central Asia as its geopolitical strategy of fending off Tang. In order to substantiate the hypothesis, some doubts must be clarified. Is it probable that they may have traveled 8,000 kilometers from Koguryo's capital, Pyeongyang, to Samarkand? Allowing that there was a route through the Mongolian grasslands, it was far beyond the territory of Koguryo. Thus, traveling through the grasslands would have been almost impossible without any help from the outside. Furthermore, given the long distance of thousands of kilometers to Central Asian countries, the geopolitical benefits that Koguryo would have earned by establishing ties with them are questionable.

Concerning the second question, it has been generally assumed that

the mural depicts an actual event in Kangju which the Koguryo envoys attended. This assumption, however, does not fit with the entire context of the west wall of Afrasiab, on which the envoys from Koguryo and Tang are depicted together along with the Sogdian King Varkhuman and the Gokturks. Koguryo had been engaged in war with Tang since 645. Thus, it is implausible that envoys from two countries at war could have stood side by side in another country. There is a precedent against the assumption: A historical record vividly describes how perplexed and outraged Sui Emperor Yang was when he encountered envoys from Koguryo at the tent of Yami Khan of the Eastern Gokturk Khanate in 607.

With these doubts in mind, I shall examine the relations between Koguryo and Turkic northern tribes and attempt to clarify the circumstances in which Koguryo envoys were portrayed in one of the murals of Kangju.

Geopolitical Perspective

Koguryo's pursuit of coalitions with Turkic northern tribes to thwart the threat of Sui and Tang was one of the interesting facets of the geopolitics of the 6th and 7th centuries. In this light, the Koguryo envoys in the Afrasiab mural have been regarded as evidence that Koguryo's diplomatic efforts extended even to Central Asia. Emphasising Koguryo's diplomatic influence extending to Central Asia, however, this line of interpretation fails to answer the following questions: what strategy did Koguryo have in mind when it extended diplomatic relations to Central Asian states, and was it truly possible to send envoys that far? Koguryo's preceding coalition attempt with Turkic northern tribes provides clues to these questions.

The Xueyantuo, one of the Tiele tribes, became the new power of the northern nomadic tribes in place of the Eastern Gokturk Khanate, whose last ruler, Illig Khan, had been completely defeated by Tang. Koguryo reached out to the Xueyantuo. This alliance provides a good precedent for examining the relations between Koguryo and the Central Asian region.¹

¹ Refer to Lee Seong-je 李成制, "Koguryo-wa tureukeugye bukbangsegyeo-ui gwangye: ihae-ui

The notable record on the contact between the Xue-Yantuo and Koguryo is found in “Beidi Zhuan”²: “Koguryo’s Makriji i.e., prime minister, then held by Yeongaesomun, secretly sent the Mohe people to Yi’nan, offering Zhenzhu Khan generous benefits, but Yi’nan did not dare to accept his suggestion of alliance [in fear of Tang’s wrath].” Koguryo moved to involve the Xueyantuo after its defeat by Tang in the battle of Mt. Zhubi. That is, only after being pushed to dire straits after a devastating defeat did Koguryo attempt to engage the Xueyantuo in its war with Tang. This indicates that forming an alliance with the Xueyantuo against Tang did not belong to the Koguryo’s initial plan: it was an expedient measure to extricate itself from an urgent situation rather than its long-planned strategy.

Koguryo’s attempt to engage the Xueyantuo in its war with Tang raises an important question regarding Koguryo’s relations with the Central Asian region: Would the strategy be effective in the geopolitical landscape of that time? Without answering this question, it is impossible to evaluate accurately the significance of Koguryo’s diplomatic efforts, which will be discussed in more detail in the following section. In addition, Koguryo’s contact with the Xueyantuo gives hints on how Yeongaesomun’s message was delivered to Zhenzhu Khan in the grasslands of the upper Orkhon River. In this contact, he used the Mohe people as an intermediary agent, which casts doubt over whether Koguryo could send envoys directly to the grasslands in Mongolia. More than anything else, the fact that Koguryo employed the Mohe people as its intermediary agent suggests that Koguryo’s geographical scope for diplomatic missions was limited.

The above-mentioned scene in the Afrasiab murals has been generally presumed to be the depiction of an actual event in the early 650s. Then, the next question arises: Who might have come forward to assist Koguryo’s attempt of engaging Central Asia for its own interest? Recent studies

 banghyang-gwa yeongubangbeop-ui mosaek” 高句麗와 투르크계 북방세력의 관계-이해의 방향과 연구방법의 모색 [The relations between Koguryo and Turkic Northern Tribes: Approaches and Research Methods], *Koguryo Balhae Yeongu* 高句麗渤海研究 52 (2015).

² Beidi Zhuan [Communications of the Northern “Di” Barbarians], *Jiu Tang Shu* [The Old Book of Tang].

speculate that the Sogdians might have lent a hand to Koguryo with its attempt to expand its diplomatic influence to Central Asia across the Mongolian grasslands.

The Sogdians were an Iranian people living in Sogdiana, an oasis region encompassing parts of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and areas between the rivers of Amu Darya and Syr Darya. They were known for being merchants who played a central role in trade along the Silk Road, and their sphere of trading influence ranged throughout the Eurasian continent since the later Han period of China. If Koguryo people had hoped to obtain their assistance, they would have restrained themselves not to advance from the Mongolian steppe to Central Asia.

Moreover, the Sogdians were not an isolated force that existed outside the world order of that time. When the Eastern Gokturk Khanate was prevailing, the Sogdians placed themselves under the influence of the Eastern Gokturk Khanate. After its collapse, a large number of them surrendered to Tang. And those resorting to Tang were incorporated into Tang's government, with their chieftains turning into Tang's officials. Such transformations helped to facilitate their main business, trading activities. Considering such characteristics of the Sogdians, it is highly doubtful that they would have collaborated with Koguryo against Tang in an extremely dangerous expedition to traverse the entire east region of the Eurasian continent.

The Western Gokturk Khanate's Rise and Tang's Military Expedition

A series of massive attacks from Tang made the Xue-Yantuo collapse in 646 A.D. After the collapse of the Xueyantuo, the Western Gokturk Khanate ascended to a Turkic power competing with Tang. There had been a number of tribes fighting against Tang in the Mobei region. The Gokturks, one of the major tribes, had crossed the Altaic Mountains and established the Western Gokturk Khanate in the northwest of the Tianshan Mountains.

The chieftain of the Western Gokturks, Ashina Helu, was originally appointed Yaochi governor in the Protectorate of the Pacified West (i.e., Anxi Duhufu). After the death of Tang Emperor Taizong, however, he as-

sumed the position of Khan under the name of Ishbara Khan, unifying 10 family lineages of the Western Gokturks, and stood against Tang. The Western Gokturks, whose foothold was the basins of the Ili River and Issykkul Lake, rebelled against Tang, and many other tribes to the east of the Tian-shan Mountains joined them. To quash the rebellion, Tang deployed troops three times in the years 652, 655, and 657, and was finally able to capture, in 658, Ashina Helu in Shiguo (present-day Tashkent, Uzbekistan).

Here, given the Koguryo's failed experience to involve the Xueyantuo in its war against Tang, it is plausible that Koguryo might have regarded the Western Gokturk Khanate, a new anti-Tang power in the 650s, as a coalition partner for its anti-Tang diplomatic strategy. From this, it has been inferred that Koguryo sent envoys to the Western Gokturk Khanate and then to Kangju, present-day Samarkand, which was under the sphere of the Western Gokturks.

But, according to "Huihu Zhuan" (回鶻傳, Communications of Huihu), *Xin Tang Shu* (新唐書, The New Book of Tang), which relates Tang's subjugation of Ashina Helu, the Huihu (i.e., the Uyghurs), which had been strengthening their power in the Mongolian steppe after the collapse of the Xue-Yantuo, provided 50,000 troops for Tang's expeditionary forces. They also joined Tang's expedition in 657, defeating Ashina Helu and earned Tang's general-in-chief positions for its reward. In addition, the epitaph of Pugu Yitu (僕固乙突墓誌), the governor of Jin Weidu (金微都督), discovered in the Republic of Mongolia in 2009, shows that the Pugu tribe, one of the nine main Tiele tribes along with the Huihu, also joined the attack on Ashina Helu and contributed to Tang's victory. And after the defeat of the Xue-Yantuo, the Mongolian grasslands were occupied by the Tiele tribes, including the Huihu and the Pugu, all of which fell under Tang's control.

All these circumstances suggest that any diplomatic mission by Koguryo to go to the Western Gokturk Khanate through the Mongolian steppe would have been unavailable at that time. In the early 650s, the steppe was under Tang's rule, which had the power of mobilizing troops as large as 50,000 without much difficulty. Under such circumstances, it would have been difficult for Koguryo envoys to cross the steppe even if Koguryo had attempted to send them to the west.

The Koguryo Envoys in the Murals and the Worldview of the Gokturks

Now we must investigate the background of having the Koguryo envoys painted on the palatial murals of Kangju. I believe that the scene is not a factual depiction of Koguryo envoys visiting Samarkand, but an iconic image of the greatness of Koguryo.³ Previous studies speculate that the iconic image originating in Tang spread to Chang'an, then to Dunhuang, and finally to Samarkand. In this light, they assume that the placement of Koguryo envoys at the far right end of the painting is based on Tang's worldview that regarded Koguryo as a country located at the eastern end of the world.

The depiction of characters in the palatial murals can be assuredly regarded as a projection of the worldview and the geographical understanding that the Kangju people had. But is it true that the worldview of the Kangju people had originated from Tang? To examine that point, let us take a close look at the overall arrangement of figures in the entire west wall painting of Afrasiab: King Varkhuman is sitting on the top tier, surrounded by Gokturks; a line of people are waiting to submit their gifts at the mid-tier; and servants and foreign envoys from various countries, including those from Koguryo, are located at the bottom tier.

Interestingly, there is a noticeable contrast between the top tier of the king with the Gokturk people and the other tiers of Kangju people and foreign envoys. The scene of the top tier seems as if the Gokturks are looking over King Varkhuman's governance at his sides. This seems to have reflected the contemporary situation in which Kangju fell under the influence of the Western Gokturk Khanate. On the other hand, Tang's envoys are standing in line in order to offer tributes to the king. This portrayal seems

³ Kageyama Etsuko, "A Chinese way of Depicting Foreign Delegates Discerned in the Painting of Afrasiab," *Sutudia Iranica*, no. 25 (Paris, 2002); Jung Hosup 정호섭, "Jowugwan-ul sseun inmuldo-ui yuhyeong-gwa seonggyeok: oeguk jaryo-e natanan godae Hangukin-ui moseup-ul jungsim-euro" 鳥羽冠을 쓴 人物圖의 類型과 性格-외국 자료에 나타난 고대 한국인의 모습을 중심으로 [The Types and Characteristics of the Jowoogwan-Wearing Figures: with a Focus on the Appearances of Ancient Koreans in Foreign Sources], *Youngnamhak* 嶺南學 24 (2013).



Figure 1. The Copy of the Restored West Wall Painting of Afrasiab Palace

to suggest that Tang did not yet exert a strong influence on Kangju.

Given my reading of the murals, where did the Kanju people's view of Koguryo come from? The origination of the view, I believe, can be found among the Gokturks. There is a Kultegin inscription, which reveals that the Gokturks shared the same view.

They (the lords) thus passed away (lit.: 'flew away to Tengri'). As mourners and laments there came from the east, the representatives of the people of the Böküli Čölüg (Koguryo), Tabγač (Chinese), Avar, Rome, Kirgiz, Uc-Quriqan, Otuz-Tatar, Qitan and Tatabi, this many people came and mourned and lamented.⁴

The inscription was on a Gokturk stele (erected in 732 A.D.), which was found at the bank of the Orkhon River in Mongolia. The Kultegin inscriptions relate the story of Kultegin, the most eminent leader in nomadic history. The above quoted text tells us of the funerals of his ancestors, most of which must have been held prior to the 8th century. Here "the east, from the place where the sun rises" refers to Koguryo, which indicates that the Gokturks also had the worldview that Koguryo was located in the eastern end of the world.

⁴ Talat Tekin, *Dolgwolbimun Yeongu* 돌궐비문연구 [Orhon Yazıtlar and Tunyukuk Yazıtı], Lee Yongseong 이용성, trans. (Seoul: J & C, 2008), 90.

The worldview in which Koguryo envoys could be placed at the east end of the wall and King Varkhuman in the front center where he presided over envoys, is very likely to have originated from the Western Gokturk people. This may imply a different origin of the Koguryo image. Previous studies have put emphasis on the Koguryo envoys' hats called *Jowooguan*, but not on their swords. In contrast, no Koguryo images from the Central Plain (i.e., Zhongyuan in China) have presented their swords as in the Samarkand palatial mural. In the paintings of foreign envoys at the Tomb of Prince Zhang Huai in the Tang era, Koguryo envoys respectfully hold their hands in front of them, while the Afrasiab mural portrays them as military men with their swords. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the Koguryo's image of military valor and strength had a different origin.

The Kultegin inscriptions refer to Koguryo as "Böküli." It is also mentioned in one of the inscriptions that when his ancestors were subordinated to China, they had the experience of taking the field to Böküli, the place from which the sun rose. In 551, the Gokturk troops attacked Shinseong (or Shin Fortress) and Baekamseong (or Baekam Fortress),⁵ and in the early 7th century, they traded with Koguryo. Furthermore, the Gokturks were mobilized in the battles against Koguryo at the demands of Sui and Tang. These historical facts indicate that interactions between the Gokturks and Koguryo were not temporary or one-dimensional.

Then, what view did the Gokturks come to have regarding Koguryo? It seems to have been more than the geographical viewpoint of it being a country at the east end, where the sun rose. To the Western Gokturk Khanate or Kangju in Central Asia, Tang's might arching over Central Asia must have been felt in their bones, but the tenacity of Koguryo, which had been thwarting a series of Tang attacks, might have seemed dazzling. If so, such impressive people may have deserved a place, along with Tang envoys, in the scene that expresses the glory of King Varkhuman's reign.

⁵ King Yangwon 陽原王, 7th year (551), *Samguk sagi* 三國史記 [The Chronicles of Three Kingdoms], vol. 19; "Wei Yunqi Zhuan" 韋雲起傳 [The Biography of Wei Yunqi], *Jiu Tang Shu* 舊唐書 [The Old Book of Tang], vol. 75.

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