

The Journal of Northeast Asian History

**Volume 17 Number 2
Summer 2021**

Editorial Board

PUBLISHER

Northeast Asian History Foundation

CHIEF EDITORS

Patricia Ebrey, University of Washington

Edward Shultz, University of Hawaii

Dong Taek Kim, Sogang University

Jeong-il Lee, Northeast Asian History Foundation

EDITORIAL BOARD

Jong Chol An, Ca' Foscari University of Venice

Byung-Yool Ban, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

John P. DiMoia, Seoul National University

Tze-ki Hon, State University of New York at Geneseo

David Howell, Harvard University

Hyun-sook Kim, Northeast Asian History Foundation

Byongtaek Lee, Northeast Asian History Foundation

Chang Wook Lee, Northeast Asian History Foundation

James I. Matray, California State University at Chico

Richard D. McBride II, Brigham Young University

Simei Qing, State University of Michigan

Maurizio Riotto, University of Naples

Michael D. Shin, Robinson College, Cambridge

Odd Arne Westad, Harvard University

Subscriptions

The Journal of Northeast Asian History (ISSN 1976-3735) is published semiannually, in June and December, by the Northeast Asian History Foundation, Imgwang Bldg, Tongil-ro 81, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul, 03739, Republic of Korea. A one-year subscription, including shipping where applicable (excluding VAT), is US\$100 for institutions, US\$40 for individuals for their personal use, and US \$35 for students. Without subscription, each issue is US\$25 plus shipping for individuals, including students. Please send your subscription order and payment directly to the publisher.

Contents

Article

Ya-Hsun CHAN

Rethinking Imperialism and Constitutional Democracy
in Interwar Japan and Colonial Taiwan

7

Special Topic

“Comfort Women” in the Military Rigime

Alexis DUDDEN

Introduction

61

Jung-ae PARK

The Concept and the Category of the Japanese Military ‘Comfort Women’:
Through Looking at Their Damage Condition

67

Jongmoon HA

Japanese Military Comfort Stations in War Diaries

97

Myungsuk YUN

Korean Wartime ‘Comfort Women’ and Japan’s National Responsibility

153

Article (Translated)

Gyeongnok KIM

Repatriation of Deserted Soldiers and Military Diplomacy
between Early Joseon and the Ming

203

Review Article

Peter YUN

Korea in the Western Studies on East Asian Interstate Relations
during the Khitan and Jin Periods

243

ABOUT THE JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY

The Journal of Northeast Asian History (JNAH) is a peer-reviewed biannual journal published by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. *JNAH* seeks challenging research focusing on regional and trans-national issues within the Northeast Asia historical context. The Journal concentrates on interdisciplinary, comparative, and cross-cultural approaches to issues such as borders, identity, international relations, history issues, history education, historiography, and other relevant themes within the humanities and the social sciences. In addition to this thematic diversity, the Journal's geographical scope extends to other areas of Asia and beyond, thus inviting scholarly engagement in rethinking globalism and localism in world history. For detailed information about the submission of manuscripts, please contact the Journal at jnah@nahf.or.kr or jnah.nahf@gmail.com.



Article

Rethinking Imperialism and Constitutional Democracy in Interwar Japan and Colonial Taiwan

Ya-hsun CHAN

Department of Advanced Social and International Studies,
University of Tokyo

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 17 Number 2 (Summer 2021), 7-56

Copyright © 2021 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

Abstract

When it comes to the interwar democratic movements in Japan and its colonies, the trend of ‘Taishō Democracy’ is often regarded as an important reference. Ideas such as international coordination and self-determination prevailed while the policy of ‘constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally’ (内に立憲主義、外に帝国主義) continued, which indicates a subtle yet critical link between imperialism and constitutional democracy. My study argues that during this period social movements were not mere reflections of an abstract belief in universal values but an interplay between different conceptions of imperialism and constitutional democracy. By delineating this inner-logic, this paper rediscovers a varied and multi-layered relationship between the empire and the colonies in East Asia, as well as the tension amid intellectuals and social activists, and offers an analytical perspective on (geo-) politics and thought in modern East Asia.

Keywords

Constitutional Democracy, Imperialism, Taishō Democracy, Japanese Empire, Colonial Taiwan

Rethinking Imperialism and Constitutional Democracy in Interwar Japan and Colonial Taiwan

Ya-hsun CHAN

Department of Advanced Social and International Studies,
University of Tokyo

Introduction

Regarding the interwar democratic movements in Japan and its colonies, the trend of ‘Taishō Democracy,’ referring to democratic reform movements that took place around the end of WWI and continued into the 1920s, is often taken as one of the new chapters in modern East Asia.¹ It was a time when ideas such as international coordination and self-determination prevailed while the policy of ‘constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally’ (内に立憲主義, 外に帝国主義) continued. Literature

¹ The specific beginning and the end of ‘Taishō Democracy’ remains contested because the timeframe varies to different narratives. In the narrowest sense, ‘Taishō Democracy’ refers to the period between the Rice Riot of 1918 and the enactment of the Public Preservation Law of 1925. However, as researchers endeavor to draw a relation between the very first spontaneous mass movement in Meiji Japan, namely, the Hibiya Incendiary Incident of 1905 and the large-scale social movements after WWI, 1905 is considered the outset of ‘Taishō Democracy’ in some studies. For instances, see Mitani Taichirō, *Taishō Demokurashi Ron* [On Taishō Democracy] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2013); and Matsuo Takayoshi, *Taishō Demokurashi* [Taishō Democracy] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001). Similarly, narratives, drawing attention to socio-political dynamics under the Public Preservation Law, tend to extend the period of ‘Taishō Democracy’ to 1931 when the Mukden Incident and its aftermath marked a clear end to the democratic institutionalization. See Narita Ryuichi, *Taishō Demokurashi* [Taishō Democracy] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2007). This paper adopts a loose time period in order to evaluate interwar democratic movements in relation to those of the late Meiji period.

regarding the development of colonial self-determination movements during the post-WWI era has provided a general picture about the juridical-political impact of the Westphalian sovereignty and Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points.' Anti-colonial nationalism, including movements in China, the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan, are considered practices that echoed the ideal of self-determination initiated by the so-called 'Wilsonian moment.'² Although Lenin's call for self-determination came forth earlier and has been acknowledged for its impact on international socialist movements as well as on decolonization in Asia and Africa, most literature suggests a closer relationship between the League of Nations and democratic movements during the early 1920s in East Asia. Studies argue that the scheme of 'constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally' held back Imperial Japan from rapid military expansion, combined with constitutional democracy, during the interwar period.³ In addition, The Taishō Democracy is praised for setting the tone for the post-WWII democratization in Japan.⁴ In some arguments, the post-WWII democracy in Japan is even forthrightly described as the 'restoration of Taishō Democracy,' or an 'Americanism' construed by Wilsonism.⁵

Despite the fact that the account of the 'Wilsonian moment' has been criticized for neutralizing the imperialist-legacy of Wilsonism in former colonies and for homogenizing colonial contexts to an abstract concept, its academic impact is of significance.⁶ Meanwhile, the Taishō Democracy accounts for a crucial part of studies on anti-colonial social movements in Taiwan, especially for analyses of the Petition Movement for the Establish-

² Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (NC: Oxford University Press, 2007), 8-11.

³ Eizawa Kōji, "Taishō Demokurashi Shisō Hatten no Shodankai" [The Stages of Development of the Thoughts of Taishō Democracy], *Shinshū Daigaku Kyōyōbu Kiyō* 4 (1970): 120-21.

⁴ Matsuo Takayoshi, *Taishō Demokurashi* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001), vi-vii.

⁵ Miyamoto Matahisa, "'kenkyū nōto' minponshugi no tanjō," *Journal of History* 50-2 (1967): 300-01; Mitani, *Taishō Demokurashi Ron*, 18-19.

⁶ Adom Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination* (NJ: Princeton, University Press, 2019), 39-40; Ussama Makdisi, "Review: The Great Illusion: The Wilsonian Moment in World History," *Diplomatic History* 33-1 (2009): 136-37.

ment of a Taiwanese Parliament (臺灣議會設置請願運動, hereafter as the Petition Movement). Its unfolding impact resonated with efforts towards cultural enlightenment and varied strategies for autonomy. Inasmuch as some attempts of decolonization turned even more critical during the late 1920s, democratic movements faced serious setbacks against the enactment of the Peace Preservation Law in Japan.⁷ In current literature, within the framework of the distinction of armed resistance and cultural resistance against the Japanese colonial rule (commonly referred to as 武裝抗日 and 文化抗日 that indicate the change of the leading form of resistance during the period 1894-1915 and the period 1918-1937 separately), the Taishō Democracy is believed to have channeled the ideal of self-determination and the Neo-Kantian culturalism amongst Taiwanese intellectuals during the 1920s.⁸ Accordingly, the 1920s is often considered the initiation of political consciousness and Taiwanese national identity.⁹

One characteristic of the above-mentioned narratives alongside the tone of the Taishō Democracy is the emphasis on constitutional democracy under the scheme of ‘constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally.’ This predisposition owes its origin, first, to the expression of ‘internally’ and ‘externally’ that implies a domestic and diplomatic distinction, and second, to the terminological proximity of ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism.’ ‘Empire’ surely accounts for a crucial part of tackling democratic practices carried out under the imperial order. For example, arguments of ‘imperial democracy’ have broadened our horizons with the analysis of labors’ participating in politics that involved both empowerment and institutionaliza-

⁷ Ito Teruo, “Shō Yisui to Taiwan minshūtō: ‘zenmin undō’ to ‘kaikyū undō’” [Jiang Weishui and the Taiwanese People’s Party: “National Movement” and “Class Movement”], *Hitotsubashi Review* 83-3 (1980): 405-08.

⁸ Wakabayashi Masahiro, *Taiwan Kōnichi Undōshi Kenkyū* [A Historical Study of the Anti-Japanese Movement in Formosa] (Tokyo: Kenbunshuppan, 1983), 75, 82-84; Wu Rweiren, *The Formosan Ideology: Oriental Colonialism and the Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism, 1895-1945* (CA: University of Chicago, Department of Political Science, 2003), 204-05, 288-89; Chen Tsuilien, “Beyond Resistance and Compliance: A Study of the Home Rule Movement in Taiwan under Japanese ruled,” *Taiwanese Journal of Political Science* 18 (2013): 144-45.

⁹ Wu, *The Formosan Ideology*, 8-12.

tion.¹⁰ At the same time, the implication of imperialism in the 1920s is often equated with imperial order that is, in many instances, regarded as *a priori*. The accent on constitutional democracy which depicts reform movements within the framework of the Japanese imperial order does reflect an undercurrent, of which ‘imperialism’ existed as a hidden premise of imperial order, of ‘empire’ as a regime. The significance and limitations of the issue of imperialism withdraws. It draws strong interest only when the subject concerns Japanese militarism and fascism during the 1930s and 1940s when the legacy of constitutional democracy was believed to have been interrupted. Following Lenin’s well-known description of ‘imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism,’ analyses of imperialism then became dominant against the growing influence of Marxist-Leninism in East Asia. Subsequently, the initiation of theories of imperialism in Japan is usually referred to as the debate on Japanese democratic revolution (日本民主主義論争), and as the debate on Japanese capitalism (日本資本主義論争) that took place between 1927 and 1937, and provided structural analyses and criticisms of western imperialism and Japanese imperialism alike.¹¹ Similar accounts can also be seen in studies on ‘Taiwanese activists’ ‘left-leaning’ around 1927 that resulted in the life-right divide amongst activists and the radicalization of anti-colonial movements.¹² The expression of ‘imperialism externally’ is thus often conceived as a diplomatic stance derived from the continuing tensions with the western powers while the issue of imperialism remains irrelevant in comparison to constitutionalism.

Another characteristic is that the left, including social democratic movements, anarchism, revolutionary socialism and bolshevism, is usually

¹⁰ Andrew Gordon, “Introduction,” *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan* (LA: University of California Press, 1992), 7.

¹¹ Inoue Kiyoshi, *Nihon Teikokushugi no Keisei* [The Formation of the Japanese Imperialism] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1974), 369-72; Fujii Shōichi, “nihon teikokushugishi no seika to mondaiten” [Achievements and Issues of the History of Japanese Imperialism], *Nihon no Teikokushugi* [The Japanese Imperialism] (Tokyo: Gakuseisha, 1975), 9-11.

¹² Qiu Shijie, *1924nián yǐ qián tái wān shè huì zhǔ yì yùn dòng de méng yá* [The Initiation of Taiwanese Socialist Movement before 1924] (Taipei: hǎi xiá xué shù chū bǎn, 2009), 110-17; Chao Hsunta, “Chiang Wei Shui’s Left-leaning Approach (1930-1931),” *Taiwan Literature Studies* 4 (2013): 142-47.

categorized as an antithesis of the Taishō Democracy. Despite the fact that a few researchers have revealed some often-neglected aspects of the Taishō Democracy in which such left ideals as feminism, minority equalities, radical liberalism, other anarchist moments, and the like were promoted, still, many scholars have assumed that the lines of the left and the Taishō Democracy barely came across each other.¹³ To a certain extent, this approach is the result of a common criticism of the Taishō Democracy as the sugar-coat of ‘bourgeois liberalism.’¹⁴ What is more, the interpretation is also connected with a tendency of decrying the left’s ‘negation of politics’ (政治の否定) between 1906 and 1922. The antagonistic view of the Taishō Democracy and the ‘negation of politics’ reflects a prolonged tension between ideology and strategy, that is a differentiation between reform and revolution, parliamentarianism and direct action, social policy and socialism, lawful gestures and radical stances, and so on. This tension contains numerous shifts and contradictions between different thoughts and actions in a particular historical context that cannot be reduced to a simple left-right distinction. There were vigorous attempts to understand the historical phenomena from diverse and varied angles. However, with the emphasis on the continuity between the Taishō Democracy and the post-WWII democratization, the left’s ‘negation of politics’ is often criticized as a strategic misjudgement and an absence in a general pursuit of democracy.¹⁵ Additionally, since the late 1990s, by redefining liberal intellectuals in the 1920s as ‘Taishō democrats,’ some studies have suggested a new picture of the liberals. Taking note of the effort of constructing ‘politics as an art’ for democracy, aimed at a ‘breakthrough’ of the existing order, they has given a positive account of the liberalist step.¹⁶ In justification of a certain consis-

¹³ In addition to Matsuo’s *Taishō Demokurashi*, Kano Masanao’s work is another outstanding exception that provides critical perspective by revealing those marginalized and understudied subject areas. For details, refer to Kano Masanao, *Taishō Demokurashi no Teiryū* [The Undercurrent of Taishō Democracy] (Tokyo: NHK Books, 1973).

¹⁴ Matsuo, *Taishō Demokurashi*, v-vi, 180-87; Mitani, *Taishō Demokurashi Ron*, 88-90.

¹⁵ Matsuo, *Taishō Demokurashi*, 180.

¹⁶ Iida Taizō, “nashonaru demokuratto to ‘shakai no hakken’” (National Democrat and the ‘Discovery of Society’), *Hihan Seishin no Kōseki: Kindai Nihon Seishinshi no Ichiryōsen* [The

tency of democracy between the interwar period and the post-war era, intentionally or unintentionally, the tension between the Japanese intellectuals and activists has been elaborated as the opposition between the ‘negation of politics’ and politics for a breakthrough, viz., an underestimation of democracy vis-à-vis persistence to democracy.

Since the 2000s, scholarships have come to question the above rationale of narratives that stress the continuity of ‘Taishō Democracy’ and post-WWII democratization. With a focus on the interrelation between the emergence of mass society after WWI and the social formation of the total empire during the 1930s and 1940s, some historians consider the Taishō Democracy as a synthesis of four mechanisms—imperialism, nationalism, colonialism, and modernism—that corresponded to the expansion of the Japanese empire.¹⁷ Sharing a similar interest in the formation of mass society in East Asia, a recent study argues that the Taishō Democracy played a pivotal role in establishing the social basis, or the mass society indispensable to the formation of a totalitarian state in the 1930s.¹⁸ These problematics overlap with the studies concentrating on ‘popular imperialism,’¹⁹ and resonates with the studies delineating the socialization of Japanese fascism known also as ‘grassroots fascism’²⁰ to which democratization served as a precursory role in organizing the arbitrary mass. Moreover, it suggests that the tension between the left and the liberals not be understood as a mere

 Trace of the Spirit of Critique: A Ridgeline of Modern Japanese History of Spirit] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1997), 158-59, 192-93, 218-20.

¹⁷ Narita, *Taishō Demokurashi*, iv-vi.

¹⁸ Koyasu Nobukuni, *‘Taishō’ wo Yominaosu: Kōtoku, Ōsugi, Kawakami, Tsuda, soshite Watsuji, Ōkawa* [Rereading the ‘Taishō’: Kōtoku, Ōsugi, Kawakami, Tsuda, and Watsuji, Ōkawa] (Tokyo: Fujihara Shoten, 2016), 24.

¹⁹ Peter Duus, “The Rise of Imperialism,” *The Rise of Modern Japan* (MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), 133-35.

²⁰ The notion of “grassroots fascism” was proposed in the 1980s by Yoshimi Yoshiaki in his *Grassroots Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People* (草の根のファシズム—日本民衆の戦争体験, English version was published in 2015). A similar interest of depicting the formation of Japanese fascism from the bottom up can also be found in some works published in the 1990s. For example, Louise Young’s *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* maintains critical perspectives based on cultural imperialism and social imperialism.

differentiation on politics as aforementioned but a tension involving both the stance of resisting the centralization of state power and the countertendency against it.²¹ In this regard, the tension amongst activists is no longer confined to the narrative of the Taishō Democracy and its antithesis, inseparable from the issue of strategic differentiation on politics, but open to a wider context encompassing the formation of Imperial Japan and its social conditions.

Meanwhile, the continuities and discontinuities of the interwar anti-colonial movements and post-war decolonization have prompted fruitful debates in terms of nationalism, political identity, and autonomy in Taiwanese studies. With reference to, not limited, to the Taishō Democracy, the relations between empire and colony remain contested and there are yet many aspects to be explored. As in Fanonian and Saidian manners, postcolonial mentalities are inevitably entangled with the socio-economic and political conditions emanating from the imperial legacy in which cultural or linguistic imperialism is embodied.²² This entanglement implies a transformation of the relation between empire and colony after the decline of the empire. Moreover, from the 1990s onwards, some studies have delineated the socio-political condition of Taiwan as the ‘periphery,’ ‘fissure,’ and ‘fragment’ of empires. Even, they have criticized Taiwan for attaching to empires in a higher level and placing itself in a position of ‘sub-empire.’ Likewise, the unsettled postcolonial complexity can also be located.²³ To

²¹ Koyasu, *Taishō'wo Yominaosu: Kōtoku, Ōsugi, Kawakami, Tsuda, soshite Watsuji, Ōkawa*, 98-101.

²² Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (NY: Grove Press, 2004), 55-60; Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (NY: Vintage Books, 1994), xxi-xxv, 78-80.

²³ The original terms in Chinese mentioned here are 帝國邊陲, 帝國夾縫, 帝國的碎片, and 次帝國. Detailed interpretation can be referred to Wu Jiemin, “tái wān zài dì guó zhēng bà jiá fēng zhōng dí chū lù” [A Passage-out of the Fissures of Empires], *xīn xīn wén* [The Journalist] 904 (2004). <https://sites.google.com/site/wujiehmin/home/she-hui-zheng-zhi-ping-lun/tai-wan-zai-di-guo-jia-feng-zhong-de-chu-lu> (accessed on 3rd Mar. 2020); and Wu Rweiren, “shòu kùn: zài dì guó jiá fēng zhī zhōng” [Impasse: Amongst the Fissures of Empires], *shòu kùn de sī xiǎng: tái wān chóng fān shì jiè* [The Thought of Impasse: Taiwan's Pivot to the World] (Taipei: Acropolis, 2016), 60-82; and Chen Kuanhsing, “The Imperialist Eye: The Cultural Imaginary of Sub-Empire and a Nation-State,” *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies* 17 (1994): 149-222.

tackle the puzzle of the colonial and postcolonial situation of Taiwan more structurally, a recent study also points to ‘empire’-ism (「帝国」主義) equipped methodologically with horizontal and vertical analyses.²⁴

With respect to the above-mentioned tension amongst different intellectual and activist narratives before the fall of Imperial Japan and the recent scholarly attempts to question the ties between post-war democracy with what was argued for democracy during the interwar era, this paper traces the interrelation of constitutional democracy and imperialism. Specifically, by re-examining Meiji criticisms of imperialism that set the tone for the debate on *minponshugi* (民本主義, a paraphrase of democracy in Japanese) and demonstrating diverse stances towards ‘constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally,’ this paper will bring the issue of imperialism back to the context of the Taishō Democracy in Japan and Taiwan. It will also treat a form of antagonism amongst these intellectuals and the activists in terms of the conceptualization of constitutional democracy vis-à-vis imperialism alongside the trend of self-determination widespread throughout East Asia after WWI. By so doing, I contend that during the post-WWI era democratic movements were not mere reflections of an abstract belief in universal values but an interplay between constitutionalism and imperialism, both of which were variously conceptualized.

From the perspective of intellectual history, this paper establishes an analytical structure composed of three sections: Meiji theories of imperialism, debate on *minponshugi* of the 1910s, and democratic movements in colonial Taiwan during the 1920s. To better provide a new approach that sheds light on the entanglement of imperialism and constitutional democracy, as well as the tension amongst intellectuals and activists, the research subjects are categorized as follows: (1) Ethical imperialism and the critique of imperialism: Ukita Kazutami (浮田和民) and Kōtoku Shūsui (幸徳秋水); (2) The debate on *minponshugi*: Yoshino Sakuzō (吉野作造), Ōsugi Sakae

²⁴ Wakabayashi Masahiro, “‘Taiwan toiu raireki’ wo motomete: hōhōteki ‘teikoku’ shugi shiron,” [Towards the History of Taiwan: Essay on a Methodological ‘Empire’-ism] Ienaga Masaki ed., *Taiwan Kenkyū Nyūmon* [An Introduction to Taiwan Studies] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2020), 354-58.

(大杉榮), and Yamakawa Hitoshi (山川均); and (3) Rethinking democratic movements in colonial Taiwan: Lim Teng-lok (林呈祿), Lien Wen-ching (連溫卿), and Fan Ben-liang (范本梁). This direction leads both to big names and to the relative unknowns, including liberal constitutionalists, socialists, nationalists and anarchists who had made impacts on social movements in East Asia to different extents. To bring to a focus my discussion on the interrelation of imperialism and constitutional democracy, subjects without any immediate connections will not be covered. In this line, 1) Takekoshi Yosaburō (竹越與三郎) and Takata Sanae (高田早苗) who espoused liberal imperialism and constitutional imperialism respectively, 2) Kayahara Kazan (茅原華山) and Ōyama Ikuo (大山郁夫) involved in the debate on *minponshugi*, and 3) such influential figures as Chiang Wei-shui (蔣渭水) and Hsu Nai-chang (許乃昌) who proactively promoted Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People and/or Lenin's criticism of imperialism will not be included either. It is also through this research that the arguments of the activists like Fan, who has barely been explored due to the lack of materials, will be more richly readdressed.²⁵ Last, despite the fact that this paper stresses the development and succession of certain thoughts and actions, it does not ignore differences and transformations in a broader context, especially, the heterogeneity of the voices for 'constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally,' and the diversity within the Petition Movement. Hence, this paper will take a constructive step in initiating new research and reinvigorating the debate about the relationship between thought and (geo)politics in early 20th-century East Asia.

²⁵ One of the difficulties of conducting research of East Asian anarchists lies in the lack of evidence and materials due to brutal oppressions and the anarchist belief in anonymity alike. For more information, see Arif Dirlik's *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution* (1991) to Hwang Dongyoun's *Anarchism in Korea: Independence, Transnationalism, and the Question of National Development 1919-1984* (2017). Depicting anarchism from a regional and trans-movement perspective is sometimes an alternative (this is also the approach of Qiu Shijie's study). This paper focuses on the continuities among discourses of imperialism, Japanese anarchism, and Taiwanese anarchist movement within existing materials.

Ethical Imperialism and the Critique of Imperialism: Ukita Kazutami and Kōtoku Shūsui

In the wake of the Meiji Restoration and the enforcement of the Meiji Constitution, Japan initiated its state-building project with western modernity as both reference and counter-reference, both of which legitimized Japan's claim for its own role in safeguarding Asian countries from the violence, posed by western powers, while validating its own ambitions for regional and global hegemony. The enforcement of the Meiji Constitution marked its legitimacy and sovereignty as the country's triumph in the First Sino-Japanese war eased its financial burdens. By waging war against China, it strengthened sovereign power over Ryukyu (now known as Okinawa) and imposed colonial rule on Taiwan. In the meantime, with a considerable amount of foreign loans, taxation and war reparations between 1895 and 1905, Japan emerged as the world's fastest-growing economy.²⁶ Herein, we can find some common factors amid theories of imperialism—military expansion, capitalism, and colonialism.

However, without severing itself from the traditional political behaviors, the Meiji Restoration turned out to be an incomplete revolution in which clanship politics continued. How to bring about a 'second Meiji Restoration,' therefore, became a heated controversy within the intellectual community.²⁷ At a time when Japan began to demonstrate its national strength through overseas expansion, most intellectuals presented supportive attitudes towards militarism.²⁸ It was generally thought that war bene-

²⁶ Robert Thomas Tierney, *Monster of the 20th Century: Kōtoku Shūsui and Japan's first Anti-Imperialist Movement* (CA: University of California Press, 2015), 31; Keiichi Harada, *Nisshin Nichiro Sensō–Siriizu Nihon Kingendaishi* [The Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War: Series Modern Japanese History] 3 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013), 125-26.

²⁷ Matsuzawa Hiroaki, "meiji shakaishugi no shisō" [Discourses of Meiji Socialism], *The Japanese Socialism* 19 (1968): 18.

²⁸ Miyamoto Moritarō, "Ukita Kazutami ni okeru rinriteki teikokushugi no keisei 1" [The Formation of Ethical Imperialism of Ukita Kazutami 1], *The Review of Law* 112-3 (1982): 68; Alistair Swale, "Tokutomi Sohō and the problem of the national-state in an imperialist world," Dick Stegewerns ed., *Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan* (NY: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 76-80; Tierney, *Monster of the 20th Century*, 83-85; Yamamuro Shinichi, *Nichiro Sensō no Seiki–Rensa*

fitted Japan's national interests and its international visibility. Along this line, Japanese imperialism was believed to be a capacity that originated exclusively from the Japanese ethnicity in opposition to western imperialism.²⁹ Many were convinced that waging war could help to end the feudal system in some 'backward' areas, such as the Qing dynasty of China, and facilitate the flow of modernization.³⁰ As a result, modernization came to make imperialist utterances just and progressive while subscribing to a modernist reform abroad, in East Asian in particular, as well as at home.

Ukita: Ethical Imperialism and the Constitutional Morality

Criticisms against the Japanese authorities' warlike policies emerged at the turn of the 20th century when Japan's militarism caused serious casualties and financial burdens. One distinguished criticism was carried out by liberal constitutionalist Ukita Kazutami (浮田和民, 1860-1946) who denounced militarism and appealed for 'ethical imperialism' as an alternative. Ukita's main argument indicates that for the future economic growth of Japan, avoiding armed conflicts and pursuing international coordination in accordance with international laws should be imminent and inevitable.³¹ This

Shiten kara miru Nihon to Sekai [The Century of the Russo-Japanese War: Japan and the World from the Viewpoint of Connection] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005), 82-84.

²⁹ Tierney, *Monster of the 20th Century*, 43-44; Yamamuro, *Nichiro Sensō no Seiki-Rensa Shiten kara miru Nihon to Sekai*, 82-84. In 1894, Tokutomi Sohō (1863-1957), editor-in-chief of *The Nation's Friend* (国民之友), issued 'The Expansion of Greater Japan' (大日本膨張論). In an attempt to counterbalance the western powers, he appealed for the diplomacy of imperialism and urged a large-scale military expansion to support Japan's state-building project. Takayama Chogyū (1871-1902), also had repeatedly condemned western powers for invading Asia and stressed the need for necessary counterattacks in justification of Japan's military expansion.

³⁰ A similar matter can be found in a common view during the Meiji period which emphasized that China was not a sovereign state (中国非国論). In accordance with the classification of *Elements of International Law*, Japan and China were both classified as 'semi-civilized.' As Japan joined the coalition force in the Boxer Rebellion alongside the so-called 'civilized' countries in 1900, some argued that this military action against China was not a war between two or more opposing sovereign nations but a 'humanitarian intervention.'

³¹ Jiang Keshi, "Rinriteki teikokushugi no keisei" [The Formation of Ethical Imperialism], *Ukita Kazutami no Shisōshiteki Kenkyū: Rinriteki Teikokushugi no Keisei* [An Intellectual History of Ukita Kazutami: the Formation of Ethical Imperialism] (Tokyo: Fujishuppan, 2003), 433-40;




Figure 1. The cover page of Ukita's *Ethical Imperialism*. Adapted from: Ukita, Kazutami (1909), *Rinriteki Teikokushugi*. Retrieved from the NDL Digital Collections. <https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/758632> (accessed on 2020/5/13)

stance can be traced back to his interest in finding a link between social evolution and the essence of the modern nation-state. To him, a nation-state is like an organic whole. It refers to a homogeneous nation integrated under 'a common and consistent national consciousness.'³² Moreover, he argues that legal order is indispensable to shaping Japan as an integrated nation-state amid international competition. In "The Japanese imperialism" (日本の帝國主義) and "Imperialism and pedagogy" (帝國主義と教育), he states as follows:

The so-called imperialism we promote is a doctrine of pursuing the independence of a nation, and, furthermore, participating in the civilization and politics of the world. . . . The one and only imperialism that Japan should advocate is exactly the one that confronts western countries and expands the

rights of its own people on the basis of consent upon which international laws are predicated. In addition, this imperialism flourishes the independence of Asian countries in furtherance of guiding and prompting their reforms.³³

To him, imperialism is meant to be a certain capacity of guaranteeing the independence of Japan and other Asian countries, and of confronting western powers in accordance with international laws. Competition is regarded as the nature of survival while international relation is described as the 'civilization' and 'politics' of the world, a similar view to Wheaton's *Elements*

Miyamoto Moritarō, "Ukita Kazutami ni okeru rinriteki teikokushugi no keisei 2" [The formation of ethical imperialism of Ukita Kazutami 2], *The Review of Law* 112-4 (1982): 74-80.

³² Jiang, *Ukita Kazutami no Shisōshūteki Kenkyū: Rinriteki Teikokushugi no Keisei*, 406.

³³ Ukita Kazutami, *Teikokushugi to Kyōiku* [Imperialism and Pedagogy] (Tokyo: Minyūsha, 1901), 36.

of *International Law*. Against the previous understandings that imperialism is equated with military expansion, Ukita endorsed rightful competitions in terms of national independence and regional leadership. This stance was later termed as ‘ethical imperialism’ (倫理的帝國主義) through which he urged for peaceful economic expansion and co-development with other Asian countries.³⁴

Alongside the escalating tension between Japan and Russia in 1903, the legal feature of Ukita’s ethical imperialism was then elaborated as what he described as the “constitutional morality” of a nation,

We carry an obligation to survive and become the foundation of ethics. Therefore, the first principle of the moral law is simply to survive. The second principle is to compete for the sake of survival. The third principle is to compete more and more for superior survival . . . To establish a nation that is consistent with this ideal, it is crucial to maintain the order and the integration of one society . . . and to demonstrate constitutional morality.³⁵

In this paragraph, the obligation, ethics, and morality of individuals all point to the same issue, namely the survival of a nation. Besides, just as international law regulates relations between nations, he pictures an ideal nation to be established on a well-organized society under the constitution. Ethical imperialism bespeaks an ideal power relation through which conflicts between nations will be dissolved. It is here that his scheme of ‘constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally’ (内に立憲主義, 外に帝國主義) emerged. By the 1910s, Ukita’s thoughts demonstrated an apparent preference for a powerful state. In *On The New Morality of A Nation*, he refuses the idea of natural rights by elaborating the notion of *polis* in Aristotle’s *Politics* as ‘a national life’ (國家的生活), and argues that ‘man is by nature a political animal’; human nature cannot be fulfilled without a na-

³⁴ Ukita, *Teikokushugi to Kyōiku*, 68-69.

³⁵ Ukita Kazutami, *Rinriteki Teikokushugi* [Ethical Imperialism] (Kyoto: Ryūbunkan, 1909), 42-43.

tional life.³⁶

The government as well as people must absolutely obey the state. In the meantime, the government will not be allowed to step outside its jurisdiction authorized by the constitution, not even one step.³⁷

Alongside the inevitable bond between man and the nation-state, Ukita envisioned an absolute obedience to the state. In his argument, the rule of law indicates limits on government while the absoluteness of governance in one nation belongs exclusively to the state. In this regard, it is clear that the emphasis on legal order in Ukita's thought ultimately turned into an advocate for the supremacy of the state. In short, with the assumption of survival as a modern moral principle, Ukita couched a nation-state-oriented imperial reform, spanning ethical imperialism and the supremacy of the state, in terms of state sovereignty.

Kōtoku: Criticism of Imperialism, Direct Action, and *Heimin* Socialism

With an anti-militarist stance similar to Ukita's, Kōtoku Shūsui (幸徳秋水, 1871-1911) also provided a significant reference to imperialism undetached from constitutionalism. However, his arguments developed in an entirely different manner. As a journalist, his editorials reflected a rough interest in establishing a politico-economic point of view. In *Monster of the 20th Century: Imperialism* (廿世紀之怪物 帝國主義), he brings up his analysis through three separate but related factors: patriotism, militarism, and capitalism. He argues that patriotism and militarism form the basis of imperialism whereas capitalism highlights its modern features. First, Kōtoku describes patriotism as a sentiment based on the 'hatred towards other countries' rather than 'pure sympathy and compassion for one's hometown.'³⁸ He warns against the consequences of patriotism: it manipu-

³⁶ Ukita Kazutami, *Shindōtoku Ron* [A New Morality] (Tokyo: Nanbokusha, 1913), 58, 77.

³⁷ Ukita, *Shindōtoku Ron*, 31-32.

³⁸ Kōtoku Shūsui, *Teikokushugi* [Imperialism] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013), 20.

lates a false opposition as friend/enemy distinction amongst people.³⁹ Second, he calls into question two common veins of militarism; the one for the sake of peace and the other for the sake of the wealth of a nation, and argues that militarism must benefit only the dictators and leave most people having suffered.⁴⁰ Third, he focuses on the specific role of capitalism and criticizes the interrelation between capitalism and imperialism in Meiji Japan. He cast doubts on the imperialist utterance describing imperialism itself as a natural outcome of the development of capitalism.⁴¹

They [the imperialists] suggest that exploring new markets is indispensable since people have been suffering from an abundance of capital and an excess of production . . . It is not because products are no longer needed that there is an excess of production but simply because most people are not capable of consuming. Our current system of free competition itself has caused the capitalist industrialists to monopolize the excessive profits of capital.⁴²

Kōtoku points out that the real issue lies in a malfunctioning socioeconomic system and puts further blame on the monopoly of profits and underconsumption. Adopting a stance similar to his contemporaries, both social democrats and radical liberals, he concludes that as patriotism and militarism strengthen the state of total antagonism and political dictatorship, the




Figure 2. The cover page of Kōtoku's *Imperialism*. Retrieved from the Bibliographic and Image Database of Japanese Modern Times. <https://base1.nijl.ac.jp/~kindai/img/YMNK/YMNK-00112/YMNK-00112-03.jpg> (accessed on 2020/5/13)

³⁹ Ibid., 34-41.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 51, 59-76, 82-84.

⁴¹ Ibid., 98-101.

⁴² Ibid., 102-03.

malfunctioning system of capitalism has made the situation worse.⁴³ Unlike Ukita, Kōtoku looks for a socialist system instead. In *Quintessence of Socialism*, he introduces Marxist historical materialism and the subsequent phenomena, peculiar to capitalism, and gives a fundamental depiction of a capitalist society, including the industrial reserve army, class struggle, exploitation of surplus-value, an excess of production, economic panic, and the economic cartel.⁴⁴ To prevent the potential risk, he puts forward a proposal derived from Richard T. Ely's reformism and delineates his own ideal for socialism in which to 'seize control of all means of production from the landlord-capitalists and to attribute it to a common ownership in the hands of people as well as society.'⁴⁵ By so doing, Kōtoku adjusts the well-known 'dictatorship of the proletariat,' cited from the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, to 'common ownership.'⁴⁶

Meanwhile, during this period, the term Kōtoku employed most frequently to call for people's actions was *heimin* (平民) which referred to common people in a literal sense. Briefly, it reflects four aspects of his arguments concerning political action. First, as patriotism has crystalized as an imperative in Japanese imperialism, *heimin* is defined as non-nationals (非国民), i.e., those un-patriots willing to stand against the fever of imperialism. Second, *heimin* indicates the suffering majority in contrast to the domination of the few. Third, it is translated as 'the proletariat' in the very first Japanese translation of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* and some other social-democratic and Marxist materials. Last, this concept am-

⁴³ Ibid., 49, 96, 113-14.

⁴⁴ Kōtoku Shūsui, *Shakaishugi Shinzui* [The Quintessence of Socialism] (Tokyo: Chōhōsha, 1903), 24-28, 36-38, 43-47.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 21. His proposal, dependent theoretically on Ely's *Socialism and Social Reform*, was generally seen as an emergency measure to cope with the warlike imperialist policies. Ely was known for his proactive appeals concerning social reforms based on land reform and public ownership. Despite this outward doubt about socialism, his work was taken as a classic text by Meiji socialists. In the meantime, it is noteworthy that although Kōtoku did partially follow Ely's proposal, he subtly dodged Ely's criticisms and brought up his own ideal in opposition to government-led reform policies.

⁴⁶ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "II. Proletarians and Communists," *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Marxists Internet Archive, 2010), 26.

ply delivers a will to transnational solidarity in which, he stresses, the *heimin* and proletariat shared a common enemy: imperialism.⁴⁷

Between 1905 and 1906, Kōtoku's thoughts went through a critical leap in his prison life for inciting subversive thoughts 'harmful to the interests of the nation and the social order,'⁴⁸ and during his later exile to the USA. After his return in the summer of 1906, he began to urge an anarcho-syndicalist direct action of society as a whole.⁴⁹ In "The tide of the world revolutionary movement" (世界革命運動の潮流), Kōtoku criticized constitutional reforms and brought up the agenda of direct action.

What our comrades in western countries plan to adopt as means of the future revolution is not something violent. The entire working class can achieve anything with joined hands. . . . To shut down every production and transportation facility in the society is sufficient. In other words, what is to solely be done is to launch the so-called general strike.⁵⁰

To Kōtoku, the direct action for a general strike is not supposed to be reduced merely to political matters, such as universal suffrage or salary ad-

⁴⁷ Kōtoku Shūsui, *Kōtoku Shūsui Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Kōtoku Shūsui] 6 (Tokyo: Meijibunken, 1968), 441; _____, *Kindai Nihon Shisō Taikei Kōtoku Shūsui* [Series of Modern Japanese Thought: Kōtoku Shūsui] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1975), 173, 197; Tierney, *Monster of the 20th Century*, 45-47, 116-17.

⁴⁸ Itoya Toshio, *Kōtoku Shūsui Kenkyū* [Kōtoku Shūsui Studies] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1969), 184.

⁴⁹ Asukai Masamichi, "Meiji shakaishugi undo no kiketsu-chokusetsu kōdō ron wo megutte" [The Consequence of Meiji Socialist Movement: Regarding the Theory of Direct Action], *Thought* 524 (1968): 263-35; John Crump, *The Origin of Socialist Thought in Japan* (NY: Routledge, 2011), 19-21; Kōtoku Shūsui, *Kōtoku Shūsui Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Kōtoku Shūsui] 7 (Tokyo: Meijibunken, 1971), 256; Komatsu Ryūji, "'keizaisoshiki no mirai' hoka— Kōtoku Shūsui to anakizumu" [The Future of Economic Organization: *Kōtoku Shūsui and Anarchism*], *Kōtoku Shūsui Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Kōtoku Shūsui] 7 (Tokyo: Meijibunken, 1969), 426-28, 436. Despite the fact that this call for direct action did not stem from a systematic understanding of anarchism, his appeal can be traced back to three anarchist factors of 1) theoretical works regarding anarchism, such as works of Bakunin, Kropotkin, or Malatesta, 2) the anarchist role of general strike in the First Russian Revolution of 1905, and 3) syndicalist practices of the time.

⁵⁰ Kōtoku, *Kindai Nihon Shisō Taikei Kōtoku Shūsui*, 101.

justments, but should be developed as revolutionary acts.⁵¹ To achieve this purpose, he believes, revolution could not be carried out overnight ‘because it takes a large amount of time to arouse consciousness and to strengthen solidarity.’⁵² Eventually, in 1909, Kōtoku put forward the slogan of ‘towards the people’ and called for action to build greater solidarity across different walks of life and social distinctions.⁵³ Arguably, the idea of *heimin* is related to common people in terms of social solidarity conjoined tightly with the practice of general strike. With a firm stance of anti-imperialist socialism against the state, Kōtoku’s direct action displays his strategic concern for political action in which a certain tension between the state and the society is never resolved.⁵⁴ In this regard, his appeal for direct action can be seen as recognition of the autonomy from within one society, or a *heimin* socialism. It brought to light a revolutionary step towards the empowerment of the people, i.e., the initiative of people’s own sovereignty.

The Debate on *Minponshugi*: Yoshino Sakuzō, Ōsugi Sakae, and Yamakawa Hitoshi

In the wake of the High Treason Incident of 1910,⁵⁵ Kōtoku’s attempt to stimulate sociopolitical changes outside of the existing legal order was

⁵¹ Kōtoku, *Kōtoku Shūsui Zenshū* 6, 434-35.

⁵² Kōtoku, *Kindai Nihon Shisō Taikai Kōtoku Shūsui*, 300.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 301-02.

⁵⁴ Kōtoku, *Shakaishugi Shinzui*, 129-30. It is noteworthy that Kōtoku did not make a clear refusal to the Emperor system during the early 1900s. Some arguments even showed that he believed a socialist system and the Emperor system were compatible with each other. This stance was in large part influenced by his mentor Nakae Chōmin who was known for his interpretation of *res publica* as a political form of joint governance between the Emperor and its royal subjects, namely people in Japan. Kōtoku’s tolerance on the Emperor system is believed to have changed after 1905 when some expressions against the system could be found in his works and correspondences. Until his execution in 1911, however, no solid arguments regarding the system had been made. Accordingly, it is difficult to judge whether his refusal to the notion of state functioned as a counterforce against the ‘national polity’ (国体) of Japan.

⁵⁵ In the incident, Kōtoku was accused of being responsible for a conspiracy to assassinate the Emperor, convicted of the crime of treason, and executed. Until the 1960s, when the ‘incident’ was proved to be a political plot, he was often misunderstood as an extremist who favored political terrorism.

forcibly interrupted. The socialist movements underwent the so-called ‘age of winter’ with constant police harassment and the government’s high-handed policies. During the 1910s and 1920s, to rely on lawfulness and patriotic gestures became more or less the camouflage for their remaining activities against the suppression.⁵⁶ By launching legal activities authorized by the constitution, such as tax reforms and the extension of suffrage, the reformist intellectuals witnessed a peak referred later to as ‘Taishō Democracy.’ On the premise of ‘imperialism externally and constitutionalism internally,’ *minponshugi* advocated by Yoshino Sakuzo (吉野作造, 1878-1933) is believed to have best represented these circumstances.⁵⁷ Meanwhile, Ōsugi Sakae (大杉栄, 1885-1923) and Yamakawa Hitoshi (山川均, 1880-1958), both of whom were Kōtoku’s fellows and successors of direct action, seemed rather detached from and intolerant to Yoshino’s legalist posture. Thus, the debate on *minponshugi* can be regarded as a prelude to the tension amid social movements during the post-WWI era.

1. Disputes over the Notion of State

Inspired by Ukita’s constitutional politics, Yoshino’s interests in constitutionalism can be traced back to his theory of state. To him, there exists an indivisible bond between individuals and the state.⁵⁸ In “On the ideas of the ‘authority of the state’ and ‘sovereignty’” (「国家威力」と「主権」との觀念に就て), Yoshino employs Hegel’s *Staatsgewalt* to delineate the difference between authority and sovereignty. He stresses that ‘sovereignty lies in the state’ is a false proposition; the real issue is ‘the authority of the state which lies in the state.’⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Matsuo, *Taishō Demokurashi*, 89, 114, 162, 169, 305.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 157-58.

⁵⁸ Yoshino did not initially distinguish between ideas of state, nation, nation-state and government, therefore the connotation of his wording of ‘国家’ appears to be ambiguous. As regards the notion of *Staatsgewalt*, I adopt both ‘state’ and ‘nation’ accordingly in the following paragraph.

⁵⁹ Yoshino Sakuzō, *Yoshino Sakuzō Senshū Seiji to Kokka* [Selected Works of Yoshino Sakuzō: Politics and the State] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 93.

From my point of view, ‘sovereignty’ indicates the legal force that demands the national actions of individuals. Therefore, it refers to coercion that aims entirely at the national actions of individuals and requires their obedience (blindness in an extreme sense) to the outer criterion. . . . What I designate as the ‘authority of the state’ indeed has a direct connection to something that not only regulates but also takes a lead in allowing for the individual act on his/her own will, i.e., the supreme inner criterion of the national actions of individuals.⁶⁰

By distinguishing between the outer-legal and inner-spiritual criteria, Yoshino introduces the distinction between sovereignty and the authority of the state. To him, the former refers to the power of subjugation and domination while the latter relates to an individual’s spontaneous obedience. Herein, it is noteworthy that sovereignty is perceived as a sovereign power, a regime, or a form of government. Authority appears indivisible to the state and bespeaks a ‘vitality of guiding the sovereignty’ in the modern era.⁶¹ To maintain this vitality, therefore, requires consistency between people and the state, which sets the tone for his political theory. Alongside this, Yoshino describes democracy as a result of an extreme discrepancy between sovereignty and the authority of the state. People have but to demand authority by launching revolution since ‘sovereignty violates the authority of state.’⁶² To avoid this situation, he urges for reconciliation under an ideal type of constitutional governance that balances the tension between statism (国家主義) and individualism (個人主義).⁶³

⁶⁰ Yoshino, *Yoshino Sakuzō Senshū Seiji to Kokka*, 92.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 96.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 124. There are some similar albeit different terms in Japanese regarding the notion of 国家 that refers to nation, state, or nation-state in different context, including 国粹主義, 国家主義, and 国家中心主義. In English, they are often translated as ‘nationalism’ which can lead to some misunderstandings. In the following paragraphs, I focus on the issue of “state” in light of governance and legal constitution by employing a relatively unpopular word “statism” to translate the term 国家主義. Accordingly, 国家中心主義 can be translated as “state-centrism.” This discernment will help highlight the significance of “state” in Yoshino’s works and distinguish his

Sharing a similar view on constitutionalism with Ukita, Yoshino regarded the constitutional governance as essential to the political reforms in both the domestic and diplomatic aspects. He warns against the danger of statism and denounces individualism for its ignorance of such crucial issues as norms of a nation (国家的規範) and the morality of sacrifice.⁶⁴ In Yoshino's theory, statism drags down the nation while individualism harms Japan's national interests in industrial development and international competitions.⁶⁵ His interest in constitutionalism stems from a pursuit of power balance regulated by the constitution.⁶⁶ His focus is primarily upon how to harmonize contradictions and avoiding political vacuums, caused by the revolutionary epoch of the day, less than how to understand sovereignty in association with social formation that includes emperor, people, and the state.

Unlike Yoshino's interest in the state theory and constitutionalism, Ōsugi and Yamakawa, as the most influential representatives of the anarcho-syndicalism, were enthusiastic about the potential of transnational direct actions. Let alone Ōsugi's remarkable self-positioning as an anarchist, a diversity of interests can be found in his thoughts on whom Kōtoku's criticism of imperialism and *heimin* socialism made some impact. During the Russo-Japanese war, Ōsugi had addressed the tension between nationalism and internationalism with a doubtful eye on patriotism channeled by the passion towards nation-state.⁶⁷

In comparison with Yoshino's interest in the theory of state, Ōsugi's apparent indifference to state can be traced back to his arguments regarding the inherent political and social orders expressed as the 'facts of conquest'

 efforts from other nationalist attempts, such as 国粹主義, regarding the supremacy of the Japanese ethnicity in relation to the Meiji nationalism.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 126-27.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 129.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 132.

⁶⁷ Ōsugi Sakae, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Ōsugi Sakae] 1 (Tokyo: Paru Shuppan, 2015), 2-6.

(征服の事実).⁶⁸ In his rationale, following the collapse of the feudal system, the rise of the constitutional state reveals the will to individual freedom in association with the birth of a modern state. However, the long-continued domination stays unchanged as the previous privileged remained and the newborn privileged came to power. Against this situation, Ōsugi doubts if the appeal for the state as the ‘highest form of community’ could fit the best interests of people.⁶⁹ The ‘facts of conquest’—the violence of the conqueror and the willing acknowledgment of the conquered—, as a prologue to Ōsugi’s serial arguments regarding the theory of the nature of slavery (奴隸根性), the extension of life (生の拡充) and the creation of life (生の創造), demonstrates the basis of his anarchism. He argues that social institutions have developed hand in hand with domination which originates from the ‘facts of conquest’ including the army, factories, the parliament and the state, and so forth.⁷⁰ And, it is modern society that has been broadly divided into capitalists as the conqueror and laborers as the conquered.⁷¹ Marxism, according to Ōsugi, provides a significant referential point in which to fathom the causes of the modern facts of conquest via historical materialism, capitals, and theories of production.⁷² However, the way people should resist against the prolonged history of conquest without falling back appears to be the most critical issue of the time. To achieve this goal, the creation of life—a leap or reverse as compared with the orderly progression of revolutionary stages—is indispensable. Then, an entirely differ-

⁶⁸ Ōsugi Sakae, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Ōsugi Sakae] 2 (Tokyo: Paru Shuppan, 2014), 102-08. The ‘facts of conquest’ refers to 征服の事実 in Japanese. Literally, 事実 indicates the reality, facts, or truths in different context. Here I choose “facts” to highlight the aspect of norms and values in one society, more in tune with Ōsugi’s counterargument against the establishment of Imperial Japan, just as “social facts” in sociology refers to a certain value system or social structure.

⁶⁹ Ōsugi Sakae, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Ōsugi Sakae] 3 (Tokyo: Paru Shuppan, 2014), 150-54.

⁷⁰ Ōsugi Sakae, *Ōsugi Sakae Hyōronshū* [Collection of Commentaries by Ōsugi Sakae] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 34, 40, 50-53.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 55-56.

⁷² Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Ōsugi Sakae] 3, 173-78.

ent projection of revolution from the traditional Marxist theory emerged.⁷³

A similar vigilance can be found in the early works of Yamakawa, in which he focuses specifically on the interrelation among the nation-state, capitalism, and imperialism. This orientation can be interpreted as a further argument of Kōtoku's criticism of imperialism which gave a general sketch of the relationship among the three elements. Yamakawa's most influential argument was launched around WWI. To him, the Great War disclosed exactly the imperialist nature of capitalism, where the emergence of the nation-state played an essential role.⁷⁴ In "Anatomy of the capital system" (資本主義のからくり), adopting a common Marxist point of view, Yamakawa captures the nation-state as a co-product of capitalism and construes the development of capitalism during the 1910s in both a liberalist pattern and an imperialist pattern.⁷⁵ Moreover, by introducing the notion of the superstructure, he calls attention to the issue a ruling class and democratization.

The modern nation-state can turn into a cause for militarism only when the nation has, to some extent, been democratized, and the lust for dynastic power has been consistent with the class that became dominant as a result of certain democratization.⁷⁶

To him, in the modern era, the interests between the previous and current ruling classes have integrated alongside the development of the nation-state and democracy. Since inequalities, originating fundamentally from economic life, are left unsolved, no end to militarism is guaranteed. In

⁷³ Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 1, 314-16. Ōsugi's interest in the possibility of carrying out a revolution without the expected stages of development of one society can be traced back to his studies of anarchism, anarchist biology, and geography. By probing into these related works, he gained insights from the theory of "mutation" and that of "deviation," which eventually supported his endeavors to tell evolution from revolution.

⁷⁴ Yamakawa Hitoshi, *Yamakawa Hitoshi Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Yamakawa Hitoshi] 1 (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2003), 388.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 440.

⁷⁶ Yamakawa Hitoshi, *Yamakawa Hitoshi Zenshū* [The Complete Collection of Yamakawa Hitoshi] 2 (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1966), 98.

short, Ōsugi and Yamakawa probe into the existing power relation by calling the state and the nation-state into question, respectively, while Yoshino upholds the constitutional authority of the state. Ōsugi and Yamakawa present more interest in revealing the untold tension behind the façade of constitutionalism whereas Yoshino seeks after a stable constitutional order in lieu of revolutionary upheaval.

2. The Debate on *Minponshugi*

The development of *minponshugi* is generally acknowledged as a progress of democracy through which the tension between the Emperor's sovereign power and people's political rights was eased.⁷⁷ In the debate on *minponshugi*,⁷⁸ Yoshino reveals a belief that monarchy and democracy will become compatible with each other once an ideal constitutionalism is established.⁷⁹ Contrarily, Ōsugi and Yamakawa cast doubts on the consequences of the ignorance of people's sovereignty and warns that democracy would move backward.⁸⁰

In the wake of WWI, the concept of democracy was rather unpopular and facing challenges in Japan. Yoshino's appeal for *minponshugi* was prepared against the conventional idea that democracy violates the Emperor's sovereign power and that the public opinion merely reflects the stupidity of the crowd.⁸¹ Meanwhile, Yoshino exerted himself balancing sovereignty

⁷⁷ Ishida Takeshi, "'Shakai' no ishikika to shakaiseisaku gakkai" [The Sense of 'Society' and the Association for Social Policy], *Nihon no Shakai Kagaku* [Social Sciences in Japan] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984), 91-92.

⁷⁸ Among a series of debates on *minponshugi* between 1912 and 1920, Yoshino's conceptualization is believed to have generated people's greatest enthusiasm in both Japan and its colonies. Instead of going through every debate at the time, this paper punctuates a discursive context between Yoshino and his opponents, Ōsugi and Yamakawa.

⁷⁹ Yoshino Sakuzō, "Kensei no hongii wo toite sono yūshū no bi wo sumasu no michi wo ronzu" [On the Essence of Constitutionalism and the Path towards Its Ultimate Fulfillment], *Taishō Demokurashi Ronsōshi* [The History of Debates of Taishō Democracy] 1 (Tokyo: Shinsensha, 1971), 258-59.

⁸⁰ Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 4, 208-11; Yamakawa, *Yamakawa Hitoshi Zenshū* 1, 453-55, 463.

⁸¹ Ōta Masao, "Kaisetsu" [Commentary], *Taishō Demokurashi Ronsōshi* [The History of Debates of Taishō Democracy] 1 (Tokyo: Shinsensha, 1971), 536-37.

and state authority on the one hand and statism and individualism on the other. Accordingly, from the perspective of constitutionalism, he stressed that the constitution determines the fundamental rules of state governance but it does not necessarily have to be defined by the doctrine of ‘the sovereignty lies with the people.’⁸² In his most-quoted article “On the essence of constitutionalism and the path towards its ultimate fulfillment” (憲政の本義を説いて其有終の美を済すの途を論ず), Yoshino asserts as follows.

When it comes to new (western) knowledge regarding politics, laws, and so forth, the term [democracy] has been applied to at least two different senses. On one hand, it is applied as ‘the sovereignty of the state lies de jure with the people,’ while on the other, as ‘the fundamental aim of the sovereign activities of the state lies politically with the people.’⁸³

First, in his argument, the state is believed to be indispensable to democracy. Second, by distinguishing between the sphere of law and that of politics, as well as the sovereignty of the state and the sovereign activities of the state, Yoshino differentiates democracy in two senses, *de jure* and *de facto* by which means the well-known distinction between democracy and *minponshugi* is made. At this juncture, democracy refers to issues regarding the whereabouts of the sovereignty (主権の所在) and *minponshugi* refers to the aim of the sovereign activities (主権活動の目的). Without necessarily elaborating democracy alone, he recapitulates the urgency of establishing a



Figure 3. Yoshino’s article published in *Chuō Kōron*. Reprinted from Yoshino, Sakuzō (1916), “Kensei no hongii wo toite” in *Chuō Kōron* 31(3) (Tokyo: Chuō Kōron Sha): 326.

⁸² Yoshino, *Taishō Demokurashi Ronsōshi* 1, 249.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 259.

constitutional *minponshugi* that connects the Meiji Constitution and democracy together and puts people at the forefront of the sovereign activities. This combination made him confide in the inviolability of the imperial system in juxtaposition with the latest (western) trend of democracy.

To be certain, Yoshino's *minponshugi* helped bring into prominence an amalgam of Imperial Japan and constitutionalism in which monarchy and democracy could be smoothly subsumed.⁸⁴ However, this stance immediately elicited a controversy, including criticism from Ōsugi and Yamakawa, in the intellectual community. In "The blind leading the blind: Dr. Yoshino's theory of the descent of democracy" (盲の手引する盲—吉野博士の民主主義墮落論), Ōsugi praises Yoshino's effort in bringing up the issues regarding sovereignty but severely criticizes the way he mixes democracy with *minponshugi*.⁸⁵ What Yoshino has described as reconciliation/balance is indeed a compromise preventing him from facing the reality that as the 'formidable institution of necessary evils,' as well as the 'highest form of community,' the state prevails (in every sector of the society).⁸⁶ According to Ōsugi, that is how Yoshino states that *minponshugi* reaffirms statism on the battlefield of constitutionalism without confronting it.

As the absolute principle of politics, democracy has turned into one of the principles of convenience that corrects the malpractice of statism—the opposite of democracy—as a result of its development. Eventually, democracy has even lost the name and been renamed as *minponshugi*.⁸⁷

Ōsugi entertained grave doubts concerning the possibility of reconciliation/balance between statism and democracy as the two ends of politics to be reconciled without distortion and takes Yoshino's *minponshugi* as the vivid example of that distortion. In the process, Ōsugi thinks, democracy was put in jeopardy and turned futile. That being so, in Ōsugi's opinion, the theory

⁸⁴ Ibid., 261.

⁸⁵ Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 4, 207.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 210-11.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 208.

of reconciliation might lead to a conspiracy between *minponshugi* and statism in which the former enhances the latter. Contrarily, during the early 1910s, Ōsugi was devoted to anarchism under the banner of new socialism and a revolutionary tactic called the ‘rebel of life’ (生の反逆).⁸⁸ He paid attention to a scheme predicated upon communal economy and union-based politics with a view to deterring the class distinctions and activating the idea of mutual aid.⁸⁹

Yamakawa shares a similar attitude against *minponshugi* and a syndicalist point of view with Ōsugi. He agrees with Yoshino’s observation that capitalist imperialism is seeking the monopoly of the global market while liberalism is incorporating into statism.⁹⁰ However, he disagrees with Yoshino’s differentiation of sovereignty.⁹¹ To him, *minponshugi* can be briefly summarized as *democracy* without democracy and as the absence of people’s demands. The constitution, conceptualized by Yoshino, is nothing but a simple fact of history and an *a priori* of politics so any reduction of democracy to *minponshugi* could serve to accentuate statism and aristocracy.⁹²

What is more, questioning a close linkage between *minponshugi* and statism, Yamakawa underlines *minponshugi* as the art of oligarchic rule interchangeable with a democracy without democratic characteristics.⁹³ More importantly, he worries about a reversal in which the anti-statist conviction of *minponshugi* might end up going the other way around to support statism and even fashion a new form of imperialism.⁹⁴ Against this scenario, Yamakawa calls for a ‘return to democracy.’⁹⁵

The spirit of pure democracy pursues direct politics of and by all mem-

⁸⁸ Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 2, 131.

⁸⁹ Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 3, 150.

⁹⁰ Yamakawa, *Yamakawa Hitoshi Zenshū* 1, 463.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 452.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 453-56.

⁹³ Yamakawa, *Yamakawa Hitoshi Zenshū* 2, 87, 93.

⁹⁴ Yamakawa, *Yamakawa Hitoshi Zenshū* 1, 463.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 460-61.

bers of the society. Also, politics should not speak up for democratic politics that lubricates the relation between the dominant and the dominated with the oil of democracy but for common affairs that involve no part of domination.⁹⁶

With a strong implication of syndicalism, Yamakawa features a society through which all members are involved without exclusion. In other words, instead of excluding particular subjects from the political sphere, he calls for an embracement of all in common affairs. In counter to *minponshugi* as a democracy without democratic characteristics, Yamakawa gave priority to a politics of inclusion as democracy in its purest form.

3. Democracy in What State?

Just as the perspective of Ukita and Kōtoku has revealed, different conceptions of the idea of imperialism occasioned various interpretations regarding state sovereignty and people's sovereignty in the 1900s. The debate on *minponshugi* showed a similar dynamism. Despite the fact that Yoshino had no intention of linking his constitutionalism to the term 'imperialism,' his theory did reflect a similar interest with Ukita's ethical imperialism. By providing a scheme of constitutional *minponshugi* that regulated the 'sovereign activities of the state,' he elaborated on Ukita's thesis about a reliable legal order in tune with constitutionalism. Similarly, Ōsugi and Yamakawa carried on Kōtoku's criticism of imperialism and developed their interpretations regarding the intimacy between the existing power relations and *minponshugi*.

However, it does not mean that the debate on *minponshugi* was a mere repetition of previous theories of imperialism. Instead of focusing on legal order in terms of imperialism, Yoshino delves more into the relationship between individuals and the state with respect to democratic thoughts. In addition, unlike Ukita's apparent mistrust in people's right of autonomy

⁹⁶ Ibid., 460.

and interest in state supremacy, supposed regulation under the constitution, Yoshino's attitude is relatively flexible.⁹⁷ To him, the authority of the state can only be disclosed with a harmonious relationship between the state and the people; yet, public opinions need guidance just as people need to be enlightened.⁹⁸ Contrarily, from the perspectives of Ōsugi and Yamakawa, an entirely different enthusiasm can be seen.⁹⁹ In Ōsugi's rationale, as the consequence of the 'facts of conquest,' society has witnessed the history of conquest having potential for the revolutionary anarchism and proving itself a 'boundless movement of evolution.'¹⁰⁰ In Yamakawa's call for a pure democracy, society is regarded as a sphere opposed to politics. This well-known anti-political stance lasted until 1922 when he announced a turn from 'the negation of politics and the confrontation of politics.'¹⁰¹ That is how Yamakawa's emphasis on society as a pivotal factor for anti-political activism comes in step with his theoretical offensive against the conspiracy between statism and *minponshugi*.

Besides, their attempt to advance people's solidarity from without the existing order reminds us of Kōtoku's *heimin* socialism amid the split between syndicalism and parliamentarianism. Against the backdrop of the 1907 Hibiya Incendiary Incident,¹⁰² how to maintain the scheme of social-

⁹⁷ During the 1910s, Ukita used to describe the masses as those who are 'mentally low-graded and lack common-sense' and therefore can be easily manipulated. To him, the mass is non-autonomous, and to an extent precarious to Japan's constitutionalism. For details about this topic, see Ikimatsu Keizō, *Taishōki no Shisō to Bunka* [The Thought and Culture of the Taishō Period] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1971), 35.

⁹⁸ Yoshino, *Yoshino Sakuzō Senshū Seiji to Kokka*, 30-31.

⁹⁹ This chapter focuses on the situation before the 1920s so changes after the debate on *minponshugi* will not be discussed. However, it is worth mentioning that although during the 1910s Ōsugi and Yamakawa shared a similar syndicalist stance, disputes over which strategy best fitted the interest of the labor movements soon occurred alongside the escalation of labor disputes in Japan. Their debate took place between 1920 and 1922 (known as the anarchist-Bolshevik debate) in which Ōsugi represented the anarchist stance while Yamakawa represented the Bolshevik one.

¹⁰⁰ Ōsugi, *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 1, 315-16.

¹⁰¹ Yamakawa Hitoshi, "Seiji no hitei to seiji no taikō" [The Negation of Politics and the Confrontation of Politics], Ōkubo Kazushi ed., *Ana-boru Ronsō* [The Anarchist-Bolshevik Debate] (Tokyo: Dōjidaisha, 2005), 72-73.

¹⁰² The incident was a patriotic riot in 1905 in the Hibiya area of Tokyo. The riot was ignited mainly

ism vis-à-vis imperialism remained contested in the 1910s. By the late 1910s, with a similar concern over imperialism, Ōsugi focused more on domination in affiliation with his hypothesis of ‘facts of conquest’ while Yamakawa showed a particular interest in articulating the nature of capitalism. While their dissent against the state appears as a common theme in their criticisms of *minponshugi*, however, the thematic spectrum of anti-statism is fairly wide. Taking the later anarchist-Bolshevik debate as a reference, Ōsugi and Yamakawa disagreed with each other in various aspects including differentiations on politics, the proletariat dictatorship, and forms of unions.¹⁰³ In search of the boundless movement of evolution, Ōsugi’s new socialism anticipated a permanent revolution without any direct hard-handed intervention of central government. Yamakawa’s social life, sitting in tandem with a pure democracy, leaned more toward the Marxist-Leninism. Taken altogether, it can be said that Kōtoku’s socialist idea was reinscribed simultaneously in the anarchist discourse of Ōsugi and the Bolshevik discourse of Yamakawa.

Rethinking Democratic Movements in Colonial Taiwan: Lim Teng-lok, Lien Wen-ching, and Fan Ben-liang

Following the end of WWI, the convention of the Paris Peace Conference, the international settlement for peace, and advocates for self-determination engendered a reshuffling of global politics. No military supremacy seemed to fit the tendency of international relations. Many intellectuals, including those in Imperial Japan and colonial Taiwan, were convinced that international relations were heading into a new phase of humanity and justice. When such valuable concepts as international coordination and autonomy

because the Katsura cabinet failed to reach a satisfactory deal with Russia after the Russo-Japanese War. The situation provoked rage amongst people in Japan. Many gathered for a protest in Tokyo and finally became violent after their confrontation with the police. The authorities had to declare martial law to suppress the riot. The state of siege lasted for more than two months and ended up with over 500 casualties.

¹⁰³ Ōkubo Kazushi ed., *Ana-Boru Ronsō* [The Anarchist-Bolshevik Debate] (Tokyo: Dōjidaisha, 2005), 76, 85, 143, 188.

triggered upheavals in the colonies of former western powers, East Asia also attested to various social movements. Reform movements gathered under the banner of *minponshugi* in Japan while the tension amid different social sectors generated a greater dynamism of ‘reconstruction.’¹⁰⁴ In the wake of the March First Movement in colonial Korea and the May 4th Movement in mainland China, intelligentsia of colonial Taiwan also quested for the well-being of Taiwanese people in various aspects. Next, I would like to explore nationalist, socialist, and anarchist voices from colonial Taiwan and shed light on their correlation with the discourses on imperialism and *minponshugi* in Japan.

1. Lim: Special Legislation as a Constitutional Exception

As regards social movements in Taiwan during the 1920s, the Petition Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament (臺灣議會設置請願運動, hereafter as the Petition Movement) is known to be the most widespread and influential one. It is praised for motivating Taiwanese nationalism in political and cultural spheres and for broaching the issue of how to reduce the inequalities under colonial rule. The movement was supported by the Taiwan Cultural Association (臺灣文化協會, hereafter as the Association), in collaboration with such magazines as *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* (臺灣青年) and *Taiwan Minpao* (臺灣民報). As a leading representative, Lim Teng-lok (林呈祿, 1886-1968) and his fellows devoted themselves to promoting colonial autonomy by way of the rule of law and constitutionalism. In “The awakening of Taiwanese youth in the new era” (新時代に処する台湾青年の覚醒), Lim defines the post-WWI era as a time of new culture, geared towards reforms of the world and human emancipation, and avows that the principle of the survival of the fittest has turned obsolete.

A united front of action in solidarity regardless of gender, class, race

¹⁰⁴Kano Masanao, “kaisetsu” [commentary], *Kindai Nihon Shisō Taikei 34 Taishō Shisō Shū II* 近 [Series Modern Japanese Thought 34 Collection of Taishō Thoughts 2] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1977), 420-21.




Figure 4. The first issue of *Tai Oan Chheng Lian*. Reprinted from *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 1(1) (Tokyo: Taiwan Seinen Zasshisha).

and so forth, he believes, for economic equality, anti-bureaucracy, *minponshugi*,¹⁰⁵ or national self-determination appears to be the impending task that fulfills ‘the sacred mission of civilization’ based on humanity, justice, liberty, and equality.¹⁰⁶ During the Paris Peace Conference, Lim argues that as a member of the League of Nations Japan is no longer an island, isolated in the old times, so needs to expand its gaze globally afar in the new era.¹⁰⁷ As the only nation with some colonies in Asia, Japan is obligated to the cultural development of Taiwan and the perpetual peace of East Asia.¹⁰⁸ With an enthusiasm for cultural development, Lim regards a thorough rule of law, i.e., constitutionalism, as the key factor and underscores the necessity of enlightenments for Taiwanese people.¹⁰⁹

enments for Taiwanese people.¹⁰⁹

Nay, as a part of the world, to enlighten Taiwan as such culturally inevitably shines a spirit of commitment and dedication for the society and the nation as well as the world. Therefore, we the youth believe, the cultural movement of ours violates no policy of the government; contrarily, it is exactly through our efforts that a decisive success in the history of imperial rule can be achieved.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵Yoshino Sakuzō, “Shukushi” [Congratulatory Address], *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 1 (July 16, 1920): 9-10. Although Yoshino did send his greetings and encouragement to *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* for the release of the first issue, he did not hesitate to address his concern about the potential issue of exclusiveness in the cultural, enlightenment in specific, movement of Taiwan.

¹⁰⁶Lim Teng-lok, “Shin jidai ni shosuru taiwan seinen no kakusei” [The awakening of Taiwanese youth in the new era], *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 1 (July 16, 1920): 30-31.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, 36-37.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, 39.

In his appeal, enlightenment refers to the culture-led practices that contribute to the civilization at home and in the world. This step informs us of how Lim strategized for a higher, more objective in a sense, standpoint from which to include both the colonizer and the colonized and to overlook colonial and international orders together.¹¹¹ A similar effort can be found in *The Movement of the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament* (台湾議会の設置運動). Here, he argues that the dictatorship of the colonial authorities contradicts the constitutionalism.¹¹²

Moreover, the constitutional politics that has developed in civilized countries is eventually becoming the common truth of the world. What is to be done at this point is to authorize the right to political participation, to put politics, based on the self-conscious public opinion, into practice, and to seek the well-being of the nation.¹¹³

As the common ground of civilization, he thinks, constitutional politics has swept across the world and has prompted movements such as the Universal Suffrage Movement in Japan.¹¹⁴ Given the fundamental ethnic differences between Taiwanese and Japanese and the lessons from the doomed European colonial policy of assimilation, he thinks, the appeal for special legis-

¹¹¹Ibid., 38.

¹¹²Taiwan Gikai Kisei Dōmeikai, *Taiwan Gikai no Secchi Undō* [The movement for the establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament] (Tokyo: Taiwan Gikai Kisei Dōmeikai, 1929), 3-8. *The Movement of the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament* is a pamphlet published by the association 'Gikai Kisei Dōmeikai' (台湾議會期成同盟会) where Lim served as the editor and the publisher. Despite the fact that the actual contributor(s) remain contested, studies have cited testimony from Tagawa Daikichirō's memoir of Lim as the person who drafted the *Prospectus* for the Petition Movement. See Chi, Hsufeng, *Taishōki Taiwanjin no 'nihon ryugaku' kenkyū* [Study of Taiwanese Residents' "Studying Abroad in Japan" in the Taishō Period] (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shosha, 2012), 209-210. The *Prospectus* has been collected in the pamphlet as an appendix. As the paragraph quoted in this paper fits the argument in the *Prospectus*, the following argument adopts it as Lim's stance. Due to the limit of space, this paper does not cover other representatives. However, what is required is further analyses which pinpoint the diversity in the Petition Movement and distinguish Lim from other participants at that time.

¹¹³Taiwan Gikai Kisei Dōmeikai, *Taiwan Gikai no Secchi Undō*, 8.

¹¹⁴Ibid.

lation for a Taiwanese parliament amounts to the enthusiastic aspiration, proposed globally at that time, for constitutionalism. It benefits Taiwanese people and ‘the spirit of the constitutionalism of the empire’ on top of Japan’s colonial rule over Taiwan.¹¹⁵ In addition to this direct reference to Yoshino’s *minponshugi*, it is noteworthy that the focal point of his constitutionalism rests on the right to political participation in harmony with the rule of law by the Japanese empire.¹¹⁶ He argues for a greater degree of autonomy, foreign to either the assimilation policy (同化政策) or the so-called inland extension (內地延長), while acknowledging the empire’s further expansion as a premise for the current and future international relations.¹¹⁷ He thus concludes that ‘[the application of constitutional politics to Taiwan] will geographically benefit the southward advance of the empire and historically achieve the mission of promoting the fraternity between the Chinese and the Japanese. . . .’¹¹⁸ On this ground, instead of advocating Taiwanese residents’ participation in the Imperial Parliament, Lim urges for a Taiwanese Parliament for the sake of civilization and imperial spirit of constitutionalism as well as a ground plan for future southward expansion of Imperial Japan.

2. Lien: A Pro-Socialist Critique of Imperialism

This acknowledgment of the expansion of the Japanese empire could be a strategy for the colonial constitutional reforms. Meanwhile, doubts concerning the nature, reasoning, and strategies of the Petition Movement increased after the Incident of Violation of the Public Order Police Law¹¹⁹ of 1923

¹¹⁵Ibid., 12.

¹¹⁶Ibid., 10. The right to political participation here refers to self-determination on representative politics, legislation and budgets, and so forth.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 9.

¹¹⁸Ibid. 8-9.

¹¹⁹The incident refers to the first systematic oppression conducted by the Japanese authorities in accordance with *The Public Order Police Law* in 1923, in which most opinion leaders in the Petition Movement were arrested, fined or confined.

which caused a serious setback and lit the fuse of a further split within the Association. The most intense criticisms came from pro-socialist activists who denounced the lawful Petition Movement for ignoring the political reality where social suffering and class contradictions worsened as the Japanese capitalist imperialism advanced. In his manuscript on the history of the political movement in colonial Taiwan, Lien Wen-ching (連溫卿, 1894-1957) noticed that the movement developed under the condition of the legitimacy of the special legislation, such as the Law 63 (六三法)¹²⁰ and the sovereign power of the Japanese empire.¹²¹ Despite the fact that the Petition Movement went strongly against the special rule authorized by the Governor-General of Taiwan, the very structure that embraces colonial Taiwan in the legal system, stipulated by special legislation, could not but contain the tone of colonialism. To Lien, the appeal for special legislation for the Taiwanese parliament was therefore not an extension of constitutionalism but that of the imperial order intent on ‘particularizing’ the colony.¹²²

Lien defines Lim’s autonomy as an attempt to secure the independence of internal affairs, namely, the decision-making process without interference.¹²³ The Petition Movement has evoked a general national consciousness against Japanese imperialism; however, it did not represent the interest of people in Taiwan on the grounds that the imperial structure remains untouched.¹²⁴ Lien, therefore, describes nationalism raised by the Association as follows.

In short, nationalists in the Cultural Association regard the old culture of the feudal system as the opposite of the new culture of capitalism

¹²⁰The Law 63 is a special legislation that authorized the special rule of the Governor-General of Taiwan during the late 19th century and the early 20th century.

¹²¹Lien Wen-ching, “ri jù shí qī zhī zhèng zhì yùn dòng” [Political Movements under the Japanese Rule], Yan-hsian Chang and Jia-yin Weng ed., *tái wān zhèng zhì yùn dòng shǐ* [The History of Taiwanese Political Movement] (Taipei tái wān zhèng zhì yùn dòng shǐ: dào xiāng chū bǎn shè, 1988), 44.

¹²²*Ibid.*, 83-84.

¹²³*Ibid.*, 86.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*, 87.

and yet employ the fraternity between Japan and China in respect of the export of capital and the mobilization of local capital.¹²⁵

According to Lien, the fraternity between Japan and China was commonly used to justify the establishment of a Taiwanese parliament while dodging the issue of the interrelation between capitalism and imperialism. From the aspect of the flow of capital, impelled by the development of capitalism, during the 1920s, Lien had devoted to the study group for social problems and Marxism. It was also in the same period that he was introduced to Yamakawa and, presumably, had a chance to deepen the mutual understanding of the socialist solidarity between Japan and Taiwan.¹²⁶ From 1923 onwards, Lien had an inclination to generate a class struggle, less than a nationalist reform, to bring an upheaval to the capitalist structure in colonial Taiwan. Although the Marxist (-Leninist) critique of imperialism began to gain more and more attention in East Asia at that time, it is noteworthy that the vigilance towards constitutionalism and imperialism in colonial Taiwan echoed an often-forgotten context of the interwar debates on *minponshugi* and imperialism in Imperial Japan.

3. Fan: Rebellious Anarchism

A similar anti-imperialist account can be found in the Taiwanese anarchist movement. In “Manifesto of the New Taiwan Anarchist Society” (新台湾安社宣言, hereafter as *Manifesto*) published in *La Nova Formoso* (新台湾), Fan Ben-liang (范本梁, 1897-1945) describes the suffering in Taiwan as part of a universal plight caused by imperialism.¹²⁷ Although it is generally believed that Ōsugi sparked Fan’s interest in anarchism during his undergraduate years in Tokyo, the *Manifesto* is indeed constructed in a Kōtoku-

¹²⁵ Ibid., 59.

¹²⁶ Qiu, *1924nián yī qián tái wān shè huì zhǔ yì yùn dòng de méng yá*, 103-07.

¹²⁷ Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, “museifushugi undō” [The Anarchist Movement], *Taiwan Sōtokufu Keisatsu Enkakushi* [The Historical Record of the Police of the Office of the Governor-General of Taiwan] 2 (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, 1939), 878.

Ōsugian manner. With the main focus on imperialism, it outlines the colonial condition as a consequence of imperialism entwined with a prolonged history of violence, conquest, and dominance. In *Manifesto*, Fan adopts Kōtoku's arguments in *Imperialism* and Ōsugi's theory of the 'facts of conquest,' the second of which discloses conflicts between gender, class, race, nation, and so forth in the modern era.¹²⁸ By referring imperialism to the capitalist monopoly, patriotism, militarism and political dictatorship, he defines Japan's rule on Taiwan and Chosŏn (the Korean Peninsula) as 'an annexation and forcible occupation by means of the aggressive imperialism and the international capitalism, or the monster of the 20th century.'¹²⁹ Regarding the upheavals and political reform movements in Asia, Fan doubts that the movements for national self-determination, independence, suffrage, and democratically elected parliament are unlikely to solve that structural and global problem thoroughly.

All of these movements of the so-called violence begets violence, nothing more than fishing in troubled waters, or an incitement of the ambitious, who makes use of a certain complex of mass revolution to gain interest from the monopoly of the petite bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, while sacrificing the wealth and endeavors of the poor people.¹³⁰

Describing the existing social movements as violence, engineered under the deception of the ambitious—the imperialist in the context of his argument—, Fan hints at a link between imperialism and the above-mentioned nationalist movements. Claiming the well-being, liberty, and equality for

¹²⁸Ibid., 879 In the *Manifesto*, one can find some paragraphs consistent to Kōtoku's *Monster of the 20th Century: Imperialism*, in denouncing the ambition of the dictators, the system of free competition, and the ideal of a cosmopolitan brotherhood. However, the appeal for socialism in Kōtoku's *Imperialism* is replaced by 'scientific anarchism' in *Manifesto*, reflexive of the opposition between the anarchist and the Bolsheviks in the 1920s. Ōsugi's interests in colonialism and the formation of the relation between the conqueror and the conquered, instilled in his anarchist phraseology, are also subtly merged into Fan's criticism of imperialism as well.

¹²⁹Ibid., 880.

¹³⁰Ibid.

all human beings appears to be naïve without a thorough disruption of the inherent system of dominance. From this point of view, almost every ‘progressive’ camp, including the Petition Movement and the Bolshevik regime, turns conservative and backward.¹³¹ Contrarily, Fan praises the violence of rebellious anarchism (暴動のアナーキズム),¹³² which aims at a future of cosmopolitanism without a dominant state, warlord, capitalist, etc. This discourse of ‘violence’ indicates a crucial momentum in the anarchist theory of revolution, thereby distinguishing revolutionary violence from the reproduction of violence or making a distinction between the replication of the imperialist structure and an escape from the structure.

Considering the fact that most of the East Asian anarchist activities stayed anonymous and underground by dint of the brutal repression against them in the 1920s, whether Ōsugi’s theory of the ‘rebel of life’ had a major bearing on Fan’s rebellious anarchism remained inconclusive. Still, with his direct adoption of Kōtoku’s arguments, a common vigilance towards the reproduction of imperialism, embedded within various forms of democratic reformism, can be located. This suggests that from the Petition Movement to the pro-socialist arguments, and onwards to the anarchist criticisms in the 1920s, activists’ disagreements to a great extent derived from different conceptions of the nature of the imperial order, i.e., imperialism.

¹³¹Ibid., 881.

¹³²Regarding the translation ‘rebellious anarchism,’ the original term ‘暴動のアナキズム’ is used to describe the relation between violence and revolution, political terrorism and anarchism. Although this topic is out of the scope of this paper, it is worth mentioning that some materials reveal Fan’s passion about the potential of bringing about anarchist revolution by political assassinations. However, in Fan’s terminology, anarchism indeed contains both connotations of violence and science. In this regard, even if ‘riot’ and ‘violent’ are closer to the word ‘暴動’ in a literal sense, ‘rebellious’ anarchism not only gives greater prominence to the aspects of disruption and creation together, but also fits better the context of direct action in East Asian anarchism. As for the joint campaign under the anarchist banner of direct action between Japan and Taiwan, see Itsumi Kichizō, “Taiwan dokuritsu undō ni chiratta mumeiki” [The Unknown Ghosts Dissipated in the Movement for the Independence of Taiwan], *The Eye of the Modern* 12: 4 (1971): 200-09.

4. The Perspective of Imperialism and *Minponshugi*

Against the backdrop of the post-WWI tension between the League of Nations and the Communist International, the antagonism amid Taiwanese activists can be seen as a reflection of different political ideologies for a world order. Nevertheless, by calling into question the local context of ‘constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally,’ it is worth remembering that the interrelation of constitutional democracy and imperialism had a tremendous impact on these political thoughts of the time. The problematics reveals great tensions between different stances towards the Japanese imperial(-ist) practices as opposed to western powers. It involves the issues of 1) the domestic order within the Japanese empire, 2) the colonial order between the empire and its colonies, 3) the regional order amid Asian countries, and 4) the global order in international competitions.

Under these circumstances, according to Lim, two common factors of autonomy, supported by the Japanese constitutionalism, and national self-determination, brought out alongside the transformation of the imperial order, are not just theoretical doctrines for certain abstract universal values to make their society better. The two agendas should be put into practice in the process of petition movement, along the growth of political consciousness, and in the course of the rule of law. Accordingly, appeals for the right to political participation or for the rule of law appeared more in relation to a greater picture of global order in lieu of imperialism than a local context foregrounding the colonial nature of modern Taiwan. Contrarily, in Lien’s rationale, criticisms against the limited autonomy swirls around the interplay between capitalism and imperialism, indicative of the politico-economic reality of repression which Taiwan had experienced under the colonial rule. He thus presented an interest in breaking free from the conundrum, posited by the overriding competence of Japan for regional hegemony, rather than integrating Taiwan into the hierarchy of global order. Last, sharing a similar interest in grasping the Japanese imperial order as an amalgam of capitalism and imperialism, still, Fan’s disallowance of any form of dominance that causes human suffering paved the way for a radical anarchist revolution in which to stand for revolutionary violence

and even goes beyond the Bolshevik political economy on how to build a post-capitalist world.

Conclusion

This paper describes two different conceptualizations towards the Japanese colonial rule; one regards it as a part of the imperial order and the other considers it as a set of practices of imperialism. Empire and imperialism are two different, *albeit* interrelated, concepts embedded in the discourses of the interwar Taiwanese social movement. By reviewing the Meiji theory of imperialism and the debate on *minponshugi*, I maintain that the utterances of the Petition Movement focused on autonomy in terms of constitutionalism influenced in large part by the legacy of Ukita and Yoshino. Among them, the appeal for the application of constitutionalism to Taiwan came in step with the issue of how to respond to the theme of ‘particularizing’ the colony. While advocating special legislation within the boundary of the Meiji Constitution, the pro-constitutionalist supporters realized that the notion of self-determination might be an exceptional matter in colonial Taiwan. Second, it is certain that constitutional politics in colonial Taiwan proved to be useful in promoting the southward advance of the Japanese empire. It thus revealed a colonial adaptation of the ‘constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally’ that echoed Ukita’s theory of ethical imperialism. Third, as the search for autonomy, instead of sovereignty, set the tone for the movement, the idea of constitutional politics could be more closely tied to the application of rule of law rather than the sovereignty of the Taiwanese people. This direction, therefore, also lacked for the issue of sovereignty, or the same problem as Yoshino had apropos of his *minponshugi* in which the whereabouts of sovereignty was considered insignificant to democracy.

On the other hand, as Kōtoku’s appeal for direct actions had generated attention amid activists in Japan and its colonies, his anti-imperialist idea, inspired by Ōsugi and Yamakawa, was well received in colonial Taiwan. In the wake of the October Revolution in Russia, the Leninist definition of imperialism as ‘the highest stage of capitalism,’ also became dominant and, in

a sense, orthodox. And, as criticism against the legal approach of the petition movement increased, how to perceive the interplay of capitalism and imperialism started revisiting the local context of the anti-colonial attempts. First, the stance of rejecting the constitutional ground of imperialism, echoed also in the Japanese anti-imperialist tradition, had emerged in the arguments made by Lien and Fan. The antagonism between the economic and legal approaches of social movements in colonial Taiwan shared a similar vision that Ōsugi and Yamakawa had in the sense that these colonial intellectuals also refused parliamentarianism and *minponshugi*. Second, criticisms of the Japanese colonialism in colonial Taiwan had an anarchist root and a communist international root in common but the issue did not generate much attention amid the Japanese socialists during the early 1920s. As in the case of Fan, eager to interweave social revolution with anti-colonialism in the anarchist manner, a more careful look at the anarchist legacy should be taken from the viewpoint of the colonies, especially anarchist activism agitated by the colonial intellectuals, in reexamining the issue of imperialism in modern East Asia at that time.

Last, without lumping the various lines of social movement during the 1920s together in Taishō Democracy, we need to delineate the multilayered and multifaceted traits of these movements in terms of popular imperialism, imperial democracy and constitutional imperialism, and the like.¹³³ The discursive diversity implies that the transformation of the Japanese imperial order was intertwined with the development of constitutionalism and democracy. In this vein, the banner of ‘constitutionalism internally and imperialism externally’ can be reinterpreted as two principles compatible and interpenetrated with, rarely disconnects from, each other. During the first quarter of the 20th century in Japan, then, imperialism was in itself constitutionalism, and *vice versa*. It is at this juncture that Taishō Democracy, praised conventionally for holding back Japanese overseas expansion, can

¹³³Duus, *The Rise of Modern Japan*, 133-35; Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan*, 7; Horio Teruhisa, “Taisei saitōgō no kokoromi to ‘Teikoku’ ideologi no keisei” [The Attempt of the Reintegration of the System and the Formation of the Ideology of ‘Empire’], *Nihon no Shakaishugi* [The Japanese Socialism] 19 (1968): 141.

be further elaborated as a mechanism capable of neutralizing imperialism and constitutionalism.

Handling both the Japanese intellectuals' debates on imperialism and democracy and the Taiwanese intellectuals' efforts to transform or deconstruct the imperial(-ist) order, this paper reveals multiple intersection between constitutional democracy and imperialism during the interwar period when such crucial questions as national identity, political consciousness, and social reforms were vitally raised in colonial Taiwan. In the process, it brings the issue of imperialism back to the study of the colonial history and democratic movements of Taiwan and charts varied relationships between the colonial empires and their colonies in East Asia as well as the tension amid intellectuals and social activists in both realms. This new perspective will help rediscover and rethink the ongoing dialogue between (geo-)politics and thought in modern East Asian history.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

- Kōtoku Shūsui. *Shakaishugi Shinzui* 社会主義神髓 [The Quintessence of Socialism]. Tokyo: Chōhōsha, 1903.
- _____. *Kōtoku Shūsui Zenshū* 幸徳秋水全集 [The Complete Collection of Kōtoku Shūsui] 6. Tokyo: Meijibunken, 1968.
- _____. *Kōtoku Shūsui Zenshū* 幸徳秋水全集 [The Complete Collection of Kōtoku Shūsui] 7. Tokyo: Meijibunken, 1971.
- _____. *Kindai Nihon Shisō Taikai Kōtoku Shūsui* 近代日本思想大系 幸徳秋水 [Series of Modern Japanese Thought: Kōtoku Shūsui]. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1975.
- _____. *Teikokushugi* 帝国主義 [Imperialism]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013.
- Lien Wen-ching. “Rì jù shí qī zhī zhèng zhì yùn dòng” 日據時期之政治運動 [Political Movements under the Japanese Rule]. In *Tái wān zhèng zhì yùn dòng shǐ* 臺灣政治運動史 [The History of Taiwanese Political Movement], Chang Yan-hsian and Weng Jia-yin, ed. 37-212. Taipei: Dào xiāng chū bǎn shè, 1988.
- Lim Teng-lok. “Shin jidai ni shosuru taiwan seinen no kakusei” 新時代に処する台湾青年の覚醒 [The Awakening of Taiwanese Youth in the New Era]. *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 1 (July 16, 1920): 29-40, 1920.
- Ōsugi Sakae. *Ōsugi Sakae Hyōronshū* 大杉栄評論集 [Collection of Commentaries by Ōsugi Sakae]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996.
- _____. *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 大杉栄全集 [The Complete Collection of Ōsugi Sakae] 2. Tokyo: Paru Shuppan, 2014.
- _____. *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 大杉栄全集 [The Complete Collection of Ōsugi Sakae] 3. Tokyo: Paru Shuppan, 2014.
- _____. *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 大杉栄全集 [The Complete Collection of Ōsugi Sakae] 4. Tokyo: Paru Shuppan, 2014.
- _____. *Ōsugi Sakae Zenshū* 大杉栄全集 [The Complete Collection of Ōsugi Sakae] 1. Tokyo: Paru Shuppan, 2015.
- Taiwan Gikai Kisei Dōmeikai 台湾議會期成同盟会, ed. *Taiwan Gikai no Secchi Undō* 台湾議会の設置運動 [The Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese

Parliament]. Tokyo: Taiwan Gikai Kisei Dōmeikai, 1929.

Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku 台湾総督府警務局, ed. “Museifushugi undo” 無政府主義運動 [The Anarchist Movement]. *Taiwan Sōtokufu Keisatsu Enkakushi* 台湾総督府警察沿革誌 [The Historical Record of the Police of the Office of the Governor-General of Taiwan] 2. Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, 875-97, 1939.

Ukita Kazutami. *Teikokushugi to Kyōiku* 帝國主義と教育 [Imperialism and Pedagogy]. Tokyo: Minyūsha, 1901.

_____. *Kokumin Kyōikuron* 国民教育論 [On National Pedagogy]. Tokyo: Minyūsha, 1903.

_____. *Rinriteki Teikokushugi* 倫理的帝國主義 [Ethical Imperialism]. Kyoto: Ryūbunkan, 1909.

_____. “Kokka ni kansuru shindōtoku” 国家に関する新道徳 [A New Morality Regarding the Nation]. In *Shindōtoku Ron* 新道徳論 [A New Morality]. Tokyo: Nanbokusha, 23-112, 1913.

Yamakawa Hitoshi. *Yamakawa Hitoshi Zenshū* 山川均全集 [The Complete Collection of Yamakawa Hitoshi] 2. Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1966.

_____. *Yamakawa Hitoshi Zenshū* 山川均全集 [The Complete Collection of Yamakawa Hitoshi] 1. Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2003.

_____. “Seiji no hitei to seiji no taikō” 政治の否定と政治の対抗 [The Negation of Politics and the Confrontation of Politics]. In *Ana-boru Ronsō* アナ・ボル論争 [The Anarchist-Bolshevik Debate], Ōkubo Kazushi, ed. 72-73. Tokyo: Dōjidaisha, 2005.

Yoshino Sakuzō. ‘Shukushi’ 祝詞 [Congratulatory Address]. *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 1 (July 16, 1920): 9-10, 1920.

_____. “Kensei no hongī wo toite sono yūshū no bi wo sumasu no michi wo ronzu” 憲政の本義を説いて其有終の美を済すの途を論ず [On the Essence of Constitutionalism and the Path towards Its Ultimate Fulfillment]. In *Taishō Demokurashi Ronsōshi* 大正デモクラシー論争史 [The History of Debates of Taishō Democracy] 1, Ōta Masao, ed. Tokyo: Shinsensha, 1971.

_____. *Yoshino Sakuzō Senshū Seiji to Kokka* 吉野作造選集政治と国家 [Selected Works of Yoshino Sakuzō: Politics and the State]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995.

Secondary Sources

- Asukai Masamichi. “Meiji shakaishugi undo no kiketsu–chokusetsu kōdō ron wo megutte” 明治社会主義運動の歸結—直接行動論をめぐって [The consequence of Meiji Socialist Movement: Regarding the Theory of Direct Action]. *Shisō* 思想 [Thought] 524: 263-82, 1968.
- Chao Hsunta. “Chiang Wei Shui’s Left-leaning Approach (1930-1931).” *Taiwan Literature Studies* 4: 129-65, 2013.
- Chen Tsuilien. “Beyond Resistance and Compliance: A Study of the Home Rule Movement in Taiwan under Japanese Ruled.” *Taiwanese Journal of Political Science* 18: 141-70, 2013.
- Crump, John. *The Anarchist Movement in Japan 1906-1996*. UK: The Anarchist Federation, 1996.
- _____. *The Origin of Socialist Thought in Japan*. NY: Routledge, 2011.
- Duus, Peter. *The Rise of Modern Japan*. MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976.
- Eizawa Kōji. “Taishō Demokurashi Shisō Hatten no Shodankai” 大正デモクラシー思想発展の諸段階 [The Stages of Development of the Thoughts of Taishō Democracy]. *Shinshū Daigaku Kyōyōbu Kiyō* 信州大学紀要 4: 89-125, 1976.
- Fanon, Frantz. *The Wretched of the Earth*. NY: Grove Press, 2004.
- Fujii Shōichi. “Nihon teikokushugishi no seika to mondaiten” 日本帝国主義史の成果と問題点 [Achievements and Issues of the history of Japanese Imperialism]. In *Nihon no Teikokushugi* 日本の帝国主義 [The Japanese Imperialism], 9-43. Tokyo: Gakuseisha, 1974.
- Getachew, Adom. *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination*. NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019.
- Gordon, Andrew. *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan*. LA: University of California Press, 1992.
- Keiichi Harada. *Nisshin Nichiro Sensō–Siriizu Nihon Kingendaishi* 日清日露戦争—シリーズ日本近現代史 [The Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War: Series Modern Japanese History]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013.
- Horio Teruhisa. “Taisei saitōgō no kokoromi to ‘Teikoku’ ideologi no keisei” 体制再統合の試みと「帝国」イデオロギーの形成 [The Attempt of the Reintegration of the System and the Formation of the Ideology of ‘Empire’]. *Nihon no*

- Shakaishugi* 日本の社会主義 [The Japanese Socialism] 19: 139-90, 1968.
- Iida Taizō. “Nashonaru demokuratto to ‘shakai no hakken’” ナショナルデモクラットと「社会の発見」(National Democrat and the ‘Discovery of Society’). In *Hihan Seishin no Kōseki: Kindai Nihon Seishinshi no Ichiryōsen* 批判精神の航跡: 近代日本精神史の一稜線 [The Trace of the Spirit of Critique: A Ridgeline of Modern Japanese History of Spirit], 155-221. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1997.
- Ikimatsu Keizō. *Taishōki no Shisō to Bunka* 大正期の思想と文化 [The Thought and Culture of the Taishō Period]. Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1971.
- Inoue Kiyosh. *Nihon Teikokushugi no Keisei* 日本帝国主義の形成 [The Formation of the Japanese Imperialism]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1974.
- Ishida Takeshi. “‘Shakai’ no ishikika to shakaiseisaku gakkai” 「社会」の意識化と社会政策学会 [The Sense of ‘Society’ and the Association for Social Policy]. In *Nihon no Shakai Kagaku* 日本の社会科学 [Social Sciences in Japan], 45-71. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984.
- Ito Teruo. “Shō Yisui to Taiwan minshūtō: ‘zenmin undō’ to ‘kaikyū undō’” 蒋渭水と台湾民衆党—「全民運動」と「階級運動」 [Jiang Weishui and the Taiwanese People's Party: “national movement” and “class movement”]. *The Hitotsubashi Review* 83.3: 396-413, 1980.
- Itoya Toshio. *Kōtoku Shūsui Kenkyū* 幸徳秋水研究 [Kōtoku Shūsui Studies]. Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1969.
- _____. *Shakaishugi Undo Shi* 社会主義運動史 [The History of Socialist Movement]. Tokyo: Hōseidaigaku Shuppankyoku, 1979.
- Jiang Keshi. “Rinriteki teikokushugi no keisei” 倫理的帝国主義の形成 [The Formation of Ethical Imperialism]. In *Ukita Kazutami no Shisōshiteki Kenkyū: Rinriteki Teikokushugi no Keisei* 浮田和民の思想史的研究: 倫理的帝国主義の形成 [An Intellectual History of Ukita Kazutami: the Formation of Ethical Imperialism], 422-65. Tokyo: Fujishuppan, 2003.
- Kano Masanao. “Kaisetsu” 解説 [commentary]. In *Kindai Nihon Shisō Taikei 34 Taishō Shisō Shū II* 近代日本思想大系34大正思想集2 [Series Modern Japanese Thought 34 Collection of Taishō Thoughts 2], 419-64. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1977.
- Komatsu Ryūji. “‘Keizaisoshiki no mirai’ hoka—Kōtoku Shūsui to anakizumu” 「経済組織の未来」ほか—幸徳秋水とアナーキズム [The Future of Economic

- Organization: *Kōtoku Shūsui and Anarchism*]. In *Kōtoku Shūsui Zenshū* 幸徳秋水全集 [The Complete Collection of Kōtoku Shūsui] 7, 419-38. Tokyo: Meiji-bunkan, 1969.
- Koyasu Nobukuni. *'Taishō' wo Yominaosu: Kōtoku, Ōsugi, Kawakami, Tsuda, soshite Watsuji, Ōkawa* 「大正」を読み直す: 幸徳・大杉・河上・津田、そして和辻・大川 [Rereading the 'Taishō': Kōtoku, Ōsugi, Kawakami, Tsuda, and Watsuji, Ōkawa]. Tokyo: Fujihara Shoten, 2016.
- Makdisi, Ussama. "Review: The Great Illusion: The Wilsonian Moment in World History." *Diplomatic History* 33.1: 133-37, 2009.
- Manela, Erez. *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*. NC: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick. "II. Proletarians and Communists." In *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, 22-27. Marxists Internet Archive, 2010.
- Matsuo Takayoshi. *Taishō Demokurashi* 大正デモクラシー [Taishō Democracy]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001.
- Matsuzawa Hiroaki. "Meiji shakaishugi no shisō" 明治社会主義の思想 [Discourses of Meiji Socialism]. In *Nihon no Shakaishugi* 日本の社会主義 [The Japanese Socialism] 19: 5-62, 1968.
- Mitani Taichirō. *Taishō Demokurashi Ron* 大正デモクラシー論 [On Taishō Democracy]. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2013.
- Miyamoto Matahisa. "'Kenkyū nōto' minponshugi no tanjō" <研究ノート> 民本主義の誕生 [<Note> Birth of Democracy]. *Journal of History* 50.2: 283-301, 1967.
- Miyamoto Moritarō. "Ukita Kazutami ni okeru rinriteki teikokushugi no keisei 1" 浮田和民における倫理的帝国主義の形成 (一) [The Formation of Ethical Imperialism of Ukita Kazutani 1]. *Hōgaku Ronsō* 法学論叢 [The Review of Law] 112.3: 42-71, 1982.
- _____. "Ukita Kazutami ni okeru rinriteki teikokushugi no keisei 2" 浮田和民における倫理的帝国主義の形成 (二) [The Formation of Ethical Imperialism of Ukita Kazutani 2]. *Hōgaku Ronsō* 法学論叢 [The Review of Law] 112.4 (1982): 73-101, 1982.
- Narita Ryūichi. *Taishō Demokurashi* 大正デモクラシー [Taishō Democracy]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2007.
- Ōkubo Kazushi, ed. 大窪一志編. *Ana-Boru Ronsō* アナ・ボル論争 [The Anarchist-

- Bolshevik Debate]. Tokyo: Dōjidaisha, 2005.
- Ōta Masao. “Kaisetsu” 解説 [Commentary]. In *Taishō Demokurashi Ronsōshi* 大正デモクラシー論争史 [The History of Debates of Taishō Democracy] 1, 528-40. Tokyo: Shinsensha, 1971.
- Qiu Shijie. *1924nián yǐ qián tái wān shè huì zhǔ yì yùn dòng de méng yá* 1924年以前台灣社會主義運動的萌芽 [The Initiation of Taiwanese Socialist Movement before 1924]. Taipei: hǎi xiá xué shù chū bǎn, 2009.
- Said, Edward. *Culture and Imperialism*. NY: Vintage Books, 1994.
- Swale, Alistair. “Tokutomi Sohō and the problem of the national-state in an imperialist world.” In *Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan*, Dick Stegewerns, ed. NY: Routledge Curzon, 68-88, 2003.
- Tierney, Robert Thomas. *Monster of the 20th Century: Kōtoku Shūsui and Japan’s first anti-imperialist movement*. CA: University of California Press, 2015.
- Yamamuro Shinichi. *Nichiro Sensō no Seiki–Rensa Shiten kara miru Nihon to Sekai* 日露戦争の世紀—連鎖視点から見る日本と世界 [The Century of the Russo-Japanese War: Japan and the World from the Viewpoint of Connection]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2005.
- Wakabayashi Masahiro. *Taiwan Kōnichī Undōshi Kenkyū* 台湾抗日運動史研究 [A Historical Study of the Anti-Japanese Movement in Formosa]. Tokyo: Kenbunshuppan, 1983.
- _____. “‘Taiwan toiu raireki’ wo motomete: hōhōteki ‘teikoku’ shugi shiron” 「台湾という来歴」を求めて—方法的「帝国」主義試論 [Towards the history of Taiwan: Essay on a Methodological ‘Empire’-ism]. In *Taiwan Kenkyū Nyūmon* 台湾研究入門 [An Introduction to Taiwan Studies], Ienaga Masaki, ed. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 343-65, 2020.
- Wu Rweiren. “*The Formosan Ideology: Oriental Colonialism and the Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism, 1895-1945*.” PhD diss. University of Chicago, 2003.



Special Topic

"Comfort Women" in the Military Regime

Introduction

Alexis DUDDEN

Department of History, University of Connecticut

The Concept and the Category of the Japanese Military 'Comfort Women': Through Looking at Their Damage Condition

Jung-ae PARK

Institute for Korea-Japan Historical Issues,
Northeast Asian History Foundation

Japanese Military Comfort Stations in War Diaries

Jongmoon HA

Department of Japanese Studies,
Hanshin University

Korean Wartime 'Comfort Women' and Japan's National Responsibility

Myungsuk YUN

Research Institute on Japanese Military 'Sexual Slavery' Issue,
Women's Human Rights Institute of Korea

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 17 Number 2 (Summer 2021), 59-200

Copyright © 2021 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

Introduction

Alexis DUDDEN
Department of History,
University of Connecticut

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 17 Number 2 (Summer 2021), 61-66

Copyright © 2021 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

Introduction

Alexis Dudden

Department of History,
University of Connecticut

This special topic of *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* addresses ongoing research involving the Japanese government's state-sponsored system of sexual slavery during the 1930s and 1940s, commonly known by its cruel euphemism, the "comfort women." As the following essays by Jung-ae Park, Joongmoon Ha, and Myeongsuk Yune make clear, all of us interested in learning from the history of Northeast Asia still have much to understand about this transnational crime against humanity, and the time for us to learn from it is now while some of the system's survivors remain alive.

Important to consider up front, the excellent essays in this special topic were researched, written, and submitted for publication before this topic once again became front page news around the world. As is now well-known, in December 2020, Harvard Law School Professor J. Mark Ramseyer circulated a new article "Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War" that had been accepted for publication in the March 2021 issue of the *International Review of Law and Economics* (the article was and remains available on the Internet, although, as of this typing in late June 2021, the print version is delayed due to the worldwide outcry over Ramseyer's factual errors and blatant denialism). Then—and still not part of what the authors of the essays in this edition of *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* address in their respective articles—in January 2021, Ramseyer subsequently published an op-ed on the right-wing English language Internet website, *Japan Forward*, describing the "comfort-women-

sex-slave-story” as “pure fiction.” This latter effort of Professor Ramseyer’s was picked up by global media outlets including and not limited to *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *CNN*, *The Associated Press*, and so on.

In brief, Professor Ramseyer decided in his publications to ignore an extensive and well-documented literature by Japanese, Chinese, Korean and Anglophone authors, and the documentary record detailing the Japanese military’s wartime system of military sexual slavery. This may not be so unusual in our Internet age where one can publish nonsense at whim. Furthermore, Professor Ramseyer is—and should be—protected by his right to exercise free speech. That said, what has become abundantly clear during recent months is that Professor Ramseyer has attempted to take advantage of academic freedom of inquiry, and he may have over-stepped his privilege. Academic freedom is not a constitutional right (unlike free speech, for example), yet it is highly prized and allows researchers to consider difficult problems from many perspectives. Academic freedom, however, is not “free.” It is predicated on academic integrity, which Professor Ramseyer has ignored, denied, and repudiated in his shameful attempts to promote a particular worldview popular among some people in Japan (and Korea, too) that names the history a “lie” and its victims “liars” in a weak-spirited effort to shore up some bygone sense of masculinity and pride.

Fortunately, we have something called “research” with which to challenge Ramseyer’s least-common denominator approach to history, and the articles in this special topic of the *Journal of Northeast Asian History* could not be more important as a result. In the lead essay, Jung-ae Park interrogates the “need” the Japanese military’s high command placed on establishing the system of sex slavery in the first place, critically arguing a multinational historical understanding of what took place at the time as well as the urgency of avoiding hierarchies among victim groups today. Ha Joongmoon’s path-breaking article introduces a plethora of fresh evidence from Japanese government archives in the form of war diaries mandated to maintain an accurate record of what took place in the field for the express purpose of creating accurate “historical accounts of war.” Finally, Myeongsuk Yun examines the issues of state responsibility, and, in particular, of how best to compel the Japanese government to accept factual records. Impor-

tantly, Yun calls also on the South Korean government to clarify its own position on the 1965 Treaty of Normalization with Japan which the Japanese government maintains absolves it from any responsibility.

These three essays read together at once make clear the vitality of the survivors' collective testimonies in learning the history at stake and also the imperative of understanding the transnationality of Asian and Pacific Islander experiences in the nexus of this history of horror.

This is key. For reasons known only to himself, Professor Ramseyer has targeted Koreans at the expense of others. He maintains in correspondence with me that Koreans were "citizens" of the Japanese empire and therefore can be measured as having the same historical experience as Japanese. This is inaccurate not in the least because the basic constitutional and legal definitions of humanity at the time disagree with Ramseyer: *all* individuals—Japanese nationals and colonials alike—were "subjects" of the emperor, whose "conditions necessary for being a Japanese subject (were) determined by law," which the Japanese emperor "sanction(ed) and order(ed)." Economic, gender, and racial factors informed these "conditions" and generated clear hierarchies of personhood. Simply put, all men were *not* created equal—let alone women in general, let alone women and minors from Japan's colonially occupied territories.

Different from the essays presented in this volume, Professor Ramseyer's absence of analysis of the first known legal record of victims of this historical crime—and, most important, the conditions of their victimization—reveals the strategy he employs, and, moreover, confirms that "contract" has no place in any discussion of this history. In his 2006 English-language publication, Etsuro Totsuka, one of Japan's pre-eminent international law scholars, analyzed the 1932 well-documented instance of trafficking 15 Japanese women by Japanese men through Nagasaki to one of the first known so-called "comfort stations" established in Shanghai by the Imperial Navy (not the Army). In 1936, a Nagasaki court found guilty the Japanese men who had deceived the women about the terms of their employment, rendering empty Ramseyer's contention "any notion that (the women) had been tricked by duplicitous recruiters (is implausible)."

In Professor Totsuka's peer-reviewed and published words:

“The author has had the good fortune to locate the earliest District Court and Appeal Court judgements of the Japanese criminal court against ten private entrepreneurs, who deceived and trafficked 15 Japanese women from Nagasaki to a Japanese Naval “comfort station” in Shanghai, China. It was already known as early as 1997 that in 1937 the then Supreme Court had endorsed the judgments of the District Court and the Appeal Court. The lower Courts’ judgement, however, had not been found.

As it was assumed by the researchers, including myself, that the judgments must have been destroyed by the atomic bomb dropped in August 1945 by the United States onto Nagasaki City, nobody attempted to find them. They, however, had survived. . . . The Court found that all defendants under a series of conspiracies deceived and trafficked 15 Japanese women in Nagasaki to a Japanese Naval “comfort station” in Shanghai, China and that they were guilty of committing crimes defined by Article 226 (1) and (2) of the Penal Code.”

Totsuka argues that this fresh evidence should encourage additional investigation by researchers “to discover the reasons why the law was not effectively enforced in Japanese colonies, particularly in Korea” where “the pattern of recruitment (was) strikingly similar to the many Korean cases of the abduction of women.”

One of the primary reasons for studying any state-sponsored atrocity in the past is to learn how it happened in order to try to prevent ongoing occurrences of similar violence and not to abuse history by weaponizing it for present purposes. The challenge remains to expand education about this crime against humanity so that undetected denialist racist claims never again pass for scholarly inquiry, and the essays in this special volume move forward our collective knowledge of Northeast Asia’s past.

The Concept and the Category of the Japanese Military 'Comfort Women': Through Looking at Their Damage Condition

Jung-ae PARK

Institute for Korea-Japan Historical Issues,
Northeast Asian History Foundation

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 17 Number 2 (Summer 2021), 67-96

Copyright © 2021 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

The Concept and the Category of the Japanese Military ‘Comfort Women’: Through Looking at Their Damage Condition*

Jung-ae PARK

Institute for Korea-Japan Historical Issues,
Northeast Asian History Foundation

Introduction

It has been more than thirty years since the Japanese military ‘comfort women’ issue was raised as a war crime and the responsibility of colonial rule. Despite all of the accumulated research findings and investigations of the actual conditions surrounding the Japanese military comfort women, the concept and the categorization of the ‘comfort women’ remains vague among researchers, activists, and related organizations without any clear agreements between them. This is mainly because previous researchers or activists have tended to over-emphasize the perspective of victims from their own countries or to only narrate the historical facts regarding the ‘comfort women system’ based on official historical documents without providing further analysis.

In order to stimulate productive discussions regarding the concept and the categorization of the ‘comfort women,’ we should examine the historical background of the Japanese military ‘comfort women’ system. At the time, the Japanese military had been facing the problem of lax military

* This translated article is a revised and supplemented version of Park Jung-ae, “피해실태를 통해 본 일본군위안부의 개념과 범주 시론,” 사학연구 120 (December, 2015): 167-203.

discipline among their soldiers. Hoping to maintain control within the military organization, the Japanese military attempted to distract from such problems by focusing on resolving the soldiers' 'sexual desire,' which was indeed over-interpreted. There were mainly three ways of dealing with the soldiers' sexual desire, which were installing new "sexual comfort facilities"; condoning the rape committed by soldiers in occupied areas; or encouraging soldiers to use the licensed prostitution facilities that had been traditionally managed by the Japanese government.

This article focuses on the characteristics of the Japanese military at the time, which managed and tolerated the soldiers' sexual violence against women for the sake of conducting efficient warfare. Specifically, I will examine how the Japanese military responded to their soldiers' wartime rape or the use of licensed prostitution facilities in the name of a "sexual comfort" policy. Finally, I argue that the concept and the category of the Japanese military 'comfort women' should be established from the perspective of the Japanese military, who actually felt the need and planned the system at that time, thus moving beyond a mere debate over whether it was those women's voluntary or forced action.

First, I will begin by examining how the concept and the categorization of the Japanese military 'comfort women' have developed in previous works. This will show that the concept and the categorization of the Japanese military 'comfort women' has not been inherently fixed but rather has been occasionally redefined, due to the different approaches that have addressed this issue. In addition, by reviewing the nature of the 'comfort women' system through the lens of historical damages, I will examine what issues should be considered by researchers and activists when defining Japanese military 'comfort women' while accounting for trends toward world solidarity at the same time. This is an attempt to demonstrate the significance of reflecting historicity not only when we establish the concept and the category, but also when we look for solutions to the Japanese military 'comfort women' system that had existed in the past.

Existing Discussions of the Concept and Categorization of Japanese Military Comfort Women

1. Categorization of Japanese Military Comfort Women according to the Number of Victims

First, the existing discussions of current researchers and activists over the concept and the category of the Japanese military 'comfort women' diverge in terms of identifying the magnitude of total damage caused. The variation in the number of victims, which ranges between 20,000 and 400,000, reflects differences in the perspectives of how the Japanese military 'comfort women' should be considered.

The causes of this divergence are related to inconsistencies in counting the victims: whether or not 'licensed prostitution' should be counted, or only be counted, among 'comfort women'; whether or not someone should be considered a victim, as a 'comfort women,' if that person was regularly forced to 'sexually comfort' soldiers in a certain place for a certain period of time; and whether or not the victims of soldiers' rape, which occurred frequently in occupied places, should be counted as 'comfort women.'

Hata Ikuhiko, a representative right-wing historian in Japan, argues that the 'comfort women' system should only be equated to licensed prostitution of the time. He insists that there is no need to discuss Japan's national responsibility for the 'comfort women' system because it was simply the transferal of traditional Japanese 'licensed prostitution' to the wartime area. His position is based on the logic that since licensed prostitution of the time was accepted as legal, we cannot discuss the illegality of or the responsibility for the comfort women system. However, he does not take into account the historical fact that the licensed prostitution system was severely criticized by the international community or by anti-prostitution activists even at that time as being equivalent to slavery or as a human trafficking system. Moreover, the historical fact that licensed prostitution operated differently in the Japanese home islands compared to its colony or its leased territory has also been ignored. He insists that there was no forced mobilization because what we call the 'comfort women' were indeed traditional Japanese licensed prosti-

tutes who were merely transferred to the wartime area. Their total number is estimated at 20,000 according to the following calculation: the number of licensed prostitutes of the time had normally been maintained at around 200,000, while each of them served about 150 visitors (遊客) each day. Taking into account the total number of Japanese soldiers dispatched overseas at that time as around 2.5 million and dividing it by 150 people, the result is 16,000. Hata argues that the total number of comfort women, if counted in a narrow sense, should be around 20,000 people. If the definition is expanded to include all other women, aside from the licensed prostitutes as well, he expects that only a few thousand additional people would be added.¹

Yoshimi Yoshiaki categorized the comfort stations into three types: first, comfort stations directly managed by the military; second, military-only comfort stations entrusted to private enterprise; and third, private comfort facilities temporarily designated and used by the military.² The first two types were the typical brothels that clearly had military involvement. However, the third type elicited some controversy, such as how to distinguish ‘designated’ comfort stations from other facilities that had no military designation; whether or not non-designated brothels could be considered comfort stations if frequently visited by the Japanese soldiers; and if only licensed prostitutes from designated comfort stations could be accepted as ‘comfort women,’ while those from the non-designated comfort stations were not. Considering all of these discussions, we can see that we truly need to consider the occurrence of the ‘comfort women’ itself in our history, rather than the distinction between ‘designated’ and ‘non-designated’ comfort women as assigned by the Japanese military. We should go further back to examine historical reality, rather than limiting ourselves to a contemporary, yet narrow, perspective.

Yoshimi Yoshiaki, on the other hand, took a completely different approach to estimating the number of ‘comfort women.’ He referred not only to

¹ Hata Ikuhiko, *Japanese Military Sexual Slavery and Battleground Sex* (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1999), 406. The number of Japanese troops overseas was estimated at 2.5 million.

² Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *The Truth about the History of Japanese Military ‘Comfort Women,’* Nam Sang-gu, trans. (Seoul: Yeoksagonggan, 2013).

what Kanahara Setsuzo's document³ revealed—one 'comfort woman' was matched to 100 Japanese soldiers of the 21st Army in 1939, but also to the commonly accepted convention of the time which was called the "Niguichi" (i.e. "29 to 1"), which meant a ratio of one comfort woman to twenty-nine soldiers as the most desirable proportion. The replacement rate for 'comfort women' was set at a minimum of 1.5 and a maximum of 2. Assuming that the average number of Japanese military overseas was three million, the number of 'comfort women' should have been at least about 50,000 (= 3 million / 100 × 1.5), and the maximum should have been about 200,000 (= 3 million / 30 × 2).⁴

In addition, the Chinese scholars Chen Lifei (陳麗菲) and Su Zhiliang (蘇智良) also raised doubts about the predicted number of 20,000, insisting that this number neglected all of the Chinese comfort women victims who were not discovered until the late 1990s. Moreover, given the enormous number of brothels distributed throughout China, as well as all of the sexual violence committed against Chinese women by the Japanese troops at that time, they believed that the actual number of the victims was much larger than the predicted number. In light of all of the investigation and research conducted in China, the replacement rate should be between 3.5 and 4.0 and, thus, the total number of 'comfort women' should be at least 360,000 people (= 3 million / 29 × 3.5) and a maximum of 410,000 (= 3 million / 29 × 4) people.⁵ They also have argued that scholars from the relevant countries believed the numbers they proposed, but this is not true.

In the case of South Korea, the number of victims of the Japanese military 'comfort women' system had been recognized as 80,000 to 200,000 until the 1990s. It is presumed that this estimated number had

³ Kanahara Setsuzo, *Compendium of Daily Work Log*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: the Ministry of War, 1939).

⁴ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Japanese Military Comfort Women*, Lee Gyu-tae, trans. (Seoul: Soхва, 1998), 90-92. The original edition is written by Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Military Comfort Women* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995). The number of Japanese troops overseas was estimated at 3 million, and 29 soldiers were calculated as 30.

⁵ Chen Lifei and Su Zhiliang, *An Inquire into a Korean Comfort Woman Pū Yǒngxīn and Her Colleagues* (Shanghai: Shìdàiguóji chūbǎn yǒuxiàngōngsī, 2005), 17-20.

been formed in the 1970s. There were two books which made a significant influence on the formation of the historicity (歴史像) of the time. These were *Military Comfort Women*, written by Senda Kakou and published in 1973 and 1974, and *The Emperor's Army and Korean Comfort Women*, written by Kim Il-myeon and published in 1976. It was in 1977 for the former and in 1981 for the latter when these two books were translated into Korean and released to readers.⁶

Senda, in his book, estimated the total number of 'comfort women' at 84,000, considering the total number of Japanese overseas armies of the time reaching about 3.2 million. Such an estimation was based on the historical record that, in 1941, about 20,000 Korean 'comfort women' were planned to be mobilized in proportion to the scale of 750,000 soldiers from the Kwandong Army who participated in the July Special Training. Despite that the total number of the military force of the Japanese army had reached almost 5.55 million, the calculation excluded the 2.35 million soldiers in mainland Japan since there were no 'comfort women' in mainland Japan.⁷ Kim Il-myeon demonstrated that the mobilization of 'comfort women' was planned at the ratio of 29 soldiers to one 'comfort woman,' so that the 'number of Korean girls' who were taken by the Japanese military was reaching approximately 170,000 to 200,000.⁸ Hence, even without mentioning any additional evidence, it seems that the books mentioned above initiated the supposition that the total number of 'comfort women' would be limited to only about 80,000 to 200,000. Yoshimi Yoshiaki later favored such a supposition and confirmed it.

⁶ Im Jong-guk, ed., *The Comfort Women* (Seoul: Ilwol, 1981). The book was a translation composed of some parts, related to Korean comfort women, from Senda Kakou's *The Main Series of the Military Comfort Women*. This translated extract was originally written by Kim Jeong-myeon but edited by Im Jong-guk and republished in 1992 with the same title. Despite translated versions show Kim Jung-myeon as the author, the original book was written by Kim Il-myeon with the title of *The Emperor's Army and Korean Comfort Women* published by San'ichi Shobo in 1976. For more reference, see Kim Ilmyeon, *The Emperor's Army and Korean Comfort Women* (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobo, 1976).

⁷ Senda Kakou, *The Main Series of the Military Comfort Women* (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobo, 1978), 167. This book, originally published in 1973 and 1974 by Futabasha, was republished in 1978 by San'ichi Shobo with two versions of the main and the sequels.

⁸ Kim Jeong-myeon, *The Comfort Women*, Im Jong-guk, trans. (Seoul: Ilwol, 1992), 89.

Yoshimi Yoshiaki, who once estimated the number of 'comfort women' as approximately 50,000 to 200,000, revised his assumption later in his research report which was submitted to the Northeast Asian History Foundation in 2007, claiming the number could range from 80,000 to 200,000.⁹ This was because even the victims of a mere rape for a certain period of time were also included in his calculation of the 'comfort women.'

By examining the existing discussions over the calculation of the number of victims, it seems that the concept of 'comfort women' could be interpreted in a variety of ways: the typical 'comfort women'; the rape victims by the Japanese military; the licensed prostitutes from the brothels designated by the Japanese military; and the licensed prostitutes from the private brothels which were directly managed by the Japanese government. When all types of rape victims are included in the calculation, still, it is possible to neglect the specificity of the 'comfort women' system via the Japanese military's 'organized and systematic' management. Meanwhile, if only the case of designated brothels is taken into consideration, the problem of neglecting the victims, those who also comforted the Japanese soldiers but worked in the non-designated brothels, remains. The claim that the Japanese government has no responsibility for the 'comfort women' as those people were originally the licensed prostitutes who had worked in common brothels of the time, similar to what Hata Ikuhiko argues, is indeed aimed at concealing the state-involved criminality of the 'comfort women' problem. Such a claim is undoubtedly ahistorical and anti-feminine as those prostitutes of the time, whether licensed by the Japanese government or not, are still related to problems such as human trafficking, the violation of international law, or the violation of human right issue especially caused by the violence by the owner or 'visitors,' for which all deserve international blame.

⁹ Center for Research and Documentation on Japan's War Responsibility-Women's War and Peace Archives, ed., *Study on the Solutions for History Problems between Korea and Japan—To Discuss Solving the Japanese Military 'Comfort Women' Problem* (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2007), 18.

2. The Concept of Japanese Military Comfort Women according to the Definition of Victims

The difference in perceptions surrounding the number of victims reflects the difference in perceptions of the concept and the category of the Japanese military ‘comfort women,’ since every single researcher estimated the number according to how they defined the term ‘comfort women.’

Yoshimi Yoshiaki defined the military ‘comfort women’ as those who were forced to sexually comfort the soldiers at brothels, which were created by the Japanese military in all war or occupied areas between the January 28 Incident in 1932 and the defeat of Japan in 1945.¹⁰ Most of the civic groups or activists in current Japan are giving their consent to Yoshimi Yoshiaki’s definition of the ‘comfort women.’ Even the Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility—Women’s War and Peace Archives, which has been striving to find the truth and solve the ‘comfort women’ problem for more than 20 years, and The ‘Fight for Justice’ Resistance to Oblivion of Japanese Military Comfort Women and Future Responsibility, the website which was launched in January 2013 especially with the help of VAWW RAC (Violence Against Women in War Research Action Center) to deal with the problems related to the Japanese military ‘comfort women,’ are also following Yoshimi Yoshiaki’s definition.¹¹

On the other hand, Yun Myungsuk approached the ‘comfort women’ issue in regard to the military comfort facility system itself, rather than the effort to find the appropriate definition of the term.¹² She argued that there were mainly three types of wartime sexual violence committed by the Japanese military of the time: ① made women arrested in the military comfort facilities and raped them every day; ② the Japanese military repeatedly raped women in certain places for a certain period of time, as in the case of China’s Shanxi Province; and ③ one-time rape committed in the war area.

¹⁰ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 20-21.

¹¹ Website for the Fight for Justice, <http://fightforjustice>.

¹² Yun Myungsuk, *Korean Military Comfort Women and Japanese Military Comfort Stations System*, Choi Min-soon, trans. (Seoul: Ehaksa, 2015), 26-27, 90-91.

Among these three, she claimed that only the first case can be considered as the military comfort women system, as it has the most obvious traits related to the state’s commitment to a war crime, and, thus, the Japanese government should take responsibility for the military comfort facility system itself. Meanwhile, the other two types could also hold the state accountable in a different dimension—such as sexual assault committed by the soldiers or the commercial prostitution problem around the military. Although Yun Myung-suk does not clearly define the term ‘comfort women,’ it seems that generally ‘a woman who was arrested and raped in the military comfort facility’ is accepted as a concept of the ‘comfort women.’

Taiwanese researcher Delan Zhu (朱德蘭), on the other hand, defined the ‘comfort women’ as the women who became licensed prostitutes limited to the Japanese military in the 1930s or in the 1940s Asia, whose total number is estimated at 400,000.¹³ It is seen that she purposely did not include the term ‘comfort facility’ in defining ‘comfort women,’ and this was perhaps because the term ‘military comfort facility’ might have been used in Taiwan meaning something different from a sexual facility. For example, one military comfort facility built in Pingtung City (屏東市), Taiwan in 1938 was equipped with a large restaurant, bathhouse, and hall, as a recreational facility where people could enjoy hobbies such as go and billiards. It was open to the public and sold groceries on weekdays and soldiers used it as a comfort facility only on Sundays. On the other hand, ‘comfort women’ in Taiwan said they were victimized at comfort facilities, which were in high-end restaurants, renovated classrooms, renovated private houses, and caves in remote military facilities, among other locations.¹⁴

In other cases, so-called comfort facilities were in areas that were not sexual facilities. One news article wrote that in June 1938, Gentaro Takagishi (高岸源太郎), a member of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Beppu City (別府市) in Oita (大分), Japan, who owned a *ryotei* (料亭), established a military comfort facility with a large hot spring and rest area in

¹³ Zhu Delan. *The Japanese Government-General of Taiwan and Comfort Women* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2005), 13.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 97-99.

downtown Kanawa (鐵輪).¹⁵ Such cases suggest that we should be careful in distinguishing locations recorded as comfort facilities in order to see whether or not they were actually utilized by soldiers as ‘sexual comfort facilities.’

Meanwhile, the Chinese researchers Chen Lifei and Su Zhiliang claimed that the term ‘comfort women’ refers to women who were forced to ‘sexually comfort (性服務)’ members of the Japanese military as sexual slaves.¹⁶ They also deliberately avoided using the term ‘comfort facility’ in defining ‘comfort women,’ because many Chinese victims experienced sexual violence temporarily or only for a certain period of time.

Four Chinese victims who were repeatedly sexually assaulted by Japanese soldiers at certain places for a certain period of time even filed a lawsuit in the Tokyo District Court of Japan in 1995 and 1996 (however it was only two of the four victims at that time) under the appellation of Chinese ‘comfort women.’ The Japanese researchers, lawyers, and activists who supported these trials termed the location of their sexual assault as ‘rape camp.’ When the Tokyo High Court ruled on this case in 2004, it stated that “this was a ‘so-called comfort women incident’ as (Japanese troops) forcibly kidnapped and detained the Chinese women living near the garrison to repeatedly rape them daily.”¹⁷ In other words, it used the term ‘the so-called comfort women’ to refer to the ‘comfort women’ victims.

Meanwhile, survivors in Shanxi Province and the Hainan Islands in China initiated lawsuits claiming damages in Japanese courts in 1998 and 2001 as ‘victims of sexual violence.’ The ‘victims’ included women who had been imprisoned and raped repeatedly for a certain period of time. The media in Korea, China, and Japan all reported on these events under the ti-

¹⁵ “This time, the Comfort Station of the Japanese Army,” *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun Seibu Office—Oita* (June 28, 1938).

¹⁶ Chen Lifei and Su Zhiliang, *An Inquire into a Korean Comfort Woman Pū Yǒngxīn and Her Colleagues*, 5.

¹⁷ Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace, ed., *One day, the Japanese Soldiers Came—Rape and Comfort Stations on the Chinese Battlefield* (Tokyo: Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace, 2008), 35.

tle of Japanese military 'comfort women.' This indicates that the victims, who were previously not included as 'comfort women' in accordance with the definition established by Yoshimi Yoshiaki and Yun Myungsuk defined, were recognized as 'comfort women' here.

The Korean public institutions or organizations, when defining the term Japanese military 'comfort women,' especially emphasize the fact that they were forced to be mobilized and raped as sexual slaves under the suppressive system of the time: The Northeast Asian History Foundation explicates the Japanese military 'comfort women' as "the women who were forced to engage in the sex with Japanese soldiers at a comfort facility established in an occupied area"¹⁸; The Korean Council for Justice and Remembrance defines them as "the victims of sexual slaves who were forced to be mobilized to the 'military comfort facility,' which was systematically established in Japan's occupied lands and colonies."¹⁹ Research Institute on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery, in its Archive webpage launched in 2020, narrated that "the Japanese government and the military systematically installed the comfort facilities through making corresponding policies, transported 'comfort women' to the battlefield by establishing internal regulations for the usage of comfort facilities, and generally managed and controlled the overall operations of the comfort facilities by, for example, conducting regular checkups for sexually transmitted diseases among the 'comfort women.'²⁰ Considering that all of the above emphasizes how the victims were in a compulsory situation under a system that the Japanese government or the Japanese military intervened in or managed, it can be said that Korean public institutions and organizations are defining the concept of 'comfort women' victims in the strictest yet and in the most narrow sense.

Meanwhile, the Japanese government tends to add the word 'so-called

¹⁸ Northeast Asian History Net, the webpage of the Northeast Asian History Foundation, http://contents.nahf.or.kr/item/item.do?levelId=iswt.d_0001 (Searched on March 29, 2021).

¹⁹ The webpage of The Korean Council for Justice and Remembrance for the issues of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, <https://womenandwar.net/kr/what-is> (Searched on March 29, 2021).

²⁰ The webpage of the Research Institute on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery Archive 814, <https://www.archive814.or.kr/About/Define> (Searched on March 29, 2021).

(いわゆる)’ in front of the term ‘comfort woman.’ When the former Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan Yohei Kono (河野洋平) announced a discourse on August 4, 1993, he declared that “The so-called military comfort women issue is obviously a serious problem that undermined the honor and the dignity of the numerous women under the involvement of the military at that time.” The website for the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF), which was supported by the Japanese government since the Kono Discourse, defines the ‘so-called military comfort women’ as “the women who were dragged to Japanese military comfort facilities and forced to serve Japanese soldiers sexually for a certain period of time during the Pacific War.”²¹ Aside from the obvious victims of the ‘comfort women’ from military comfort facilities, the AWF brings all of the various types of female victims, who were sexually assaulted by the soldiers in the occupied areas, under the concept of ‘the so-called comfort women.’ Then, the AWF includes the victims, who were imprisoned in Japanese military garrison buildings and raped for a certain period of time, as an equal footing with the ‘comfort women’ victims in Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, the Netherlands, and Indonesia altogether.

The term ‘military sexual slavery’ is more broadly used than the term ‘comfort women’ in the international community, since the special rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission Radhika Coomaraswamy’s claim in the 1996 report that the term ‘military sexual slavery’ is a more accurate expression for use. In 1998, the special rapporteur Gay McDougall defined the ‘comfort women’ system as a ‘sexual slavery system held in rape centers’ and specified the Japanese military ‘comfort women’ system as the most severe form of sexual violence among all of other violence that women experienced during the war. However, since the 2000s, the international community has begun to deal with the problem of the Japanese military ‘comfort women’ merely as one common case of infringement on women’s rights that occurred during the war. Even the Korean activist groups, with the support from international solidarity, have started to consider the ‘comfort women’ issue as a common case of infringement of

²¹ The webpage of the Asian Women’s Fund, <http://www.awf.or.jp/k1/> (Searched on March 29, 2021).

women's rights that occurred universally during the war period.²² In other words, the historical specificity of the 'comfort women' victims has been blurred and the feature as a universal and a common sexual violence has emerged instead.

When it comes to the case of related organizations and the researchers of Korea, China, and Taiwan, there is a tendency to explain the concept and the category of 'comfort women' with emphasis on the features of their own countries' 'comfort women' victims. On the other hand, Japanese researchers attempt to explain the overall damages caused by the 'comfort women' system, focusing on the characteristics of the comfort facilities and the 'comfort women' as revealed in the documents, especially in Japanese administrative data or military documents. The 'comfort women' resolution movement, which encompasses the research conducted so far, has expanded its global solidarity by emphasizing that the system was a 'universal violation of women's rights.' However, it seems that the peculiar historicity of the 'comfort women' system itself has not yet achieved general consensus, to say nothing of its universal nature as 'wartime sexual slavery.'

In order to overcome this confusion over the concept and the categorization of the Japanese military 'comfort women,' we should return to the history. The following sections will discuss the unique historicity of the issue of Japanese military 'comfort women,' considering all the actual damages as well as its universality in its relation to women's rights across different generations. In this manner, what is readdressed is how to define the Japanese military 'comfort women.'

²² Chung Jinsung, "The Historical Reality of the Japanese Military Comfort Women Issue and the Coloniality," in *The Japanese Military Comfort Women Problem and Japan's Historical Revisionist Policy*, Do Si-hwan, ed. (Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2018), 21-22; _____, "Universality as Sexual Violence under Armed Conflicts and Historical Peculiarity of Japanese Sexual Slavery: Focusing on the Discussions of International Society," *Journal of Korean Women's Studies* 19, no. 2 (August 2003): 46-47.

Japanese Military Warfare Participation and Controlling the Sexual Desire of the Soldiers

1. The Lax Military Discipline of Soldiers and the Japanese Military's Response

The necessity of the Japanese military 'comfort women' system arose from the need to address the problem of the soldiers' lax military discipline. Japanese troops did not conduct themselves very well during the wartime period. When Miki Yoshihide (三木良英), the medical director of the Ministry of the Army of Japan, went out to inspect the northeastern region of China in May 1940, he commented that "the life of the Kwandong Army was a total mess, full of fleeing and assault."

Japanese troops in China are generally ill-conducted. They are in need of mental comfort and a supply of commodities. The commander claims that mental instability is the fundamental cause of all the unknown feelings and assaults. Thus, commander Doihara (土肥原) is requesting the dispatch of a group of comfort women. It has been known that there was no one from the border guards who went out. I ask for urgent support from The Relief Department of the Military (恤兵部).²³

Regarding the problem of the bad behavior of the soldiers on the battlefield, the Japanese military tried to find the cause of the soldiers' mental illness. "Due to the conditions of the battlefield, soldiers were repeatedly exposed to extraordinary yet varied stimuli or impulses and this caused a peculiar mental illness as a consequence."²⁴ In summary, "such excessive mental instability which lasted for a long time causes mental fatigue, and this will finally result in an accident such as when a [musical] instrument's

²³ Kanahara Setsuzo, "Compendium of Daily Work Log (February 5, 1940)," in *Complete Compilation of Documents on the Japanese Military Comfort Women*, vol. 1, Yuko Suzuki, Yon'e Yamashita, and Masaru Tonomura, eds. (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2006), 242.

²⁴ Hayao Torao, "Special Phenomena on the Battlefield and Its Countermeasures (1939. 6)," in *Government Investigation: Complete Compilation of Documents on Military Comfort Women*, vol. 2, Asian Women's Fund, ed. (Tokyo: Ryukei-shosha, 1997), 55.

string easily breaks when it has been pulled too tight for a long time. The malfunctioning mentality leads to the frequent occurrence of crimes.”²⁵

In his article written in 1939, the army surgeon Hayao Torao (早尾 雄) introduced twenty-two factors that influenced the soldiers' mentality by controlling their mind and body. Sexual desire and rape was the 17th factor among the total of 22. Hayao insisted that the incidents of rape of Chinese women, which was attributed to the over-suppression of the Japanese soldiers' sexual desire at the time, directly triggered the establishment of the official comfort facility for the military and, thereby, introduced ten different cases of rape committed by the soldiers. He also revealed his sarcastic attitude by commenting about why Japanese soldiers could not behave rationally in the face of their sexual desire and, even worse, the military authorities did not consider it strange. Instead, he believed that the Japanese military authorities at the time thought that there was no better way than holding a woman for soldiers to suppress the difficult instincts arising from the dull life of war.²⁶

What we can learn from here is that the Japanese military regarded the problem of their soldiers' lax military discipline—including fleeing, assault, and rape—as something that commonly occurred on the battlefield, rather than as a particular problem of the Japanese military. Mental illness is also something that is commonly experienced by any army, participating in war, with the 'sexual desire'²⁷ of their soldiers being one of the most critical factors that affect their mentality. Thinking that the soldiers had no choice but to become rough as their 'sexual desire' had been suppressed for so long on the battlefield, they regarded having sex with women to satisfy their sexual desire as very natural, viz., a male-centered sexual consciousness.

It was the feature of the modern Japanese military that interpreted the

²⁵ Hayao Torao, "Two War Neurosis and Two Crimes in the Battlefield (1938)," in *Field Reports of the Military Doctors*, Takasaki Ryuji, ed. (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1990).

²⁶ Hayao Torao, "Special Phenomena on the Battlefield and Its Countermeasures (1939. 6)."

²⁷ The soldier's 'sexual desire' quoted in this article is nothing more than a patriarchal discourse as it implies that soldier's 'sexual desire' is either to be resolved through sex with women or to inevitably cause crimes such as violence and rape. Thus, we used the quotation marks for 'sexual desire.'

matter of military discipline in terms of male's sexual instinct. What enabled the Japanese military to maintain its discipline was the compulsion of absolute obedience and the emphasis on mentalism.²⁸ All the strict rules, training, and punishment helped maintain decent discipline. Military authorities aimed at making their young soldiers fight like a robot by neglecting their ill-conducted private lives.²⁹ This was also aimed at concealing the fundamental problem of what Japanese troops had—too much repression lied in their soldiers' human rights. Life in the military was always full of tension and the military facilities were generally poor in quality. Despite the armies of the western countries that are guaranteed a certain period of vacation, all of the Japanese troops, except for only a small number, were not given any vacation during wartime.³⁰

In 1939, the military surgeon Aso Tetsuo (麻生徹男) suggested establishing other types of entertainment facilities—places for troops to enjoy music, movies, books, sports, and so forth—aside from the 'comfort facilities' to deal with a lax military discipline problem, but it was not accepted.³¹ Similarly, the military surgeon Torao Hayao also appealed that what soldiers with mental illness were in need of was mental therapy with corresponding hospitalization and treatment, plus the coordination of work, a guarantee of enough rest, and the prohibition of drinking with tight monitoring, but it was not taken seriously by the Japanese military.³² What these two military surgeons paid attention to was the problem of the over interpretation of soldiers' 'sexual desire.' The perception, as Torao Hayao pointed out, was that 'there is no better way than holding a woman to the soldiers to suppress their tough instinct.' This was indeed the direct trigger that resulted in establishing the Japanese military 'comfort women' system.

²⁸ Yun Myungsuk, *Korean Military Comfort Women and Japanese Military Comfort Stations System*, 223-24.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 224.

³⁰ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 64-65.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 64.

³² Yun Myungsuk, *Korean Military Comfort Women and Japanese Military Comfort Stations System*, 241.

2. Controlling the Sexual Desire of Japanese Soldiers and the 'Comfort Women'

1) Installation of the Military Comfort Facility

The Japanese military established the 'comfort women' system on the pretext of sexually comforting their soldiers. The Ministry of the Army of Japan announced the "Measures to Raise the Morale of the Military" in September 1940, saying that "the comfort that soldiers receive in the sexual comfort facilities is in particular the most honest and yet the most significant one. Therefore, when it comes to discussing the need to suppress such convention, we also need to take into consideration its impact on other factors such as the promotion of motivation, the maintenance of military discipline, and the prevention of crime or "sexual diseases."³³

Installing comfort facilities was the Japanese military's unique system that was difficult to find in other countries. When the United States military wrote a report in 1944 by arresting and interrogating the operators and the 'comfort women' from the comfort facilities, they demonstrated that "the term 'comfort girl' is a unique Japan-thing because different types of 'comfort women' are found in all of the other places where Japanese troops participated in battles."³⁴ The one who receives the 'comfort' from the term 'comfort women' is the soldier. Referring to the United States military's report that "the 'comfort women' are found in all of the other places where Japanese troops participated in battles," it can be noted that there had prevailed the perception that 'comfort women' were aimed at helping Japanese soldiers. In other words, this reflected the specific intention of the Japanese military at the time towards the creation of 'comfort women,' which was to make the execution of war more efficient.

³³ Yuko, Yon'e, and Masaru, eds. *Collection of Documents Related to the Japanese Military Comfort Women*, vol. 1, 247-51.

³⁴ United States Office of War Information, *Japanese Prisoner of War Interrogation Report*, no. 49 (October, 1944).

2) Soldiers' Conceal and Promotion of Raping the Women

The military comfort facilities were under the direct and the indirect control of the Japanese military. The Japanese military was involved in the mobilization and the transfer of the 'comfort women' as well as the operation of the military comfort facilities. There have been four main motivations for establishing the Japanese military 'comfort women' system discussed so far, including what Yoshimi Yoshiaki analyzed: 1) preventing the occurrence of rape incidents in occupied areas; 2) preventing soldiers' sexual diseases; 3) providing 'comfort' to their soldiers; and 4) maintaining the military's internal secrets.³⁵

The second item corresponds to the purpose of suppressing possible violations of military flags, as mentioned above. We should consider the point that the purpose of establishing a military comfort facility for the 'prevention of rape' was for suppressing anti-Japanese sentiment against the Japanese soldiers in order to maintain military discipline in the occupied area, rather than for the protection of ordinary women's dignity.³⁶ Okabe Naozaburo (岡部直三郎), chief of staff of the Japanese Northern China Area Army, dispatched a note to each army on June 27, 1938, that supports this point. The note stated that rape by military rape is an 'act of rebellion against the state,' as it 'interrupts the overall operational behavior of the military.'³⁷

³⁵ Yun Myungsuk, *Korean Military Comfort Women and Japanese Military Comfort Stations System*, 188.

³⁶ 'The protection of ordinary women's dignity was the commonly used excuse of the people who supported establishing a licensed prostitution system by insisting that establishing a legal place for men to resolve their sexual desire would help protect women's dignity. The Japanese government, recognizing the licensed prostitution system, led by soldiers and city laborers, as a necessary evil of the modern state, did always support this system to argue that the abolishment of licensed prostitution would increase sex crimes against 'ordinary women.' Thus, the licensed prostitution system was closely related to the promotion of the 'good housewife' ideal in modern Japan. However, the local women in occupied lands were not considered to be protected by patriarchal Japanese men, which was a belief deeply influenced by nationalism. Therefore, such recognition led to the weak protection of the local women in the occupied area from sexual crimes committed by the Japanese military.

³⁷ Suzuki, Yamashita, and Tonomura, eds., *Collection of Documents Related to the Japanese Military Comfort Women*, vol. 1, 109-10.

The Japanese military did not strictly punish the crime of rape committed by their soldiers. Even Naozaburo Okabe, who had emphasized the seriousness of the rape problem, did not consider the problem of the soldiers' sexual assaults seriously, as it was 'a crime committed unintentionally.' Despite the provision in Chapter 9 of the Japanese Army Criminal Code that rape by soldiers would be treated as a 'crime of robbery or rape' and be punished indefinitely or by at least more than one year (amended in 1932), some said that "even the commander sometimes overlooked their soldiers' rape, thinking that it helped to energize them."³⁸ In the cases of Hebei and Shanxi in China, where the Japanese military's sexual crimes were relatively concentrated during the Sino-Japanese War, the cases of collective rape—men—were easily found.³⁹ Considering that even rape committed by the entire army base was not treated as a violation of the Army's criminal code, should this be viewed as systematic occurrences by the military or as casual acts of aberration by a military that was lucky enough to avoid any condemnation at the time?

Kasahara Tokushi (笠原十九司) pointed out that the pleasure that soldiers gained from murdering or raping sometimes helped them transcend the pain and the fear from the war.⁴⁰ Having said that, the Japanese military indeed promoted efficiency of warfare by condoning rape by their soldiers. In other words, rape by soldiers was considered as a strategy of war.

There is also testimony from one Korean woman who was once mobilized by Japanese naval forces in the past. She described an episode when one soldier, after committing rape, killed the victim because he feared exposure to the public when she returned to her village.⁴¹ As such,

³⁸ Torao Hayao, "Special Phenomena on the Battlefield and Its Countermeasures (1939. 6)."

³⁹ Kasahara Tokushi, "The Investigation of Japan's Military Sexual Violence in Hebei and Shanxi Provinces," *Quarterly Report on Japan's War Responsibility, Center for Research and Documentation on Japan's War Responsibility* 13 (January 1996): 9.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁴¹ Jung Bong-yeon, "A Study of the Actual Condition of the Korean 'Comfort Women' in Haenam Province," interview by Jang Soo-ji and Park Jung-ae, in *Research Report of the Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism Republic of Korea* (Seoul: The Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism Republic of Korea, 2007), 67.

the Japanese military was not concerned about rape committed by their soldiers but rather the possibility that this crime would become known publicly. Driven not only by the fear of anti-Japanese actions by the residents in the occupied area, but also by fear that the victims would appeal to the Japanese military police, many of the soldiers, who committed rape, killed the victims to destroy the evidence.⁴² In addition, some said that conversations among senior and junior soldiers where they boasted of their rape activities also implicitly encouraged each other's sexual offenses.⁴³ The military surgeon Torao Hayao said, "Not engaging in raping does not mean anything but just a little stricter discipline."⁴⁴ Therefore, rape by a soldier was not an unusual event but a daily routine, which was generally tolerated by the military authorities. This also suggests that the gap between rape victims from the Asian-Pacific War and the 'comfort women' victims was almost negligible.

3) Use of Brothels in Imperial Japan

The last issue regards the licensed prostitution system that existed in the main islands of Imperial Japan, in the colonies, in the areas under occupation, and in the wartime territories. When we discuss the historical specificity of the Japanese military 'comfort women' system, people often mention its difference from the licensed prostitution system. Licensed prostitutes from brothels have not been generally recognized as 'comfort women' victims. However, such a perception was created to refute the logic of the history deniers, who argued that Japan had no responsibility for the 'comfort women' as they were originally licensed prostitutes.

Since the 1990s, several studies have attempted to clarify the relationship between the licensed prostitution system and the Japanese military 'comfort women' system. They demonstrated that both systems could suppress the human rights of women and exert control over a male's sexual

⁴² Kasahara Tokushi, "The Investigation of Japan's Military Sexual Violence in Hebei and Shanxi Provinces," 10.

⁴³ Ibid., 11.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 11.

desire through the process of institutionalization within a framework enabled by state power.⁴⁵ On the other hand, others have explained the licensed prostitution system in terms of Japan's modernization process. They have interpreted the advent of the system as a natural process that strengthened the power of the wealthy as well as of the urban laborers through rapid conflict and discrimination by ethnicity, class, and gender.⁴⁶ Therefore, in line with the argument of the modern Japanese government, they claim that prostitutes were not victims of human trafficking since they were legally permitted, and apply the same principle to the 'comfort women' as well.

On the other hand, there is a clear perception that women who were taken to the comfort facilities in Japan, the colonial regions, and Manchuria, where the licensed prostitution system operated during wartime, were obviously 'comfort women' victims. The Chinese 'Comfort Women' Museum in Shanghai exhibited photographs from Osaka Town (逢坂町) in Dalian (大連) in the 1930s.⁴⁷ This was a leased territory controlled by the Japanese military after the Sino-Japanese War, which later became an area for licensed prostitution in December 1905.⁴⁸ In other words, the brothel run by the Japanese Consulate in China at the time is considered to be a military comfort facility by the Chinese archives.

In addition, a Korean victim, Yun Du-ri, testified that she was taken to the first comfort facility located in Yeongdo, Busan in September 1943. She said that around 30 to 40 Japanese soldiers came each day and there

⁴⁵ Yuki Fujime, "The Comfort Women Issue From the Perspective of Women's History," in *Quarterly Report on Japan's War Responsibility* 18 (January, 1997); Youn'ok Song, "History Development From the Licensed Prostitution to the Comfort Women System," in *Judging Japanese Military Slave—Records of 2000 International Women's War Crimes Tribunal*, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Ryokufu Shuppan, 2000).

⁴⁶ Hata Ikuhiko, *Japanese Military Sexual Slavery and Battleground Sex*, 27-57.

⁴⁷ Seoul National University Institute for Gender Research, ed., *Research on Analyzing the Current Situation of the Historical Contents Related to Japanese Military Comfort Women and Improvement Plans for Their Utility* (Seoul: Ministry of Gender Equality, 2009), 45.

⁴⁸ Takeshi Fujinaga, "The Russo-Japanese War and Japan's Transplantation of Licensed Prostitution to Manchuria: Pleasures and Control," in *Examining the Traces of Amusement in Modern Times* (Ōsakasangyōdaigaku sangyō kenkyūjo kenkyū sōsho, 1998).

were more soldiers on the day the ship came in.⁴⁹ Yun Du-ri's experience is not much different from that of the 'comfort women' victims who were taken to China and Southeast Asia. The area where Yun Du-ri was taken was the brothel in Makishima (牧島), Busan during the colonial period.⁵⁰ Lee Seo-geun, the first Korean naval volunteer who was mobilized to Hainan Island of China via Taiwan, also said that while he stayed in Kaohsiung (高雄), Taiwan for one week in 1944, he witnessed soldiers using the local brothels. Since most of the people there were soldiers, it deserved to be called a 'comfort facility.'⁵¹

In the areas for licensed prostitution in Imperial Japan, each police officer belonging to the Ministry of Home Affairs of Japan, the Home Affairs Bureau of the Chosun Governor-General, and the local Japanese Consulate carried out the registration of the women in hospitality, the examination of sexual diseases, and the collection of sales tax, etc. Furthermore, when the total mobilization system was in operation after 1938, the Imperial Japanese licensed prostitution system began to be reorganized to participate in war. The Japanese government tried to suppress the wartime hospitality business through business control and tax increase policies, and to close completely the relatively non-competitive hospitality business. As a result, the licensed prostitution business, which lost its competitiveness among the private brothels in the early and the mid-1930s, began to show its strength again after 1938. The brothels were becoming wealthy as there were many military visitors, especially during the army's camping period.⁵²

⁴⁹ Yun Du-ri, "Being Trapped in Comfort Facilities—Right in Front of My House," interview by An Yeon-seon, in *The Korean Military Comfort Women, Who Were Taken by Force*, vol. 1, the Korean Council for Justice and Remembrance for the Issues of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, ed. (Seoul: Hanul, 1993), 289-96.

⁵⁰ Yun Du-ri once appeared in the documentary "Low Voice 2" (Director Byeon Yeong-joo) in 1997 and pointed out the comfort facility in Yeongdo, Busan as the place where she was taken. This was an area within the Makishima Brothel of Busan during the colonial period.

⁵¹ Lee Seo-geun, interview by Park Jung-ae, in *Mindeullaey yeongto*, Shinchon (May 17, 2008).

⁵² Police Agency of Gyeonggi Province, "Regarding the Second Sino-Japanese War—Economic Situations," in *Security Situation* (September 1938), ed. Police Agency of Gyeonggi Province, (Police Agency of Gyeonggi Province, 1938).

Due to the Japanese government's policy of eliminating a number of hospitality businesses which were not competitive enough, ironically, the government left a few businesses that could have had more soldiers during the war. The licensed prostitution system during wartime was also reorganized in tune with the total mobilization system and eventually transformed, thereby transforming into a system with different characteristics as compared with the previous system.⁵³ It can be said that the licensed prostitution facilities developed into the facilities that could operate as 'sexual comfort facilities' when all of the comfort facilities were starting to actively yet systematically appear after the Sino-Japanese War.

Conclusion

In regard to the 'comfort women' system, Chung Jinsung believed that its incorporation into the global women's movement for the sake of strengthening international solidarity indeed resulted in excessive discussion of the Japanese military 'comfort women' issue without consideration of its core historicity.⁵⁴ The historicity of the Japanese military 'comfort women' issue lies in the 'historical facts' that the mobilization of the 'comfort women' and the establishment of the comfort facilities were all part of an organized and long-lasting Japanese system. Therefore, she argued that the effort to resolve the 'comfort women' issue should start from an analysis of the actual historical context.⁵⁵ This article also concurs with her position that establishing the concept and the category of the 'comfort women' requires an analysis of the actual situation in history. Nevertheless, her argument contains less of historical context in delving into the local brothels as military comfort facilities or the rape cases against local women by the Japanese

⁵³ Park Jung-ae, "The Joseon Government-General's Policy to Suppress the Entertainment Industry and Changes in the Hospitality Industry in Joseon during the General Mobilization Period," *The Journal of Korean-Japanese National Studies* 17 (2009): 191-222.

⁵⁴ Chung, "The Historical Reality of the Japanese Military Comfort Women Issue and the Coloniality," 21-22.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 29-32.

military that had operated military comfort facilities for a long period of time.

As the ‘comfort women’ issue was raised in terms of Japanese war crimes and the responsibility for colonial control, the concept of the Japanese military ‘comfort women’ system could be interpreted as a national crime since the 1990s. This was possible because the perception that sexual violence experienced by women was not a problem of individual misfortune but rather a problem of a patriarchal and violent social structure, which began to be recognized in Korean society after 1987. Moreover, the social consensus on the need to criticize the secondary perpetrators by looking at the sexual violence from the victims’ perspective has gradually grown. Among the soldiers who used military comfort facilities at the time, the words that were used more often than ‘comfort women’ were gisaeng, whore, barmaid, P (ປໍ່), or prostitute. However, since the 1990s, these terms have all been included within the concept of ‘comfort women’ as defined from a new perspective. We cannot just simply negate the historical context and define the concept only from a contemporary point of view. Since the damage experienced by the ‘comfort women’ victims is inextricably linked to the systematic and the prolonged involvement of the Japan government, we should emphasize the peculiarity of the ‘comfort women’ ‘system’ itself.

This ‘institutional’ aspect can only be revealed when we look at the ‘comfort women’ issue from the perspective that the ‘sexual comfort of the soldiers’ was supported by a corresponding policy implemented by the Japanese government as a strategy to raise efficiency in conducting warfare. The licensed prostitution system and the comfort facilities were established and women’s sexual segregation was solidified, all of which were made possible under the policy considerations of public power. We should avoid discussions which aim at creating competitions among ‘comfort women,’ ‘licensed prostitutes,’ and ‘rape victims’ with respect to the extent of their respective damages on the grounds that these discussions will lead to the exclusion of or to the hierarchization of these victim groups. The victims were either glossed over by being conceptualized with the term ‘comfort women’ or hated as being ‘whores’ or ‘prostitutes’ who were confined in

the 'sexual comfort facilities' and forced to endure inhumane lives. Having said that, the fact that the licensed prostitution system and the Japanese military 'comfort women' system, both of which turned women into sexual objects, were legally accepted and actively utilized as a strategy of warfare should be criticized severely. Henceforth, we need to stop the circumvention of the responsibility for past crimes under the excuse that this behavior was considered legal in the past, and to eradicate the voices that seek to legalize men's sexual use of women.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

- Asian Women's Fund, ed. *Government Investigation: Complete Compilation of Documents on Military Comfort Women*, vol. 2. Tokyo: Ryukei-shosha, 1997.
- Kanahara Setsuzo. *Compendium of Daily Work Log*, vol. 1. Tokyo: the Ministry of War, 1939.
- Suzuki Yuko, Yamashita Yon'e, and Tonomura Masaru, eds. *Complete Compilation of Documents on the Japanese Military Comfort Women*, vol. 1. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2006.
- "This Time, the Comfort Station of the Japanese Army." *Osaka Mainichi Shimbun Seibu Office—Oita*. June 28, 1938.
- United States Office of War Information, *Japanese Prisoner of War Interrogation Report*, no. 49 (October, 1944).

Secondary Sources

- Center for Research and Documentation on Japan's War Responsibility·Women's War and Peace Archives, ed. *Study on the Solutions for History Problems between Korea and Japan—To Discuss Solving the Japanese Military 'Comfort Women' Problem*. Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2007.
- Chen Life and Su Zhiliang. *An Inquire into a Korean Comfort Woman Pū Yǒngxīn and Her Colleagues*. Shanghai: Shídàiguóji chūbǎn yǒuxiàngōngsī, 2005.
- Chung Jinsung. "The Historical Reality of the Japanese Military Comfort Women Issue and the Coloniality." In *The Japanese Military Comfort Women Problem and Japan's Historical Revisionist Policy*, edited by Do Si-hwan, 21-43. Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2018.
- _____. "Universality as Sexual Violence under Armed Conflicts and Historical Peculiarity of Japanese Sexual Slavery: Focusing on the Discussions of International Society." *Journal of Korean Women's Studies* 19, no. 2 (August 2003): 39-61.
- Fujinaga Takeshi. "The Russo-Japanese War and Japan's Transplantation of Licensed Prostitution to Manchuria: Pleasures and Control." In *Examining the Traces of*

- Amusement in Modern Times*, 57-100. Ōsakasangyōdaigaku sangyō kenkyūjo kenkyū sōsho, 1998.
- Hata Ikuhiko. *Japanese Military Sexual Slavery and Battleground Sex*. Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1999.
- Kim Ilmyeon. *The Emperor's Army and Korean Comfort Women*. Tokyo: San'ichi Shobo, 1976.
- Park Jung-ae. "An Essay on the Category and Concept of 'Comfort Women' Drafted into the Japanese forces through Damage Status." *The Review of Korean History* 120: 167-203. Winter, 2015.
- _____. "The Joseon Government-General's Policy to Suppress the Entertainment Industry and Changes in the Hospitality Industry in Joseon during the General Mobilization Period." *The Journal of Korean-Japanese National Studies* 17: 191-228, 2009.
- Senda Kakou. *The Main Series of the Military Comfort Women*. Tokyo: San'ichi Shobo, 1978.
- Seoul National University Institute for Gender Research, ed. *Research on Analyzing the Current Situation of the Historical Contents Related to Japanese Military Comfort Women and Improvement Plans for their Utility*. Seoul: Ministry of Gender Equality, 2009.
- Song Yeonok. "History Development from the Licensed Prostitution to the Comfort Women System." In *Judging Japanese Military Slave—Records of 2000 International Women's War Crimes Tribunal*, vol. 3. Tokyo: Ryokufu Shuppan, 2000.
- Takasaki Ryuji, ed. *Field Reports of the Military Doctors*. Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1990.
- The Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism Republic of Korea, ed. *Research Report of the Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism Republic of Korea*. Seoul: The Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism Republic of Korea, 2007.
- The Korean Council for Justice and Remembrance for the Issues of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, ed. *The Korean Military Comfort Women, Who Were Taken by Force*, vol. 1. Seoul: Hanul, 1993.
- Women's Active Museum on War and Peace, ed. *One day, the Japanese Soldiers*

Came—Rape and Comfort Stations on the Chinese Battlefield. Tokyo: Women's Active Museum on War and Peace, 2008.

Yoshimi Yoshiaki. *The Truth about the History of Japanese Military 'Comfort Women.'* Nam Sang-gu, trans. Seoul: Yeoksagonggan, 2013.

_____. *Japanese Military Comfort Women.* Lee Gyu-tae, trans. Seoul: Sohwa, 1998.

Yun Myungsuk. *Korean Military Comfort Women and Japanese Military Comfort Stations System.* Choi Min-soon, trans. Seoul: Ehaksa, 2015.

Zhu Delan. *The Japanese Government-General of Taiwan and Comfort Women.* Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2005.

Japanese Military Comfort Stations in War Diaries

Jongmoon HA
Department of Japanese Studies,
Hanshin University

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 17 Number 2 (Summer 2021), 97-152

Copyright © 2021 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

Japanese Military Comfort Stations in War Diaries*

Jongmoon HA
Department of Japanese Studies,
Hanshin University

Introduction

Since the 1990s, various efforts have been made to investigate the historical reality of the Japanese military comfort women (hereinafter referred to as ‘comfort women’) and comfort stations, and thereby call for the resolution of related issues. Thanks to such efforts, comfort women victims have been able to emerge from the darkness of oblivion and the activities of relevant organizations have received international attention for the progress they have made.

Nevertheless, considerable challenges still lie ahead. Not only are Japanese conservatives refusing to offer apologies and reparations to the victims, but they are also refusing to acknowledge that comfort women are victims of wartime sexual violence. Japanese historical revisionists have argued that comfort women were prostitutes and that comfort stations were no more than brothels operated by civilians. As for research in this area, connections need to be drawn between victim testimonies and other documents uncovered with a view to shedding further light on the history of

* This translated article is a revised and supplemented version of Ha Jongmoon, “진중일지 속의 부대 운용과 일본군 위안소 제도,” *동북아역사논총* 64 (June, 2019): 171-217.

comfort stations and comfort women. Uncovering the complete history of comfort stations to support victim testimonies from different countries appears to be far beyond reach for now.

This study's primary interest lies in proving that the establishment and the operation of comfort stations were linked closely to the operations and the stationing of each military unit and were therefore practically part of their ancillary facilities. This study hence seeks to demonstrate that the Japanese troops' visits to comfort stations were acts based on official permission to leave granted by the commander of a stationed unit. For this purpose, *Jinchū (Sakusen) yomurei* (陳中 (作戰) 要務令), or *Field Service Regulations* and *Guntai naimusho* (軍隊内務書), or the *Handbook of Military Regulations*, were examined. This study also locates how the comfort station system appeared around the time of the Mukden Incident, stretched into the Second Sino-Japanese War, and then began to operate at full capacity concomitant with the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War.

Because this study focuses on revealing the reality and the structure of comfort stations rather than the comfort women at such stations, war diaries were analyzed to prove that the stations were ancillary facilities of the Japanese military. War diaries were records which military units with the size of a company or larger were each required to keep daily from the beginning to the end of deployment. Tracing the movements of each unit through those diaries was expected to help provide context to individual historical sources related to comfort stations and to develop more detailed descriptions regarding the reality of wartime sexual violence. As a result, this study has verified that comfort stations were created and operated in tandem with the overall activities of each military unit, including their movements, operations, and training. In other words, comfort stations were planned and utilized as military facilities, which set them apart from the other brothels that Japanese troops visited while on leave.

The Mukden Incident and Comfort Station “Protocols”

1. Military Regulations Related to Comfort Stations

1) *Jinchū yomurei* and *Sakusen yomurei*

Jinchū yomurei (陳中要務令) specified regulatory guidelines on field and combat duties for different branches of service including staff officers, military police, infantry, cavalry, artillery, military engineers, transportation corps, and aviators. Originally, *Yagai yomurei* (野外要務令), drafted in 1889, served as a manual until *Jinchū yomurei* was revised to replace the first part of *Yagai yomurei* in March 1915.¹ *Yagai yomurei* was thereafter partially revised in August 1924² to reflect the reduction of forces as well as “lessons” learned from World War I. In February 1929, *Sento kōyo* (戦闘綱要) was drafted as a manual for actual combat.

Jinchū yomurei consisted of articles and an appendix that covered combat hierarchy, branch classification, orders, notifications, reports, searches, intelligence, marching, quartering, communication, dispensation and supplementation of provisions, sanitation, battlefield clearance, transportation by rail and ship, military police, and the upkeep of war diaries or field diaries.

According to Article 18 of *Jinchū yomurei*, orders were classified into operation orders and daily orders. While operation orders involved military tactics (Article 19), daily orders involved “the military’s internal affairs, personnel matters, supplementation of personnel and horses, battlefield clearance, the handling of prisoners of war, and other matters irrelevant to operations” (Article 20).

Article 321 classified quartering into billeting, bivouacking, and biv-

¹ 陳中要務令制定 野外要務令第1部廢止の件, 密大日記 4冊の内 2 大正3年. Catalogue Reference: 陸軍省-密大日記-T3-2-5, no. 64. The documents cited in this article are from the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan (<https://www.jacar.go.jp>).

² 陳中要務令改定に関する件, 永存書類甲輯第4類 大正13年. Catalogue Reference: 陸軍省-大日記甲輯-T13-3-15, no. 24.

ouacking in villages. Billeting referred to lodging and resting at a building outside the barracks. Through billeting, Japanese troops established comfort stations. Article 325 stipulated that when billeting, the billeted area was to be divided into sections in order to handle internal affairs, security, and quarterage, and if a unit's sojourn was extended, Article 333 required the training of men and horses to be carried out at the billet base. The billet commander appointed among the higher-ranking senior officers had control over matters pertaining to the billet's internal affairs and security and was responsible for issuing billet orders (Article 337). According to Article 346, should sojourn in a certain area be extended, regulations for each duty including air defense and hygiene had to be established just as they would be at a garrison.

Each unit was also required to keep a war diary and a field diary. The purpose of recording such military experiences, according to Article 622, was to use them to create historical accounts of war, review meritorious acts, and contribute to Japan's military future. Based on Article 605 and Article 606, units the size of companies (including individual platoons) and larger up to the Imperial General Headquarters were required to keep a war diary from the day a mobilization order was received.

Upon the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese Army combined *Jinchū yomurei* and *Sento kōyo* to draft and implement *Sakusen yomurei* in September 1938. *Sakusen yomurei* consists of four parts. The first part is based mainly on one-half of *Jinchū yomurei* and the second part is based on *Sento kōyo*. The third part, completed in October 1939, includes the other half of *Jinchū yomurei* concerned with transportation, supplies, and logistics. The fourth part, drafted in March 1940, covers matters related to chemical warfare and landing battles. Overall, the content of *Sakusen yomurei* bears little difference from that of *Jinchū yomurei*.

2) *Guntai naimusho* and *Guntai naimurei*

Barracks were living spaces that accommodated soldiers and noncommissioned officers ranked sergeant or lower.³ As a basic unit of military force,

³ Noncommissioned officers were ranked sergeant major (*sōchō*), sergeant (*gunsō*), or corporal

barracks represented the everyday lives of military personnel residing in them. *Hohei naimusho*, the *Infantry Handbook for Internal Affairs*, established in 1872, was revised into *Guntai naimusho*—the *Handbook of Military Regulations*—in 1888 and was replaced by *Guntai naimurei*—the *Army Regulations*—in 1943. *Guntai naimusho* experienced several revisions beyond 1888 and its main contents outlined below are based on the revised edition from September 1943,⁴ which is largely similar to that of *Guntai naimurei*.

Chapter 10 deals with the delivery of orders, which were carried out through bulletins designated by the regimental commander and overseen by the unit's adjutant, squad leader, or barracks leader (Article 57).

Chapter 20 deals with living routines and demeanor. In principle, the regimental commander was to determine daily routines and their deadlines according to Article 173, including when to rise, call the roll, eat, issue bulletins, and put the lights out. Based on Article 175, orders and instructions were to be delivered through the evening roll call.

Chapter 21 deals with holidays and leave. According to Article 194, rest was allowed on holidays, the grand festival day of Yasukuni Shrine, the Army's annual kickoff ceremony (January 8), Army Day (March 10), Sundays, and other designated holidays. Article 195 stipulated that servicepersons were allowed to leave their barracks on holidays as long as their service and training were not interrupted. Leaving after breakfast, soldiers were required to return by dinner, while noncommissioned officers were required to return by the evening roll call. Such instances of leave were extended to the evening roll call for soldiers and midnight for noncommissioned officers on January 1, February 11 (*Kigen setsu*, National Foundation Day), April 29 (*Tenchō setsu*, Emperor's birthday), November 3 (*Meiji setsu*, Emperor Meiji's birthday), and the grand festival day of Yasukuni Shrine according to Article 196. Although Article 197 stipulated that leave

 (*gochō*), while soldiers were ranked captain (*heichō*, newly created in September 1940), superior private (*jōtōhei*), first-class private (*ittōhei*), or second-class private (*nitōhei*).

⁴ *Jinchū yomurei* and *Guntai naimusho* were both military commands approved by the Japanese emperor.

of absence would not be granted to those on duty on a holiday, it was granted in cases where an entire unit had been deprived of a holiday due to training or inspection. Based on Article 204, soldiers going on leave on a regular holiday were required to notify their barracks leaders of their destination in order to receive a pass which was to be handed back to the non-commissioned officer on duty upon returning from leave. The form of such a pass was defined through Article 213.

2. The Mukden Incident and the 14th Mixed Brigade

1) Leave for the 14th Mixed Brigade

Once the Mukden Incident occurred on September 18, 1931, the Japanese Army sent reinforcements from Japan and Korea to support the Kwantung Army already stationed in China. Among those reinforcements was the 14th Mixed Brigade (hereinafter referred to as the 14th Brigade), formed on September 24, 1932, of which Major General Hattori Heijirō (服部兵次郎) had been appointed as commander. In addition to mobilizing one third of the 7th Division's troops, one battalion from each of the 25th-28th Infantry Regiments were reassigned to the 14th Brigade.⁵ The brigade also had the 7th Cavalry Regiment, the 2nd Cavalry Company, the 7th Field Artillery Regiment, the 2nd Field Artillery Battalion, a Signal Detachment, and detachments of the Motor Transport Corps and Sanitary Corps under its command.

After engaging in its first battle on October 11 in Tonghua near the Korean-Manchurian border, the 14th Brigade carefully sought measures to prevent venereal diseases. Once the brigade entered Tonghua, the sanitary detachment issued sanitary precautions to be taken between stationed troops on October 18. The precautions forbade entry into pleasure quarters, called for each unit to especially tend to the prevention of venereal diseases, and ordered platoon leaders and those ranked above to provide a lecture

⁵ 混成第14旅団將校同相当官職員表 (昭和7年9月24日調), 関東軍職員表 昭和7年9月. Catalogue Reference: 中央-軍事行政職員表-39, no. 3.

on hygiene.⁶ When a case of venereal disease emerged near the end of that month, each unit was tested and by early November, troops were not allowed to go out at night or enter any villages infected by venereal disease.

From late October, the 14th Brigade carried out operations as a punitive force in the areas of Fengtian (today's Shenyang) and Tieling. From December 17, the brigade remained in the Hailar District of Hulunbuir in order to perform policing duties until it returned to Fengtian between the 24th and the 25th of January 1933.

While stationed in Hailar, the first mention of the brigade's implementation of regulations for stationing appears on January 5.⁷ Critical information and orders were delivered through the brigade bulletin at two o'clock in the afternoon. Through the bulletin issued on January 7, caution was raised over off-base attire since the troops would be permitted to go out after the military review/parade to be held the next day. Whether only one-half of each unit would be allowed to take leave, or one-half of each unit would take turns taking leave would be decided by the commander. The time the troops would be allowed to leave was to be determined by Article 6-2 of the Regulations for Stationing at Hailar. This is the first officially documented instance of troops going on leave and confirms that such regulations had in fact been implemented by the brigade. The entire brigade went off duty on the afternoon of January 8.⁸

From mid-January, the brigade began preparing for its return to Fengtian and arrived in the areas of Fengtian, Tieling, and Liaoyang by late January. The issuance of the brigade's bulletin was resumed in Fengtian on January 26. The Regulations for Stationing in Fengtian were established the following day and until those regulations were issued, the regulations

⁶ [衛生業務旬報] 自昭和7年9月24日至昭和8年12月10日, 衛生業務旬報. Catalogue Reference: 返赤 43011000. The ten-day report was drafted by Nakano (中野織治), the second-class medical officer at the brigade command.

⁷ 1月5日 晴 海拉爾, 混成第14旅団 陣中日誌 昭 8. 1. 1~8. 1. 31. Catalogue Reference: 滿洲-滿洲事変 -129, no. 6.

⁸ According to the war diaries, the brigade also went off duty on the afternoons of December 30-31, January 1, 2, and 5.

Table 1. Leave Days of the 14th Brigade Units Stationed at Fengtian

	Mon.	Tue.	Wed.	Thu.	Fri.	Sat.	Sun.
U n i t	• Cavalry (Field Artillery Platoon)	• 28th Regiment	• Cavalry (Signal Detachment, Motor Transport Detachment, Sanitary Detachment)	• 26th Regiment • Mounted Punitive Force • Brigade Command	• Field Artillerymen (Signal Detachment, Motor Transport Detachment, Sanitary Detachment)	• 28th Regiment	• 26th Regiment • Mounted Punitive Force • Brigade Command

from Hailar remained in effect. Bulletins issued daily in Hailar were reduced to three per week in Fengtian on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. The bulletin issued on January 30 reported that the brigade commander was pleased to find that there were no cases of venereal infection within the brigade.

The purpose of establishing regulations for stationing was to “specify details necessary in overseeing the internal affairs of units under the 14th Brigade.” Details not specified in those regulations were to be handled according to articles on billeting in *Jinchū yomurei*.⁹ The particulars of the regulations are summarized henceforth. Regarding daily routines, breakfast was served at 7:30 in the morning and the evening roll call was to be taken at 8:30. Each unit was permitted to go out on a certain day of the week, as shown in Table 1.

Half of each unit was divided into several teams to go out while the brigade command would remain on duty for half the day on Sundays and holidays. Soldiers could go out between breakfast and 4:00 in the afternoon while noncommissioned officers could stay out for a few more hours until 7:30 in the evening. Company commanders or those ranked above had the authority to permit temporary leave. The official military pass and the pass to leave had to be formatted as specified in *Guntai naimusho* and

⁹ 昭和8年1月27日 奉天駐留規定 混成第14旅団司令部, 混成第14旅団 陣中日誌 昭 8. 1~8. 1. 31. Catalogue Reference: 満洲-満洲事变-129, no. 29.

bear each unit's stamp mark. Soldiers were required to wear their swords and were allowed to go as far as downtown Fengtian. Upon returning, as a precautionary measure against venereal diseases, they were required to clean their private parts and receive a physical examination by a designated commissioned officer with or without the presence of a Sanitary Detachment member.

Attached to the end of the Regulations for Stationing at Fengtian were the "Command's Orders Based on the Regulations." These orders were a set of rules the brigade command laid out upon taking leave. The officer of the day was responsible for maintaining overall military discipline and preventing fires. The noncommissioned officer of the day was responsible for aiding the commissioned officer and designating which half of the brigade would go on leave. The authority to grant temporary leave was left with the aide-de-camp. To examine and disinfect those returning from leave, a disinfection station was to be set up at the Command's quarters and was to be presided over by the Command's medical or nursing officer (or, in the medical or nursing officer's absence, by the officer or the noncommissioned officer of the day).

Each unit's leave was permitted in accordance with the Regulations for Stationing at Fengtian, and the purpose of going on leave was assumed to be physical contact with women. Hence, the regulations were none other than codes for Japanese troops visiting comfort stations. According to a ten-day report on hygiene affairs in early February, the number of cases of venereal infection was low and instructions were handed out to each unit after an examination was conducted on the private parts of soldiers in the garrison town of Fengtian.

On February 20, 1933, the 14th Brigade Command departed from Fengtian in order to take part in the Rehe (熱河) Operation. In late March, the 14th Brigade Command confronted Chinese troops on the other side of the Great Wall at Pingquan (平泉), east of Chengde (承德). The brigade command was thereafter stationed at Xiadian (夏店) near Beijing from late May, at Shanhaiguan (山海關) from late June, and at Jinzhou (錦州) from early October. According to descriptions in ten-day reports on field hygiene, the 14th Brigade took precautions to prevent venereal diseases

wherever it was stationed. New cases of venereal infection amounted to one in late March, three each month between April and July, seven in August, six in September, four in October, and one in November.

Among the measures often taken against venereal infection was an order issued on March 27 which prohibited entry into three Chinese brothels in Fengtian because many of the approximately 20 prostitutes there had been infected. And since 38 Korean and Japanese prostitutes were sent to Fengtian, the order also announced that the private parts of soldiers would be inspected on a weekly basis after the inspection conducted on April 16.¹⁰ Prostitutes were required to carry a health pass presentable upon request, which soldiers were made aware of as well. Soldiers were also ordered to use a cream called *Sehiko* (星秘膏) to prevent venereal infection and condoms called *sakku* in addition to disinfecting themselves thoroughly upon return. The second weekly inspection took place on April 23, and a week later, on April 30, all of the Japanese and Korean prostitutes in the area were summoned to be educated on how to prevent venereal infection in the presence of the chief constable, who later visited each brothel with the military police in order to give orders regarding the prevention of venereal diseases.

On April 28, the 14th Brigade devised instructions for performing checkups on prostitutes and hostesses, which were delivered to each unit's medical officer on May 1. The checkup method was to be decided in consultation with a police officer or a military police officer. General examinations were performed once a month, whereas the inspection of private parts was performed once a week. The medical officer recorded the examination results and any diagnosis on a checkup chart that every prostitute would be required to carry and present upon a customer's request. The medical officer was to inform a police officer or a military police officer about each patient's condition and supervise the owners of brothels in allowing patients to be treated properly and fully equipping the brothels with facilities neces-

¹⁰ The 38 prostitutes consisted of one Japanese entertainer, two Japanese hostesses, two Korean entertainers, and 33 Korean hostesses. Among the infected Koreans, two were infected with syphilis and two were infected with gonorrhea.

sary to prevent venereal infection.

These instructions exemplify how the Japanese military recognized and responded to venereal diseases around the time of the Mukden Incident. Such instructions are likely to have come from the Kwantung Army, which ranked above the 14th Brigade, because in cases where a medical care center was inaccessible, the brigade was to follow the “Instructions on Free Medical Treatment to Locals under the Kwantung Army’s Control.” The instructions also suggest that receiving checkups and taking measures according to diagnoses fell under the realm of supervision rather than being mandatory. The instructions called for checkups to be “performed with care, since they are in every respect a matter of human rights” and added that “Disciplinary Rules for Prostitutes” served as a basis for performing such checkups.

Since being stationed at Shanhaiguan from late June, the 14th Brigade declared that it would invest further efforts into the prevention of dysentery and venereal infections, because this was a matter that required immediate attention. The matters of inspecting the private parts of prostitutes and launching a hygiene committee were both discussed at a meeting held with the head of the Public Order Maintenance Committee on June 28.¹¹ In reality, however, the 14th Brigade was forced to place a priority on quenching the sexual desire of its troops. By early July, talk of lifting the ban on visiting Chinese brothels arose because “several units had suggested it for various reasons.” Despite the ban introduced by the Regulations for Stationing in Fengtian and the fact that the inspection of private parts on July 14 revealed an infection rate of more than 30 percent, the brigade decided on July 16 to revise the regulations and permit entry to Chinese brothels.¹²

¹¹ The Public Order Maintenance Committee was an administrative group of Chinese locals formed for the purpose of maintaining public order in areas occupied by Japanese forces.

¹² On July 15, Medical Officer Nakano gave an interesting lecture about lifting the ban. The number of patients suffering from venereal diseases in the 14th Brigade amounted to 47, which was low compared to those in the Kwantung Army or the Shanghai Expeditionary Army. Nakano explained that the reason the brigade was less infected most likely had to do with the fact that combat left fewer opportunities to “deflower.”

2) The Case of the 27th Infantry Regiment's 1st Artillery Platoon

To delve deeper, it may prove useful at this point to trace the movements of an individual unit such as the 27th Infantry Regiment's 1st Artillery Platoon under the 14th Brigade (hereinafter referred to as the artillery platoon). The artillery platoon kept war diaries from September 1932, when it became mobilized, until March 1934, when it was reassigned. The war diaries indicate that the artillery platoon frequently went out. The earliest entry on record was November 25, 1932, when it arrived in Fengtian and allowed those off duty to go out from 10:00 in the morning until 4:00 in the afternoon.¹³ On December 25, the artillery platoon was divided in half in order to take turns in being led by a noncommissioned officer to go out between breakfast and dinner in Harbin.

While the artillery platoon was staying in Mishan (密山), the Draft Regulations on Internal Affairs was distributed to the security force in Mishan on January 16, 1933. A few days later, on January 18, noncommissioned officers and soldiers were permitted to take a walk around the city between 9:00 in the morning and 3:00 in the afternoon. On the same day, the Regulations on Guarding Mishan was distributed. Along with other commissioned officers, the artillery platoon leader studied both the Regulations on Guarding Mishan and the Draft Regulations on Internal Affairs at the battalion commander's quarters on January 21; the next day, the Regulations on Internal Affairs of the Security Force at Mishan was distributed.

On January 24, training on internal affairs and hygiene took place at 4:30 in the afternoon and lasted 40 minutes. The artillery platoon rested on the afternoon of January 25 as well as on January 26 (on which the entire battalion took a substitute holiday for January), and January 29. After resting in the afternoon, a 30-minute training session on hygiene was held from 4:30 in the afternoon on February 1. While the artillery platoon was in Liaoyang, the entire battalion was permitted to go out on February 20 between breakfast and 4:00 in the afternoon. The artillery platoon members

¹³ 12月, 歩兵第27連隊 第1歩兵砲小隊 陣中日誌 2/2 昭7.9.19~9.3.2. Catalogue Reference: 滿洲-滿洲事変-206 (No. 7).

took turns going out either in the morning or in the afternoon in groups of more than two members. From mid-March, the artillery platoon moved to Fengtian with the brigade's main force and rested either in the morning or in the afternoon on April 5, 18, and 24 as well as on May 4, 5, and 27.

On June 19, the artillery platoon arrived in Linzhou with the battalion's main force. While stationed in Linzhou, the guidelines for going out were modified. According to the Orders Regarding the Internal Affairs of Units Quarters in Linzhou, Wednesdays and Sundays were to be regular leave days because the service of noncommissioned officers and soldiers were unlikely to be disrupted on those days. Soldiers could go out from noon to 5:00 in the afternoon, while noncommissioned officers could stay out a bit later, until the evening roll call. Noncommissioned officers could also go out in between duties on Mondays, Thursdays, Saturdays, and Sundays from noon until the evening roll call. The battalion's main force was permitted to go out from June 25, thus the artillery platoon went out that day. Permission to leave was also granted for the afternoons of June 28 and July 2, on the latter of which fifteen platoon members went out.

On June 26, a first-class private was sentenced to one day of heavy imprisonment. Although there is no record of him having been out, the first-class private had caught a venereal disease from a prostitute in Beipiao (北票) in Chaoyang Prefecture on April 10 and had been hospitalized at a field hospital on April 15. He was henceforth punished for failing to discipline himself and for damaging the reputation of soldiers. Another soldier was hospitalized on July 6 for a venereal disease which turned out to be gonorrhoea contracted from a Korean prostitute while on duty in Liaoyang.

The artillery platoon moved to Tangshan (唐山) on July 10. The bulletin delivered to the artillery platoon on July 11 conveyed future regulations on internal affairs as well as precautions ordered by the battalion commander. From seven in the evening on July 15, the platoon commander gave a 30-minute lecture on preventing venereal diseases. Twelve platoon members took leave on July 17 and eleven on July 20. According to the Regulations on Internal Affairs of the Security Force in Tangshan, July 24 and 26 were leave days but were cancelled due to unit reorganization.

Leave was granted on July 31.

Upon orders to move issued on August 3, the artillery platoon moved to Qiansuo (前所) on August 7 and decided to abide by the Regulations on Internal Affairs of the Security Force at Tangshan for the time being. On August 9, a 40-minute training session on internal affairs and hygiene was held from 10:00 in the morning. The next day, the regulations for stationing (noted in sources as “remaining on camp”) at Qiansuo were made known to all platoon members. According to those regulations, seven members went out from 1:00 in the afternoon on August 13 and leave was also granted on August 15.

On August 19, from 6:10 to 8:00 in the evening, the platoon commander held a training session on regulations on stationing and security in addition to instructions and precautions given by the brigade commander. The entire platoon rested on August 20 as well as the next day when six platoon members went out. When permission to leave was granted in the afternoon of August 27, twelve went out the next day. Through a partial revision of the regulations on stationing on August 29, the platoon members were allowed to go out a bit further to the west and the time for the evening roll call was changed to 8:00. In September, platoon members went out on the 3rd day and the entire platoon rested in the afternoon on the 10th day. Seven platoon members went out on September 11, and leave was also granted on September 17.

On September 19, the artillery platoon set up camp at Dahushan (大虎山) near Jinzhou. The Regulations on Internal Affairs in Between Camping on Guard were shared through the bulletin on September 24 and Sunday was designated as a leave day. Ten members went out on October 1 when the entire platoon was resting, and ten were also permitted to leave on October 8. In November, nine went out on the 3rd, which was *Meiji setsu*. On November 23, another holiday called *Niinamesai* (新嘗祭), when an imperial ritual was held, the entire platoon was permitted to go out from 1:00 in the afternoon. Leave was regularly permitted on Sundays, which included November 19th and 26th, December 3rd (on which six went on leave), the 10th and 17th (on which seven went on leave), and the 24th (on which seven went on leave). Three platoon members also went out on De-

ember 25, the anniversary of Emperor Taishō's death. Leave continued to be regularly granted in 1934, including on January 7th, 14th, 21st, and 28th. The platoon rested on January 3, when the Shinto Festival of Origins (*Genshisai*, 元始祭) was held, and members went out on January 8 as well. After resting on February 4th and 11th, the artillery platoon was on the move again from February 15 and then returned to Japan.

Based on what has been described so far, rest days and leave days for the artillery platoon were determined by regulations on internal affairs or regulations for stationing. Moreover, such days coincided with when soldiers visited brothels.

The Second Sino-Japanese War and Comfort Stations

1. The Case of the 14th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment

1) Organizational Realignment and the Establishment of Comfort Stations

On July 7, 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out. The Japanese Northern China Area Army was newly created on August 31 as an elite unit to ravage northern China. It was the first area army to have under its command the 1st Army, the 2nd Army, and other direct command units. As for southern China, the Japanese Central China Area Army was created to oversee the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, assigned on August 15, and the 10th Army, assigned on October 9. After seizing Nanjing in mid-December, each unit was charged with the task of mopping up remnants, securing public order, and guarding the occupied territories. On February 12, 1938, the Japanese Central China Area Army was reorganized into the Japanese Central China Expeditionary Army.

The 6th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade (hereinafter the 6th Brigade) under the 10th Army was in command of the 13th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (hereinafter the 13th Regiment) and the 14th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (hereinafter the 14th Regiment). Upon receiving orders to guard Songjiang (松江), the 6th Brigade moved along the south side of Lake Taihu (太湖) on December 28 to the district at the upper reaches of

the Huangpu (黄浦) River to the west of Shanghai.¹⁴ On the same day, the 14th Regiment was ordered by its brigade to assemble at Beiqiaozhen (北橋鎮) in Songjiang.

On January 10, 1938, the 6th Brigade divided its patrol zone in Songjiang into four sections. The command of the 6th Brigade settled down in the northeastern section and the 13th Regiment settled down in the eastern section. The brigade's transportation detachment was assigned to the western section and the 14th Regiment was assigned to Shanghai County to the south, which corresponds to the southwestern section of today's Minhang District in Shanghai. The four locations where each unit set up camp and formed a billeting zone where the commander of each unit served as the billet commander.

As the brigade settled down, comfort stations started to be created. Signs of this can be detected from the war diaries kept by the 14th Regiment's 1st Battalion. The 14th Regiment consisted of its command, the 1st and the 2nd Battalion, and regimental columns. On January 7, the 14th Regiment launched individual weekly bulletins for the 1st and the 2nd Battalion and set a schedule for daily routines which specified dinner to be served at 6:00 p.m. and the evening roll call to be taken at 7:00 p.m. The brigade bulletin was to be issued at 11:00 a.m. in the morning and the battalion bulletin at 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon. The brigade bulletin for January 12 announced the brigade commander's directive to maintain military discipline, and a ban on entry into areas outside designated zones.

Moves to establish comfort stations were taken early on, one of which was the appointment of Comfort Committee members on January 13. The brigade bulletin announced that Captain Arai (新井) and Medical Officer and Second Lieutenant Nomiya (野見山) had been appointed as Comfort Committee members and notified each command and company column to select a noncommissioned officer to be sent to the brigade command the next day.

¹⁴ 陣中日誌 第4号 自昭和12年12月1日至昭和12年12月31日 野戦重砲兵第14連隊 第1大隊本部 (3), 支那事变 陣中日誌 第4号 昭和12年12月. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变全般-330 (No. 4).

On January 16, a brigade order announced a change in the schedule for daily routines that had been determined on January 7 so that the evening roll call at 7:00 was to be pushed back to 8:50. This change appears to have taken into account the fact that noncommissioned officers were allowed to use comfort stations between 6:00 and 8:00 in the evening.

The battalion bulletin for January 25 announced orders for two non-commissioned officers and ten soldiers (including three pioneers) to be drafted for the construction of a “comfort hall” from 9:00 a.m. the following morning. The battalion bulletin for January 27 conveyed that the comfort hall was to open that day according to the Provisional Regulations on Special Comfort Stations. The news was no doubt circulated throughout the entire brigade.

On January 27, 1938, the 14th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment opened a comfort station in the southwestern area of Shanghai. The reason why the regulations for its establishment were provisional was that they contained instructions aimed only at the comfort station’s primary users, who were likely to be soldiers.

The comfort station was closed on the 15th of each month. Soldiers could visit between 10:00 a.m. in the morning and 5:00 p.m. in the afternoon, while noncommissioned officers could visit from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. in the evening. The fee for one 20-minute session was 1 *yen* and 50 *sen* with a Japanese comfort woman¹⁵ and 1 *yen* with a Chinese comfort woman. The fee was payable only in Japanese notes and military notes. At 9:00 a.m. in the morning, the unit to use the comfort station for the day was to draft a noncommissioned officer to be responsible for policing the comfort station and charging fees. Apart from the committee members Captain Arai and Medical Officer Nomiyama, the only people allowed to enter the comfort stations were each unit’s commander, billet staff officers, officers on patrol, and medical officers.¹⁶ Everyone who used the comfort station

¹⁵ As with the Regulations for Comfort Stations at the front, it seems difficult to exclude the possibility that Koreans could have been included in the number of Japanese women at the comfort station in Beiqiaozen.

¹⁶ The names of the Comfort Committee members appointed on January 13 are identical to those of

Table 2. The 14th Regiment’s Weekly Reservation of the Comfort Station

	Thu. (Jan 27)	Fri.	Sat.	Sun.	Mon.	Tue.	Wed.
Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brigade Command • Brigade Column 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1st Battalion Command • 1st Company 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2nd Company • 3rd Company 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1st Battalion Column • 2nd Battalion Command 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4th Company • 5th Company 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6th Company • 2nd Battalion Column 	Other Units

was obligated to use a condom (*bōdokugu* 防毒具) and the sale of food and entry after drinking was prohibited. Table 2 below shows which day of the week was reserved for which unit of the 14th Regiment until the regular holiday on March 15.

Units under the 14th Regiment took turns using the comfort station six days of the week, and the one remaining day was allocated to a different unit outside the regiment. Because February 15 (Tuesday) was a regular holiday, the 6th Company and the 2nd Battalion column were directed to use the comfort station the next day.

The operation of the comfort station, however, was far from smooth in the beginning. Issues were raised from January 28, the very day after the comfort station was opened. The regiment bulletin noted that caution should be taken regarding soldiers trespassing in the special comfort hall, although there was no need to name names. The brigade bulletin reported that there were soldiers who did not use condoms at the special comfort hall. The next day Brigade Commander Maruyama listed a number of precautions to be taken regarding the overall operation of units. He particularly warned that entering the special comfort hall in a drunken state was a cause for punishment. He then ordered the noncommissioned officer sent to the special comfort hall from each unit to not only sell tickets but to inspect whether the Regulations on the Comfort Hall were being followed. The battalion bulletin declared that soldiers should not seek comfort after

the committee members allowed to enter comfort stations, which gave reason to conclude that the appointment on January 13 was part of the process of establishing comfort stations.

drinking and that visiting during outside hours would be punished if caught.

2) Full-scale Operation of Comfort Stations

On January 30, the 1st Battalion revised the Patrol Regulations for the Security Force at Beiqiaozhen, which was to be implemented from February 1. The Patrol Regulations for the 14th Regiment in Shanghai County were established the next day, thereby completing preparations for stationing at Songjiang. What is worth noting is the fact that the Regulations on the Supervision of Comfort Stations, which replaced the Provisional Regulations for the Special Comfort Hall, were appended to the Patrol Regulations for the 14th Regiment. The establishment of the Regulations for Comfort Stations suggests that they were linked to the patrol regulations' systemization. The 14th Regiment's Regulations for Comfort Stations was the earliest of its kind and its content was detailed and extensive. In addition to its ten introductory articles, the regulations included a total of 41 articles divided into five chapters on operation procedure, operation facilities, hygiene, operation methods, and prohibitions and enforcement. It is therefore necessary to compare the Regulations on the Supervision of Comfort Stations with the Provisional Regulations for the Special Comfort Hall when investigating the reality of early comfort stations.

Compared to the Provisional Regulations for the Special Comfort Hall, the Regulations on the Supervision of Comfort Stations stipulated more detailed guidelines on establishing and operating comfort stations. Only a "billet commander recognized by the Songjiang district leader" had the authority to establish special comfort stations in the 5th Brigade's patrol zone. The Songjiang district leader is presumed to have been the commander of the Army Service Corps in Songjiang, based on the fact that the expression "Army Service Corps in Songjiang" appears in a war diary entry from January 5. It is therefore reasonable to surmise that the Army Service Corps established the comfort station for the 14th Regiment. Apart from the typical comfort stations that sold sex, places that sold food (hereinafter referred to as restaurants) also fell under the category of special comfort stations.

Officers in charge of supervising comfort stations and restaurants had the power to remove the operator of a comfort station or a restaurant, or to limit its operation. Without their permission, a comfort station or restaurant could not be shut down or be closed partially or entirely. No businesses similar to special comfort stations were allowed to operate within the Japanese army's patrol zone in Shanghai County, and special comfort stations were prohibited from being used by anyone other than Japanese soldiers or civilian personnel. The regular leave day for special comfort stations was the 15th of each month.

The Regulations on the Supervision of Comfort Stations specified the operating procedure of comfort stations. In order to obtain an operating permit, an operator first had to fill out an application form, write a pledge, and attach copies of the contracts concluded with comfort women for submission to a billet commander. Once the operating permit was issued, the women had to be inspected by the supervising officer for comfort stations and were examined by a medical officer. The billet commander would then issue a bill of health and a permit to those who passed the inspection and examination.

The renovation of a comfort station had to be reported to the supervising officer and altering a comfort station's facilities for different purposes was prohibited. Operators were responsible for furnishing comfort stations with certain items, including a clock, makeshift fire extinguisher, and name tags of a designated size and color for comfort women.

The articles related to hygiene were detailed and specific. Examinations for venereal infections, tuberculosis, trachoma, and infectious skin diseases were performed by a medical officer every Saturday. The results of such examinations were documented in the bill of health and sealed by the persons concerned. Those who failed to pass an examination were banned from receiving customers. The operator was to bear the cost of the examination as well as items to prevent venereal infections. Operators were also responsible for the maintenance of clean bedding, lighting, and ventilation. Operation methods were also specific enough to designate where and how comfort women should wear their name tags. The fee and the duration per session were identical to those stipulated in the Provisional

Regulations for the Special Comfort Hall. A billet commander accompanied by a medical officer could launch an inspection at any time to check on the conditions of operation. Comfort women were not allowed to set foot outside a designated zone, and operators who failed to fulfill their contract with comfort women would be ordered to suspend business.

Two points seem to stand out from the above review of the Regulations on the Supervision of Comfort Stations. One involves the matter of who actually drafted the regulations. They seem unlikely to have been independently drafted by the 14th Regiment or the 6th Brigade. Considering the level of detail in the articles and the standardized forms, it seems more plausible to conclude that the 14th Regiment referred to a “manual” on the establishment and operation of comfort stations and made its own revisions. And it may be worth considering whether that manual could have been drafted by the Japanese Central China Area Army (or the Japanese Central China Expeditionary Army).

The other involves the head of security’s connection to the establishment and operation of comfort stations. As declared through the Regulations on the Supervision of Comfort Stations, the power to operate or shut down special comfort stations in Shanghai County belonged to billet commanders. The unit in charge of guarding an occupied area was therefore able to control both its stationing arrangements as well as the existence and the operation of comfort stations and women. These two points are circumstances that appear to be different from those around the time of the Mukden Incident in September 1931.

2. The Case of the 2nd Independent Siege Heavy Artillery Battalion

1) Stationing and Early Comfort Stations

Comfort stations continued to be created in areas guarded by units under the Shanghai Expeditionary Army. The case of the 2nd Battalion of the Independent Siege Heavy Artillery is a rich source of information on the unit’s activities as well as on the establishment and the operation of comfort stations during the early stages of the Second Sino-Japanese War. This battalion, stationed at Changzhou (常州) between Nanjing and Shanghai,

had under its command the battalion command, the 1st Company, the 2nd Company, a battalion column,¹⁷ and the temporarily assigned 3rd Tractor Transportation Unit. The battalion commander was Major Mannami Shitomi (万波藤). The battalion command, 2nd Company, and battalion column kept war diaries beginning on July 27, 1937, immediately after joining the Second Sino-Japanese War.

The 5th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade was the unit above the 2nd Independent Siege Heavy Artillery Battalion. The brigade's artillery units, including the 3rd Transport Regiment and the 3rd Cavalry Brigade that originally belonged to the 3rd Infantry Division, were jointly responsible for guarding Changzhou. The security forces commander, or the billet commander, was Lieutenant Colonel Hoshi Zentarō (星善太郎), commander of the 3rd Infantry Division.

On December 25, 1937, the 2nd Battalion arrived in Changzhou and determined the daily schedule the next day, fixing dinner time at half past five and the evening roll call at nine. The battalion commander cautioned soldiers to bring their official military pass with them whenever they went out. On January 5, 1938, the Patrol Regulations for Stationing at Changzhou Beyond January 1938 were established.¹⁸

The first bulletin the Changzhou Security Force issued soon after its arrival stated that the Army Service Corps would “soon prepare an entertainment station.”¹⁹ Rest day came on January 3, 1938, and a few days later, the column commander gave instructions on acceptable behavior of soldiers toward drinks and women.²⁰ On January 9, an “entertainment center”

¹⁷ A column refers to a group of servicemen responsible for furnishing supplies and repair service necessary for operations in the Artillery Platoon or the Armor Platoon. Infantry had its own transport or baggage train.

¹⁸ The war diaries of the battalion command and column only mention that the regulations were issued.

¹⁹ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊本部 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-557, no. 2.

²⁰ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列, 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年10月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-558, no. 2.

was opened near the post in northern Changzhou where the 1st Battalion was stationed.²¹ To prevent congestion, the 2nd Battalion was assigned use of the center once every five days from 10:00 in the morning until 7:00 in the evening. Everyone had to use a *sakku* when engaging in entertainment, and the entry of patients with venereal disease was prohibited.

On January 13, criticism was raised over the fact that soldiers were not dressed properly when they went out and that they saluted in an unsatisfactory manner.²² While there was no mention of rest on January 14, bulletins for January 19, 24, and 29 all included the statement that “because it was a rest day, rest was granted once precautions were given after the morning assembly.”²³ This hints that soldiers were permitted to go out on a regular basis, although there is no specific mention of such instances of leave.

According to a report the 2nd Battalion commander drafted for the 5th Brigade commander’s inspection of the battalion,²⁴ the comfort facilities in Changzhou as of January 20 consisted of one operated by the Army Service Corps and two others operated by direct command units.²⁵ Each unit was led by a commissioned officer to use those facilities on a designated day for an hour and a half. Hygiene inspections were performed in the presence of a medical officer, which confirmed one case of venereal infection.

The supervision of comfort stations was left to a military police de-

²¹ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列, 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年10月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-558, no. 2.

²² 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列, 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年10月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-558, no. 2.

²³ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列, 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年10月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-558, no. 2.

²⁴ This report is assumed to have been drafted for the 5th Brigade commander’s inspection of the 2nd Battalion on January 22.

²⁵ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵第2大隊本部 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-557, no. 2.

tachment. The battalion bulletin for January 26 mentioned how the commander of the military police detachment had pointed out the need for soldiers to be more rigorous about their attire and their salutation on leave. In addition to asking soldiers to always carry their leave passes and notify superiors whenever an entire unit went on leave, the military police detachment commander asked them not to demand prostitutes who had failed their physical examination to perform.²⁶

On a similar note, a security force bulletin announced orders for units to notify the security force whenever they went on leave. The same bulletin also added that since the 4th Field Hospital tested and confirmed the venereal infection of a nine-year-old girl who had been raped, soldiers should be aware that prostitutes of the Army Service Corps who passed their physical examination were required to carry a pass ticket (which was a wooden tag).²⁷

The column bulletin for January 29 contained the following information: The entertainment center created in front of the 1st Battalion's post is now closed.

At present, the Army Service Corps' entertainment center is available. The day for entertainment has not been stipulated for each unit, but those seeking entertainment may visit between 1:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. in the afternoon as long as doing so does not disrupt their daily routine on duty. Those engaging in entertainment must use the cleansing equipment available at the dispensary.

On rest days for entire units, operation will continue as usual unless ordered otherwise by the command.

To summarize, there were two comfort stations in Changzhou as of Janu-

²⁶ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵第2大隊本部 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-557, no. 2.

²⁷ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊本部 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-557, no. 2.

ary 1938; one established by the Army Service Corps and one created by an artillery unit. The latter seems to have been the comfort station the battalion column used to visit on rest days until January 29, when the column was directed to use the Army Service Corps' comfort station because the other comfort station had already been closed by then. Yet, since the battalion command or other higher units did not give any separate instructions about which days it was allowed to use the comfort station, the battalion column directed use from 1:00 to 4:00 in the afternoon in between duties. This instruction applied to rest days as well, unless ordered otherwise by the battalion command. These circumstances suggest that rest days, as well as the establishment and the operation of comfort stations, had not yet been systematized by the end of January 1938, one month after the battalion had arrived in Changzhou.

The operation of the Army Service Corps' comfort station began to gradually become more systematized in February. The battalion bulletin for February 1 informed that the assigned day for using the entertainment center would be announced as soon as it had been decided. The bulletin also reminded soldiers to carry their leave pass and reminded them of the precautions necessary for using the cream *Sehiko* distributed for the prevention of venereal diseases.²⁸ The next day, the 2nd Battalion received notice from the 1st Battalion that it would be allowed to use the comfort station on Wednesdays and assigned a time slot for each unit under the battalion: 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. in the morning for the battalion command, 11:00 a.m. to noon for the 1st Company, 1:00 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. in the afternoon for the 2nd Company, 2:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon for the battalion column, and 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. in the afternoon for the 3rd Tractor Transportation Unit.²⁹

The basics for using the comfort station had thus been established. On February 2, the day the battalion first used the comfort station, the bat-

²⁸ The war diaries of the 2nd Battalion and 2nd Company only mention the distribution of *Sehiko*.

²⁹ Since the service hours of the Artillery Platoon's comfort station was also from 10:00 in the morning to 7:00 in the evening, it seems to have allotted time slots like the Army Service Corps' comfort station.

talion column held its morning assembly at 9:00 a.m. in the morning, cleaned its weapons, and then rested.³⁰ The same day was also recorded for the first time in the 2nd Company's war diary as a rest day.³¹

The battalion command designated February 9 as "comfort day" so that caution was given on using the entertainment center while the aide-de-camp contacted the Army Service Corps to make the necessary arrangements.³² Having been instructed the previous day to submit an application for leave to the commander, the battalion column rested after undergoing a weapons cleaning inspection and after being cautioned about conduct on leave. A total of 64 persons went out that day, and the column's war diaries marked the 16th and the 23rd as rest days as well. Although the company's war diaries did not contain any other mention of resting, it also marked February 16 and February 23 as rest days.

On February 11, the battalion column delivered orders through its bulletin not to enter the comfort station outside rest days. The next day's bulletin revealed that the reason behind such orders was that soldiers continued to be caught visiting after drinking or without a leave pass on days that were not rest days.³³ Hence, soldiers going out on February 14 were required to report their leave and return to the guardhouse, where a register was to be kept.³⁴ The system for using the comfort station had not been fully established at that point.

³⁰ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列, 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年10月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-558, no. 2.

³¹ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 第2中隊 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 第2中隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-556, no. 2.

³² 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊本部 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-557, no. 2.

³³ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列, 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年10月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-558, no. 2.

³⁴ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 第2中隊 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 第2中隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-556, no. 2.

On February 16, i.e. the third comfort day that month, the time slots were switched so that the 2nd Company became the first to use the comfort station.³⁵ Another switch was notified for February 24, when noncommissioned officers used the comfort station from 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. in the morning³⁶ and soldiers from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon.³⁷ Three days later, on February 27, a reminder was issued on the hours for noncommissioned officers to use the comfort station,³⁸ suggesting that it had taken until late February to separate the hours for noncommissioned officers and soldiers. On February 28, a warrant officer of the 2nd Company was appointed as the supervisor for the use of the comfort stations.³⁹

2) Comfort Stations and Regulations on Internal Affairs

On March 10, 1938, the battalion command ordered each company to provide training to officers and soldiers according to the Japanese Central China Expeditionary Army's training regulations established on March 5.⁴⁰ Event schedules were to be drafted based on the battalion's training sched-

³⁵ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊本部 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-557, no. 2.

³⁶ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊本部 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-557, no. 2; 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊第2中隊 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 第2中隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-556, no. 2.

³⁷ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 第2中隊 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 第2中隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-556, no. 2.

³⁸ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊第2中隊 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 第2中隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-556, no. 2.

³⁹ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊本部 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-557, no. 2.

⁴⁰ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊本部 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-557, no. 2.

ule.⁴¹ Each unit created their own schedule for March. The battalion command set daily tasks for detachments of the Observer Corps, Signal Corps, Wireless Corps, Anti-Aircraft Corps, and Motor Transport Corps.⁴² The 2nd Company organized a schedule that included gunnery exercises, disciplinary drills, and combat drills with rifles in the morning and in the afternoon.⁴³ The battalion column filled its morning and afternoon schedule with sessions on mental training or vehicle inspection.⁴⁴

Meanwhile, the battalion bulletin for March 1 announced that the 2nd Battalion's "comfort day" had been changed to Thursdays.⁴⁵ This change was likely caused by a reshuffle of the unit stationed at Changzhou. The battalion command had been informed of the change the previous day so that Thursdays were marked as rest days in the battalion's training schedule drafted on February 28. The schedules of the 2nd Company and the battalion column also marked Thursdays in March (i.e. March 3, 17, 24, and 31) as rest days.⁴⁶

As previously mentioned through bulletins, the entry for March 3 in the battalion column's war diaries also discussed the need to carry a leave pass, to refrain from drinking at the comfort station on days reserved for other units, and to be aware of venereal diseases. The following notice was

⁴¹ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列, 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年10月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-558, no. 2.

⁴² 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊本部 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-557, no. 2.

⁴³ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊第2中隊 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 第2中隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-556, no. 2.

⁴⁴ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列, 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 段列 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年10月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-558, no. 2.

⁴⁵ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊本部 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-557, no. 2.

⁴⁶ Although an event related to an event was scheduled for Army Day on March 10, the war diaries of the battalion column marked that day as a rest day as well.

once attached to the 2nd Company bulletin.⁴⁷

Five. Details from the Regulations for Comfort Stations that require attention are listed below:

1. Noncommissioned officers and soldiers are to enter through the same door on the south side.
2. Rates
 - Chinese comfort woman 1 *yen*
 - Korean comfort woman 1 *yen* 50 *sen*
 - Japanese comfort woman 2 *yen*
3. Fees must be paid.
4. The duration of each session must be less than one hour.
5. Take precautions to avoid venereal infections.
6. Drunks are prohibited from entry.

From the above notice, the reality of the comfort station the Army Service Corps installed in Changzhou can be inferred. The comfort station was used not only by noncommissioned officers and soldiers but also by commissioned officers as well. Multiple comfort stations or one large-scale comfort station housed and charged different rates for Chinese, Korean, and Japanese women by the hour.

Trouble surfaced from the first rest day of March. The battalion bulletin for March 5 reported that the Changzhou Security Force had sent news about the poor attire of the 1st Company soldiers on leave⁴⁸ and then announced that those henceforth accused of poor attire would not be grant-

⁴⁷ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊第2中隊 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 第2中隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事変北支-556, no. 2.

⁴⁸ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 第2中隊 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 第2中隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事変北支-556, no. 2: 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列, 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年10月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事変北支-558, no. 2.

ed leave.⁴⁹ Trouble, however, continued to crop up over the use of comfort stations. The battalion bulletin for March 10 warned soldiers not to enter comfort stations on days reserved for other units⁵⁰ and that their conduct was a matter of the unit's integrity, which gave reason to be especially careful at comfort stations and to always carry their leave pass. The bulletin also conveyed orders to appoint someone to keep an eye on behavior at the comfort stations and report to the battalion's aide-de-camp the rank and the name of those appointed.⁵¹

On March 16, the Regulations on Internal Affairs at Changzhou were established.⁵² Two reasons appear to have prompted the establishment of such regulations. One was because orders to submit regulations on internal affairs had come down from the 5th Brigade on March 11.⁵³ The other was most likely because of the need to revamp the stationing arrangements, including those pertaining to comfort stations.

The regulations, consisting of one hundred articles divided into seventeen chapters, covered all actions except for those related to combat and training. Comfort stations were mentioned in Chapter 8 on rest days and leaves.⁵⁴ Rest days referred to comfort days on Thursdays and other public holidays during which soldiers were required to carry their leave passes.

⁴⁹ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列, 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年10月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-558, no. 2.

⁵⁰ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊本部 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-557, no. 2.

⁵¹ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列, 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年10月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-558, no. 2.

⁵² 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊本部 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-557, no. 2.

⁵³ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊本部 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-557, no. 2.

⁵⁴ 常州駐屯間内務規定 昭和13年3月 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊, 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 關係資料 常州駐屯間内務規定警備間教育規定. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变上海·南京-270, no. 2.

Chapter 9 was particularly devoted to Regulations for the Use of Comfort Stations, which can be summarized as follows:

Units were assigned different days of the week to use the comfort station. Sundays were reserved for the 3rd Cavalry Regiment led by *Hoshi*, Mondays and Tuesdays for the 3rd Transport Regiment led by *Kuriawa*, Wednesdays and Thursdays for the 1st and the 2nd Independent Siege Heavy Artillery Battalions led by *Matsumura*, Fridays for the unit led by *Achiha*, Saturdays for the unit, involved in the Army Service Corps, under *Narita*, and Sundays for all field storage units under *Murata*.⁵⁵ Temporarily stationed units were to be separately assigned a day or time to use the comfort station. The day a soldier was permitted to visit the comfort station was considered his rest day, which was the same for all Japanese soldiers in Changzhou, including those of the 2nd Battalion.

Noncommissioned officers and soldiers could visit comfort stations between 9:00 a.m. in the morning and 6:00 p.m. in the evening. The rate for a maximum of one hour was 1 *yen* with a Chinese woman, 1 *yen* 50 *sen* with a Korean woman, and 2 *yen* with a Japanese woman. Commissioned officers had to pay double those rates. Instead of selling tickets, the fee was to be paid in cash at the comfort station. A military police detachment would continue to supervise the comfort station as it had since the station's establishment in January 1938. Comfort women, described as "proprietors," were only allowed to visit designated places, and comfort stations were closed on the 15th day of each month. Since these were facilities exclusively for the Japanese Army, the Chinese were not allowed entry.

The comfort station was housed on the south side of Nikka (日華) Hall, consisting of an annex of the hall and a separate building for non-commissioned officers and soldiers. Noncommissioned officers and soldiers were to use the hall's south side entrance. They were physically examined between 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. in the morning on Mondays and Fridays and were regularly tested for venereal infections on Fridays. A medical officer from the 4th Field Hospital oversaw the examinations and

⁵⁵ 常州地区警備(衛戍服務)規定 昭和12年12月 常州地区警備隊、独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年12月1日~13年1月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事変上海・南京-230, no. 7.

was assisted by medical officers from each unit as well as the Army Service Corps Reserve Hospital. The medical officer who oversaw the examinations was responsible for notifying each unit of the examination results.

According to the entry for March 3 in the 2nd Company's war diaries, these regulations on internal affairs accurately reflect how comfort stations were actually used. Hence, the regulations must have been drafted by the Army Service Corps and applied to all units guarding the garrison at Changzhou. In other words, the establishment and the operation of comfort stations were inseparable from the duties of the garrison command. Moreover, the fact that the regulations included a chapter on the use of comfort stations implies that the act of going on leave and visiting the comfort station was directly linked to the original, official duties of the soldiers of the 2nd Battalion such as taking part in daily routines, performing all sorts of tasks, delivering orders or messages, protecting military secrets, and preventing espionage.

The management of comfort stations was therefore planned and executed within the operational framework of military units from the beginning. Soldiers who gained permission to leave visited comfort stations to be provided with "authorized comfort." Such leaves based on *Guntai naimusho* were not personal actions, but official actions taken through a system of sexual slavery that connected Japanese commissioned officers and soldiers to comfort stations and women.

Through the morning assembly on March 20, the battalion commander gave instructions on military discipline, preparations for future operations, and healthcare.⁵⁶ And the following orders were posted in the battalion bulletin.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊本部 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-557, no. 2; 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊第2中隊 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 第2中隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-556, no. 2.

⁵⁷ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列, 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 段列 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年10月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-558, no. 2.

1. Regulation enforcement must be carried out strictly on comfort days, especially with regards to regulations on time.
2. Officers in charge of enforcement must be appointed for comfort days and take rotations.
3. Noncommissioned officers can use comfort stations from 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. in the morning on any rest day.

From the Second Sino-Japanese War to the Asia-Pacific War: The 11th Infantry Regiment

1. The Second Sino-Japanese War

The main units under the 5th Infantry Division were the 9th Brigade in command of the 11th and the 41st Regiments and the 21st Brigade in command of the 21st and the 42nd Regiments. The 9th Brigade kept war diaries since it was sent to war in March 1940, and the 1st Battalion's Artillery Platoon and the 3rd Company, as well as the 2nd Battalion's 7th Company—all under the 11th Regiment—kept war diaries that spanned between the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Asia-Pacific War. Such diaries can provide clues about changes in the comfort women system that were linked to the movements of military units as the war spread from China to South-east Asia.

After the battles in Shanghai and Nanjing ended, the 9th Brigade received orders to move on January 10, 1938, and arrived in Qingdao a few days later, on January 14.⁵⁸ The brigade commander Major General Kuni-saki Noboru (国崎登) was appointed as the commander of the Eastern Guards.

On January 22, the 9th Brigade established the Regulations for Maintaining Security and Military Discipline in Qingdao, the first comprehensive set of regulations to guard Qingdao.⁵⁹ One article concerning military

⁵⁸ 陣中日誌 自昭和13年1月1日至昭和13年1月31日 歩兵 第9旅団 (2), 歩兵 第9旅団 陣中日誌 6/12 昭和13年1月1日~昭和13年1月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-236, no. 4.

⁵⁹ 青島に於ける警備並に軍秩維持に関する規定 昭和13年1月, 歩兵第9旅団陣中日誌 6/12 昭和13年1

discipline stipulated that leaving for purposes other than official business or bathing would be banned for the time being. At a briefing the next day attended by an aide-de-camp or a commissioned officer from each unit, the matter of leave for soldiers was discussed. This indicates that the matter was a basic factor worth considering early on when making security arrangements.

On January 31, the 5th Division's guidelines on leave were passed down to the 9th Brigade. The guidelines stated that instructions had been given for commanders of each unit to permit ordinary leave beyond February 1; however, since the decision to open comfort stations had been made, each unit had to limit leave days to avoid congestion. In other words, the 5th Division command had decided to open comfort stations and ordered units to organize ordinary leave accordingly. Units under the 9th Brigade were thereafter engaged in security tasks in Qingdao and occasionally took part in suppression operations.

Mentions of going on leave can be found in the war diaries of the Artillery Platoon and the 3rd Company under the 11th Regiment's 1st Battalion. Both units arrived in Qingdao on January 19⁶⁰ and only the 3rd Company rested on the afternoon of January 31.⁶¹ On February 1, the 1st Battalion, including the Artillery Platoon and the 3rd Company, was sent on a suppression operation and returned early in the morning of February 8. The 3rd Company rested in the afternoon, upon which most of its members, 147 out of about 190, received permission to go out. The Artillery Platoon rested for the entire day, and thirteen members were permitted to leave. These were the first instances of leave granted as per the 5th Division's instruction to permit leave from February 1. The Artillery Platoon and the 3rd Company were sent on an operation on February 14 and returned to

 月1日~昭和13年1月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-236, no. 6.

⁶⁰ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和13年12月31日 歩兵第11連隊 第1大隊砲小隊 (5), 歩兵第11連隊 第1大隊砲小隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~13年12月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-305, no. 6.

⁶¹ 陣中日誌 昭和13年度 歩兵 第11連隊 第3中隊 (1), 歩兵 第11連隊 第3中隊 陣中日誌 昭和13年7月1日~13年12月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-304, no. 2.

Qingdao ten days later, on February 24. The next day, the two units were granted leave in the afternoon.

The 5th Division thereafter took part in the Battle of Xuzhou (徐州), the Canton (廣東) Operation, and the Nanning (南寧) Operation before seizing the northern part of French Indochina. In November 1940, the division moved close to Shanghai and engaged in security tasks, operations, and training for one year. The Artillery Platoon and the 3rd Company of the 11th Regiment's 1st Battalion kept war diaries from January 1941. Not long after its move in November 1940, the 11th Regiment established its quarters in Wusong (吳淞) in Yangpu (楊浦), which was twenty kilometers north of central Shanghai. Beginning in late April, the regiment was stationed near Ningbo (寧波), to the south of Shanghai, until it returned to Wusong in October, and was then sent to the Southeast Asian warfront.

When the regiment was first stationed at Wusong, leave began to be granted early on. On January 1 and January 2, the Artillery Platoon and the 3rd Company were allowed to go out to Shanghai or Wusong under the guidance of a commissioned or noncommissioned officer. Whenever leave was permitted, the 3rd Company, with approximately 120 members, would head to Shanghai to Wusong. The Artillery Platoon, on the other hand, was a smaller unit of about fifty members so its war diaries only occasionally mention Wusong as the destination of those who went out. According to the entry for February 13 in the Artillery Platoon's war diaries, the regular leave day for both units was Friday, while other units, such as the regiment command, rested on Saturday. These leave days were likely to have been based on the "Regulations on Leave" and the Regulations for Stationing mentioned in the January 2nd and 9th bulletins of the 5th Division. Although the bulletins did not include details on those regulations, the bulletin for January 9 issued a warning to soldiers who continued to go out alone. The Regulations for Stationing must have been referring to the Regulations for "The 3rd *Matsu*" stationed near Shanghai. ("The 3rd *Matsu*" was the 11th Regiment's nickname.)

Regular leave days were granted every Friday without fail. The 3rd Company observed leave days until it left Wusong on March 23 to take part in operations and training as did the Artillery Platoon until it went into

special training on March 26. Leave days could also be rescheduled if they were canceled due to training. On January 20, the fourteen members of the 3rd Company to receive training in poison gas assembled at the regimental headquarters every day from January 21 to 24. On January 23, the day before a regular leave day, the regiment ordered the 1st Battalion members participating in the training in poison gas to rest on January 25 instead of the regular leave day on January 24. Except for one person, the 13 other members of the 3rd Company went out to Wusong from 10:00 in the morning until 4:00 in the afternoon on January 25. The 13 members of the Artillery Platoon who received training in observation and motor transportation on January 31, which was a regular rest day, were permitted to go out to Wusong between 11:00 a.m. in the morning and 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon of February 1. Both the Artillery Platoon and the 3rd Company were granted leave on March 15 due to the training and the inspection that had been carried out the previous day.

None of the records regarding the two units going on leave specifically mention visits to comfort stations. There is, however, reason to suspect that such leave days involved visits to comfort stations because venereal infections occurred. On January 17, a first-class private of the Artillery Platoon was sentenced to one day of heavy imprisonment for becoming infected with chancroid and thereby “failing to fulfill his duty.” Instead of imprisonment, he was sent to the sanatorium of the 21st Regiment on January 18. Considering that chancroid remains latent from one to seven days, the first-class private seems to have become infected either on the special leave days of January 1 and 2 or on January 10, which was a regular leave day. Mention of this incident in the records for January 16 explains that the first-class private received both punishment and admonition, particularly for “○ visiting a comfort station” (○ remains illegible).

A similar incident occurred among the 3rd Company. On February 16, a superior private was confirmed to have been infected with a venereal disease; then, he was immediately imprisoned and sentenced to one day of heavy imprisonment. The description of this incident came with the explanation that it was against the company commander’s disciplinary policy to catch a venereal infection, due to failing to take any precautions with a

prostitute at a comfort station in Wusong during a permitted leave on January 31.

2. The Asia-Pacific War

The 5th Division waited on Hainan (海南) Island in southern China and then continued to advance southward after landing in Thailand on December 8. On February 15, 1942, the British forces surrendered. The Japanese 25th Army command in Singapore ordered the 5th Division to cover all of Malaysia except for the state of Johor, which had been left to the 18th Division. While the suburbs of Singapore were assigned to the Guards Division, the Singapore Security Force was primarily organized into two battalions (i.e., the 11th Regiment's 3rd Battalion and the 41st Regiment's 1st Battalion) under the command of the 5th Division's 9th Brigade, and was to be stationed in downtown Singapore. Then orders were given to purge the Chinese in Malaysia and Singapore for the sake of public order.

As the Southern Guards, the 9th Brigade's 11th Regiment was to cover the two states of Negeri Sembilan and Melaka to the south of Kuala Lumpur. The regiment command settled down at Seremban, the capital of Negeri Sembilan. The 1st Battalion in charge of Melaka was to focus on guarding the state's capital, while the 4th Company was sent to Tampin at the southern edge of Negeri Sembilan. The 1st Battalion's 3rd Company came under the 11th Regiment's direct control on March 2 and moved to Seremban. The 2nd Battalion was ordered to serve as the Northern Guards, set up base at Seremban and dispatched one company each to Bahau, Kuala Pilah, and Kuala Klawang.⁶² Kuala Lumpur was to be covered by the 7th Company.

The circumstances of the stationed units in 1942 can be inferred through the war diaries left by the 1st Battalion's 3rd Company and Artillery Platoon as well as the 2nd Battalion's 7th Company. In Southeast Asia,

⁶² 陣中日誌 第4号 自昭和17年2月1日至昭和17年2月28日 (2), 歩兵 第11連隊 第7中隊 陣中日誌 昭和17. 1. 1~17. 6. 30. Catalogue Reference: 南西-マレー・ジャワ-61, no. 6.

the Japanese troops adhered to the practices and habits that they had developed from using comfort stations in China.

1) Circumstances in Melaka

On February 26, the 1st Battalion commander banned soldiers from going out for purposes other than official business until ordered otherwise.⁶³ The next day, the Regulations for Guarding and Stationing in Melaka were established.⁶⁴ Those regulations most likely determined the daily routines and the rest days for the battalion, because the 3rd Company rested in the barracks on March 1, just before it moved to Seremban. Moreover, the daily orders for March 20 were basically about discarding Article 18 in Chapter 5 of those regulations so that rest days would coincide with the day assigned to each unit for the use of comfort stations.⁶⁵ This change in regulations for rest days seems to have been prompted by the two suppression operations that took place from March 3rd to 8th and from March 12th to 13th. Thirty-seven members of the Artillery Platoon did, however, go out to downtown Melaka on March 10, which was Army Day.

On March 20, the comfort stations system was established. The Regulations on Using Comfort Stations were announced through the daily orders and the Artillery Platoon was to rest on Fridays, when it was assigned to use comfort stations. On March 27, thirty-seven platoon members visited *gokugakuen* (極樂園) and comfort stations. Two days later, on March 29, eleven platoon members who had remained on duty on March 27 went out to visit comfort stations and “entertainment centers.” Except for those

⁶³ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和13年12月31日 歩兵第11連隊 第1大隊砲小隊 (5), 歩兵第11連隊 第1大隊砲小隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~13年12月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-305, no. 6.

⁶⁴ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和13年12月31日 歩兵第11連隊 第1大隊砲小隊 (5), 歩兵第11連隊 第1大隊砲小隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~13年12月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-305, no. 6; 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和13年12月31日 歩兵第11連隊 第1大隊砲小隊 (5), 歩兵第11連隊 第1大隊砲小隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~13年12月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-305, no. 6.

⁶⁵ 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和13年12月31日 歩兵第11連隊 第1大隊砲小隊 (5), 歩兵第11連隊 第1大隊砲小隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~13年12月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-305, no. 6.

who were on detached duty, most of the platoon members went on leave that week.

At 11:00 in the morning on April 3, a noncommissioned officer led 35 platoon members out to visit comfort stations and entertainment venues downtown. They reassembled at 2:00 in the afternoon to enjoy Malayan and Chinese theatre and dance performances at the *gorakuen* (娛樂園) before returning to the base at 7:00 p.m. in the evening. On April 5, six platoon members who had been on duty on April 3 went out at 10:00 a.m. in the morning to visit comfort stations and entertainment venues downtown. Based on mentions about *gokugakuen* on March 27, *gorakuen* on April 3, and an “event at *gokugakuen*” on April 29, *gokugakuen* seems to have been a theater. While comfort stations never surfaced again in the diary entries from that period, there were three stations in Melaka according to a study by Hayashi Hirofumi.⁶⁶

Judging from the fact that the diary entry for April 9, a Thursday, was marked as a rest day, the platoon’s rest day was thereafter changed. However, a mobilization order issued that day caused April 11 to be designated as a substitute holiday on which 35 platoon members went out downtown. Five platoon members who remained on duty that day went out the next day on April 12.

From mid-April until mid-December, when the platoon moved to Java, Indonesia, the Artillery Platoon’s rest day continued to be Thursday. Leave was permitted every Thursday and permission was usually granted from one to three days ahead of going on leave. While the bulletin for May 28 announced that soldiers and civilian personnel were banned from entering “dance halls,” the only instruction on comfort stations was given through the bulletin for September 8, which warned soldiers not to visit the “Melaka Military Club (London Comfort Station)” because it had been shut down that day.

The platoon’s rest day was changed several more times and temporary

⁶⁶ Hayashi Hirofumi, マレー半島における日本軍慰安所について, *Shizen ningen shakai* 15 (July 1993). A paper with the same title was accessed online on July 16, 2018 (<http://www.geocities.jp/hhhirofumi/paper09.htm>).

leave days were granted from time to time. The leave day on June 10 (Wednesday) was granted because an inspection by the battalion commander was scheduled for the next day, in order to prepare for the inspection by the new division commander from June 12 to 13. The rest days scheduled for July 15 (Wednesday), August 12 (Wednesday), and October 14 (Wednesday) were moved up because of a dispatch assignment the following day, and rest on July 22 also had to be moved up because of an inspection by the battalion commander. Rest on November 19 had to be pushed back two days due to shooting for a film about the Japanese landings in Malaysia. Temporary leave was granted on a holiday related to the Japanese imperial family, including the Emperor's birthday on April 29, the grand festival day of Yasukuni Shrine on April 30 and October 23, Autumnal Equinox Day on September 23, *Niinamesai* on October 17, the Emperor Meiji's birthday on November 3, as well as other special days, such as August 15 to celebrate the fall of Singapore six months earlier or the first anniversary of the Great East Asia War on December 8. *Guntai naimusho* (Article 196) served as the basis for granting temporary leave, which would be notified through the daily orders given by the 1st Battalion.

The Regulations for Guarding and Stationing in Melaka most likely embodied what had been established earlier through the Regulations on Using Comfort Stations of March 20 and therefore set a standard for going on leave and using comfort stations. On April 26, the establishment of the Regulations for Stationing in Melaka was announced through the battalion's daily orders. A few months later, changes were made on September 2 to the rest day assignment stipulated in the Regulations for Guarding and Stationing in Melaka.

On August 22, daily orders were given on the 11th Regiment's operational order related to the 5th Division's plan to move. The next day, the 1st Battalion permitted temporary leave for the battalion command (August 23), the Machine Gun Company and Artillery Platoon (August 24), and the 4th Company (August 25). However, the move scheduled for August 30 was postponed. On September 2, the battalion's daily orders indicated that the rest day assignment in the Regulations for Guarding and Stationing in Melaka had been revised as follows.

Table 3. Assignment of Rest Days for the 11th Infantry Regiment's 1st Battalion

	Sun.	Mon.	Tue.	Wed.	Thu.	Fri.	Sat.
Units Off Duty	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security Force Command • Battalion Transport Squad 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Machine Gun Company 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1st Company 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The <i>Ikagura</i> (Foot Guards) • Military Police 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Battalion Artillery Platoon 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4th Company 	

The reason for revising the rest day schedule was because a rest day had to be designated for the newly assigned *Ikagura* Foot Guards. Because regular rest days were synchronized with the day a unit was permitted to use comfort stations, the arrival of new units made it necessary to realign arrangements crucial to the operation of the security forces. The 11th Regiment's orders given on August 30 announced that two infantry companies of the Sawamura (沢村) Detachment were to be reassigned to the 3rd Company. The 1st Battalion's orders given on August 31 announced that one infantry company, most likely the *Ikagura* Foot Guards, would be newly placed under the battalion's command at midnight. "Sawamura" here refers to Sawamura Shunsuke (沢村駿甫), the commander of the 5th Infantry Regiment under the Guards Division.⁶⁷

On September 3, thirty Artillery Platoon members went downtown from 10:00 a.m. in the morning. Three of those on duty that day (the non-commissioned officer of the day, the superior-private of the day, and the platoon member on duty) went downtown on September 4 and returned by 7:00 p.m. in the evening. As mentioned above, despite the reassignment of rest days, soldiers continued to regularly take leave until they had moved to Java, Indonesia in the middle of December.

⁶⁷ The *Ikagura* Foot Guards and the 4th Company moved on October 27, but the war diaries made no mention of changes to rest days. Other units also assigned comfort stations to units temporarily stationed at a large garrison.

2) The Circumstances in Seremban

• Leave and the Use of Comfort Stations

The 3rd Company repeatedly engaged in training and suppression missions from the day it arrived at Seremban on March 2 until it moved to Gemas on the eastern border of Negeri Sembilan. Meanwhile, the 7th Company stayed in Kuala Lumpur for one month until it dispatched a platoon to Bahau approximately 15 kilometers away from Kuala Lumpur on April 22.

March 15 and 22 were marked as off days in the 3rd Company's war diaries, but the diaries mention nothing about leave on those two Sundays. The diaries instead indicate that the first leave was taken on March 26, which was a Thursday. On this day, 30 soldiers left their barracks to take "special leave on official business," which appears to have been a reward for purging, in other words, killing the Chinese and the Malayan Chinese in downtown Melaka and Seremban when many in the 11th Brigade were called out on March 24 and 25.

Apart from three exceptions, the 3rd Company's war diaries indicate that 18 to 75 company members went on leave every Thursday at Seremban until the company moved to Gemas. The first exception occurred on May 28, when 40 company members were permitted to leave after 10 a.m. in the morning but were required to return by 3:00 in the afternoon because the newly appointed regiment commander was scheduled to arrive at 5:50 that evening. The diary entry for June 11 states that although it was a rest day, leave was not granted because the company was in isolation. It remains uncertain, however, whether the isolation had been triggered by a venereal infection, since diary entries around the time bear no such mention. Before departing for Gemas on July 2, a rest day was moved up to July 1, allowing 75 company members to go out between 10:00 a.m. in the morning and 8:00 p.m. in the evening. Like the Artillery Platoon in Melaka, temporary leave was granted on April 29 and 30 for the 3rd Company as well as the 7th Company.

According to the testimonies Hayashi Hirofumi heard from Japanese troops, there were more than two comfort stations in Seremban. One local who appears to have been of Korean or Taiwanese descent testified that the comfort station in the area had seven to eight women who spoke Japanese

and bore a horizontal sign that read “Seifusō (清風荘)” and a vertical sign that read “Japanese Military Comfort Station” at its main entrance.

The 7th Company’s war diaries offer further clues as to how Japanese soldiers regarded comfort stations. The Southern Guards’ bulletin for March 23 warned that soldiers were banned from visiting brothels other than the comfort stations approved by the Army Service Corps. A few days later, the bulletin brought up the case of a soldier who exhibited undisciplined manners while on leave as an example to caution soldiers. On March 27, the bulletin stated that noncommissioned officers were banned from bringing soldiers to the officer’s club to dine or entertain and criticized a noncommissioned officer from a branch of the Army Service Corps who had gone on leave wearing his slippers. As a result, through the bulletin for March 28, the 2nd Battalion ordered commissioned officers to oversee the observation of military discipline and morals because soldiers were often committing displeasing acts after being stationed for the first time in a while. The bulletin for April 10 declared that second-class patrol as well as independent patrol would be carried out whenever off-duty soldiers went on leave.⁶⁸ The bulletin for April 24 reiterated that tickets had to be purchased beforehand in order to use a comfort station and ordered patrol officers to rigorously track down and report soldiers who had violated the regulation.⁶⁹

Disciplinary issues while on leave or at comfort stations nevertheless continued to arise. The Southern Guards’ bulletin for May 20 and 22 both remarked on the undisciplined attire and the manners of the soldiers who went on leave.⁷⁰ On September 13, the 3rd Company commander called for soldiers on leave to display proper salutations and manners. On November 30, he ordered soldiers not to dine at restaurants other than those designated by

⁶⁸ 陣中日誌 昭和13年度 歩兵 第11連隊 第3中隊 (1), 歩兵 第11連隊 第3中隊 陣中日誌 昭和13年1月1日~13年12月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-304, no. 2; 陣中日誌 第4号 自昭和17年2月1日至昭和17年2月28日 (2), 歩兵 第11連隊 第7中隊 陣中日誌 昭和17. 1. 1~17. 6. 30. Catalogue Reference: 南西-マレー・ジャワ-61, no. 6.

⁶⁹ 陣中日誌 昭和13年度 歩兵 第11連隊 第3中隊 (1), 歩兵 第11連隊 第3中隊 陣中日誌 昭和13年1月1日~13年12月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-304, no. 2.

⁷⁰ 陣中日誌 第4号 自昭和17年2月1日至昭和17年2月28日 (2), 歩兵 第11連隊 第7中隊 陣中日誌 昭和17. 1. 1~17. 6. 30. Catalogue Reference: 南西-マレー・ジャワ-61, no. 6.

Table 4. Prospective Assignment of Rest Days for the Northern Guards

	Sun.	Mon.	Tue.	Wed.	Thu.	Fri.	Sat.
Units Off Duty	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security Force Command • 2 Battalion Command • Military Police 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regimental Gun Company • 5th Company • 2nd Battalion Artillery Platoon 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rapid Gun Fire Company • 6th Company • 2nd Machine Gun Company 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Signal Detachment • 7th Company • 2nd Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3rd Company • 8th Company • Military Engineers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 Field Hospital • Railway Detachment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Army Service Corps • Construction Detachment • Signal Detachment

Note: This is a prospective assignment that can be changed through agreement between different units due to missions to purge or to sabotage and such changes must be promptly reported to the Northern Guards Command.

Table 5. Assignment of Rest Days in Accordance with the Regulations for Stationing at Seremban

	Sun.	Mon.	Tue.	Wed.	Thu.	Fri.	Sat.
Units Off Duty	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security Force Command • 2nd Battalion Artillery Platoon • Postal Detachment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 Battalion Command • 5th Company • 2nd Machine Gun Company 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rapid Fire Gun Company • 6th Company • Regimental Gun Company 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Signal Detachment • 7th Company • 2nd Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department • Main Force of the 4th Field Hospital 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 3rd Company • 8th Company 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Part of the 4th Field Hospital • Railway Detachment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military Police • Army Service Corps • Signal Detachment

Note: This assignment can be changed through agreement between different units due to missions to purge or sabotage and such changes must be promptly reported to the Guards Command.

the Military Club, to salute properly, and to be punctual. The regiment bulletin for December 3 announced orders to not go out alone, or dine at unap-

proved restaurants, or use violence at comfort stations and restaurants.⁷¹

Since comfort stations approved by the Army Service Corps were already in place by March 23, when they were mentioned in the Southern Guards' bulletin, the regulations for their use had to be established as quickly as possible. The 7th Company's diary entry for March 29 shows that the Prospective Assignment of Rest Days for the Northern Guards had been prepared as follows:

The above assignment was prospective probably because the regulations for stationing were yet to be established. Once the Regulations for Stationing at Seremban were established on April 20, the 7th Company commander, in charge of guarding the Japanese-occupied territory in Seremban, stated that those regulations had served as a basis for the establishment of the Regulations for Stationing in Kuala Pilah and Bahau on April 25.⁷² On May 22, the daily orders given by the Southern Guards announced that changes had been made to the assignment of rest days, superseding the Regulations for Stationing at Seremban established on April 20, 1942.

The changes made on May 22 seem to be related to the fact that the Postal Detachment came to be stationed at Seremban instead of the Construction Detachment and military engineers. The reason for listing the 6th Company and the 8th Company in parentheses is yet to be determined.

As previously mentioned, the 7th Company rested in the barracks on both days it was granted rest, both before and after being called out on March 24 and 27. On March 29, Wednesday became the company's assigned rest day. The next Wednesday arrived on April 1, but the company rested in the barracks instead of going out. On April 3, a comfort station opened in Kuala Pilah. Technically, the company was supposed to wait until its next rest day on April 8, but special leave was granted the following day on April 4. After cleaning the weapons and the bicycles for inspection by the newly appointed battalion commander and receiving instructions re-

⁷¹ 陣中日誌 第4号 自昭和17年2月1日至昭和17年2月28日(2), 歩兵 第11連隊 第7中隊 陣中日誌 昭和17. 1. 1~17. 6. 30. Catalogue Reference: 南西-マレー・ジャワ-61, no. 6.

⁷² クワラピラ・バハウ駐留規定 昭和17年4月25日, 歩兵 第11連隊 第7中隊 陣中日誌 昭和17. 1. 1~17. 6. 30. Catalogue Reference: 南西-マレー・ジャワ-61, no. 14.

garding going on leave in the morning, 37 company members went out and returned by 6:00 p.m. in the evening. A reconnaissance mission made it impossible to take leave on April 15, but temporary leave was granted instead on April 20. Temporary leave was also granted on May 7 because the company had to be vaccinated the previous day against cholera and smallpox. The company thereafter continued to be granted leave on Wednesdays or on Thursdays for those who were on duty the previous day.

On July 3, the 3rd Company was stationed in Gemas in order to serve as the Eastern Guards alongside a branch of the Army Service Corps, military police, and Signal Detachment. The 2nd Platoon settled down at a separate location in Kampung Tengah, i.e., today's downtown Gemencheh. The linear distance between Gemas and Kampung Tengah was more than 20 kilometers. The diary entries regarding the company's time in Gemas bear no mention of comfort stations. The only similar reference is "restaurants designated by the Military Club" which appeared in an entry for November 30. Based on a Japanese soldier's testimony about a comfort station in Hayashi Hirofumi's research paper, it would be reasonable to assume that soldiers who went on leave must have paid visits to comfort stations.

On their first day of leave on July 7, thirty-two members of the 3rd Company went to downtown Gemas between 10:00 a.m. in the morning and 5:20 p.m. in the afternoon. The following day the five members who had been on duty the day before went out. Due to the frequent schemes to purge surrounding districts, the company's second leave took place on July 27. Except for the 18th, when the entire company was subjected to a uniform inspection and weapon cleaning, the company regularly went out on Mondays in August, or on Tuesdays for those who had been on duty the previous day. In late August, the company had been scheduled to move with the Artillery Platoon to Singapore until the plan was postponed. From September, the company focused on training and continued to be granted leave on Sundays instead of Mondays. Temporary leave was often granted as well.

What is worth taking note of is the 2nd Platoon's actions while on leave in Gemas. On July 12, an automobile was allocated for the platoon's

leave day. The platoon members arrived at the Guards command at 11:20 a.m. and used the same automobile to return by 6:30 in the evening. The war diaries that the platoon kept also mention six of its members who took an automobile back and forth to go on leave.⁷³ While most of the 3rd Company was engaged in a purging scheme on July 23, ten platoon members again used an automobile to go out. On July 31, eight members also took leave and traveled back and forth to Gemas via automobile. On August 1, the platoon moved to Ayer Kuning, which used to be guarded by the 1st Company, but the platoon was not granted leave, possibly because its stay in Ayer Kuning lasted a mere two weeks.⁷⁴

• Regulations for Stationing and Comfort Stations

As previously mentioned, the 7th Company established the Regulations for Stationing in Kuala Pilah and Bahau on April 25. These regulations seem to have been devised to reflect the change in circumstances that occurred when the 7th Company was ordered on April 20 to move part of its troops to Bahau in order to relieve the 6th Company. The 1st Platoon thus was stationed at Bahau from April 20. The regulations included general rules, as well as rules pertaining to security and other areas of duty, military discipline and morals, internal affairs, emergencies and fires, and hygiene. Examining the regulations can therefore help have a better understanding of those of higher units and how both of them were practically applied to the use of comfort stations.

Details pertaining to rest days were stipulated by the rules for internal affairs. Guards in Kuala Pilah and Bahau could take leave on Wednesdays and could go out as far as the boundaries of the area they were guarding. All matters involving leave on rest days were to abide by the Regulations for Stationing at Seremban. Soldiers going out on official business or taking leave were banned from eating or drinking downtown during that time,

⁷³ 「カンボンテナー」 警備日誌 自昭和17年7月2日至昭和17年7月31日, 歩兵 第11連隊 第3中隊 陣中日誌 昭和17. 6. 1~17. 12. 31. Catalogue Reference: 南西-マレー・ジャワ-58, no. 8.

⁷⁴ 「アイエルクニン」 警備日誌 自昭和17年8月1日至昭和17年8月16日, 歩兵第11連隊 第3中隊 陣中日誌 昭和17. 6. 1~17. 12. 31. Catalogue Reference: 南西-マレー・ジャワ-58, no. 12.

although eating at restaurants inside comfort stations was allowed. This appears to have been a decision made for hygienic reasons.

The war diaries of the 1st Platoon guarding Bahau indicate that leave was not granted as per regulations. Until the platoon returned to Kuala Pilah on August 15 to rejoin its company, it was granted only four days of rest on April 30, May 14 (Thursday), June 10 (Wednesday), and July 14 (Tuesday). Rest days were not only less frequent than before, but were also irregular. The only mention regarding taking leave was on April 30, the grand festival day of Yasukuni Shrine, when special leave was granted for the afternoon. Such circumstances stood in stark contrast to those of the 3rd Company, which even provided an automobile to facilitate soldiers going on leave. This suggests that the smaller the unit, the greater the chances for leave, depending on the commander's inclination to grant it.

According to Hayashi Hirofumi, there were two comfort stations with a total of 18 Chinese comfort women in Kuala Pilah.⁷⁵ Five women were at the comfort station for commissioned officers and military policemen, and 13 women were at the comfort station for soldiers, which seems to have been called "Shōwa (昭和) Park." Records indicate that visits to the "Park" were made on May 27 and 28 as well as July 9, while visits to "Shōwa Park" were made on June 8, 22, and 24. Shōwa Park was not located within the permitted boundaries of leave in Kuala Pilah. The Park was located in what is now the center of downtown Kuala Pilah, and considering that one side of its square outline was less than 500 meters long, it would be safe to assume that the Park was in fact a comfort station.

The analysis thus far shows that the regulations on leave applied to the units stationed at Seremban were based on regulations established by higher units. For instance, the 7th Company's regulations for stationing were based on the 11th Regiment's Regulations for Stationing at Seremban. The general rules in the 7th Company's regulations for stationing stipulated that the regulations on guarding or maintaining military order, disci-

⁷⁵ Hayashi Hirofumi, マレー半島における日本軍慰安所について, *Shizen ningen shakai* 15 (July 1993). A paper with the same title was accessed online on July 16, 2018 (<http://www.geocities.jp/hhhirofumi/paper09.htm>).

pline, and morals were established according to the Regulations for Stationing at Seremban. The garrison decree, work decree, *Sakusen yomurei*, and *Guntai naimusho* were to be consulted on matters that were not covered through the Regulations for Stationing at Seremban.

Apart from these regulations, the 5th Division had separately established the Regulations on Leave While Stationed in Malaysia. Two daily orders issued by the Southern Guards hint at why such regulations were separately established. The order given on April 28 stated that because noncommissioned officers were exhibiting undisciplined behavior on leave, each unit must screen everyone going out, provide rigorous training beforehand, and organize individual patrols as per Article 3 of the Regulations on Leave While Stationed in Malaysia.⁷⁶ The order given on June 22 announced that changes had been made to the time for the evening roll call defined in the Regulations for Stationing at Seremban and to details pertinent to noncommissioned officers in the Regulations on Leave While Stationed in Malaysia.⁷⁷

The 25th Army was the highest among the Japanese military units stationed on the Malay Peninsula. Its command in Singapore issued orders to units in different locations through the Army Bulletin. Through the May 14 edition, the 25th Army Command warned that soldiers and civilian personnel should not be allowed to use automobiles to visit comfort stations. This warning was mentioned in war diaries by the 11th Regiment's 7th Company and the 42nd Independent Motor Battalion. The warning was mainly aimed at saving petroleum but was relevant to the practice of visiting comfort stations on leave.

As such, the use of comfort stations went in tandem with the daily operations of Japanese military units. The regiment bulletin for June 1 an-

⁷⁶ 陣中日誌 昭和13年度 歩兵 第11連隊 第3中隊 (1), 歩兵 第11連隊 第3中隊 陣中日誌 昭和13年1月1日~13年12月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-304, no. 2; 陣中日誌 第4号 自昭和17年2月1日至昭和17年2月28日 (2), 歩兵 第11連隊 第7中隊 陣中日誌 昭和17. 1. 1~17. 6. 30. Catalogue Reference: 南西-マレー・ジャワ-61, no. 6.

⁷⁷ 陣中日誌 第4号 自昭和17年2月1日至昭和17年2月28日 (2), 歩兵 第11連隊 第7中隊 陣中日誌 昭和17. 1. 1~17. 6. 30. Catalogue Reference: 南西-マレー・ジャワ-61, no. 6.

nounced that because the unit name had been changed to “Koi (鯉) 5173,” everyone in the regiment had to renew their official military pass by June 10 and submit them to be stamped.⁷⁸ Old passes with different unit names could not be used beyond June 15, which naturally affected regular leave and visits to comfort stations.

Conclusion

Fundamental regulations such as *Jinchū (Sakusen) yomurei* and *Guntai naimusho*, in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and the Asia-Pacific War (1941-1945), and war diaries have so far been examined and considered to determine how the stationing of Japanese military units was connected to the establishment and operation of comfort stations. The mechanism between Japanese soldiers and comfort stations was formed contemporaneously with the Mukden Incident in 1931. As individual units came to be stationed in certain areas, rest days were designated, and soldiers went on leave and caught venereal diseases from visiting brothels. Brothels and women with venereal infections were, however, left under the indirect control of the police and the military police.

Then, the system of comfort stations was further developed after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The case of the 2nd Independent Siege Heavy Artillery Battalion shows that the operation of comfort stations became stabilized as the battalion settled down and assigned regular rest days. Each unit would divide a rest day into multiple time slots for smaller groups of soldiers to be led out and visit comfort stations. Soldiers and noncommissioned officers used comfort stations at separate hours. The practice of using comfort stations became relevant to regulations on internal affairs to the extent that formal regulations were later established on the operation and the use of comfort stations. If combat or training caused changes to the schedule for visiting comfort stations, such changes were

⁷⁸ 陣中日誌 昭和13年度 歩兵 第11連隊 第3中隊 (1), 歩兵 第11連隊 第3中隊 陣中日誌 昭和13年1月1日~13年12月31日. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-304, no. 2.

officially announced through daily orders. Comfort stations were therefore established and operated according to a strictly top-down approach.

Meanwhile, the Regulations for Comfort Stations established by the 14th Regiment are significant for two reasons. One is because the details relating to the establishment of comfort stations, covered in 41 articles and standardized forms, are suspected to have helped the Japanese Central China Area Army (or the Japanese Central China Expeditionary Army) devise a manual that fashioned regulations for comfort stations. The 14th Regiment's Regulations for Comfort Stations indicated that the billet commander had the power to authorize the operation of comfort stations, which became pertinent to the unit in settling down at and governing an occupied area.

The war diaries, kept by the 11th Regiment and other units under the 9th Infantry Brigade, reveal how the comfort station system formed in China and expanded to Southeast Asia. Policies on stationing and taking leave, not to mention the use of comfort stations, became absorbed by the regulations for stationing. Regulations on granting leave tended to be based on other regulations previously established by higher units. The 11th Regiment's Regulations for Stationing at Seremban and the 5th Division's Regulations on Leave While Stationed in Malaysia outranked the 7th Company's Regulations for Stationing.

The findings above demonstrate that from the beginning the use of comfort stations was arranged within the framework of operating military units and that soldiers were granted leave to seek comfort at comfort stations approved and controlled by military units. Whenever a unit was stationed somewhere, according to the *Sakusen yomurei*, it would grant leave based on the *Guntai naimusho*. Thus, such leave days were official acts that connected comfort women to commissioned officers and soldiers, thereby leading to the creation of the Japanese military system of sexual slavery.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 陣中要務令制定、野外要務令第1部廃止の件、密大日記 4冊の内 2 大正3年, 1914. Catalogue Reference: 陸軍省-密大日記-T3-2-5, no. 64. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2006083122032412143&ID=M2006083122041212272&REFCODE=C03022357300>.
- 陣中要務令改定に関する件、永存書類甲輯 第4類 大正13年, 1924. Catalogue Reference: 陸軍省-大日記甲輯-T13-3-15, no. 24. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2006090102394440470&ID=M2006090102394640494&REFCODE=C02031162900>.
- 混成第14旅団 将校同相当官職員表 (昭和7年9月24日調)、関東軍職員表 昭和7年9月, 1932. Catalogue Reference: 中央-軍事行政職員表-39, no. 3. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2013071117233675508&ID=M2013071117233675511&REFCODE=C13070939900>.
- 「12月」, 『歩兵第27連隊 第1歩兵砲小隊陣中日誌 2/2 昭7. 9. 19~9. 3. 2, 1932. Catalogue Reference: 満洲-満洲事変-206, no. 7. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2014032016083853233&ID=M2014032016083953240&REFCODE=C14030324000>.
- [衛生業務旬報] 自昭和7年9月24日至昭和8年12月10日, 衛生業務旬報, 1932. Catalogue Reference: 返赤43011000. <https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/das/image/F0000000000000218579>.
- 1月5日 晴 海拉爾, 混成第14旅団 陣中日誌 昭8. 1. 1~8. 1. 31, 1933. Catalogue Reference: 満洲-満洲事変-129, no. 6. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2014032016075252371&ID=M2014032016075252377&REFCODE=C14030237700>.
- 昭和8年1月27日 奉天駐留規定 混成第14旅団司令部, 混成第14旅団 陣中日誌 昭8. 1. 1~8. 1. 31, 1933. Catalogue Reference: 満洲-満洲事変-129, no. 29. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2014032016075252371&ID=M2014032016075352400&REFCODE=C14030240000>.
- 陣中日誌 第4号 自昭和12年12月1日至昭和12年12月31日 野戦重砲兵 第14連隊 第1大隊本部 (3), 支那事変 陣中日誌 第4号 昭和12年12月, 1937. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事変全般-330, no. 4. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2011112915311298653&ID=M2011112915311298657&REFCODE=C11110645400>.

- 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊本部 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日, 1937. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-557, no. 2. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2011112915411005994&ID=M2011112915411005996&REFCODE=C11111379200>.
- 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 第2中隊 (1), 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 第2中隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年9月30日, 1937. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-556, no. 2. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2011112915410905985&ID=M2011112915410905987&REFCODE=C11111378300>.
- 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和12年8月31日 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列, 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊段列 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~12年10月31日, 1937. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-558, no. 2. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2011112915411006006&ID=M2011112915411006008&REFCODE=C11111380400>.
- 常州地区警備 (衛戍服務) 規定 昭和12年12月 常州地区警備隊, 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年12月1日~13年1月31日, 1937. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变上海・南京-230, no. 7. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2011112915504111000&ID=M2011112915504211007&REFCODE=C11111880300>.
- 陣中日誌 自昭和12年7月27日至昭和13年12月31日 歩兵第11連隊 第1大隊砲小隊 (5), 歩兵第11連隊 第1大隊砲小隊 陣中日誌 昭和12年7月27日~13年12月31日, 1937. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-305, no. 6. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2011112915392203987&ID=M2011112915392203993&REFCODE=C1111178900>.
- 常州駐屯間内務規定 昭和13年3月 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊, 独立攻城重砲兵 第2大隊 關係資料 常州駐屯間内務規定警備間教育規定, 1938. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变上海・南京-270, no. 2. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2011112915510411401&ID=M2011112915510411403&REFCODE=C11111919900>.
- 陣中日誌 自昭和13年1月1日至昭和13年1月31日 歩兵第9旅団 (2), 歩兵第9旅団 陣中日誌 6/12 昭和13年1月1日~昭和13年1月31日, 1938. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-236, no. 4. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2011112915385903558&ID=M2011112915385903562&REFCODE=C1111135800>.

青島に於ける警備並に軍秩維持に関する規定 昭和13年1月, 歩兵第9旅団 陣中日誌 6/12 昭和13年1月1日~昭和13年1月31日, 1938. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-236, no. 6. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2011112915385903558&ID=M2011112915385903564&REFCODE=C11111136000>.

陣中日誌 昭和13年度 歩兵第11連隊 第3中隊 (1), 歩兵第11連隊 第3中隊 陣中日誌 昭和13年1月1日~13年12月31日, 1938. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事变北支-304, no. 2. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2011112915392203978&ID=M2011112915392203980&REFCODE=C11111177600>.

陣中日誌 第4号 自昭和17年2月1日至昭和17年2月28日 (2), 歩兵 第11連隊 第7中隊 陣中日誌 昭和17. 1. 1~17. 6. 30, 1942. Catalogue Reference: 南西-マレー・ジャワ-61, no. 6. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2014120214355824309&ID=M2014120214355824315&REFCODE=C14110590500>.

クワラピラ・バハウ駐留規定 昭和17年4月25日, 歩兵 第11連隊 第7中隊 陣中日誌 昭和17. 1. 1~17. 6. 30, 1942. Catalogue Reference: 南西-マレー・ジャワ-61, no. 14. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2014120214355824309&ID=M2014120214355824323&REFCODE=C14110591300>.

「カンポンテンガー」警備日誌 自昭和17年7月2日至昭和17年7月31日, 歩兵 第11連隊 第3中隊 陣中日誌 昭和17. 6. 1~17. 12. 31, 1942. Catalogue Reference: 南西-マレー・ジャワ-58, no. 8. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2014120214355624272&ID=M2014120214355624280&REFCODE=C14110587000>.

「アイエルクニン」警備日誌 自昭和17年8月1日至昭和17年8月16日, 歩兵第11連隊 第3中隊 陣中日誌 昭和17. 6. 1~17. 12. 31, 1942. Catalogue Reference: 南西-マレー・ジャワ-58, no. 12. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/listPhoto?LANG=default&BID=F2014120214355624272&ID=M2014120214355624284&REFCODE=C14110587400>.

Korean Wartime 'Comfort Women' and Japan's National Responsibility

Myungsuk YUN

Research Institute on Japanese Military 'Sexual Slavery' Issue,
Women's Human Rights Institute of Korea

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 17 Number 2 (Summer 2021), 153-200

Copyright © 2021 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

Korean Wartime ‘Comfort Women’ and Japan’s National Responsibility*

Myungsuk YUN

Research Institute on Japanese Military ‘Sexual Slavery’ Issue,
Women’s Human Rights Institute of Korea

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate Japan’s national responsibility for its wartime comfort women system. The Japanese government acknowledges its involvement in the system and its military’s inhumane acts toward comfort women, but it does not accept its national responsibility. Furthermore, the rise of neo-liberalism in Japanese society facilitates the glorification of its national history, disseminating the view that “Japan as a nation has no responsibility for wartime comfort women.” This neo-conservative leaning in Japan poses a great hurdle for the future of cooperative relations between Korea and Japan. Against this backdrop, finding the truth about wartime comfort women is a pressing matter to resolve for the future relations of the two countries, and this paper is an attempt at this endeavor.

This truth-finding endeavor focuses its research on Korean comfort women, comfort stations built in China, and direct and indirect evidence from various sources. With the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War (July 1937–November 1941), the Japanese system of wartime comfort sta-

* This translated article is a revised and supplemented version of Yun Myungsuk, “조선인 군위안부와 일본의 국가책임,” 한국독립운동사연구 11 (December, 1997): 349-78.

tions took its full shape, and the largest number of Korean comfort women were deployed to mainland China.

While comfort women were recruited in various ways depending on their nationalities, the largest proportion of Korean comfort women were recruited through brokers who were hired by private contractors designated by the military. This paper, however, investigates only private contractors, not brokers, since private contractors were the direct link to the Japanese government or the Japanese military.

No documented evidence has yet been found indicating that the Japanese Government-General of Korea was directly engaged in recruiting comfort women in Korea. This is in part because the Japanese government has not allowed the public access to documents of the Ministry of Colonial Affairs and the Home Ministry, both of which supervised the Government-General of Korea, nor to police documents during the imperial era. However, there are ways to assess the situation. First, documents from the Government-General of Taiwan can shed light since it was in a similar situation to Korea. Second, administrative directives that the central government of Japan issued to local governments are another source of evidence since the same directives were likely sent to the Government-General of Korea. Despite the limitations, including the paucity of records, these complementary methods enable this study to reconstruct the entirety of Imperial Japan's comfort women system and illuminate Japan's national responsibility.

The discussion is divided into four parts presented in the following order: Section 1 relates the course of the comfort women issue from its dramatic appearance as a significant social issue for the current state. In addition, it provides an overview of the stances of the Japanese government, civic groups, victims, and international organizations regarding Japan's national responsibility concerning wartime comfort women. Section 2 explores the Imperial Japan's motives for establishing comfort stations in its war zones, including the circumstances leading up to the military's direct installation of comfort stations. Section 3 gives detailed accounts of how the Japanese government and the military supervised and controlled the comfort station system in the following order: the installation of comfort

stations, the recruitment of comfort women, their transportation to designated stations, and the operation of comfort stations. Lastly, the conclusion touches on the author's opinions regarding the pending reparations issue concerning comfort women victims and the lessons that we must learn from this historical tragedy.

Controversies over Japan's Wartime Comfort Women System

1. Revelation of the Comfort Women Issue

The issue of Japan's wartime 'comfort women' gained public attention in association with the nation's postwar reparations in 1991 with the Korean woman Kim Hak-sun's public testimony of her experience as a comfort woman under the Imperial Japanese army. She was the first former comfort woman who publicly testified under her real name. Beginning with her press conference, Korean and Japanese civic organizations officially raised Japan's responsibility to compensate comfort women victims, and since then it has developed into one of the thorniest diplomatic issues between South Korea and Japan.

Individual reparations for various groups of victims under Japanese colonial rule had already been an issue long before the comfort women issue came about. Notable cases are conscripted Korean laborers, repatriation of Korean expatriates in Sakhalin, and Class B and Class C war criminals; none of these issues have been resolved yet. However, these cases have not created as momentous an impact and controversy as the comfort women issue. The report on the brutal sexual abuses that the women had suffered grabbed the media spotlight as well as international attention at that time due to the increasing awareness of women's rights. In addition, the courage of a sex slavery victim's public testimony in her real name made a dramatic impression on people. The Japanese media also covered Kim Hak-sun's accounts of comfort station experiences extensively as the Japanese public watched the news with complicated feelings.

Kim Hak-sun's testimony was triggered by a series of events at the

time of South Korean President Roh Taewoo's visit to Japan in May 1990. A South Korean women's group released a statement demanding an apology and compensation from the Japanese government to *Jeongshindae* victims. In response to these demands, the Japanese government strongly denied any state-level involvement in wartime comfort stations, claiming that they were run by private businesses.

Furious with the Japanese government's blatant denial, Kim Hak-sun made her first public testimony. Following this event, Professor Yoshimi Yoshiaki (吉見義明) of Chuo University discovered an official document in the library of Japan's Ministry of Defense that demonstrates the Japanese military's direct involvement in the recruitment of comfort women. *The Asahi Shimbun* covered his findings in its headline of the January 11, 1992 issue, and as a result, the Japanese government could no longer maintain its denial.

On the following day, January 12, 1992, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kato Koichi (加藤紘一) officially acknowledged the Japanese military's involvement in wartime comfort stations and, on the next day, announced an official statement of apology to the victims at a press conference. All of these events took place just before Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa Ki-ichi's (宮澤喜一) visit to South Korea on January 17, on which he made a formal apology at his summit meeting with the South Korean president.

After this dramatic revelation, Japanese scholars and civilians unearthed a substantial number of materials concerning Japan's wartime comfort women system. Pushed by Korean and Japanese civic groups' demands for truth, the Japanese government also released its own investigative reports on comfort women twice, on July 6, 1992 and August 4, 1993, but they were little more than a recycling of already known facts and thus, were vastly inadequate. Despite activists' continuous demands for more detailed information about comfort women, the Japanese government has not responded.

2. Stances on Japan's National Responsibility

This subsection summarizes the stances of relevant parties—the Japanese

government, right wing Japanese, victims, and the international community—on Japan's national responsibility and reparations for wartime comfort women.

1) The Japanese Government

As mentioned before, the initial position of the Japanese government was that “wartime comfort women had traveled with private contractors, following military forces” and that the Japanese government had not taken any part in the operation of comfort stations. This position has changed since Kim Hak-Sun's testimony and since the revelation of evidence in January 1992, which were enough to acknowledge the military's involvement and to necessitate the issuance of a formal apology to victims.

Later, on August 4, 1993, along with the second government-level investigative report, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei (河野 洋平) made an official statement that admitted “military and government authorities' involvement in the comfort system” and “the use of coercion while recruiting and managing comfort women,” acknowledging “profound human rights violations in the core of the system.” Despite some progress, this statement has still left room for the interpretation that private contractors were the principal agents of procuring comfort women and operating the comfort system. In other words, the Kono statement acknowledges the Japanese government's involvement in the comfort system to a certain extent but leaves a nuance that the overall responsibility was placed on private contractors.

On the same day, however, the Cabinet's Foreign Affairs Office released a report entitled “On the Issue of Wartime Comfort Women,” which stated, “Comfort women were always under the supervision of the military and were forced to move with troops because they were in battle zones. Thus, it is evident that they were forced into a miserable life with no freedom.” This document seems to suggest that the military played the main role in the comfort system, a different position from the Kono Statement. From this, we can see that the Japanese government has not been clear and consistent with its stance on who was mainly responsible for the comfort system—the military or the private contractors.

Turning to the issue of reparations for comfort women, the Japanese government maintains the stance that all reparation issues have been settled with South Korea and thus individual reparation for comfort women is out of the question.

Three years after the Japanese government's admission of its military's involvement in the comfort system, Prime Minister Murayama Tomichi (村山 富市), the chairman of the Japan Socialist Party, led the coalition cabinet. In his speech delivered on August 31, 1994, a couple of days before Japan's 50th postwar anniversary, Murayama proposed a blueprint of "peaceful and friendly relations" and declared that the government would seek "a wide way of engaging the Japanese people" in the cause of comfort women instead of paying individual reparations. Following his speech, a subcommittee under the Diet Affairs Committee was formed for "the project of the 50th year postwar affairs and the comfort women issue," which announced the fund-raising project of "the Asia Peace and Friendship Fund for Women" (a.k.a., the Asian Women's Fund) on December 7, 1994. This fund idea was the result of a compromise among the coalition parties of the cabinet, departing from Murayama's Socialist Party's original stance that "Japan as a nation must compensate for individual comfort women."

Behind this Asian Women's Fund plan lay the Japanese government's refusal to pay individual reparations to colonial victims. The Japanese government claims that postwar reparations have all been settled, except for those with Taiwan and North Korea, thus it has no national responsibility to pay reparations to comfort women victims from South Korea. Thus, the intent of this fund was to offer symbolic compensation on moral grounds to comfort women.

On July 18, 1995, a private fund-raising organization called "The Asia Peace Fund of the People for Women" was established, which started raising funds from Japanese people from August 15 of that year. Then the Japanese government announced its plan to pay compensation to comfort women victims with this fund collected from Japanese people.¹

¹ The Asian Women's Fund was authorized as a foundation on December 8, 1995 and has been under the joint jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

From August 14, 1996, the Asian Women's Fund began to pay lump sum allowances to comfort women victims, and as of August 1997, twenty-eight victims from South Korea and the Philippines received two million yen each with a letter of 'apology and regret' signed by the prime minister. The rest of the victims are, however, refusing to accept the fund and are still demanding reparations from the Japanese government.²

2) Right Wing Japanese

The right wing Japanese stance on national reparations for comfort women is succinctly encapsulated in a statement by Okuno Seisuke (奥野誠亮), a former Minister of Justice quite well-known in Korea, who, at a press conference on June 4, 1996 announcing the establishment of a union of parliament members called "Bright Japan," stated that "Wartime comfort women were engaged in trade; they were not forced to come." In May 1996, the Ministry of Education permitted the use of a middle school social science textbook that included a description of wartime comfort women. Itagaki Tadashi (板垣 正), a parliamentary member and the advisor of the Japan War-Bereaved Families Association, condemned this decision to license the textbook "attributing things to historical facts which are not proven with historical facts."

Right wing Japanese, represented by the Association for the Advancement of the Liberal View of History, in which Professors Fujioka Nobukatsu (藤岡信勝) of the University of Tokyo and Hata Ikuhiko (秦 郁彦) of Chiba University are active members, also condemned the textbook for distorting Japanese history. They claim that 'comfort women' were prostitutes providing sexual services to soldiers and that teaching prostitution as men's sexual abuse of women would lead teenagers to form wrong sexual beliefs and that it would have adverse effects on future generations. They also criticize the history education labelling Japan's course of actions after the First Sino-Japanese War as aggression for teaching 'masochistic' history, urging Japan to break from such history education and revise history

² *Yonhap News Agency*, 15 August, 1997, <https://news.v.daum.net/v/19970815014000859> (Searched on July 30, 2021).

textbooks to benefit the nation. These right wing nationalists echo Okuno's view on wartime comfort women, stating that comfort women were not forcibly mobilized, but that they conducted commercial activities, and thus insist that the descriptions of comfort women as victims must be removed from textbooks. Furthermore, they denounce the Japanese government's acknowledgement of the military's involvement and apology, claiming that they were induced by the media's manipulation of public opinion and the government's incompetent foreign policy.

3) Victims and the International Community

The fundamental wish of comfort women victims is, in a nutshell, "Return my lost youth." However, it is impossible to make this wish come true. Realistically, the most we can do for them is to compensate for their loss and restore their honor.

The consensus of the victims, the Korean public, and the *Jeong-daehyeop* (The Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan; henceforth, The Korean Council) is that the Japanese government is responsible for the comfort women issue and thus must acknowledge this, apologize and compensate the victims, and punish those responsible.

International NGOs and public opinion generally agree with the victims' stance and support their cause in seeking the Japanese government's acknowledgement of its national responsibility and in demanding that it provides individual reparations. On February 1, 1992, the IED of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) demanded the Japanese government to pay individual reparations to the victims. On April 10, 1996, the UNCHR officially adopted a report containing recommendations for the Japanese government to acknowledge its national responsibility and to pay individual reparations to comfort women. Those recommendations were made on the grounds of the international law of the Imperial Japan era, and the most relevant are the following five cases.³

First, Japan's wartime comfort system violated the "International

³ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Japanese Military Comfort Women* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), 160-92.

Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children.” This 1921 treaty bans the prostitution of women under the age of 21 with or without their consent (Article 5), and those who force even adults into prostitution by means of fraud, threats, the use of violence, the abuse of power, or the use of other forms of force or coercion are deemed to be prosecutable (Article 2).

When Japan signed this treaty, colonies were excluded from its application. Thus, some raise doubts regarding whether this convention can be applied to Korean cases. However, since Korean comfort women were carried by Japanese vessels and transported first to Japan, and from there to China or other war zones, it is generally believed that the colonial exemption does not apply in this case.

Although prostitution of minors and forced prostitution conducted in Korea were exempted from the convention, some argue that those cases under the command of the War Central of mainland Japan and those that the War Central was aware of must not be deferred as colonial matters. According to this argument, the comfort women recruitment conducted in Korea from March 4, 1938—i.e., the moment that the Ministry of War issued the document “Concerning the Recruitment of Women for Military Comfort Stations”—should be subject to the convention.

Second, Japan’s wartime comfort system violated “The Forced Labor Convention” of 1930, which made provisions for maximum labor hours, guarantee of payment, compensation for workplace injuries or death, and maintenance of workers’ health. However, there is some controversy over whether sexual services forced upon comfort women could be construed as ‘labor’ as defined in the treaty. On this, the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations declared its opinion in its 1997 report that the sexual services of wartime comfort women were also a form of forced labor.

Third, Japan’s wartime comfort system violated the 1926 Slavery Convention. Since this is an international convention, Japan was obligated to comply with this treaty despite not being a member of the treaty. This convention prohibits ‘debt slavery (bonded labor),’ which includes certain comfort women cases bound by cash-advance contracts.

Fourth, Japan's wartime comfort system committed crimes against humanity. The Charters of the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and for the Far East define crimes against humanity to be "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts done against civilian populations, or persecutions on political or racial grounds before or during a war." They include all inhumane acts or persecutions committed outside battlefields or battle time.

Japan accepted the 1951 San Francisco Treaty, and this entails its acceptance of the Charters. Thus, the Japanese military's murders, abuses, and slavery testified by comfort women can be prosecuted as crimes against humanity. However, in order to apply the Charters to comfort women cases, some argue that the Japanese government's organizational plan and execution of such inhumane acts must be proven.

Fifth, Japan's wartime comfort system violated the 1907 4th Hague Convention. Although this convention is relevant only to the treaty participants and Japan did not join it, it is possible that Japan will be called for violating Article 46 because it is a conventional law. The article requires respecting the laws and customs of war on land such as "family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property." Humiliating acts such as rape are, therein, regarded as violating "family honor and rights." Article 46, however, specifies respect in 'war on land,' and thus its application to Korea, a colony, is disputable.

The discussions so far have demonstrated Japan's national responsibility for its wartime comfort system in terms of major international law.

3. The Core Issues Relating to Japan's Wartime Comfort System

As explained in the previous subsections, there are serious differences of opinion regarding the issue of comfort women among the victims, NGOs, and the Japanese government. Many assume that Japan's national responsibility comprises only the forced conscription of comfort women under the government's order. Furthermore, some tend to minimize the entire comfort women issue into a mere question of whether coercion was used to procure comfort women.

Also, as has already been emphasized several times, the most controversial points in the comfort women issue are Japan's national responsibility and the method of compensation. Here, we should refrain from simplifying the situation into the equation of Japan as the perpetrator and of comfort women as the victims. Such bipolar simplification, which highlights the legal aspects of the comfort women issue, may render the public disinterested and lead them to dismiss it as somebody else's matter and lose the chance to learn historical lessons from the past. The following presents four core issues relating to Japan's wartime comfort system that underlie the timeless significance of this issue.

First, Japan's wartime comfort system is a war crime committed by a state. That is, state power violated fundamental human rights for the purpose of war, which is the main point this paper aims to underscore. In this regard, the wartime comfort system must be distinguished from commercial prostitution, which is often found even these days in the vicinity of military bases.

Second, the comfort system has an element of racism in the specific context of colonies or occupied territories. Situated in this context as women of a colony, Korean women were subjected to conscription as "comfort women" for Imperial Japan's military and furthermore, were rendered vulnerable to racial discrimination and contempt at comfort stations. It should not be overlooked that their status as prostitutes from a colony made their conditions far more harrowing.

Third, the comfort system represents gender discrimination. It reflects the institutionalized sexual ideology that condones women as sex slaves for male soldiers. This aspect must have drawn the particular attention of women's organizations around the world today to the comfort women issue. Therefore, the comfort system needs to be understood not merely as a historical event of the past but as an on-going event of the present.

Fourth, the comfort system resulted from the unique characteristics of Japanese militarism. While the three issues above are inherent to Japan's comfort system itself, this fourth core issue has to do with its background, which facilitated a military brothel system particular to Japan among many countries engaged in World War II. Behind the institutionalization of the

comfort system lay the uniqueness of Japanese militarism and the traditional values and lifestyle of Japanese society of that time, which Section 2 demonstrates in detail.

Reasons for Establishing the Wartime Comfort System

1. Circumstances prior to the Establishment

The military comfort system was modelled after the existing public brothel system of Japan. The Japanese military adopted the system to facilitate its control and management, including compulsory STD (sexually transmitted disease) testing for prostitutes.

The history of Japan's public brothel system dates back to the early 17th century, when the Edo Shogunate permitted a red-light district in Edo in 1617, but compulsory STD tests were not conducted immediately. STD testing for prostitutes began in the late Edo era at the request of a Russian admiral whose battleship docked at Nagasaki Harbor in Kyushu. In March 1876, Japan legalized the twice-a-month compulsory syphilis testing for prostitutes, and from October 1900, a modernized public brothel system was implemented by the Home Ministry with the enactment of prostitution regulations.

How then did this public brothel system develop into the wartime comfort system? The process will be discussed in the following order: the circumstances in mainland Japan, the colonies, and the occupied territories. Japan licensed brothels only to restricted areas on the mainland, limiting the number of prostitutes. As a result, entertainer geishas and barmaids in private brothels greatly outnumbered prostitutes in public brothels. In addition, public brothels were mostly located around big cities, far from barracks. Therefore, cash-strapped soldiers often patronized cheap bars and private brothels, where STDs were not rigorously tested, during their off days, and caused headaches for the military by contracting and spreading venereal diseases rampantly in their barracks. Moreover, civilian society was not much different in this regard, thus a high proportion of drafted men already had venereal diseases.

The military determined the primary cause of widespread STDs among soldiers to be private brothels, followed by prostitutes in public brothels. Then it called for a ban on private brothels and more frequent STD testing for prostitutes in public brothels.

The spread of STDs in barracks was a serious problem. It damaged the health and lives of soldiers, weakened their morale and fighting power by hindering their training, and incurred enormous treatment costs.⁴ In addition, this problem was not limited to mainland Japan; a similar situation was playing out in Taiwan. According to records from the Taishō period, the Japanese army medical corps repeatedly called for the establishment of public brothels for soldiers, rigorous STD testing and control, and a ban on private brothels. Also, the Japanese government instituted Japanese-style public brothel systems in Korea and Taiwan in order to manage and control their prostitution businesses efficiently.

Before the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese military's fundamental strategy to prevent STDs was their strict ban on private brothels and thorough STD testing at public brothels. Shanghai, where a Japanese concession was located, had Japanese-style public brothels, *kashiseki* (貸席), run by Japanese. In 1929, the Chinese government abolished its public brothel system and requested Japan to close its public brothels in China. To save face, Japan's Foreign Affairs Ministry closed them but found an expedient way to operate a *de facto* public brothel through the Japanese consulate's licensing and policing authorities over Japanese restaurant hostesses and barmaids.⁵

The problem was, however, the occupied territories in war zones. The consulate could not properly supervise war zones and hence, could not conduct rigorous STD tests there. In March 1932, concomitant with the Shanghai Incident, the Japanese expeditionary force in Shanghai established and ran a comfort station of its own. This was Japan's first military comfort station in records so far, but the deputy chief of the expeditionary

⁴ The Ministry of War, *Military Hygiene* (Tokyo: Heiyo Tosho, 1929).

⁵ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women* (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1992), 183.

army staff, who had participated in the establishment of the station, testified that it had been modelled after the Japanese navy brothel in Shanghai.⁶

Although no historical document has been found so far, it is highly probable that Japan's military had operated comfort stations before March 1932. By the end of 1936, the Japanese army comfort station in Shanghai housed approximately 300 prostitutes and the navy operated seven comfort stations. The navy comfort stations accepted only petty officers and naval soldiers, and specialist doctors examined prostitutes once a week under the supervision of marines and the consulate police.⁷

In July 1937, Japan launched a full-scale invasion of China, thereby starting the Second Sino-Japanese War. Hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops were deployed to China, and by 1938, nearly one million Japanese troops were stationed in China. From that time, comfort stations were built on a massive scale, attracting in droves those who were attempting to make money by running comfort stations and those who did not hesitate to commit crimes to supply women to comfort stations. To control this situation, in early 1938 the Japanese government and War Central began to be directly involved in the overall operation of the comfort system, which was previously under the supervision and control of Japanese expeditionary forces in China, from the installation of stations to the recruitment of women.

2. Circumstances behind the Establishment

Why did the Japanese forces build comfort stations? The reasons can be surmised into the following four: (1) to prevent soldiers' crimes such as looting and rape in occupied territories; (2) to prevent the spread of STDs among the troops; (3) to prevent violent and disorderly acts within the barracks, including assaults on superiors; and (4) to prevent the infiltration of

⁶ Okabe Naozaburo, *General Okabe Naozaburo Diary* (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, 1982), 23; Inaba Masao, *General Yasuji Okamura Documents <Part I>: Battlefield Memories* (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1970), 302.

⁷ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women* (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1992), 185.

spies. The first three are interrelated to each other. That is, STDs, crimes, and disciplinary misconduct were all closely linked to the historically rooted unique characteristics of the Japanese military.⁸

The Meiji regime, which was forging ahead with Japan's modernization with the successful Meiji Restoration of 1868, instituted a conscription ordinance in January 1873 and enacted a system of universal military conscription (國民皆兵制) with the proclamation of the Meiji Constitution in January 1889. The universal military conscription system offered a way to draft a massive number of impoverished young men, mostly from the peasant class, who were, on average, very undereducated and ill mannered. Later, as emperor-centered Japanese militarism was increasingly strengthened, the military worked hard to install soldiers with the warrior ethos, which included unquestionable obedience and fealty, manners, valor, austerity, and loyalty.

However, the Japanese military's mental education at that time was far from a modern education, which is based on mutual respect. Rather, it was an extension of the traditional premodern patriarchal disciplines, which were adapted for a unique social system—the military. As a result, violent means such as abuse and beating by superiors were commonplace in barracks, under the guise of “the rod of love.” The military leadership was aware of improper personal disciplinary acts but acquiesced to maintain order within the barracks, having no better options. Trained through such inhumane manners, it is not surprising that peripheral soldiers had a scant sense of human rights toward others.

Against this backdrop, the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in July 1937. Most of the Japanese military forces were dispatched to China to fight the untenable and unjustifiable war. Tied in a long war without any end in sight and without a break, the morale of the troops was naturally very low. Soldiers felt desolate because of the inhumane conditions and the barracks, some even showing psychiatric symptoms due to anxiety and

⁸ For more information, please refer to Ohama Tetsuya, *The Emperor's Army* (Tokyo: Kyōikusha, 1986); Yoshida Yutaka, *The Emperor's Army and the Nanjing Incident* (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1986).

desperation over the fear of death. Thus, this unruly and desperate army with low morale, infused with a sense of superiority and racist supremacy as the Emperor's Troops, ended up committing the Nanjing Massacre and killing hundreds of thousands of Chinese on their way to plunder, burn, and rape.

The Nanjing Massacre intensified anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese and made it very difficult for the Japanese military to maintain order in their occupied territories in China. Seeing the danger of losing leverage in the war if it allowed the situation to continue as it was, the Japanese military leadership sought solutions to remedy it. One of them was building as many comfort stations as possible, where soldiers could satisfy their sexual and violent urges in a controlled and orderly manner.

The Japanese Government's Involvement in the Wartime Comfort System

1. Overview of the Wartime Comfort System (Refer to Chart 1 and 2 in the Appendix)

A wartime comfort station was a brothel for soldiers and civilians attached to the military. There were two types of public bodies involved in the establishment and operation of comfort stations: government offices and the military. In addition, comfort stations can be divided into three types in terms of their locations: mainland Japan, the colonies, and the occupied territories. Accordingly, our main research targets are Japan's central government and its War Central in the case of mainland Japan, the Government-General and the Japanese military in the colonies, such as Korea and Taiwan, and government agencies such as consulates and expeditionary troops in occupied territories.

To illustrate how government authorities were involved in the comfort system, the operation of comfort stations will be investigated in five stages: the installation of comfort stations, recruitment of women, transportation of comfort women, supervision and management of comfort stations, and finally, postwar settlement.

(1) Installation of Comfort Stations: Comfort stations were installed at the instruction of the Ministry of War and the authorities of each expeditionary force. To be more specific, comfort stations were set up through three routes: first, a higher military office giving orders to each contingent force; second, the headquarters of the expeditionary force permitting the requests of its battalions or companies; and third, individual barracks installing stations on their own without permission from their superiors.

(2) Recruitment of Comfort Women: The recruitment process was extremely complicated since it was executed mostly by private contractors. In general, comfort women were procured in the following four steps:

First, the authorities of the expeditionary force which planned to set up a comfort station requested the relevant government body of the mainland or the colony to procure comfort women for them.

Second, the relevant bodies—i.e., the Ministry of War and the Home Ministry in the case of the mainland, and the Government-General and military headquarters in the case of Korea and Taiwan—administered the recruitment of comfort women in each region. As of the present time [December 1997], no official document proving that the Government-General of Korea had ordered the recruitment of comfort women has been discovered.

Third, the Home Ministry sent out to each prefectural office a notice with an assigned number of women to procure. Then the local police of each prefecture selected private contractors to recruit comfort women. In Korea, the headquarters of the Japanese force in Korea directly designated private contractors. On other occasions, it is believed that the Government-General of Korea also assigned the number of women to recruit to each province and each provincial police office designated private contractors.

Fourth, the private contractors designated by the military or the police recruited comfort women by themselves or through hired brokers.

(3) Transportation of Comfort Women: The military or private contractors were in charge of transporting recruited women to their destinations while the Japanese government or relevant troops provided support and conveniences. Comfort women were transported to China by military or fishing vessels or by railroad, and within China, by Japanese military-controlled railroads or military trucks.

(4) Operation of Comfort Stations: Wartime comfort stations fell into two types—direct military-run stations and civilian-run stations. Even those run by civilian contractors were provided with various conveniences from the military and were practically supervised and managed by the military.

(5) Postwar Settlement: It is not an exaggeration to say that defeat in World War II came suddenly to Japan with the nuclear bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, which did not allow for much preparation. The defeated Japanese troops left comfort women behind in their occupied territories, where many of those dislocated women are still living. Since this stage is not directly related to the Japanese government and the military's involvement in the comfort system, it will not be dealt with in this paper.

2. Installation of Comfort Stations

The Japanese government has acknowledged its military's partial involvement in the installation of comfort stations but is maintaining the claim that most of them were set up by profit-seeking civilian contractors. Right wing Japanese go even further, denying any involvement of the Japanese government or military all together. Their blatant denial is apparently an act of suppressing and distorting historical truth. As an endeavor to reveal the truth, this subsection examines various documents and records that have been disclosed so far to demonstrate that the Japanese military planned and supervised most of the installation process of the military comfort stations.

The document that made the Japanese government acknowledge its

military's involvement was the notice "Regarding the Recruitment of Women for Military Comfort Stations" issued by the Ministry of War in 1938.⁹ The evidence that has been gathered so far indicates that this notice, dated March 4, 1938, signaled the War Central's direct involvement in comfort women recruitment. This notice, signed by a deputy of the Ministry of War, was sent to the chiefs of the Japanese North China Area Army (北支那方面軍) and the Japanese Central China Area Army (中支那方面軍). Its main message was to order them to monitor and supervise with the utmost care the installation of comfort stations from the designation of private contractors to the recruitment of comfort women and to closely collaborate with the local and the military police of their respective areas in recruiting comfort women. As previously mentioned, this was the very document that forced the Japanese government to acknowledge the Imperial Army's involvement in the comfort system in January 1992. Delegated by Minister of War Sugiyama Hajime (杉山元) of the Konoe Fumimaro (近衛文麿) Cabinet, the notice was first drafted by the Military Administration Bureau of the same ministry, and then was approved by Umezu Yoshijiro (梅津美治郎), Vice Minister of War. The head of the Military Administration Bureau was Imamura Hitoshi (今村均) and the Senior Staff Officer of the Military Administration Bureau was Chiba Kumaji (千葉熊治).

The reason behind the Ministry of War's issuance of this notice was the social problem caused by private contractors in Japan who even employed means as foul as kidnapping to procure women and girls for comfort stations. The Ministry of War was worried about the damage to the Imperial Army's reputation if the situation was not dealt with, as an increasing number of comfort women recruiters were being investigated by the police as kidnappers. Therefore, it ordered the military to thoroughly and strictly monitor and supervise private contractors and to collaborate closely with local and military police.

The next evidence is Kodama Kyuzo's (兒玉久藏) testimony at the

⁹ 軍慰安所従業婦等募集に関する件, 支受大日記(密) 基10 昭和13年自3月3日至3月11日. Catalogue Reference: 陸軍省-陸支密大日記-S13-6-115, no. 242.

International Military Tribunal for the Far East, IMTFE, a.k.a., Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, Record Number 265.¹⁰ Colonel Kodama served in the Military Administration Bureau during the Pacific War and testified during the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. According to his testimony, the Ministry of War sent out the following instructions to occupying forces as preventive measures of war crimes: (1) Distribute the guideline booklet *Wartime Service Requirements* (戦時服務提要), published by the Inspectorate General of Military Training (教育総監部), to all officers and instruct them to follow its instructions in occupied territories; (2) Dispatch a military discipline inspection team (軍紀風紀査察團), specifically composed of staff from the Ministry of War of the central government, to various locations in China for two months to conduct surveys and give instructions on comfort stations while taking measures such as expanding the stations in accordance with the survey outcome; and (3) Expand and supplement comfort station facilities.

The booklet *Wartime Service Requirements* was issued on May 25, 1938. Chapter 8, entitled ‘The Hygiene of Troops,’ gave instructions as follows: “Find effective prevention for STDs and equip comfort stations with complete sanitation facilities. In addition, strictly control any access to unlicensed prostitutes and local Chinese.” This instruction reveals that the Ministry of War tried to control and supervise the installation and the management of comfort stations in all of its occupied territories.¹¹ The other instructions in Kodama’s testimony also clearly indicate that the Ministry of War was directly involved in the installation and the expansion of comfort stations in its occupied territories on the premise of preventing war crimes.

The next document to examine is “Instructions Regarding the Troops’ Conduct toward Local People,” which Okabe Naozaburo (岡部直三郎), Chief of Staff of the Japanese Northern China Area Army, issued to each contingent force in June, 1938. The document ordered to accelerate the installation of the comfort stations as quickly as possible, since

¹⁰ International Military Tribunal for the Far East, *Stenographic Record of International Military Tribunal for the Far East VI* (Tokyo: Yushodo Shoten, 1968), 483-500.

¹¹ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 161-63.

“misconduct toward local people is provoking their resentment and anti-Japanese sentiment and is providing anti-Japanese communists with excuses to incite natives.” The document warned that the troubling situation was obstructing the troops in keeping order and conducting missions in its occupied territories.¹²

The misconduct specified in the document was the raping of Chinese women and girls, which was “occurring frequently in various places.” The Chinese of this period maintained strong traditional Confucian values, such that they considered raping a woman or a girl to be a more serious crime than anything else. Japan’s military leadership ordered the installation of comfort stations to prevent its soldiers from raping local women or girls and thereby provoking anti-Japanese sentiment.

Another interesting document is “Measures to Raise the Morale of Soldiers, Learned from the War in China,” a report written by the Ministry of War based on two months of research on the ground in 1939. Completed in 1940, this report was distributed to all of the army commands as a mental education textbook for soldiers.¹³ The report pointed out that frequent misconduct by soldiers, such as looting, rape, arson, and killing prisoners, since the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, had been undermining the reputation of the Imperial Army and had been inciting aversion to the so-called ‘holy war’ from both inside and outside Japan. This also disrupted the order in Japan’s occupied territories and aggravated its international relations, thus disrupting its overall strategies in the war. In order to amend this situation, the report instructed its readers to “consider installing comfort stations” and in particular to “reinforce the facilities of comfort stations using any possible means.”

The four documents discussed above have demonstrated that the Japanese military leadership directly ordered the installation of comfort stations. Apparently, the military leadership considered comfort stations a solution to prevent soldiers from committing crimes such as rape, looting,

¹² Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 209-11.

¹³ 陸密 第1955号 支那事変の経験より觀たる軍紀振作対策. Catalogue Reference: 中央-軍事行政 その他-42, no. 9.

and arson, which were raising anti-Japanese sentiment and deteriorating international opinion, thus resulting in the loss of Japanese forces.

The following examples illustrate how comfort stations were typically installed at the command of the military leadership in occupied territories.¹⁴ The Japanese China Central Area Army ordered the installation of comfort stations in its contingent units in December 1937. The Shanghai Expeditionary Force had the Office of the Chief of the Second Section draft the installation and the operation plan for the comfort stations and set up comfort stations in Nanjing under the command of Colonel Chō Isamu (長勇). During the same period, Chief of Staff of the Tenth Army, Terada Masao (寺田雅雄), mobilized military police to set up comfort stations in Huzhou (湖州). Although no record has been found, it was likely that Lieutenant-General Okabe's army underwent the same process to install comfort stations in the Northern China Area Army.

Finally, there was a case where more comfort women were dispatched because troops were transferred or engaged in battles. This was the case of the Third Dulishan (獨立山) Artillery Regiment. Originally, this regiment belonged to the Third Division of the Second Army, but after participating in the attack on Nanchang (南昌), it was transferred to the 16th Division to be part of the attack on Wuhan (武漢), and was then stationed in Yingshan (應山). This regiment already had its own comfort station, but since it frequently moved to different locations to participate in battles, its superiors gave instructions to increase comfort women in order to raise soldiers' morale and prevent rapes in their occupied territory.¹⁵

3. Recruitment of Comfort Women

Comfort women were recruited by and large in one of two ways depending on the comfort station locations: 1) the occupying troops recruited them directly from their stationed areas; or 2) they were recruited from Japan, Ko-

¹⁴ Yoshimi Yoshiaki-Hayashi Hirofumi, *Comfort Women of Japanese Army* (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1995), 16-17.

¹⁵ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 219-23.

rea, or Taiwan and were transferred to the war zones. The following case of comfort stations installed in China demonstrates in detail the process of comfort women recruitment in occupied territories.

1) Recruitment in Occupied Territories

The most noticeable difference between recruitment in an occupied territory and that in a colony is that in the occupied territories the military directly conducted the procurement of comfort women. Each expeditionary force instructed its contingent units to install comfort stations, then the commissariat, accounting department, and military police conscripted prostitutes under the supervision of the rear or the deputy chief of staff of each division, brigade, or regiment. Even in such cases, it was common for the force to request assistance from local influentials, a request that could not be refused as subjects in an occupied area. To avoid STDs, troops also forcibly conscripted local women who were not prostitutes. They even abducted women or girls at times during so called "crackdown" missions.¹⁶ As for the Korean comfort women, most were recruited in Korea. Very few cases were from occupied territories according to their testimonies. In fact, Kim Hak-sun was one of the latter cases. She was abducted by Japanese soldiers on her way to Shanhaiguan, China with her stepfather and was sent to a comfort station in 1941 when she was only 17 years old.¹⁷

2) Recruitment in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan

Having private contractors at the forefront was the most typical form of comfort women recruitment in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Nevertheless, the Japanese government and military were involved in the process of supervising and controlling private contractors. First, in Japan, the recruitment began when expeditionary forces or the Ministry of War requested the Home Ministry to send prostitutes for their comfort stations. In re-

¹⁶ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 112-19.

¹⁷ The Korean Council for Justice and Remembrance for the Issues of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, ed., *The Korean Military Comfort Women, Who were Taken by Force (I)* (Seoul: Hanul, 1993), 35-37.

sponse to the request, the Home Ministry designated to each prefectural government the number of prostitutes to procure. After receiving this order from the central government, the local police began to choose private contractors who were to actually carry out the recruitment.

A document that illustrates this process clearly is an official notice from the Home Ministry to five prefectures.¹⁸ Two men, Kumon Arifumi (久門有文), a major in the army's aviation squad and a staff officer from Furushō's (古莊) Army of the South China Expeditionary Force, and an unnamed manager of the Recruitment Division of the War Ministry came to the Home Ministry to request 400 comfort women to send to the South China Expeditionary Force (the 21st Army). In response to the request, the Home Ministry issued the aforementioned notice in November 1938, specifying the number of comfort women each of the five prefectures were required to recruit, including 100 women from Osaka, 100 from Hyogo, and 100 from Fukuoka. The notice also instructed the local police to designate private contractors to procure comfort women. Prior to this, in February 1938, the Home Ministry had restricted the recruitment of comfort women to only prostitutes in the profession of 21 years of age or older. In addition, it instructed the local police to employ credible procurers who could run comfort stations. Accordingly, the 400 Japanese comfort women dispatched to the 21st Army were most likely prostitutes of 21 years of age or older.

As in Japan, the recruitment process in Korea also began with a request from an expeditionary force to the Government-General Office of Korea or the Commander Office of the Japanese Army in Korea. It is likely that the Government-General of Korea also assigned each province the number of comfort women to procure and had local police designate private contractors to recruit women, but no specific document to evince this has been found so far. Nevertheless, there is credible testimony that supports the view that the Government-General of Korea was involved in

¹⁸ 支那渡航婦女に関する件、内務大臣決裁書類：昭和13年(下). Catalogue Reference: 平9警察 00286100, no. 24 (<https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/img/pdf/1022670>).

comfort women recruitment in Korea.

Hara Zenshirō (原善四郎), a former rear deputy chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, wrote in his book that the Kwantung Army drafted a plan to conscript 20,000 Korean women for comfort stations around July 1941 and made a request to the Government-General of Korea which recruited 8,000 Korean comfort women in response.¹⁹ No other record has been found so far to underpin this claim, but it is highly plausible to believe that the Government-General of Korea was in fact deeply involved in the recruitment of Korean comfort women.

Another record that indirectly supports the Government-General of Korea's involvement in the recruitment comes from the Home Ministry's document²⁰ with reference to Taiwan, a colonial state of Japan, as was Korea. The document contains the following statement: "With assistance from the Government-General of Taiwan, about 300 Taiwanese comfort women are ready to be shipped." This shows, with no doubt, that the Government-General of Taiwan was directly involved in the comfort women recruitment process and suggests that the same is true in the case of colonial Korea. There is another interesting statement in the document: "Designate a reliable agent (procurer) discreetly and have them recruit and transport comfort women to the destined places." Thus, the Japanese government and the military tried to hide their supervisory role over the whole process of comfort women recruitment by putting forth civilian agents.²¹

The documents discussed below also indicate that the Government-General of Korea was fully aware of the entire process of recruiting and transporting comfort women. These documents are correspondences be-

¹⁹ Shimada Toshihiko, *Kwantung Army* (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 1965), 176; Senda Kakou, *Japanese Military Comfort Women* (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1978), 102-03.

²⁰ 支那渡航婦女に関する件, 内務大臣決裁書類・昭和13年(下). Catalogue Reference: 平9警察00286100, no. 24 (<https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/img/pdf/1022670>).

²¹ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 142-43. These two documents between the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government-General of Taiwan also gave a hint of their attempt to maintain secrecy regarding the comfort women. These handwritten messages contain written and crossed-out phrases exemplified by those in parentheses in the following sentence: "(It is not good to issue passports) to comfort women and transport them (by military vessels)."

tween the Japanese consulate in Hankou (漢口) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November 1939. Three months later, the Chinese city had been seized. One of the letters requested the Ministry to restrict those sailing to Hankou since the city was already crowded with 2,289 consulate-registered Japanese, 258 diners, cafés, tea rooms and restaurants, 220 general stores, and twenty comfort stations licensed by the commissariat, the military police, or the consulate. In response, the Ministry promised to limit the number of people crossing the sea to Hankou.²² This document from Hankou was also delivered to the Government-General of Korea through the Ministry of Colonial Affairs (拓務省).²³ This fact suggests that the Government-General of Korea was supervising and controlling the maritime transport of people including comfort women.

Like the Government-General of Korea, there is also testimonial evidence that indicates the Japanese forces in Korea's involvement in comfort women recruitment. In November 1944, United States Infantry Colonel Wilendes Swift, who supervised the Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Center, submitted the report titled "Psychological Warfare: Interrogation Bulletin," based on his center's interrogations of Japanese prisoners. The report included accounts of prisoners who had managed wartime comfort stations.

Some Japanese restaurant owners in Seoul were asked in 1942 by the headquarters of the Japanese forces in Korea to manage comfort stations in Burma, and a prisoner was one of them. The Commander Office of the Japanese forces in Korea granted those civilian agents a license to recruit comfort women and a reference to request local military offices to provide them with as much food and medical supplies as possible. The prisoner recruited twenty-two unmarried Korean women between the ages of 17 and 29, some of whom had been trafficked, and boarded with them on a ship at Busan Port on July 10, 1942. On this voyage, 90 Japanese agents and 703 Korean comfort women boarded seven different ships after being provided

²² Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 118-20.

²³ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, "Sending Japanese Military Comfort Women and the Government-General of Korea," *The Report on Japan's War Responsibility* 5 (September 1994): 32-36.

with free boarding passes from the Commander Office of the Japanese forces in Korea.²⁴

Private contractors and the Japanese military recruited comfort women from Korea by and large using the following four methods: (1) job scams, (2) human trafficking, (3) kidnapping and abduction, and (4) arrests by authorities. It is difficult to pin down the exact method in more than a few comfort women cases, but overall, it can be said that job scams were the most commonly used in Korea.²⁵ Another point to note about Korean comfort women is that a large number of them were underage. According to a 1993 survey, approximately 90% of the 175 known Korean comfort women had been minors at the time of their first recruitment.²⁶

4. Transportation of Comfort Women

1) Documents Required for Voyage

Both designated agents and recruited comfort women were required to carry a number of certificates on board to China. One of them was an identification certificate, which the local police chief issued at the request of the resident in Japan, Korea, or Taiwan before a voyage to China. As it had been in the midst of the Second Sino-Japanese War since September 1937, Japan required everyone to have an identification certificate in order to control civilians' entries to China. Accordingly, comfort women were also required to carry identification documents, but with the consent of the Japanese government and military, they were actually exempted, being classi-

²⁴ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 458-59.

²⁵ For more information, please refer to Yun Myungsuk, "Formation of Korean Comfort Women during the Second Sino-Japanese War," *Bulletin of the Society for the Korean Historical Science* 32 (October 1994): 89-118.

²⁶ For more reference, see Jeong Jin-seong, "The Formation of the Japanese Military Comfort Women Policy and Its Change," in *The Second Korea-Japan Joint Research Council Report*, The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan and The Center for Research and Documentation on Japan's War Responsibility, ed. (Seoul: The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan and The Center for Research and Documentation on Japan's War Responsibility, 1993).

fied as a group affiliated with the military, along with their contractors.

Later, with the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, when comfort stations were expanded to Southeast Asia, voyage certifications of comfort women and private contractors became an issue again. In response, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs enabled comfort women to travel with military-issued identification certificates instead of passports.²⁷ This simplified protocol for comfort women and contractors conversely suggests that they could not go to Southeast Asia without permission from the military and were treated differently from other civilians. The Taiwan document discussed in the previous subsection also displays the imperial Japanese government's intent to hide the existence of comfort women.²⁸ The document included the following message, in which the phrases in parentheses were written and crossed out: "(Since we do not issue passports) for the agents and comfort women, issue them military certificates and transport them (using military vessels)."

Meanwhile, the local police provided conveniences to comfort station personnel regarding the issuance of identification certificates. Background checks, which were ordinarily necessary in order to issue an identification certificate, were dispensed with in the case of agents designated by the Home Ministry (police). In addition, agents designated by the expeditionary force were treated in the same way as military employees and automatically received a travel certificate to China (or an identification certificate) authorized by consulates without the consulate police checking their backgrounds.²⁹ With this travel certificate to China, one could eschew any background check in practice, even from the police in Japan.

²⁷ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 143.

²⁸ 支那渡航婦女に関する件, 内務大臣決裁書類: 昭和13年(下). Catalogue Reference: 平9警察00286100, no. 24 (<https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/img/pdf/1022670>).

²⁹ "Statement of Reasons to Travel to China (渡支事由證明書)," a travel certificate to China, was a document issued by a Japanese consulate in China for Japanese or colonial citizens returning to China. This certificate was required by local police chiefs in their homeland to apply for a shipboarding permit to China. In principle, comfort women recruiters were also required to submit a military-authorized certificate to receive a consulate's travel certificate to China, but in practice the step of obtaining consulate-issued travel certificates was passed over in various ways.

The following episode illustrates the special treatment that comfort women staff received in terms of traveling. A private contractor, running a comfort station attached to the Shioda (鹽田) Corps and the Hayashi (林) Regiment of the South China Expeditionary Force in Guangdong Province, returned to Taiwan in June 1940 to bring back more comfort women.³⁰ This private contractor recruited six more comfort women and requested the police of Takao Prefecture (高雄州), Taiwan for an identification certificate to sail back to the army base in Guangdong. Although this contractor did not have a travel certificate issued by the Guangdong consulate—something that every civilian needed in order to return to Guangdong—and although he only had military-issued identification, the Takao police facilitated his return with a special issuance of his identification certificate for an interesting reason. The stated reason for this special treatment was as follows: “Matters pertaining to comfort stations must be treated with in urgency; it was difficult for the contractor to go to the Guangdong Consulate to obtain a travel certificate, as the consulate was too far from the barracks.” To be certain, the privileges that other ordinary civilians could not receive at that time were given to comfort station personnel by the Japanese government and the Japanese military.

2) The Home Ministry's Supervision of Sea Travel

Civilians were required to carry police-issued identification certificates in order to travel by sea. Local police chiefs were required to check the identity, job, purpose of travel, qualification, and the duration of the stay of each applicant. In February 1938, the Japanese central government's Home Ministry sent out the following set of directions regarding comfort women to local governments: (1) Only recruit prostitutes 21 years of age or older, complying with international law, and who are without STDs; (2) Have comfort women visit their local police offices in person in order to apply for an identification certificate issuance and confirm the necessary qualifi-

³⁰ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 130-32.

cations; and (3) Check if recruited women were kidnapped or trafficked.³¹ These directions show that the Japanese government made efforts to a certain extent to prevent illegal recruitment on Japanese soil, but these efforts were not applied to Korea and Taiwan. It can be said that “the Japanese government did not take any preventive measures regarding the illegal recruitment of women in Korea and Taiwan” as they had done in Japan.³²

The case of the private contractor for the South China Expeditionary Force also illustrates the different responses to illegal procurement of women in Japan and its colonies.³³ As discussed above, this contractor was able to obtain a travel certificate to China through the approval of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government-General of Taiwan, and then the governor of Takao Prefecture, without the consulate-authorized certificate required for other ordinary civilians because he had a clear identity and purpose as a comfort station manager and recruiter of comfort women. According to this document, the comfort women he recruited from Taiwan were between the ages of 14 and 18 years old. In their testimonies, recorded in *Testimonies of Comfort Women from Korea: Forced Prostitution 1 & 2*, thirty-one out of thirty-four former Korean comfort women—that is, 91%—were under the age of 21 when they were first recruited.³⁴ These evidences indicates that the Japanese government clearly knew but turned a blind eye to the fact that underage girls were being recruited in Taiwan and Korea as wartime comfort women.

³¹ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 102-04.

³² The Ministry of War was also aware of illegal acts by procurers of comfort women and had the responsibility to stop them. However, they did not take any actions to stop these illegal acts in Korea and Taiwan. Yoshimi Yoshiaki·Hayashi Hirofumi, *Comfort Women of Japanese Army*, 21.

³³ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 134-37.

³⁴ The Korean Council for Justice and Remembrance for the Issues of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, ed., *The Korean Military Comfort Women, Who were Taken by Force I* (Seoul: Hanul, 1993); The Korean Council for Justice and Remembrance for the Issues of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, ed., *The Korean Military Comfort Women, Who were Taken by Force II* (Seoul: Hanul, 1993).

3) Responsibility of Transporting Comfort Women

Since the means of transportation has been discussed in Section 3 (Subsection 4), here the responsible bodies in the transportation of comfort women are investigated with reference to three documents. As the Home Ministry supervised the sea travel of its people in Japan, the military was the main agency which directed transportation or permitted boarding on military vessels. It is reasonable to speculate that the Government-General of Korea and the Japanese forces in Korea played similar roles. The Japanese forces in Korea provided free boarding passes to ships, in addition to other conveniences. Although it was private contractors who led and brought recruited women to designated military bases, this was because of the Japanese government's efforts to keep the existence of the comfort women a secret.

The first document concerns a case of transporting comfort women from Japan.³⁵ Four hundred comfort women were transported from Japan via Taiwan to comfort stations in China. They were recruited from five prefectures in Japan at the direction of the Home Ministry in response to a request from the South China Expeditionary Force. The Home Ministry and the Ministry of War provided contacts and gave directions for their transportation within Japan, but for travel to China, the army headquarters took charge. Both the government and the military authorities gave the contractor detailed instructions, from necessary means and a path of travel for precautionary measures. They also instructed the contractor to take the recruited prostitutes to Taiwan discreetly and transfer them to a fishing boat or use a ferry from Takao to Guangdong.

The second document is a case of transportation from Taiwan to Borneo.³⁶ At the request of the Japanese forces in Southeast Asia, the headquarters of the Japanese forces in Taiwan had its military police designate three contractors. They requested the Minister of War to allow those contractors to travel to China on March 12, 1942 and received permission on March 16 through the deputy chief of the Japanese force in Taiwan. The

³⁵ 支那渡航婦女に関する件, 内務大臣決裁書類・昭和13年(下). Catalogue Reference: 平9警察 00286100, no. 24 (<https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/img/pdf/1022670>).

³⁶ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 144-46.

three contractors boarded a ship with fifty recruited Taiwanese women.

The third document concerns the transportation of Korean comfort women. The Japanese forces in Korea also designated contractors at the request of the Japanese forces in Southeast Asia and provided them with various conveniences. They transported recruited women on a 4,000-ton vessel.³⁷

All of these records indicate that although civilian contractors transported recruited women to comfort stations in occupied territories, it was the Japanese government or the Japanese military that supervised the entire process behind the scenes.

5. Operations of Comfort Stations

1) Types of Comfort Stations

There were three types of wartime comfort stations depending on the relationship between the military and the private contractor, and the extent of the military's supervision and control. The first were direct military-operated comfort stations, which the military oversaw and managed directly without contracting any civilian agents. The second were military-affiliated comfort stations, which had contracted civilian agents but were in practice operated by the military. These military-affiliated comfort stations were the most common type and housed the largest number of identified Korean comfort women.

The third were military-designated private brothels, which were originally for civilians but provided services to occupying troops. However, as the presence of the Japanese forces expanded in occupied territories, many of these became military-affiliated comfort stations, especially at the rear of battlefields.³⁸ This status change subjected those brothels to the supervision and the control of the military but brought many benefits as well, thus the contracts were mutually beneficial to both the military and the brothel owners.

³⁷ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 459.

³⁸ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 177-80.

2) Direct Military-Operated Comfort Stations

The most typical case of this type was the 'Army Recreation Center (陸軍娛樂所)' installed in Yangjiazhai (楊家宅), Shanghai in January 1938.³⁹ It was first managed by the Chief Office of the 11th Army Commissariat. It housed 109 comfort women, eighty of whom were Koreans recruited from a coal mining town in Kyushu. The center was built by the engineering corps (營繕部) of the same army and comprised of thirteen buildings, including a management office with barbed wire walls. The chief of staff office of the same army drafted and circulated regulations entitled "Military Recreation Center Regulations" for the center. According to these regulations, only military personnel could use this center, and they were required to buy a ticket at the management office, where they were to pay the comfort women. The fee was 2 yen and the time of use was limited to 30 minutes.

Two more examples of military-operated comfort stations were in Indonesia.⁴⁰ One was a navy-operated comfort station of the Balebale Coast Guard of the Second Navy. Its manager was the lieutenant colonel of the same division and the buildings were under the ownership of the same force, where the soldiers lived with 11 Indonesian comfort women. Another station belonged to the Kendari navy force unit, whose supervisor was a captain. The unit had 28 Indonesian comfort women who were living on food, clothes, and beddings provided by the troops.

3) Military-Affiliated Comfort Stations

These comfort stations were under the name of private contractors but their *de facto* managers were the military. The following examples illustrate how the military and the civilian contractors were associated in terms of the operation of the military-affiliated comfort stations. Two comfort stations were attached to the Nakayama Guards and the Toyama Regiment, the 13th Brigade of the Independent Infantry, and another was attached to

³⁹ For more information, refer to Takasaki Ryūji, *A Sourcebook of Battlefield Reports by Japanese Military Doctors* (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1990), 55-85; Senda Kakou, *Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 37-65.

⁴⁰ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 373-74.

the Iloilo branch unit of the Visayas Office of the Philippine Military Administration Headquarters.⁴¹ Their conditions and forms varied depending on the attached barracks, but they shared one common characteristic: civilian contractors were managers in name only, and the deputy or the administrative officer were *de facto* managers, supervising the entire operation of the comfort stations.

The civilian contractors had to submit a daily report, as well as a report early each month regarding the previous month's operations, to the military supervisor of the comfort station. The daily report recorded the names of comfort women, their incomes, and visitors by rank (officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates), while the monthly report meticulously recorded the monthly incomes and the work days of each comfort woman, as well as the income of each contractor. The military doctor of the garrison supervised all the sanitary and health matters of its comfort stations, including checking comfort women for STDs and even monitoring their diets. In addition, the accounting officer (主計官) supervised the bookkeepers of the stations. The civilian contractors were, on the other hand, in charge of supervising and controlling comfort women. They were to keep an eye on women's actions, including their outings. Should anything happen, they were required to report it to the military staff immediately and receive directions. They also had to submit daily and monthly reports to the military.

Regulations on the use of comfort stations also illustrate how military-affiliated comfort stations were operated. The regulations defined the time of use, fees, and off days, down to specific details. Comfort stations were open from 9:00 a.m. to midnight and hours of use were divided by ranks: privates could visit the comfort stations from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., non-commissioned officers and civilian workers from 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.,

⁴¹ 軍人俱樂部利用規定, 諸規定綴 (23A独立歩兵13旅団) (広東) 昭和19年度. Catalogue Reference: 支那-大東亞戦争南支-99, no. 13; Suzuki Yuko, Yamashita Yon'e, and Tomomura Masaru, eds., *Complete Compilation of Documents on the Japanese Military Comfort Women 1* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2006), 460-62; Asian Women's Fund, ed., *Government Investigation: Complete Compilation of Documents on Military Comfort Women 3* (Tokyo: Ryukei-shosha, 1997), 187-93.

and officers and cadets from 7:00 p.m. to midnight.

The service fees for comfort women were determined differently according to their nationalities; for instance, the service fee for Japanese women was 2 yen per hour, for Korean women 1 yen and 50 sen, and Chinese women 1 yen. The fees were paid to the management office in cash or military currency and the buyers received a numbered ticket, or sometimes paid the comfort women directly.

Comfort women were allowed one day off once a month and had to be tested for STDs every 7 to 10 days by military doctors. Their outings were very restricted. Before leaving the comfort station, comfort women were required to obtain permission in advance, and the areas and the times for them to freely go about were strictly limited as well. As such, the women's activities were thoroughly controlled by the military.

Meanwhile, the barracks regulations of the Second Independent Heavy Siege Artillery Battalion (獨立攻城重砲兵) in Changzhou (常州) specified directions, such as "Make sure to pay fees" and "Be cautious and do not use violence at the comfort stations."⁴² The existence of these regulations suggests that it was not uncommon for soldiers to neglect paying fees or the use violence against women.

4) Conditions of Comfort Women

Comfort women had to follow the regulations of their comfort stations. As mentioned above, many Korean comfort women were young virgins. For instance, Kim Hak-Sun testified that she had lost her virginity on the day of her arrival at the comfort station to an officer who had raped her. In general, they were required to work 10 hours a day. According to the survey by South Korea's Ministry of Health and Welfare, 8 out of 22 Korean comfort women had to serve 20-30 men a day on average. According to a study by The Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery, 11

⁴² 常州駐屯内務規定 昭和13年3月 獨立攻城重砲兵第2大隊, 獨立攻城重砲兵第2大隊 關係資料 常州駐屯内務規定警備間教育規定 (1938). Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事変上海・南京-270, no. 2.

women out of 32 had a similar workload.⁴³

The working and living conditions that comfort women experienced were detrimental to their health. In particular, venereal diseases caused them the greatest agony. As discussed previously, one of the reasons for the Japanese military to build comfort stations was to prevent venereal diseases among soldiers. However, a research report by a military doctor indicated that venereal diseases had become more rampant in barracks because comfort stations had increased the possibility of soldiers contracting STDs from women there.⁴⁴ It seems evident that many soldiers and comfort women suffered from STDs. A document with specific numbers sheds light on the severity of the situation: The medical corps of the 15th Division published “Health Service Reports” (衛生業務要報), which recorded the results of STD tests for women working at comfort stations in four to six cities in China, including those in Nanjing, for a duration of three months from December 1942 to February 1943. The report relates that the number of infected women increased monthly, from 71 cases out of 568 tested women (12.5%) in December, to 84 out of 540 (15.6%) in January, and then to 143 cases out of 628 (22.9%).⁴⁵

The Japanese military made numerous efforts to eradicate STDs in its barracks, which included testing comfort women once a week, but their endeavors all failed. Kojima’s testimony illuminates one of the reasons for the failure to control STDs: He stated that Japanese soldiers, as “the great emperor’s troops,” considered it a great dishonor to contract a venereal disease, and thus, whenever they became infected, they tried to hide it.⁴⁶ Another report revealed that soldiers seldom used any STD prevention tools.⁴⁷

⁴³ Yun Jeong-ok, “Wartime Comfort Women as Part of Japan’s Colonial Policy in Korea,” in *The Truth About Comfort Women in the Japanese Military*, The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery, ed. (Seoul: Yeoksabipyongosa, 1997), 280.

⁴⁴ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 224-33.

⁴⁵ Asian Women’s Fund, ed., *Government Investigation: Complete Compilation of Documents on Military Comfort Women 3* (Tokyo: Ryukei Shosha, 1997), 213-25.

⁴⁶ Nishino Rumiko, *Japanese Military Comfort Women: Testimony of Former Soldiers* (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1992), 89-91.

⁴⁷ Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*, 271.

The amount of STD prevention tools was not sufficient, because soldiers also used them at unlicensed brothels, violating the strict ban of the military. Furthermore, soldiers were also reluctant to use these STD prevention tools.

Finally, the testing itself seemed to be inadequate. STD tests were usually conducted by military doctors, not by STD specialists, and even such non-specialist doctors were insufficient in number. Thus, ordinary medics or even senior comfort women sometimes performed the tests.⁴⁸ As can be seen, the once-a-week testing of STDs was oftentimes merely a routine name-only procedure.

Some accused comfort women as the main cause of the rampant venereal diseases in the barracks, but the truth was the other way around. Comfort women were subjected to rigorous testing for venereal diseases when recruited, so they apparently caught STDs from soldiers visiting the comfort stations. Thus, it must be remembered that comfort women—rather than their inflictors—were the most numerous victims of STDs.

Conclusion: Implications of the Korean Wartime Comfort Women Issue

This paper has investigated facts revealing how the Japanese government and the military were involved in the overall comfort women policy, with a focus on “the violation of individual human rights by a state,” one of the four essential issues concerning Imperial Japan’s wartime comfort women system (discussed in Section 1). The remainder of this paper summarizes this investigation and concludes with Japan’s national responsibility in the wartime comfort system while offering an opinion on the current dispute over national reparations. Additionally, some facts that have not been in-

⁴⁸ Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility, “The First Report on the Issue of Japan’s Military “Comfort Waman”: The Historical and Legal Investigations of the Japanese Military Comfort Women Issue,” *Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility* (March 1994). This manuscript was drafted by Center for Research and Documentation on Japan’s War Responsibility but not published.

cluded in the main text will be briefly presented below.

1. The Japanese Government's National Responsibility for Wartime Comfort Women

This paper has examined a number of documents that prove the Japanese government and the military's involvement in the installation and the operation of wartime comfort stations. These documents reveal that Imperial Japan's military drafted and directed the installation of comfort stations. The imperial Japanese military's involvement in recruiting women and girls for comfort stations was also evinced in various documents: the military directly recruited women in occupied territories, in colonies such as Korea, the Government-Generals and the headquarters of the Japanese forces designated civilian contractors, ignored their various illegal activities in the process of procuring comfort women and girls, and provided them with special conveniences such as travel permits. In addition, recruited women were transported via military or other Japanese national vessels. Comfort stations, whether owned by the military or civilian contractors, were directly run and managed by the military in practice. To conclude, borrowing the former comfort station manager Katsuki's (香月久治) words, "the military headquarters supervised everything including sales" of wartime comfort stations.⁴⁹

The reality of the human rights' violations against the comfort women can be summed up as 'rape' and 'sexual slavery.' In the process of recruiting these women, various illegal methods were employed, including job scams and abductions. It is known that 22 Korean comfort women, including several minors sent to Burma (present-day Myanmar) were recruited through human trafficking, which violated the contemporaneous international law. Comfort women who were recruited through job scams were also mostly bound by a cash-advance contract by subcontractors and desig-

⁴⁹ "Special Report: Korean Comfort Women—the Responsible of the Japanese Imperial Army," TBSテレビ, December 15, 1991.

nated procurers and thus, were victims of debt slavery, which again violated the contemporaneous international law.

From the moment they were recruited as comfort women, they had lost their physical freedom. They were forced to work 13 to 14 hours each day regardless of their will; when they refused, they were frequently subjected to violence. They were not allowed to move or leave freely. They had only one day off each month, and many women died suffering from venereal or endemic illnesses. Following campaigning troops to battlegrounds, they were not only forced to provide sexual services but were also placed at the risk of death. As in the case of STDs, the comfort women's health received little care and attention. Many comfort women were not paid, and when paid, they received military currencies which became useless with the defeat of Japan. It is a widely known fact that Japan did not compensate for any military scrips that they had issued during the war. These also clearly violated the provisions of international laws that ban forced labor, limit working hours, guarantee pay for labor, and maintain the health of workers.

Japan had a long history of managing public brothels and had a strong cultural tradition that regarded prostitutes as subhuman. Also, Japanese society at that time still maintained medieval sexism toward women. All these negative societal views contributed to the discrimination and the abuse of comfort women. Racial discrimination was also inflicted upon comfort women from colonies such as Korea, as exemplified by the lower service fees allotted to Korean comfort women, which were only about 70% of those of their Japanese counterparts.

2. Reparations to Victims

The numerous sufferings that comfort women had to endure were rooted in Japan's wartime comfort station policy, and the *de facto* supervisor of comfort stations was the Japanese government and the military. Accordingly, it is justifiable for comfort women to demand the Japanese government's acknowledgement of its national responsibility as well as its apology and individual compensation.

In response to these demands, the Japanese government has acknowledged only its moral responsibility, admitting the involvement of military and local authorities but not that of the central government. It formed The Asian Women's Fund and began the payment of "atonement money," but not individual reparations. Still, the Japanese government has denied any legal responsibility for Korean comfort women because, it claims, except for Taiwan and North Korea, it has already resolved all of the issues relating to reparations and property claims through the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea and thus has no reason to compensate individuals again.

With this being its position, even if Japan were to acknowledge its national responsibility, the issue of the Korean comfort women would be impossible to resolve without the Korean government's clarification of its stance on the 1965 Korea-Japan treaty. The Korean government must clarify whether the treaty has actually absolved Japan's responsibility toward individual Koreans and relinquished individual Koreans' rights to claims toward the state of Japan. Meanwhile, international law provides a legal interpretation that separates international reparations from individual rights to claim, an issue which this paper will leave to legal experts for further research.

The Asian Women's Fund that the Japanese government has established is clearly a recompense that eschews its national responsibility. Thus, most comfort women victims have been refusing to accept it. However, for the two aforementioned reasons individual compensation by the Japanese government is not likely to be accomplished anytime in the near future, and we must consider the fact that comfort women victims are in their senior years.

At present, Koreans demand that the Japanese government acknowledge its national responsibility, provide compensation to individual victims with an apology, and punish the responsible. This stance has its own justification, but seven comfort women victims are receiving the "atonement money" from the Asian Women's Fund at the moment. Therefore, we should ask ourselves if it is fair to demand the victims to refuse the money without shouldering their burden together. If Koreans want comfort women

to pursue the Japanese government's apology and individual reparations to the end, then we must share their pain and burden, providing them with mental and financial support.

The reality is not very positive. On October 18, 1996, an organization known as the "Citizens' Solidarity to Find the Right Solutions for the Issue of Japan's Wartime Sex Slaves" (henceforth, "Citizens' Solidarity") was launched in order to share the victims' burden and facilitate their cause demanding Japan's national reparations. The initial goal of this organization was to raise approximately 2 trillion 200 million KRW, which includes the 2 million-yen "atonement money" that Japan's Asian Women's Fund promised to pay for each of the 160 comfort women victims. However, only 5.5 million KRW was raised by the time the "Citizens' Solidarity" was dissolved on May 28, 1997.

Although civic movements for comfort women victims do exist, such as *Nanum ui jip*, or the House of Sharing, which provides a home and financial support for comfort women victims, I wish to emphasize that we must extend this civic effort to the national level in order to adequately support comfort women victims. Only then can we encourage the victims to refuse the "atonement money" and fight for Japan's reparations to individuals.

I personally believe that the decision to receive the Asian Women's Fund or not should be left to each individual victim. At the same time, no one should criticize the victims who have collected the "atonement money" paid as a moral recompense from the Japanese government while continuing to demand the Japanese government's legal responsibility for individual compensation. It is not difficult to imagine that serious conflict will ensue between the victims who want to receive the Asian Women's Fund and those who insist on refusing it among various groups that support the victims. In order to prevent such conflict and bring about Japan's national compensation to individual victims, Koreans as a whole must make efforts to share the victims' burdens. Additionally, more forceful demands must be made to the Japanese government in order to reveal the truth and disclose relevant documents, while Korean and Japanese researchers, including this author, must make efforts to find the truth.

3. Implications of the Wartime Comfort Women Issue

Finally, as a woman, I would like to discuss the implications that the wartime comfort women issue holds for Koreans. It took as many as 46 years for Kim Hak-sun to reveal that she used to be a comfort woman. For this period of time, she had to lead a life hiding her painful past.

Why did she have to keep her silence? She said that she could come out revealing her name because “no family member or others are left now to be harmed or ashamed because of my testimony.” In other words, one of the most important reasons that she remained silent that long was because of the long-held traditional Korean view of women, i.e. the view that women who are not able to keep their chastity and virginity have no worth as women. It is not an exaggeration that this ethical concept or ideology about women led the victims to remain silent about the brutal violation of their human rights in colonial Korea.

Koreans could not protect their country from the Japanese imperialists, thereby resulting in victims of wartime sex slavery living through all that suffering on their land. It cannot be denied that Korean society has held a negative view of the sex slavery victims thus far, without realizing its collective responsibility as a nation. At this moment, one lesson that the comfort women issue gives us is a thorough awareness of the value of human rights above all in which to view a woman not merely as a female but as an independent human being.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Asian Women's Fund, ed. *Government Investigation: Complete Compilation of Documents on Military Comfort Women 3*. Tokyo: Ryukei Shosha, 1997.

International Military Tribunal for the Far East, *Stenographic Record of International Military Tribunal for the Far East VI*. Tokyo: Yushodo Shoten, 1968.

"Special Report: Korean Comfort Women—the Responsible of the Japanese Imperial Army." TBSテレビ. December 15, 1991.

Suzuki Yuko, Yamashita Yon'e, and Tonomura Masaru, eds. *Complete Compilation of Documents on the Japanese Military Comfort Women I*. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2006.

The Korean Council for Justice and Remembrance for the Issues of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan. *The Korean Military Comfort Women, Who were Taken by Force I*, The Korean Council for Justice and Remembrance for the Issues of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, ed. Seoul: Hanul, 1993.

The Korean Council for Justice and Remembrance for the Issues of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan. *The Korean Military Comfort Women, Who Were Taken by Force II*, The Korean Council for Justice and Remembrance for the Issues of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, ed. Seoul: Hanul, 1993.

The Ministry of War. *Military Hygiene*. Tokyo: Heiyo Tosho, 1929.

Yoshimi Yoshiaki. *A Sourcebook of Japanese Military Comfort Women*. Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1992.

軍慰安所従業婦等募集に関する件, 支受大日記(密) 基10 昭和13年自3月3日至3月11日. 1938. Catalogue Reference: 陸軍省-陸支密大日記-S13-6-115, no. 242. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/das/image/C04120263400>.

常州駐屯間内務規定 昭和13年3月 独立攻城重砲兵第2大隊, 独立攻城重砲兵第2大隊 関係資料 常州駐屯間内務規定警備間教育規定, 1938. Catalogue Reference: 支那-支那事変上海・南京-270, no. 2. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/das/image/C11111919900>.


陸密 第1955号 支那事変の経験より観たる軍紀振作対策. 1938. Catalogue Reference: 中央-軍事行政その他-42, no. 9. <https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/das/image/C15120129000>.

Secondary Sources


- Inaba Masao. *General Yasuji Okamura Documents <Part I>: Battlefield Memories*. Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1970.
- Nishino Rumiko. *Japanese Military Comfort Women: Testimony of Former Soldiers*. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1992.
- Ohama Tetsuya. *The Emperor's Army*. Tokyo: Kyōikusha, 1986.
- Okabe Naozaburo. *General Okabe Naozaburo Diary*. Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, 1982.
- Senda Kakou. *Japanese Military Comfort Women*. Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo, 1978.
- Shimada Toshihiko. *Kwantung Army*. Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 1965.
- Takasaki Ryūji. *A Sourcebook of Battlefield Reports by Japanese Military Doctors*. Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1990.
- Yoshida Yutaka. *The Emperor's Army and the Nanjing Incident*. Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1986.
- Yoshimi Yoshiaki. "Sending Japanese Military Comfort Women and the Government-General of Korea." *The Report on Japan's War Responsibility* 5: 32-36, September 1994.
- _____. *Japanese Military Comfort Women*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995.
- Yoshimi Yoshiaki·Hayashi Hirofumi. *Comfort Women of Japanese Army*. Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1995.
- Yun Jeong-ok. "Wartime Comfort Women as Part of Japan's Colonial Policy in Korea." In *The Truth about Comfort Women in the Japanese Military*. The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery, ed. Seoul: Yeoksabipyongsa, 1997.
- Yun Myungsuk. "The Formation of Korean Comfort Women during the Second Sino-Japanese War." *Bulletin of the Society for the Korean Historical Science* 32: 89-118, October 1994.

Appendix

The Japanese Government's Supervision of the Wartime Comfort System 1 (Installation and Recruitment) - Korean Comfort Women -



The Japanese Government's Supervision of the Wartime Comfort System 2 (Transportation and Operation) - Korean Comfort Women -





Article
(Translated)

Repatriation of Deserted Soldiers and Military Diplomacy between Early Joseon and the Ming

Gyeongnok KIM

Research Institute for Korean Military History

The Journal of Northeast Asian History

Volume 17 Number 2 (Summer 2021), 203-239

Copyright © 2021 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.

*No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.*

Repatriation of Deserted Soldiers and Military Diplomacy between Early Joseon and the Ming*

Gyeongnok KIM

Research Institute for Korean Military History

Introduction

Over the course of the epochal changes marked by the transition from the Yuan 元 to the Ming 明 in China and from Goryeo 高麗 to Joseon 朝鮮 in Korea, Joseon and the Ming alternated between conflict and cooperation over the matters of politics, military strategy, and diplomacy. The Yuan-Ming transition signified a shift in the international order. This was marked by a transition from the Yuan Order, longing for a global empire, to the Ming Order predicated on the ideology of the civilized versus barbarian world (*hwai* 華夷) of Neo-Confucianism. This Ming hierarchical international order, based on Confucian ritual obligations, paralleled the highly-centralized domestic political structure which the Hongwu Emperor (*Hongwu di* 洪武帝) wanted to build. It is at this juncture that the newly-founded Joseon dynasty tried to gain legitimacy by becoming a member of the tributary system presided over by the Ming and maintaining good relations with them. Despite the stormy first decades of their relationship, the Joseon state managed to adapt to changing international circumstances and

* This translated article is a revised and supplemented version of Kim Gyeongnok, “朝鮮初期 軍人送還問題와 朝明間 軍事外交,” *근사* 83 (June, 2012): 221-58.

engaged in vigorous diplomatic interactions with the Ming via the Ming representatives in Liaodong.

Extensive research in Korean historical circles allows us to paint an overall picture of foreign relations during the period of late Goryeo and early Joseon. Nevertheless, there is a dearth of in-depth research on individual topics of diplomacy, especially on the topics of military diplomacy. Even Seo Inhan's pioneering study on military relations between Korea and China from ancient times to the Joseon era does not go beyond a general survey of the subject.¹

Wada Sei was one of the first to draw attention to the topic of military deserters (*mansangun* 漫散軍) in the context of Joseon's relations with the Ming,² while Bak Wonho highlighted it as a major diplomatic issue between Joseon and the Ming in the context of the civil war between the Prince of Yan (*Yanwang* 燕王) and the Jianwen Emperor (*Jianwendi* 建文帝 r. 1398-1402).³ Going still further and drawing on chronological sources, Gang Seongmun traced the history of deserters crossing into Joseon and the repatriation procedures put in place for them, and introduced the conventional Chinese idea of *chomu* (Ch. *zhaofu* 招撫 (pacification) as an explanatory tool for understanding why the deserters were repatriated.⁴ Bak Seongju focused on refugees (*yumin* 流民) between early Joseon and the Ming, analyzing the reasons why they fled and in turn why they were repatriated to the Ming⁵ while Kim Gyeongnok conducted a similar study analyzing Joseon-Ming relations and focusing on the repatriation procedures for immigrants between the two states. However, little in-depth research

¹ Seo Inhan, *Han Jung gansa gwangyesa* (Gansa pyeonchan yeonguso, 2007).

² Wada Sei, "Mei sho no Manshū kyōryaku ka," in *Tōashi kenkyū* (1955).

³ Bak Wonho, "Myeong jeongnan cui yeok e daehan Joseon cui daejeung," *Asea yeongu*, 26, no. 2 (1983).

⁴ Gang Seongmun, "Joseon chogi mansangun cui yuip gwa songhwan," in *Han minjok eui gunsajeok jeontong* (Bongmyeong, 2000).

⁵ Bak Seongju, "15 segi Jo Myeong gan yumin cui balsaeng gwa songhwan," *Gyeongju sahak* 21 (2002).

has been done on deserters from the perspective of military diplomacy.⁶

This article seeks to fill this void by exploring the specific topic of military deserters from its emergence and development into a major issue of military diplomacy through to its ceasing to be an issue between Joseon and the Ming. Since late Goryeo, government officials had been aware of problems with migrants and runaway soldiers (*dogun* 逃軍), but the problem of large numbers of deserters in the wake of the civil war in China and military actions in Liaodong turned into a major issue in military diplomacy between Joseon and the Ming, especially in the years of King Taejong's reign 太宗 (r. 1400-1418). I will shed light on that period of intense military diplomacy over the repatriation of Ming deserters who fled to Joseon territory. Small bands of soldiers continued to desert until after the mid-15th century, the era of King Sejo 世祖 (r. 1455-1468), but these were seen as regular border events and did not provoke a strong diplomatic reaction. With the thematic accent on deserters in the aftermath of the civil war in mainland China, this study explores the circumstances of their influx into Joseon and the procedures put in place for their repatriation in the context of the military and diplomatic policies of the two states.⁷ By so doing, this approach will enable us to rethink the concept of military diplomacy and to recontextualize the military and diplomatic interactions between Joseon and the Ming in their early decades.

Military Diplomacy and Early Joseon's Relations with the Ming

The ideas of military power and diplomacy might sound incompatible, given that military action involves the use of force to attain one's goals, whereas diplomacy ideally employs negotiation by the state or a civilian group to achieve a desired result. Yet, in the real world, it is not unusual to

⁶ Kim Gyeongnok, "Joseon chogi gwihwa jeongchaek gwa Jo-Myeong gwangye," *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 83 (2012).

⁷ The topic of the repatriation of soldiers and civilians throughout Goryeo and Joseon is ripe for the attention of researchers.

include a military threat as a means of diplomatic negotiation. For example, it is not uncommon for superpowers like the United States to include military action as an option in diplomatic negotiations in what may be referred to as “coercive diplomacy.” As such, to achieve a national objective, the state can use the threat of military action as leverage to enforce its will.⁸

On the other hand, military cooperation in the form of personnel exchange, mutual security and defense agreements, and technological cooperation can be used as a positive means of diplomacy to achieve national security and practical benefits. Thus, military diplomacy in a positive light can be defined as military exchange and cooperation with another state or organization to achieve the state’s diplomatic and security goals.⁹

The way military diplomacy was conducted in early Joseon was quite different from the present. The international order under which early Joseon conducted diplomacy was not a world of sovereign nations, but rather a tributary system. The shift in the international order from the Yuan to the Ming witnessed the institutionalization of a more regularized and sophisticated tributary system,¹⁰ under which the Joseon state was expected to perform the role of a junior/vassal state vis-à-vis the Ming. Although it was obliged to fulfil the requirements and protocols of the tributary system, it still sought to establish diplomatic policies and to put them into practice so as to achieve state objectives. These objectives included specific military goals which were to be achieved through military policies and actions. The concept of military diplomacy in early Joseon can thus be defined as a range of external military activities that would affect diplomatic and defense policies and were designed to achieve state objectives under an inter-

⁸ Choe Yeongjong, “Uri nara gunsa oegyo eui iron gwa silje,” *Jeollyak yeongu* 32 (2004): 182.

⁹ Bae Jinsu, “Hanguk gunsa oegyoron,” *Gukje jeongchi nonchong* 37, no. 2 (1998): 292.

¹⁰ Kim Gyeongnok, “Joseon sidae jogong cheje wa dae Jungguk sahaeng,” *Myeong Cheong sa yeongu* 30 (2008): 93-98; Kim Gyeongnok, “Joseon sidae gukje jilseo wa Jo-Myeong gwangye,” in *Munhwaro boneun hanguksa*, Yitaejigyosu cheongnyeonginyeom nonchongganhaengwiwonhoe, ed. (Seoul: Taehaksa, 2009), 4-9; _____, “Joseon sidae gukje jilseo wa Han Jung gwangye eui jeongae yangsang,” *Jungguk hakbo* 60 (2009): 289-96.

national order centered on the Ming.

This study defines “external military activities” as constituting military diplomacy. As such, it is necessary to distinguish between “external military activities” and “internal/domestic military activities.” In order to distinguish external military activities related to military diplomacy, it is necessary to refer to the twenty five categories of diplomatic activities established in the *Dongmun hwigo* 同文彙考, a collection of diplomatic documents from the Joseon dynasty.¹¹ These categories indicate the way the Joseon state recognized its diplomatic activities under the Sino-Korean tributary system.¹² Out of these diplomatic categories, the following categories were the diplomatic categories of a military nature: *jinju* 陳奏 (reporting), *gyoyeok* 交易 (trade), *ganggye* 疆界 (border affairs), *beomwol* 犯越 (border incursions), *beomgeum* 犯禁 (prohibitions), *swaehwan* 刷還 (repatriation), *pyomin* 漂民 (marooned people), *gunmu* 軍務 (military operations), and *waejeong* 倭情 (Japanese affairs).

In the early Joseon military context, *jinju* 陳奏 (reporting) referred to the reporting of military events like rebellions, while *gyoyeok* 交易 (trade) referred to supplies of horses and grain. *Ganggye* 疆界 (border affairs) was very much concerned with avoiding military conflicts over territorial boundaries, and *beomwol* 犯越 (border incursions) referred to the crossing of state borders, especially by soldiers. *Beomgeum* 犯禁 (prohibitions) meant military materials prohibited by both states, with *swaehwan* 刷還 (repatriation) referring to repatriating illegal deserters who crossed the borders. *Pyomin* 漂民 (marooned people) referred to those who washed up on foreign shores as well as their ships, while *gunmu* 軍務 (military operations) meant military actions like safeguarding the king and raising armies. Finally, *waejeong* 倭情 (Japanese affairs) meant reporting on the condition or situation of the Japanese.

The military diplomacy of early Joseon unfolded in the context of the

¹¹ Kim Gyeongnok, “Joseon hugi Dongmun hwigo cui pyeonchan gwajeong gwa seonggyeok,” *Joseon sidaesa hakbo* 32 (2005): 194-95.

¹² Kim Gyeongnok, “Dongmun hwigo reul tonghan Joseon hugi oegyo saan yeongu,” *Myeong Cheong sa yeongu* 32 (2009): 74-76.

Yuan-Ming transition in China. Launching a military campaign against the Mongol Yuan, the Hongwu Emperor 洪武帝 declared a Ming-centered international order based on a dichotomous worldview of the distinction between the civilized and the barbarian. In the frontier regions beyond the Ming's direct control, the emperor used investiture to exercise Ming influence on the rulers of these frontier states, thus enhancing the international status of the Ming as an empire.¹³ The Hongwu Emperor and his successors were concerned with consolidating and expanding Ming control in border areas. As such, they established a series of guard units (*weisuo* 衛所) in the borderlands and on lands of strategic importance to enforce military control over these lands.¹⁴

The Hongwu Emperor's armies occupied Shangdu 上都, the Yuan summer capital, and following the surrender of the Yuan warlord Liu Yi 劉益, founded the Liaodong Guard 遼東衛 in Liaoyang in 1371 (20th year of King Gongmin; 4th year of the Hongwu reign), thus securing a frontier foothold to advance into the Liaodong region. However, a band of Mongol generals rose in rebellion and killed Liu Yi in retaliation. The Hongwu Emperor then ordered that the Office of Commissioner-in-Charge of Stabilizing the Liaodong Guard (Ding Liao duwei zhihuishi si 定遼都衛指揮使司), headed by Ma Yun 馬雲 and She Wang 葉旺, be established to command a network of local guards (*wei* 衛) across the Liaodong region.¹⁵ However, most of the Liaodong region still remained under the control of loyal supporters of the Yuan, such as the Mongol potentate Naghachu 納哈出. Meanwhile, Goryeo, alarmed by Ming inroads into Liaodong, attempted to maintain contact with the Yuan forces in the north, among them those led by Naghachu.

Having taken over mainland China, the Hongwu Emperor began to

¹³ Kim Gyeongnok, "Yeomal Seoncho Hongmuje eui Goryeo Joseon insik gwa oegyo gwangye," *Myeong Cheong sa yeongu* 35 (2011): 4.

¹⁴ Guo Hong and Yu Cuiyan, "Mingdai tusi weisuo zhidu yu junguanxing zhengqu," *jūnshì lishi yánjiū* 4 (2004): 79-80.

¹⁵ *Mingshi*, *juan* 134, *Liechuan* 22, She Wang; *Ming Taizu shilu*, *juan* 66 (4th year of Hongwu, 6th month).

extend imperial power into the Liaodong region where a considerable number of Koreans from Goryeo also had lived. One of his key policies for expansion was the incorporation of peoples residing in the region into Ming imperial jurisdiction. This policy was predicated on his perception that the Ming would inherit all the territories and peoples therein that hitherto had belonged to the Yuan.¹⁶ He warned the Goryeo court that since the boundaries of the two countries had already been defined, each party ought to stay within its respective territory. The aggressive policy of the Hongwu Emperor provoked a strong reaction on the part of Goryeo which went so far as to send a force to Liaodong but withdrew its forces because it gave way to the new Joseon dynasty. The emperor also tried to shift the allegiance of the Jurchen peoples away from the remaining Yuan commanders like Naghachu 納哈出 in order to prevent them from entering into any alliance with Korea.

The Ming incursions in Liaodong combined the three strategies of a military campaign, conciliatory measures towards the peoples residing there, and diplomacy with neighboring states. In 1387, the massive 200,000-strong northern expedition army under the command of Ping Sheng 憑勝 and his lieutenant generals Fu Youde 傅友德 and Lan Yi 藍玉 mounted attacks against the Yuan forces in the north.¹⁷ The northern expedition army captured Daning and advanced as far as Jinshan, pressing Naghachu and his allies hard. Heavily pressured, the remnants of the Yuan yielded to the Ming in large numbers. In particular, when Baijinwange 拔金完哥 and his allies surrendered, the Hongwu Emperor dispatched the assistant commissioners Li Wen 李文 and Go Yong 高顥 and the pacifier Du Xi 杜錫 to establish the Tieling Guard (*Tielingwei* 鐵嶺衛) in Fengji county, and made a point of notifying Goryeo of its establishment.¹⁸

In pursuit of his expansionist policy into Liaodong, the Hongwu Emperor met one serious problem: the Ming forces were suffering from the

¹⁶ *Ming Taizu shilu*, juan 187 (20th year of Hongwu, 12th month, *renxu* day).

¹⁷ *Ming Taizu shilu*, juan 180 (20th year of Hongwu, 1st month, *guichou* day).

¹⁸ *Ming Taizu shilu*, juan 189 (21st year of Hongwu, 3rd month, *shenchou* day); *Joseon Taejo sillok*, gwon 1, "Chongseo."

problem of desertion. The forces sent to Liaodong, though battle-hardened and of formidable strength, were exhausted by near constant warfare with the Mongols. Moreover, the intermediate stations (*yi* 驛) built for storing military grain along their lengthy supply lines from the mainland were vulnerable to Mongol attacks. On one occasion, Naghachu's forces raided Niujiazhuang 牛家莊, a newly-established Ming guard outpost in Liaodong, and burned 100,000 bags of grain and killed 5,000 soldiers, revealing the vulnerability of the Ming forces.¹⁹ The Ming forces responded by expanding the network of guard posts and fortifying stations and garrisons, but such problems continued.

In 1395 (28th year of the Hongwu reign), some twenty years after the start of the Liaodong campaigns, the emperor articulated his concern about such problems, when he issued an edict to Guo Ying 郭英, who was the field commander of the Liaodong armies. He ordered Guo Ying to stop the construction of the Liaodong palace, and expressed his concern about the desertion of soldiers as they came closer to the border with Goryeo.²⁰ It is highly likely that the Ming court was aware of massive numbers of desertions (Ch. *mansanjun*; K. *mansangun* 滿散軍), which were exacerbated by border issues with Goryeo, now that the Ming forces were approaching the border between the two countries.

As the Ming forces came closer to Goryeo, relations between the two countries alternated between military tension and reconciliation. The Ming had demanded that Goryeo discontinue military cooperation with the Yuan and supply war horses to them, and they became increasingly high-handed after King U's 禡王 accession to the throne, demanding a complete break in relations with the Yuan. Soon afterwards, Goryeo was replaced by Joseon, and the border issues with Korea carried over to the new dynasty.

The new Joseon dynasty was eager to engage in diplomatic activities with the Ming and ensure peace with this new dynasty of mainland China. To stay on good terms with the Ming, Joseon recognized an international

¹⁹ Kim Gyeongnok, "Gongmin wang dae gukje jeongse wa daeoe gwangye eui jeongae yangsang," *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 64 (2007): 221.

²⁰ *Ming Taizu shilu*, *juan* 238 (28th year of Hongwu, 4th month, *shenwei* day).

order centering on the Ming and willingly participated in it by sending tribute missions to the Ming emperor. Upon ascending the throne, King Taejo dispatched a series of tribute missions to notify the Ming of the founding of the dynasty, to offer the tribute horses requested by the Ming, and to offer condolences on the death of the crown prince in 1392. The Joseon court became the most active participant in the tributary system, frequently sending both regular and special tribute delegations to the Ming court to offer gratitude and congratulations and to join in celebrations on various occasions.

The Joseon court deemed Ming recognition of the new dynasty an essential condition of stable relations between the two states. As a goodwill gesture, it offered one thousand tribute horses to the Liaodong authorities. Following this, Yi Seonggye 李成桂, the day after his ascension to the throne in 1392, agreed with the proposal of the Deliberative Council of Top Officials (*Do pyeongeuisa sa* 都評議使司) to dispatch a special tribute mission to the Ming court. Shortly thereafter, on the 29th day of the 8th month, Jo Rim 趙琳, a former royal secretary, set out on a mission to the Ming court bearing a memorial to the throne (*pyomun* 表文) announcing the foundation of the new dynasty. This mission illustrates how Joseon intended to ensure Ming approval by recognizing it as a dominant power in Northeast Asia.²¹

Joseon cooperated with Ming demands for the repatriation of its subjects.²² Such demands came from both the Ming central government and the Ming authorities in Liaodong. The first official repatriation sent Li Shun 李順 and two more men, who had escaped from the captivity of Japa-

²¹ *Joseon Taejo sillok*, *gwon* 2 (1st year of Taejo, 11th month, *byeong'o* day); *gwon* 3 (2nd year of Taejo, 2nd month, *gyeong'in* day).

²² In fact, during the period of the Yuan dominance over Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula, Goryeo Koreans had settled *en masse* in the Liaodong area. However, at the time of the Yuan-Ming transition, many of them fled southward back to Goryeo to escape the conflict. Since they had already been included in the Liaodong military registers, however, the Ming claimed jurisdiction over them. The issue of who had jurisdiction over those Koreans, residing in Liaodong or returning to their homeland, remained problematic again after the foundation of the Joseon dynasty that pressed its claims to have jurisdiction over both Korean residents in Liaodong and those who had returned to Korea.

nese pirates (*wakō* 倭寇), to Nanjing 南京. Shortly afterward, Joseon repatriated Li Tangxin 李唐信, who had been captured during a fight with Japanese pirates, to the Liaodong authorities. In 1393, the Ming envoy Tuohuanbuhua 脫歡不花 demanded that former residents of Liaodong be repatriated. Joseon was unwilling to become embroiled in a diplomatic dispute with the Ming envoy and after some investigation acceded to his demands.²³ It was not the Hongwu Emperor in Nanjing who had sent Tuohuanbuhua 脫歡不花 but rather the Liaodong Regional Military Commission. Still, the emperor first raised the issue of repatriation when he sent an edict carried by the imperial commissioner Huang Yongqi 黃永奇 in 1394.

Despite Nanjing remaining the political and economic center of the Ming Empire in its first decades, the Hongwu Emperor stationed large armies in the north around the Beijing area in response to the ever present threat from Mongol forces. However, he understood that large armies in the frontier regions under the control of powerful local warlords would represent no less of a threat to the newly founded dynasty than the Mongols. As such, he invested his sons with the title of prince (*qinwang* 親王) of strategic territories, assigning them major responsibility for defending the new dynasty from its adversaries, in particular the Mongols.

Joseon did maintain close relations with the Princedom of Yan (*Yanwang fu* 燕王府), the Princedom of Liao (*Liaowang fu* 遼王府), and the Princedom of Ning (*Ningwang fu* 寧王府) as well as the Liaodong Regional Military Commission—a major communication channel to the Ming—. When Yi Seonggye took power in the Goryeo court, he sent An Sungno 安淑老, an associate royal secretary, to present congratulatory gifts to the newly installed Prince of Yan (*Yanwang* 燕王). In addition, he sent Bak Won 朴原, a former royal secretary, and Ryu Un 柳雲, a former deputy royal secretary, to the Prince of Liao (*Liaowang* 遼王) and to the Prince of Ning (*Ningwang* 寧王), respectively, to express his congratulations on their appointments to their princedoms.

²³ *Joseon Taejo sillok*, *gwon* 2 (1st year of Taejo, 11th month, *byeongsul* day); *gwon* 3 (2nd year of Taejo, 3rd month, *gapsul* day); (4th month, *jeongchuk* day).

Meanwhile, in terms of military diplomacy between Joseon and the Ming, several important issues were at stake in the Liaodong region, including border disputes, the repatriation of deserters, and the incorporation of the Jurchens. In logistical terms, maintaining supply lines, either by land or by sea, between the Liaodong region and the Beijing capital area was of key importance. In the Hongwu era, the newly established Guard for Stabilizing Liaodong (*Dingliaowei* 定遼衛), in attempting to suppress the northern Yuan forces, was forced to transport military grain by sea from Shandong due to the difficulty of securing overland routes from the capital.²⁴ Similarly, in his campaign against the Jianwen Emperor, the Prince of Yan (*Yanwang* 燕王) drove the Liaodong forces out of the Shanhai Pass (*Shanhaiguan* 山海關), the easternmost terminus of the Great Wall, but refrained from pursuing them further, judging that they no longer presented any serious threat. He was proved correct when the Jianwen Emperor tried to supply his military forces by sea but failed as his ships drifted to the coast of Jeolla Province in southwest Korea.²⁵

Military diplomacy between early Joseon and the Ming had several defining characteristics. First, even though political crises sometimes generated military tension, there was never an armed conflict between the two states. The earlier Goryeo expedition against Liaodong, which was forced to turn around at Wihwa Island 威化島 and eventually triggered the transition from Goryeo to Joseon, had not faced the Ming armies. Similarly, a number of diplomatic disputes, including several border disputes, did not escalate into military confrontation. Jeong Dojeon 鄭道傳, a founding member of the Joseon dynasty, did train the military with the aim of strengthening the defense of the northern border region, but it is unlikely that he had in mind an attack against Liaodong.²⁶ At any rate, a military conflict was the last thing the Joseon rulers had in mind in their efforts to secure Ming support for the legitimacy of their new dynasty.

²⁴ *Mingshi*, juan 130, *Liechuan* 18, Qiu Cheng; juan 131, *Liechuan* 19, Wu Zhen.

²⁵ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, gwon 1 (the ascending year of Taejong, 5th month, *musul* day).

²⁶ Bak Honggyu, "Jeong Dojeon cui gong Yo gido jaegeomto," *Jeongchi sasang yeongu* 10, no. 1 (2004): 13-14.

On the Ming side, the Hongwu Emperor, in his injunctions to posterity, admonished his subjects not to initiate hostilities with Joseon, occupied as he was with several other issues. Although Ming forces had pushed the Mongols far to the north, its armies in Liaodong frequently engaged in skirmishes with the remaining Mongols that had not been pacified. In addition to the Mongol problem, the still unsettled relations with the Jurchens and the long supply lines from the mainland worked against the Ming risking any military conflict with Korea.²⁷ Despite the thorny issue of inadequate memorials to the throne (K. *pyojeonmun*; Ch. *biaojianwen* 表箋文) in initial diplomatic relations between Joseon and the Ming, the emperor chose to rely on diplomacy via the Board of Rites (Libu 禮部) to secure the kind of relationship he wanted, dismissing the calls of his generals to send armies to Korea.²⁸

A second characteristic of military diplomacy between Joseon and the Ming was military collaboration. Both perceived Japanese pirates and to some extent the Jurchens as common adversaries. Japanese pirates in the Hongwu era were a serious challenge to the emperor's efforts to build maritime defenses,²⁹ and many guard posts were put in strategic areas to repel them.³⁰ As their attacks persisted, however, the Ming sought Joseon's cooperation in gathering intelligence about their movements. Korea saw the Japanese pirates as a plague on its coastal regions, and King Gongmin even sent an envoy to ask Japan to deter them.³¹ Notably, a Korean attack against Tsushima, a stronghold of the Japanese pirates, in the early years of King Sejong coincided with major incidents of pillaging of the Ming coasts

²⁷ *Ming Taizu shilu*, juan 255 (30th year of Hongwu, 9th month, *wuji* day).

²⁸ Kim Gyeongnok, "Joseon chogi jonggye byeonmu eui jeongae yangsang gwa dae Myeong gwangye," *Guksagwan nonchong* 108 (2006): 5-6; *Ming Taizu shilu*, juan 257 (31st year of Hongwu, 4th month, *gengchen* day).

²⁹ Wang Rigen, "Mingdai haifang jianshe yu wokou, haizei di chisheng," *Zhongguo Haiyang daxue xuebao* 4 (2004): 13-14.

³⁰ In 1387 (20th year of Hongwu), 11 guards, 13 outposts, and 44 checkpoints were put in place, and in the Yongle era, waterside stockades (*shuizhai* 水寨) were built.

³¹ Yi Yeong, "14 segi eui Dong Asia gukje jeongse wa waegu: Gingmin wang 15 nyeon (1366) eui geumwae sajeol eui palyeon eul jungsim euro," *Hanll gwangyesa yeongu* 26 (2007): 108.

and was facilitated by an exchange of information between the two states. However, cooperation between Joseon and the Ming in military diplomacy could have two contrasting results: collaborative action that had the potential to promote good relations, and at the same time, pressure from the Ming that could generate tensions between them.³²

A third characteristic of military diplomacy was the issue of the repatriation of deserters or sailors who drifted onto the Korean coast.³³ This included the return of Koreans registered with Liaodong military units and former Liaodong soldiers who had fled to Korea because of the conflict there. It also included seamen who drifted onto the Korean coast while transporting military provisions to Liaodong. The issue of repatriation was handled smoothly in most cases with the exception of a few cases complicated by problems of a political and military nature. The repatriation of large groups of deserters (*mansangun* 漫散軍) was rather rare; the repatriation of small groups of soldiers or sailors was much more common. Repatriation was, in fact, bilateral in nature, also involving the return of Koreans in Chinese territories to Korea, as demonstrated by Korean seamen marooned on China's coasts.³⁴ However, the Joseon court, despite its willingness to meet Ming demands, was nonetheless concerned about the potential for repatriates to expose state secrets and the weakness of its position.

The fourth characteristic was issues related to military supplies and weapons. The best-known example is Joseon supplying horses and other weapons to supplement Ming military preparations against the Mongols.³⁵ In principle, weaponry remained an article of contraband between Joseon and the Ming. Accordingly, Ming authorities firmly rejected Joseon demands for Chinese weapons while Joseon prevented its cannons and maps from coming into the hands of foreigners. Nevertheless, trade in horses and

³² *Joseon Sejong sillok*, *gwon* 101 (25th year of Sejong, 7th month, *imo* day).

³³ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, *gwon* 12 (6th year of Taejong, 7th month, *giyu* day).

³⁴ *Joseon Sejong sillok*, *gwon* 101 (25th year of Sejong, 7th month, *imsin* day).

³⁵ *Imun*, *gwon* 2, "Yebu wi maga sa." The Hongwu emperor asked Goryeo to supply military horses, which resulted in the trading of 10,000 Korean horses in the years 1392 and 1393, the time of the change of the royal house in Korea.

oxen took place according to Ming military needs.³⁶ The disparity in the power of the two states left Joseon with little option but to acquiesce to Ming demands. However, such accommodations benefitted its efforts to stabilize relations with the Ming.

At the same time, the repatriation of soldiers was an integral aspect of military diplomacy between Joseon Korea and Ming China, and it is necessary to examine how this came about and the actual procedures put in place to achieve it. All those subject to repatriation were deemed to have committed the serious crime of illegal entry (*beomwol* 犯越). A variety of terms were used to refer to those who committed this crime and entered Joseon territory, such as runaway soldiers (*dogun* 逃軍), refugees (*yuimin* 流移民), migrants (*doraein* 逃來人), and deserters (*mansangun* 漫散軍). The terms *dogun* 逃軍 and *mansangun* 漫散軍 both refer to soldiers who have deserted. However, *mansangun* is used in this study as its use parallels soldiers coming into Joseon in large numbers, especially during the reign of King Taejong.³⁷ In Joseon and the Ming alike, illegal entry (K. *beomwol*; Ch. *fanyue* 犯越) was considered taboo. Although there is no extant detailed elaboration of the crime, it is referenced in a collection of the Joseon dynasty's diplomatic documents (*Dongmun hwigo* 同文彙考).

The *Dongmun hwigo* 同文彙考 is a *magnum opus* of Joseon Korea's diplomatic documents. Though compiled in the late Joseon period at the time of the Qing, the protocols contained therein applied to tributary relations with China in general. It is organized according to diplomatic categories and contains diplomatic protocols for each of these.³⁸ In the categories of illegal entry (*beomwol* 犯越) and repatriation (*swaehwan* 刷還), it stipulates that those who crossed the border between Joseon and the Ming with the intention of staying temporarily or permanently were subject to thorough investigation followed by repatriation. It can thus be said that an

³⁶ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, *gwon* 2 (1st year of Taejong, 9th month, *jeonghae* day).

³⁷ The term *mansangun* 漫散軍 appears predominantly during the reign of King Taejong in historical chronicles such as *Joseonwangjo sillok* 朝鮮王朝實錄 [Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty].

³⁸ Kim Gyeongnok, "Joseon hugi *Dongmun hwigo* cui pyeonchan gwajeong gwa seonggyeok," *Joseon sidaesa hakbo* 32 (2005): 197.

agreement existed between Joseon and the Ming to repatriate all trespassers and deserters.

The term *beomwol* 犯越 (illegal entry) could be used interchangeably with a similar term, *wolgyeong* 越境 (border crossing). Those crossing borders often had compelling reasons, such as war and famine, yet the dynastic government saw it as a form of revolt against the king's rule (*wangjeong* 王政), and as such, deemed it unacceptable. To the government, it undermined the stability of the state's legal order and economy. Moreover, crossing the border into Liaodong was strictly prohibited, both because of its potential to precipitate a diplomatic crisis in Joseon-Ming relations and because the Joseon court was very much concerned that Korean defectors would disclose information it wanted to hide if captured and interrogated by the Ming.

Those people crossing the border had a variety of motivations.³⁹ However, with the exception of Buddhist monks crossing the border for religious purposes, these were largely of an economic nature, for example, illegal trade with the Jurchens or cultivating fallow land. Regardless of motivation, Joseon and the Ming authorities alike strictly prohibited all such acts⁴⁰ and imposed strict penalties to deter them. During the reign of King Taejo, the Deliberative Council of Top Officials introduced capital punishment for border crossers, both principal offenders and accomplices. To show his determination not to tolerate border crossings, King Taejo ordered the decapitation of seven offenders from Pyeong'an Province. Such punishments were written into the Joseon law code, *Gyeongje yukjeon* 經濟六典.⁴¹ Border crossings continued to occur from the four border garrisons of Hamgil Province during the time of King Sejong, leading him to order the Ministry of Punishment (Hyeongjo 刑曹) to punish transgressors

³⁹ *Joseon Taejo sillok*, gwon 7 (4th year of Taejo, 2nd month, *eulchuk* day); *Joseon Taejong sillok*, gwon 11 (6th year of Taejong, 4th month, *muin* day); *Joseon Sejong sillok*, gwon 26 (26th year of Sejong, 10th month, *gyehae* day); *Joseon Seongjong sillok*, gwon 13 (2nd year of Seongjong, 12th month, *gimyō* day).

⁴⁰ *Joseon Taejo sillok*, gwon 2 (1st year of Taejo, 12th month, *gyeongo* day).

⁴¹ *Joseon Taejo sillok*, gwon 6 (3rd year of Taejo, 6th month, *gisa* day).

severely.⁴²

There were, however, several situations in which the Joseon government authorized individuals to cross its borders. One of these was the immigration of people (*samin* 徙民) to populate the Korean-controlled borderlands captured from the Jurchens. Many Korean settlers, however, crossed the border and joined Jurchen communities, forcing the government to further tighten its control over the border. In addition, undercover Korean intelligence gatherers crossed the border to collect information about the Liaodong and Jurchen regions. However, these espionage acts met with strong protests from the Ming authorities when they arrested several of these Korean spies (*ganja* 間者), leading the Joseon court to order a halt to such acts.⁴³

Repatriation of Deserted Soldiers: The Reasons and Procedures

During the Mongol invasions of Goryeo, a large number of people were taken to Liaodong, and later on some local warlords also took many people to Liaoyang to become part of the Dongning Guard (*Dongningwei* 東寧衛). These Koreans maintained contact with their relatives and occasionally returned *en masse* during wars and famines in the Liaodong region, although this necessitated hiding from the Korean authorities.⁴⁴ However, at the time of the establishment of the Joseon dynasty, official protocols for their repatriation to the Ming did not exist.⁴⁵ When the Liaodong Regional Military Commission demanded their repatriation via official communications (K. *jamun*; Ch. *ziwen* 咨文), the Joseon court decided to repatriate them to avoid friction with the Ming, although it often proved difficult to locate these refugees from Liaodong.

⁴² *Joseon Sejong sillok*, *gwon* 97 (24th year of Sejong, 9th month, *jeongchuk* day).

⁴³ *Joseon Seongjong sillok*, *gwon* 224 (20th year of Seongjong, 1st month, *imsin* day).

⁴⁴ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, *gwon* 3 (2nd year of Taejong, 2nd month, *jeongsa* day).

⁴⁵ Kim Kyeongnok, "Joseon chogi gwihwa jeongchaek gwa Jo-Myeong gwangye," *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 83 (2012): 224-27.

The Joseon government's position was that regardless of their ethnicity, if they were registered with the Ming authorities, they were regarded as Ming soldiers and as such were subject to repatriation. However, these deserters were scattered across the country and often could not be located, the fact that a frequent source of friction in Joseon-Ming relations. In addition, the Joseon response to Ming demands for the repatriation of its soldiers was very much dependent on its own political and strategic considerations. Early Joseon kings sometimes chose to allow Korean soldiers who had deserted from the Ming to resettle in Korea in order to collect military information from them. For example, in King Taejo's time, a Korean conscript named Kim Song 金松, who had been involved in battles between the Ming and the Mongols and then escaped, was allowed to resettle in his homeland.⁴⁶ Similarly, in King Jeongjong's time, Korean soldiers who had joined the Dongning Guard and then deserted were also allowed to resettle. The Joseon court often gleaned important information from these Korean deserters from Liaodong, for example, the first news of the Prince of Yan's rebellion.⁴⁷

For the Ming, the issue of deserters (*taojun* 逃軍) was a matter of military administration (*junzheng* 軍政) under its legal system.⁴⁸ It was a serious offense in military administration as it could result in a disruption of military affairs. It was on the same level as other serious military offenses such as the unauthorized raising of government armies, failure to report military affairs correctly, failure to report military circumstances promptly, delay of supplies to the frontiers, mistaken reports of military affairs, avoiding military service, failure to defend an assigned post, plundering while on campaign, intimidating commoners, selling or damaging war horses and military equipment, hiding military equipment, unauthorized granting of military-service exemptions, abuse of power by military commanders, and failure to provide for the dependents of soldiers. Desertion

⁴⁶ *Joseon Taejo sillok*, *gwon* 3 (2nd year of Taejo, 6th month, *eulhae* day; *gwon* 14, 7th year of Taejo, 6th month, *gabin* day).

⁴⁷ *Joseon Jeongjong sillok*, *gwon* 1 (1st year of Jeongjong, 3rd month, *imsin* day).

⁴⁸ *Da Minglu jijie fuli*, *juan* 14, "Junzheng"; *juan* 15, "Guanjin."

was also a grave violation of the management of military checkpoints along with other offenses such as allowing unauthorized passage through military checkpoints, allowing passage through military checkpoints with forged travel documents, and causing trouble while staying in military checkpoints.

Under the Ming legal system, the concept of *yuejing* 越境 (crossing a boundary) meant not only crossing the state border, but also leaving one's registered area. In 1390 (23rd year of the Hongwu reign), the emperor ordered local officials in territorial administrative units (*fu* 府, *zhou* 州, and *xian* 縣) to examine the *lijia* 里甲 system for tax collection and forced labor in an effort to identify deserters and to send them back to their original place of registration. However, the search was ineffective and the Yongle Emperor (r. 1402-1424) issued a similar decree calling for a thorough investigation of deserters and their families (*taohu* 逃戶) in 1421 (19th year of the Yongle reign). And, as these early measures to return deserted soldiers to their original places of registration were largely ineffective, the Hongwu Emperor ordered the setting up of stations of the Military Inspectorate (*Xunjiansi* 巡檢司) at strategic points throughout the empire. In addition, the government promulgated detailed articles of punishment for those who deserted.⁴⁹ Those caught illegally crossing the state borders (*guojing* 國境) received heavier punishments than those crossing domestic boundaries (*yuejing* 越境).

It should be noted that in cases of desertion it was not only the soldiers themselves but also their family members who were included in the repatriation. During the Joseon era, deserters were usually accompanied by their family members. As such, both diplomatic documents from the Ming demanding the repatriation of soldiers and Joseon's listing of them used the unit of the household.⁵⁰ The soldiers repatriated from Joseon to the Ming can be divided into three groups. The overwhelming majority of them were

⁴⁹ *Da Ming huidian*, *juan* 19, "Hukou 1" 戶口 [Household and population], "Taohu" 逃戶 [Deserted households]; *Da Ming huidian*, *juan* 138, "Guanjin 1" 關津 [Military checkpoints], "Guanjin Xunkiansi"; *Da Minglu jijie fuli*, *juan* 14, "Binglu," "Junzheng," "Zongfan junren xieyi."

⁵⁰ *Joseon Taejo sillok*, *gwon* 4 (2nd year of Taejo, 8th month, *Imin* day).

soldiers who had run away from their units (*dogun* 逃軍) and had fled to Joseon to avoid war. A second group was war captives from the Jurchen lands who had fled to Joseon or been captured by the Joseon armies. The final group was seamen whose ships carrying military provisions had run aground in Korea.

The deserters who fled to Korea came mostly in times of war such as the Yuan-Ming transition, the rebellion of the Prince of Yan against the Jianwen Emperor, and the invasions of the Tatar 韃靼 tribes. During the turbulent Yuan-Ming transition, many ethnic Koreans residing in Liaodong migrated to Goryeo. However, their number decreased sharply as Joseon's tributary relationship with the Ming court under Hongwu stabilized. However, during the civil war between the Jianwen Emperor and the Prince of Yan (August 1399 to July 1402), an unprecedented number of deserters—referred to as *mansangun* 漫散軍 in this study—took refuge in Joseon. The *mansangun* issue involved the interests of multiple parties, including the Ming court under Jianwen, the Prince of Yan (later the Yongle emperor), and the Joseon court, and emerged as one of the biggest issues during the reigns of King Taejo and King Taejong. However, beginning with the reign of King Sejong, the numbers of *mansangun* dropped precipitously, and thereafter ceased to be a major issue between the two states.

The second group of repatriates came about as a result of border incursions by the Jurchens. The Jurchens maintained a semi-autonomous status under the competing influences of Joseon Korea and Ming China. However, they had difficulty in creating a self-sufficient economy. As they moved from a semi-nomadic and primitive agricultural stage to a more sedentary agricultural stage, they needed more agricultural labor, in particular experienced farming labor. As such, they staged frequent raids on Liaodong and Joseon to take captives to be used as agricultural slaves. Farmers made up the bulk of those kidnapped, but a substantial number were also soldiers. Joseon and the Ming considered the Jurchen encroachments a serious challenge to the frontier security of both states, creating common cause between them. Joseon habitually repatriated Ming subjects captured by the Jurchens when they fled into its territories. Between 1392 and 1494,

Joseon repatriated a total of 2,468 individuals to the Ming authorities,⁵¹ the majority after the reign of King Sejong. The Ming subjects who came into the custody of the Joseon authorities consisted of those who had fled to Joseon, those who were captured by Joseon armies during attacks against the Jurchens, and those sent as human tribute to the Joseon court by the Jurchens.

The least problematic repatriations involved seamen in charge of transporting military grain and soldiers whose ships ran aground on the Korean coast. Both military and civilian seamen were sent back according to well-established conventions of the tributary relationship between Joseon and the Ming. Few diplomatic disputes arose from such events.

Over the course of time, individual cases of repatriation gave rise to a set of conventions on how this was carried out but how to repatriate large groups of deserters was a different matter. Typically, the Joseon court was able to know about Ming deserters crossing into Joseon via a report from a border officer. Only when receiving Ming demands for their repatriation, then, the court would formally order the border officer to investigate them. After the border officer's report on the details of the deserters and their companions, including their sex, age and health status, the court ordered their repatriation to fully comply with the Ming demand. The principal destination for repatriated deserters was the Liaodong Regional Military Commission, and transfers took place in conjunction with regular Joseon missions sent to the Ming capital (*bugyeong sahaeng* 赴京使行) or specially-appointed missions to Liaodong (*Yodong sahaeng* 遼東使行),⁵² which were small and usually led by translators (*tongsa* 通事).

When deserters returned, the Ming authorities interrogated them about their motives for desertion, their companions, places of residence in Joseon, and any deserters remaining in Joseon territory. A typical case was that of the Wang Hegui 王和貴 group of 36 deserters who were repatriated

⁵¹ Bak Seongju, "15 segi Jo Myeong gan yumin cui balsaeng gwa songhwan," *Gyeongju sahak* 21 (2002): 132.

⁵² Kim Gyeongnok, "Joseon chogi tae Myeong oegyo wa oegyo jeolcha," *Hanguksa ron* 44 (2000): 23-27.

to the Liaodong Regional Military Commission and then interrogated by a Chinese general. He discovered that another group of deserters from the Tieling Guard still remained in Joseon and reported this to the Left Military Commission (*Zuojun dudufu* 左軍都督府). The Left Military Commission in turn reported this to the emperor, who ordered it to send the Joseon court an official communication demanding the repatriation of the remaining Ming deserters.⁵³

In the event of such a demand, the State Council (*Euijeongbu* 議政府) was in charge of supervising the whole repatriation procedure. It saw to it that deserted soldiers and their family members were put in the custody of local administrative units, *ju* 州, *gun* 郡, or *hyeon* 縣, and then reported them to the king. The king then appointed a special envoy to escort them to Liaodong or handed them over to a returning Ming envoy. The envoy carried an official communication to the Ming authorities, which by convention, listed the number of men and women, the number of fugitives still at large, and the number of deaths from diseases.⁵⁴

The Issue of Deserted Soldiers and Military Diplomacy between Joseon and the Ming

After the death of the emperor Hongwu, Ming China experienced great turmoil due to the struggle between the Ming court of the Jianwen Emperor and the Prince of Yan over political hegemony in the Ming empire, later referred to as the Jingnan War (*Jingnan zhi yi* 靖難之役), literally a campaign to clear away disorder, by the victors. During the bloody, three-year power struggle between the two forces, a large number of soldiers took flight to places of safety such as Joseon Korea. This presented Joseon with a serious diplomatic issue in regard to their repatriation to the Ming—initially in the reign of Jeongjong, but more seriously in the reign of Taejong.

In 1370, Zhu Di 朱棣 became the Prince of Yan (*Yanwang* 燕王). He

⁵³ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, gwon 5 (3rd year of Taejong, 1st month, *sinmyo* day).

⁵⁴ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, gwon 5 (3rd year of Taejong, 3rd month, *gihae* day).

established himself in the area around modern Beijing in 1380 and soon began to expand his power. In 1391, he commanded campaigns against the Mongols outside of the Great Wall.⁵⁵ However, at the same time, the new Jianwen Emperor was attempting to curtail the power of the princes invested by the Hongwu Emperor, and this brought him into open conflict with his uncles, in particular Zhu Di, the Prince of Yan, who commanded formidable forces. In a series of ill-thought-out actions, the Jianwen Emperor sought to destroy the power of the princedoms. He first demoted the Prince of Zhou, his half-brother, to the rank of commoner and banished him to Yunnan. Finally, he eliminated the princedoms of the Prince of Min, the Prince of Qi, and the Prince of Dai. These moves provoked the Prince of Yan into preparing a counteroffensive. The resulting massive increase in forced labor and military duties led to overwhelmed soldiers fleeing their posts. Among these, Korean soldiers attached to the Dongning Guard fled to their homeland.⁵⁶

In the initial phase of the war, the Prince of Yan defeated an army under Geng Bingwen 耿炳文, a commanding general appointed by the Jianwen Emperor, at Zhending, southwest of Beijing.⁵⁷ However, while raising an army against the Jianwen court in the south, the Prince worried about the Liaodong armies in the rear. He intended to seize control of the Liaodong region ahead of the armies of Li Jinglong 李景隆, who was stationed at Dezhou in Shandong and who had replaced Geng Bingwen. A number of Liaodong generals, including Wu Gao 吴高, Geng Huan 耿璣, and Yang Wen 楊文, heard of the Prince of Yan's uprising from Ge Liang 各亮, the general in charge of the defense of Yongping, and promptly laid siege to Yongping. In reaction, the Prince of Yan led his troops into battle against

⁵⁵ Zhu Di, the 4th son of the Hongwu emperor, was invested as the Prince of Yan at the age of eleven in accordance with the emperor's strategy of assigning fiefs to his sons as a defense against the Mongols, but he only took up residence in Beiping (modern Beijing) at the age of twenty one when he reached adulthood.

⁵⁶ *Joseon Jeongjong sillok, gwon 1* (1st year of Jeongjong, 3rd month, *imsin* day). Korean soldiers from the Dongning Guard informed the Joseon court of the outbreak of hostilities between the Jianwen emperor and the Prince of Yan.

⁵⁷ *Mingshi, juan 5*, Chengzu benji.

the Liaodong armies, leaving Beijing to his eldest son to guard against the armies of Li Jinglong.

With his armies routed in the battle at Zhending, the Jianwen Emperor summoned the Prince of Liao (*Liaowang* 遼王) from Guangning and the Prince of Ning (*Ningwang* 寧王) from Daning to form an alliance with him. While the Prince of Liao to the north of the Yan principedom responded, the Prince of Ning to the northeast declined. The Jianwen Emperor thus had the Liaodong armies as an ally, but let the Prince of Ning come under the influence of the Prince of Yan.⁵⁸ In strategic terms, this meant that the Prince of Yan had to fight against the armies of the Jianwen Emperor in the south while the Liaodong armies threatened his rear.

The armies of the Prince of Yan drove out the Liaodong armies besieging Yongping to the Shanhai Pass and attacked and captured Daning to the north, annexing the armies of the Prince of Ning to the Prince of Yan's command.⁵⁹ He also managed to convince the Mongols to attack the Liaodong armies, thus removing any threat from the rear.⁶⁰

The Liaodong armies at the Shanhai Pass under Wu Gao and Yang Wen remained largely on the defensive. Due to disinformation from the Prince of Yan, Wu Gao was demoted and exiled to Guangxi. Yang Wen continued to defend the Liaodong region and reinforced his army with men drawn from military registers.⁶¹ However, though an able general with battle experience vanquishing native tribes,⁶² Yang Wen was not able to lead his army in a major offensive against the superior forces of the Prince of Yan. Starting in 1400, this allowed the Prince, his armies reinforced with Tatar recruits, to launch major offensives against the armies of the Jianwen Emperor. In the 5th month of 1402, his armies crossed the Zhangjiang 長江 (i.e., the Yangzi River 揚子江), and finally succeeded in capturing Nanjing

⁵⁸ *Guoque*, *juan* 11 (starting year of Jianwen, 9th month, *dingmao* day).

⁵⁹ *Ming Taizong shilu*, *juan* 3 (starting year of Yongle, 9th month, *renchen* day); (*renyin* day).

⁶⁰ *Guoque*, *juan* 11 (3rd year of Jianwen, 11th month, *yimao* day).

⁶¹ *Ming Taizong shilu*, *juan* 4 (starting year of Yongle, 11th month, *yihai* day); (12th month, *dingyou* day).

⁶² *Ming Taizu shilu*, *juan* 255 (30th year of Hongwu, 9th month, *yihai* day).

南京 in the 6th month, thus putting an end to the three-year civil war.

On the 1st day of the 7th month of 1402, the Prince of Yan ascended the throne as the Yongle Emperor and immediately issued a proclamation of his accession and policy directives.⁶³ This proclamation included regulations governing the return of all Ming subjects who had fled during the conflict. In principle, all the people displaced during the civil war were to be returned to their original place of registration where they would continue their original occupations. Soldiers who had deserted were to return to their original guard posts and would avoid punishment if they returned within one month of the edict. Soldiers from regional military commissions (*dusi* 都司) and guard units (*weisuo* 衛所) who had been taken captive or killed during the war, were to be returned or investigated to ascertain their affiliation during the Hongwu Emperor's reign.

The Joseon court first became aware of the uprising of the Prince of Yan in the 3rd month of the 1st year of the reign of King Jeongjong (r. 1398-1400). The interrogation of deserters from the Dongning Guard revealed that the Prince had raised an army against the Jianwen Emperor.⁶⁴ Knowing that the Prince of Yan, or later Yongle Emperor was enlisting troops into his armies on a massive scale in his preparations for war, soldiers from many guard units including the Dongning Guard began to desert.

By the 3rd month of the 2nd year of the reign of King Taejong, the Jianwen Emperor's armies had suffered a series of defeats and the Tatar tribes had begun to invade. This precipitated some 2,000 soldiers from the Liaodong army fleeing their posts into Joseon territory. The influx of soldiers coincided with overwhelming victories by the Prince of Yan in his march on Nanjing, and with the incorporation of many troops into the Prince's forces under the Stabilizing Liaodong Guard (*Ding Liao wei* 定遼衛). Those in Liaodong who had fought against the Prince found themselves in an untenable position, and many began to flee for their lives.

King Taejong initially decided to accommodate the deserters (*mansangun*

⁶³ *Ming Taizong shilu*, *juan 10 shang* (35th year of Hongwu, 7th month, *renwu* day).

⁶⁴ *Joseon Jeongjong sillok*, *gwon 1* (1st year of Jeongjong, 3rd month, *imsin* day).

漫散軍) who had fled to Joseon. He informed the Ming authorities that though he was aware of armed men in the border areas, he could not establish their identities as Ming soldiers or other, and as such, he could not send an expedition against them.⁶⁵ Shortly thereafter, the Ming envoy Zhu Mengxian 祝孟獻 arrived at the Joseon court in 1402. Initially, Joseon officials did not divulge the fact that they knew they were harboring Liaodong soldiers, and they asked him to positively identify them as Ming soldiers. However, on learning that Zhu intended to send an official letter based on that request to the Stabilizing Liaodong Guard, the Joseon court objected to it, fearing it would lead to Ming armies approaching the borders.

The issue of how to handle the situation with the deserters caused considerable debate in the Joseon court. Taejong was in favor of accepting them on the grounds that abandoning starving deserters would cause a serious threat in the frontier areas. For instance, the head of the deserted soldiers, Impallalsilli 林八刺失里, claiming that many officers and soldiers from the Stabilizing Liaodong Guard had already sided with the Prince of Yan's cause, entreated the Joseon court for an opportunity where his party could be resettled in Joseon. Taejong knew that accepting the deserters could provoke a conflict with the Ming. However, without taking the besieged Jianwen court in Nanjing into account, he chose to make an independent decision and ignore a letter from the Ming Left Military Commission (Zuojun dudufu 左軍都督府) demanding the return of the deserters. He then ordered that they be relocated to provinces with adequate food supplies: the first group of 869 to Punghae Province, then 1,297 to Gyeong-sang Province, 854 to Chungcheong Province, 488 to Gyeonggi Provinces, and finally 1,585 to Jeolla Province.⁶⁶

Taejong, however, was inconsistent in his refusal to repatriate deserters, using them instead as leverage to achieve his diplomatic and military goals in relation to the Ming. When his court received a strong Ming demand for the repatriation of its soldiers, he chose to be receptive to the de-

⁶⁵ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, gwon 3 (2nd year of Taejong, 3rd month, *giyu* day; (4th month, *mujin* day).

⁶⁶ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, gwon 3 (2nd year of Taejong, 5th month, *eulmi* day; (5th month, *imja* day); (gwon 4, 2nd year of Taejong, 9th month, *jeongyu* day).

mand so as not to upset relations with the Ming. As soon as the Joseon court learned that a Ming envoy was *en route* with Ming demands in 1402, it ordered provincial governors to investigate the deserters from Liaodong and eventually had the party of Impallalsilli 林八刺失里 transferred to the Ming authorities in Liaodong.

Once enthroned, the Yongle Emperor sent the Joseon court a strong demand for the repatriation of deserters. The Joseon court replied apologetically that it had initially accepted the deserters as most of them were Korean expatriates residing in Liaodong and they had suffered from war and bad harvests. However, after discovering that they had killed many Ming soldiers from Shenyang and Kaiyuan, the court decided to extradite them back to Ming jurisdiction.⁶⁷ These soldiers were mostly from the Dongning Guard, the Sanwan Guard, and the Liaohai Guard, as well as garrison soldiers in defense of the Kaiyuan area. In the course of their escape, they had fought with the chasing armies of the Prince of Yan, inflicting many casualties, which served as the grounds for extraditing them to the Ming authorities. Taejong made it clear to the Ming court that his government did its best to repatriate deserters, and that the difference between the number requested by the Ming and the number actually repatriated was due to the fact that some of them had not yet entered Joseon territory, and those that had hid themselves in deep mountains and were difficult to distinguish from the local populace.⁶⁸ However, the Ming court remained unconvinced and persisted in its demands for further repatriations.⁶⁹

Ming's demand persisted throughout the Taejong era. In the wake of the repatriation of Impallalsilli's party in 1402, another group of 3,649 deserters and their family members was repatriated. King Taejong had no desire to send back all of those who had already settled in his lands. As such, he limited repatriations only to those soldiers who appeared on the listings

⁶⁷ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, *gwon* 4 (2nd year of Taejong, 12th month, *imsul* day and *imsin* day); (*gwon* 5, 3rd year of Taejong, 1st month, *sinmyo* day and *imjin* day).

⁶⁸ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, *gwon* 5 (3rd year of Taejong, 1st month, *sinmyo* day); (*gwon* 6, 3rd year of Taejong, 8th month, *gveyu* day).

⁶⁹ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, *gwon* 6 (3rd year of Taejong, 10th month, *imsul* day).

presented by the Ming authorities.⁷⁰ In the 3rd month of 1403, the Joseon court sent a report on the 2nd major repatriation, listing 10,920 returnees, 2,225 fugitives, and 496 dead due to disease out of a total of 13,641 deserters (both men and women). Afterwards, on receiving further Ming demands for repatriations, the Joseon court responded by sending 60 more deserters in the 4th month, 230 and 153 in the 11th month, and 28 in the 12th month of the next year (1404).⁷¹ At that point, the Ming side calculated that Joseon had returned 10,755 deserters but that 4,940 were still missing.

Joseon's cooperation with Ming's demands for repatriation helped it to achieve its diplomatic objectives, such as receiving an investiture of the crown prince from the Ming court. The investiture issue had remained a troubling one for the newly established Joseon dynasty, since its founder Yi Seonggye and his successor King Jeongjong had not received an imperial edict of investiture (K. *gomyeong*; Ch. *gaoming* 誥命) from the Hongwu Emperor.⁷² However, Taejong's proactive response to Ming demands for the repatriation of deserters facilitated the Ming's confirmation of the crown prince Yi Je 李禔. What is more, six Koreans, who had been marooned on the Ming coast, were allowed to return.⁷³

In the 3rd month of 1406, the Ming dispatched the eunuch Zheng Sheng 鄭昇 to Joseon, again demanding the repatriation of deserters. In response, Joseon returned 419 individuals the following 8th month. However, the response from Joseon fell short of Ming expectations, leading to a subsequent more strongly-worded demand containing more thorough information on the deserters, which had been gathered from a range of agencies concerned with Liaodong, such as the Left Military Commission, the Lia-

⁷⁰ *Joseon Taejong sillok, gwon 5* (3rd year of Taejong, 1st month, *eulsa* day); (2nd month, *jeongmyo* day).

⁷¹ *Joseon Taejong sillok, gwon 5* (3rd year of Taejong, 3rd month, *gihae* day); (4th month, *sinmi* day); *gwon 6* (11th month, *sinchuk* day); *gwon 8* (4th year of Taejong, 12th month, *imjin* day).

⁷² Kim Gyeongnok, "Joseon chogi jonggye byeonmu eui jeongae yangsang gwa dae Myeong gwangye," 28-29. For diplomatic characteristics of the investiture protocol, see Kim Gyeongnok, "Dongmun hwigo reul tonghan Joseon hugi oegyo saan yeongu."

⁷³ *Joseon Taejong sillok, gwon 9* (5th year of Taejong, 3rd month, *imja* day).

odong Regional Military Commission, the Board of War, and the Board of Rites.⁷⁴ The Ming were quite serious in their intent to repatriate those who still remained in Joseon lands, as illustrated by their interrogation of repatriates and from their extensive intelligence-gathering activities through various channels such as the Liaodong Regional Military Commission.

In addition to demanding the repatriation of Chinese subjects, the Ming court also began to lay claim to those Jurchen subjects originally wanted by the Jurchen chieftains. Ming pressed for a group of 64 Jurchen family members residing in Korea and another group of 13 Jurchen families in 1407.⁷⁵ The Joseon court became increasingly concerned with the growing nature of Ming demands, which now included Jurchen immigrants in Korean territories. Since a top priority for the Joseon court was to maintain normal relations with the Ming and to avoid incidents deriving from the repatriation issue, the court took a more proactive attitude toward Ming demands and increased the number of those repatriated from 100 to 200 people at a time up to 500 to 2,000. Sometimes, Ming envoys were invited to visit the settlements of deserters to conduct on-site investigations. As a result, in 1407, a series of major repatriations took place: 2,000 in the third month, 746 in the 5th month, 831 in the 6th month, and 549 in the 8th month.

Despite Joseon attempting to provide the details of those people who had been repatriated, the Ming remained suspicious of Joseon. In 1407, the Ming complained that Joseon efforts to repatriate deserters were inadequate and pushed for another 2,829 deserters originally under the Ming commander Wu Dingduo to be repatriated to the Liaodong Regional Military Commission. The demand was accompanied by a request for 3,000 horses.⁷⁶ In response, though the Joseon court initially procrastinated under the pretext of the deserters being settled households and slaves, it eventual-

⁷⁴ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, *gwon* 11 (6th year of Taejong, 3rd month, *giyu* day); *gwon* 12 (8th month, *gyemyo* day); *gwon* 12 (12th month, *jeongmi* day).

⁷⁵ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, *gwon* 13 (7th year of Taejong, 1st month, *sinsa* day).

⁷⁶ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, *gwon* 14 (7th year of Taejong, 8th month, *imjin* day and *gyeongsul* day); (9th month, *gyeongsin* day).

ly dispatched commissioners to the settlements of the deserters. They were accompanied by Ming interpreters who acted as eyewitnesses. As a result, in 1408, a large number of deserters were repatriated, including 781 in the 4th month, 159 in the 5th month, 99 in the 7th month, and 114 in the 9th month.⁷⁷

The repatriations in the 9th month of 1408 concluded the process for that year. In its report to the Ming, the Joseon court noted that although the Ming had demanded the repatriation of numbers of Jurchens, the Ming Board of War (Bingbu 兵部) had asked for a total of 1,100 persons, whereas Joseon had repatriated a total of 1,153 individuals over the course of four occasions.⁷⁸ The Joseon court was of the opinion that its proactive policy had minimized the issue of Jurchen repatriation as well as facilitating the achievement of Joseon's goals in its relations with the Ming Empire.

In the years after 1408, small bands of soldiers continued to desert to Joseon territory. However, this ceased to be an issue between Joseon and the Ming, as altered domestic and foreign conditions rendered their existence far less significant than before. For the Ming, moving the capital to Beijing and a series of northern expeditions meant the rule of the Yongle Emperor was much more secure. Furthermore, the effective incorporation of the Jurchens and the suppression of the Mongols removed the threats to Ming control over the Liaodong region. For Joseon, small groups of deserters had become a routine border event with little political impact. Moreover, the Joseon state managed to maintain its influence over the Jurchen on its borders and was not especially concerned with those Jurchens incorporated into the Ming network of guard units. After 1409, small groups of Liaodongese soldiers were covertly allowed to make their way into Joseon, while large groups of armed soldiers were blocked from crossing the Yalu River. However, Ming captives of Japanese pirates, who fled to Joseon,

⁷⁷ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, *gwon* 15 (8th year of Taejong, 2nd month, *byeongsul* day and *gichuk* day); (4th month, *gapjin* day); (5th month, *gimi* day); *gwon* 16 (7th month, *imsul* day); (9th month, *gapsul* day).

⁷⁸ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, *gwon* 16 (8th year of Taejong, 9th month, *gapsul* day).

were quite often not sent back to their homeland for fear that they might report those who still stayed behind in Joseon.⁷⁹

Conclusion

The repatriation of military deserters during the reign of King Taejong 太宗 (r. 1400-1418) was a sensitive issue in relations between Joseon and the Ming. During the transition period from Goryeo 高麗 to Joseon 朝鮮 in Korea, corresponding to the immense turmoil in the international order produced by the transition from the Yuan 元 to the Ming 明, the Liaodong region saw extensive military diplomacy in the midst of military conflict. Military diplomacy in early Joseon can be defined as its military interactions with outside forces, particularly the Ming, conducted in such a way as to achieve the new dynasty's objectives of gaining Ming recognition of its legitimacy and stabilizing the security of its border areas.

In handling international issues such as the repatriation of deserters (*mansangun* 漫散軍) and exerting influence on the Jurchens, Joseon military diplomacy took place within the framework of a tributary relationship with the Ming and with the aim of achieving the dynasty's practical goals. The major issue of military diplomacy it faced was the repatriation of deserters generated by the struggle for the Ming throne between the Prince of Yan and the Jianwen Emperor. A military clash between Joseon and the Ming was a real possibility as the new Ming dynasty sought to extend its power and influence over the Liaodong region. However, both sides avoided such a clash, and the two states chose diplomatic means when tensions arose. For this reason, military diplomacy played a vital role in diplomatic interactions between them. Such diplomacy was of a cooperative and concessive nature, particularly on the part of the Joseon court, in handling such issues as joint measures against common enemies and the process of repatriation of deserters.

⁷⁹ *Joseon Taejong sillok*, *gwon* 18 (9th year of Taejong, 11th month, *muin* day); *gwon* 25 (13th year of Taejong, 1st month, *jeongmi* day).

The repatriation of soldiers presupposed border incursions (K. *beomwol*; Ch. *fanyue* 犯越), and it was a convention to repatriate such perpetrators of illegal entry or border crossing (K. *wolgeong*; Ch. *yuejing* 越境). In principle, the Joseon state was, thus, obliged to repatriate deserters from Ming jurisdiction, although it had power to negotiate the timing, scale, and nature of the repatriation, a power it used at times to increase its diplomatic leverage.

The Ming identified three groups who were subject to repatriation: military deserters, soldiers captured by foreign forces, and seamen who drifted into foreign territorial waters. The *mansangun* 漫散軍 were the principal group of these deserters, yet little research has been done on the process of their repatriation. Based largely on the dynastic records of the two states, this study has outlined the typical process of their repatriation. The repatriation issue arose when the Ming Board of War reported the status of deserters to the emperor. This was then followed by the sending of a diplomatic letter in his name to the Joseon court demanding their repatriation. Subsequently, the Joseon court conducted on-site investigations and prepared a report about these soldiers, which eventually led to their repatriation, usually to the Liaodong Regional Military Commission. Repatriated soldiers were generally subject to interrogation by Ming authorities as they sought to confirm that their demands had been met.

The mass exodus of Ming soldiers from Liaodong to Joseon territory took place in 1402 (2nd year of the reign of King Taejong) in the midst of the civil war in mainland China, and deserters continued to come thereafter, albeit in smaller groups. The Joseon state relocated them across the country. The repatriation of these deserters emerged as a major issue of military diplomacy between Joseon and the Ming. Initially, taking advantage of the unsettled domestic conditions in China during the transition of power from the Jianwen Emperor to the Yongle emperor, the Joseon government allowed deserters to resettle under its jurisdiction. However, with the establishment of the Yongle regime's control over mainland China and Liaodong, Joseon was forced to respond to Ming demands for the repatriation of its soldiers in order to gain practical benefits like official Ming acknowledgement of the Joseon crown prince.

The Ming, for their part, often felt that the Joseon response to their demands was inadequate and thus made further demands for repatriation that even included Jurchen refugees in Joseon lands. This came to a head in 1408 (8th year of the reign of King Taejong) when the Joseon court chose to repatriate a large number of the remaining deserters in its territory. In doing so, it sought to show its compliance with Ming demands, and bring the repatriation issue to a close. Thereafter, the desertion of small groups of soldiers into Joseon continued, which ceased to be a major issue of military diplomacy between the two states.

While this study contributes to our knowledge of military diplomacy in early Joseon, further research needs to be done in order to refine its definition and to analyze its nature, procedures, and categories. New perspectives on military diplomacy between Joseon and the Ming, marked by both military tension and cooperation, would enhance research in a variety of fields of military history, such as warfare, military policy, innovations in weaponry, war strategy, and military ideology. The current prevailing approach to military history focusing on changing domestic circumstances and institutions is to be supplemented by an approach that takes into account diplomatic interactions over military issues. This aspect is particularly important for the period when the new Joseon dynasty had to confront a changing international order under the Ming hegemony.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

- Da Ming huidian* 大明會典 [Collected Statutes of the Great Ming].
- Da Minglu jijie fuli* 大明律集解附例 [Great Ming Code with Interpretations and Precedents Attached].
- Dongmun hwigo* 同文彙考 [Joseon Dynasty's Diplomatic Documents].
- Guoque* 國權 [Discussions about the State].
- Goryeo sa* 高麗史 [History of Goryeo].
- Gyeongguk Daejeon* 經國大典 [Law Code of the Joseon State].
- Imun* 吏文 [Diplomatic Documents between the Ming and Goryeo/Joseon].
- Joseon Jeongjong sillok* 朝鮮定宗實錄 [Veritable Records of King Jeongjong].
- Joseon Sejong sillok* 朝鮮世宗實錄 [Veritable Records of King Sejong].
- Joseon Seongjong sillok* 朝鮮成宗實錄 [Veritable Records of King Seongjong].
- Joseon Taejo sillok* 朝鮮太祖實錄 [Veritable Records of King Taejo].
- Joseon Taejong sillok* 朝鮮太宗實錄 [Veritable Records of King Taejong].
- Mingshi* 明史 [History of the Ming dynasty].
- Ming Taizong shilu* 明太宗實錄 [Veritable Records of Ming Taizong].
- Ming Taizu shilu* 明太祖實錄 [Veritable Records of Ming Taizu].

Secondary Sources

- Bae Jinsu 배진수. "Hanguk gunsa oegyoron" 한국 군사외교론 [Theory of Military Diplomacy of Korea]. *Gukje jeongchi nonchong* 국제관계논총 37, no. 2: 289-307, 1998.
- Bak Honggyu 박홍규. "Jeong Dojeon eui gong Yo gido jaegemto" 정도전의 攻遼 기도 재검토 [Reexamination of Jeong Dojeon's Attempt to Attack Liaodong]. *Jeongchi sasang yeongu* 정치사상연구 10, no. 1: 7-31, 2004.
- Bak Seongju 박성주. "15 segi Jo Myeong gan yumin eui balsaeng gwa songhwan" 15세기 朝明간 流民의 發生과 送還 [Emergence of Refugees and Their Repatria-

- tion between Joseon and the Ming in the 15th Century]. *Gyeongju sahak* 경주사학 21: 127-67, 2002.
- Bak Wonho 박원호. “Myeong jeongnan eui yeok e daehan Joseon eui daceong” 明靖難의役に 대한 朝鮮의 對應 [Joseon’s response to the Ming Civil War]. *Asea yeongu* 아세아연구 26. no. 2: 179-94, 1983.
- Choe Yeongjong 최영중. “Uri nara gunga oegyo eui iron gwa silje” 우리나라 군사외교의 이론과 실제 [Theory and Reality of Our Nation’s Military Diplomacy]. *Jeollyak yeongu* 전략연구 32: 181-221, 2004.
- Gang Seongmun 강성문. *Han minjok eui gungsajeok jeontong* 韓民族의 軍事的 傳統 [Military Traditions of Korean People]. Seoul: Bongmyeong, 2000.
- Guo Hong 郭紅, and Yu Cuiyan 于翠艷. “Mingdai tusi weisuo zhidu yu junguanxing zhengqu” 明代 都司 衛所 制度 與 軍管型 政區 [Regional Military Commissions and Guards in the Ming Period, and Administrative Divisions Based on Military Control]. *軍事歷史研究: jūnshì lishǐ yánjiū* 4: 78-87, 2004.
- Kim Gyeongnok 김경록. “Joseon chogi tae Myeong oegyo wa oegyo jeolcha” 조선초기 대명외교와 외교절차 [Early Joseon’s Diplomatic Relations with the Ming and Their Procedures]. *Hanguksaron* 한국사론 44: 1-54, 2000.
- _____. “Joseon hugi *Dongmun hwigo* eui pyeonchan gwa jeong gwa seonggyeok” 조선후기 ‘동문회고’의 편찬과정과 성격 [Compilation Process of the *Dongmun hwigo* 同文彙考 and Its Characteristics]. *Joseonsidaesahakbo* 조선시대사학보 32: 185-226, 2005.
- _____. “Joseon chogi jonggye byeonmu eui jeongae yangsang gwa dae Myeong gwangye” 조선초기 종계변무의 전개양상과 대명관계 [Issue of Yi Seonggye’s Lineage and Relations with the Ming in Early Joseon]. *Guksagwan nonchong* 국사관논총 108: 1-37, 2006.
- _____. “Gongmin wang dae gukje jeongse wa daeoc gwangye eui jeongae yangsang” 공민왕대 국제정세와 대외관계의 전개양상 [International Circumstances of King Gongmin’s Era and the unfolding of Goryeo’s Foreign Relations]. *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 역사와 현실 64: 197-231, 2007.
- _____. “Joseon sidae jogong cheje wa dae Jungguk sahaeng” 조선시대 조공체제와 대중국 사행 [Tributary System in the Joseon Era and Diplomatic Missions to China]. *Myeongcheongsayeongu* 명청사연구 30: 91-128, 2008.
- _____. “*Dongmun hwigo* reul tonghan Joseon hugi oegyo saan yeongu” 동문회고를 통한 조선후기 외교사안 연구 [Study of Diplomatic Issues in Late Joseon through

the *Dongmun hwigo*). *Myeongcheongsayeongu* 명칭사연구 32: 69-103, 2009.

_____. “Joseon sidae gukje jilseo wa Han-Jung gwangye eui jeongae yangsang” 조선시대 국제질서와 한중관계의 전개양상 [International Order in the Joseon Era, and Evolution of Korea-China Relations]. *Junggukhakbo* 중국학보 60: 287-316, 2009.

_____. “Joseon sidae gukje jilseo wa Jo-Myeong gwangye” 조선시대 국제질서와 조명관계 [International Order in the Joseon Era and Joseon-Myeong Relations]. In *Munhwaro boneun hanguksa* [Rethinking Korean History: Cultural Perspectives], 이태진교수 정년기념 논총간행위원회 편 Yitaejigyosu cheongnyeonginyeom nonchongganhaengwiwonhoe, ed. [Publications Committee for Collection of Papers to Celebrate the Retirement of Professor Yi Taejin], 155-83. Seoul: Taehaksa, 2009.

_____. “Yeomal Seoncho Hongmuje eui Goryeo Joseon insik gwa oegyo gwangye” 여말 선조 홍무제의 고려 조선 인식과 외교관계 [Perceptions of the Hongwu Emperor and Joseon, and Korea-Ming relations in Late Goryeo and Early Joseon]. *Myeongcheongsayeongu* 명칭사연구 35: 1-33, 2011.

_____. “Joseon chogi gwihwa jeongchaek gwa Jo-Myeong gwangye” 조선초기 귀화정책과 조명관계 [Naturalization Policy of Early Joseon and Its Relations with the Ming]. *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 역사와 현실 83: 213-47, 2012.

Seo Inhan 서인한. *Han Jung gansa gwangyesa* 한중 군사관계사 [Military Relations between Korea and China]. Seoul: Gunsa pyeonchan yeonguso, 2007.

Wada Sei 和田清. “Mei sho no Manshū kyōryaku ka” 明初の滿洲經略 (下) [Early Ming Advance into Manchuria, Part 2]. *Tōashi kenkyū* 東亞史研究 37 [Study of East Asian History 37]. Wada Sei, ed. 337-477. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1955.

Wang Rigen 王日根. “Mingdai haifang jianshe yu wokou, haizei di chisheng” 明代海防建設與倭寇, 海賊의 熾盛 [Building of Maritime Defense in the Ming Era and Thriving of the Japanese Pirates]. *Zhōngguó hǎiyáng dàxué xuébào* 中国海洋大学学报 4: 13-18, 2004.

Yi Yeong 이영. “14 segi eui Dong Asia gukje jeongse wa waegu: Gingmin wang 15 nyeon (1366) eui geumwae sajeol eui pagyeon eul jungsim euro” 14세기의 동아시아 국제 정세와 왜구-공민왕 15년(1366)의 禁倭使節의 파견을 중심으로 [East Asian International Situation and the Japanese Pirates in the 14th Century: Focusing on the Dispatch of an Embassy Calling for the Suppression of the Japanese Pirates in the 15th year of King Gongmin (1366)]. *Hanllgwangyesayeongu* 한일관계사연구 26: 95-146, 2007.



Review Article

Korea in the Western Studies on East Asian Interstate Relations during the Khitan and Jin Periods

Peter YUN
University Collage,
Yongsan University

The Journal of Northeast Asian History

Volume 17 Number 2 (Summer 2021), 243-258

Copyright © 2021 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.

*No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.*

Korea in the Western Studies on East Asian Interstate Relations during the Khitan and Jin Periods*

Peter YUN

University Collage,
Youngsan University

Tribute System and Treaty Relations during the Khitan and Jin Periods

Scholars have claimed that by the Han period the tribute system was firmly established “as a continuous quest on the part of the Chinese empire for a proper form in which Sino-foreign relations could be regulated in keeping with the general imperial order,”¹ and that “the Chinese had begun to believe that the tributary relationship was the only normal one which did not conflict with their view of the known world.”² The size, culture, power, and wealth of Han Chinese states would induce foreign states to seek recognition as “tributaries” in the hierarchical “Chinese World Order.” Chinese historians often portrayed the “tribute system” as the “proof” that foreign states and peoples were “subjects” of China. Recently, a number of Chinese scholars such as Yan Xuetong 阎学通, Qin Yaqing 秦亚青, Zhang

^{*} Parts of this article was published in Korean in “서구학계의 10~14세기 “정복왕조사” 연구 - 『케임브리지 중국사』 제 6권 (The Cambridge History of China, volume 6, Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368)을 중심으로,” *만주연구* 30 (October, 2020): 281-306.

¹ Yü Ying-shih, *Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the Structures of Sino-Barbarian Economic Relations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 39.

² Wang Gungwu, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia,” in *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations*, John K. Fairbanks, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 41.

Dingyang 赵汀阳 also turned to the “tribute system” model in their formulation and application of the China-centered “Tianxia system” to premodern East Asian interstate relations.³ However, the tribute system based on the cultural and ideological notion of Chinese superiority was sustainable only when China dominated its neighboring states politically and militarily. Indeed, interstate relations were determined first and foremost by the relative military strength of each player, and they encompassed a wide range of political relations that ranged from total subjugation to equality and even to the “barbarian” superiority.⁴

The Chinese assertions of superiority and concomitant stereotyping of “barbarians” in predominantly Chinese sources often hindered our efforts to properly assess premodern East Asian interstate relations. It is true that the conduct of regular interstate exchanges in premodern East Asia were mostly Han Chinese or Confucian in concept, ritual, and rhetoric. However, nominal recognition of the formalities of the tribute system never signified actual exercise of Chinese suzerainty or even an acceptance of the Chinese claims of cultural superiority. In fact, the China-centered ideology failed to convince even the ethnic Han Chinese who lived in the frontier region far from the political center.⁵ Tributes were not always a sign of submission, but of mutual recognition and accommodation.

Northeast Asian interstate relations during the Khitan and Jin periods

³ William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?” *International Studies Review* 10 (2008): 749-61; William A. Callahan, “History, Tradition and the China Dream: Socialist Modernization in the World of Great Harmony,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 24 (2015): 893-1001; Emilian Kavalski, “Conclusion: Recognizing Chinese International Relations Theory,” in *Asian Thought on China’s Changing International Relations*, N. Horesh and E. Kavalski, ed. (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 230-47.

⁴ Franke and Twitchett, “Introduction,” in *The Cambridge History of China, vol. 6, Alien Regimes and Border States*, Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 38. See also the description of diplomatic exchanges between the Timurid monarch and the Ming emperor on the basis of equality in the early 15th century (Joseph Fletcher, “China and Central Asia, 1368-884,” in *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations*, John K. Fairbanks, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 209-16).

⁵ Jonathan Skaff, “Survival in the Frontier Zone: Comparative Perspectives on Identity and Political Allegiance in China’s Inner Asian Borderlands during the Sui-Tang Dynastic Transition (617-30),” *Journal of World History* 15 (2004): 122.

were governed by a treaty system based on the principle of reciprocity. Song China and the Khitan Empire preserved the peace based on the Treaty of Shanyuan that provided for “friendly relations” on the condition that the Song would submit annual payments to the Khitan state.⁶ In the 11th century, Song China had to offer an annual “subsidy” of silk and silver to Khitan Liao and Tangut Xia states to ensure peace. Later the Southern Song emperor Gaozong even addressed himself humbly using his personal name as “Your Servant [Zhao] Gou” of an “insignificant state 弊邑” and was invested by the Jurchen emperor of a “superior state 上國.”⁷ In this multistate system, nominal investitures meant little to the legitimacy of rulers of “tributary” states such as Goryeo.

The tribute system model has shown its limitations and inadequacy as an analytical framework for a comprehensive understanding of pre-modern Northeast Asian interstate relations.⁸ We must inquire closely the internal structure of politics, economy, and culture of the non-Chinese societies to explore further the dynamics of pre-modern East Asian interstate relations. Only with inclusion of “outside” or “non-Chinese” perspectives can we overcome the bias of the “tribute system.” To gain insights into the reality of East Asian interstate relations, we must widen our view to include Korean perspective and strategy.

Korea, A Tributary State?

While the so-called Chinese world order was “a unified concept only at the Chinese end and only on the normative level, as an ideal pattern,” many continue to insist that the more “Sinic” states such as Korea accepted moral validity of the China-centered world order due to a high level of

⁶ Tuotuo 脱脱 et al., *Songshi* 宋史, 7.126-27; Tuotuo et al., *Liaoshi* 辽史, 14.160; Li Tao 李焘, *Xu zizhi tongjian changbian* 續資治通鑑長編, 58.1299.

⁷ Tuotuo et al., *Jinshi* 金史, 77.1755-56.

⁸ Peter Yun, “Rethinking the Tribute System: Korean States and Northeast Asian Interstate Relations, 600-1600” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1988), 6-11.

“Sinicization.”⁹ This claim is based on rather naive assumption that Korean states always had a “tradition of admiring China”¹⁰ and even more uncritical assumption that such alleged cultural admiration then influenced Korean policy toward Chinese states. It simply ignores the reality of geopolitical balance of power in pre-modern East Asian interstate relations.

The volume 6 of *The Cambridge History of China*, published more than two decades ago has been regarded as the most comprehensive and representative western work on the conquest dynasties. In chapter 1, Denis Twitchett wrote that by the 10th century “the Koreans were thoroughly imbued with Chinese cultural influence at all levels and hated, despised, and feared the Khitan,” and that such Korean “intransigence” toward the Khitan would persist until the early 11th century.¹¹ However, Twitchett then provides a completely different description of Goryeo-Khitan relations in the 1020s.

“The tributary relationship was resumed, and envoys were regularly exchanged. When in 1031 Hyōnjong died, his son and successor Wang Hūm (Tōkchong; r. 1031-1034) was invested as king by the Liao court. From this date until almost the end of the Liao, Koryō remained a loyal vassal, and peace prevailed between the two states.”¹²

How did Goryeo go from the hatred of the Khitan to become a “loyal vassal” in a decade? *The Cambridge History of China* does not offer an explanation. Perhaps the author was following the assertions of Michael Rogers

⁹ John K. Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework,” in *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, John K. Fairbanks, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 11-12, 16.

¹⁰ Kawachi Yoshihiro 河内良弘, *Mindai Joshin shi no kenkyu* 明代女眞史の研究 [A Study of Jurchen History during the Ming Period] (Tokyo: Dohosha, 1992), 11.

¹¹ Denis Twitchett and Klaus-Peter Tietze, “The Liao,” in *The Cambridge History of China, vol. 6, Alien Regimes and Border States*, Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 103, 111.

¹² Denis Twitchett and Klaus-Peter Tietze, “The Liao,” in *The Cambridge History of China, vol. 6, Alien Regimes and Border States*, Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 112.

that Goryeo was dedicated to “Chinese Universalism,” and that the political status of Goryeo elites was based on “their acknowledged role as custodians of (Confucian) virtue and wisdom within the framework of the Chinese world order.”¹³

Goryeo did send “tributes” to the Khitans, but it was a vassal state only in name. Goryeo, along with the Tangut Xia, projected their own worldview in the Northeast Asian multi-state system and functioned as balancers in the military balance of power by forcing the stronger Manchurian and Chinese dynasties to divide their military resources. The Khitan never gained any military or other advantage from its suzerain status vis-à-vis Goryeo or Xia.

As the Khitan power declined in the early 12th century, the Song state actively sought a military alliance with Goryeo. However, Goryeo refused to get involved in continental conflicts, and King Sukjong (1095-1105) refused Song’s offer of formal investiture.¹⁴ During the Zhenghe 政和 reign (1111-1117), the Song court accorded Goryeo embassies the status of the State Letters Embassy 國信使 that had heretofore been reserved only for the Khitan embassies.¹⁵ Song’s lavish gifts and friendly gestures from the Song were undoubtedly intended to induce the Korean state to join the Song-Jurchen alliance against the Khitan. Goryeo once again refused the Song Chinese overture of investiture in 1123, when the final fall of the Khitan state was all but a foregone conclusion.¹⁶ The Song Chinese court must have assumed that Goryeo would welcome the official recognition from the “Central Kingdom,” the “real” legitimacy in the Song court’s point of view. However, Goryeo understood that the Song investiture would be followed by requests for military assistance in the impending struggle against the Jurchens. In the end, the Song investitures, just like those from the Khitan court, were all token gestures inconsequential to the

¹³ Michael C. Rogers, “The Chinese World Order in Its Transmural Extension,” *Korean Studies Forum* 4 (1978): 9.

¹⁴ Jeong Inji 鄭麟趾 et al., *Goryeosa* 高麗史, 13: 16a2-4.

¹⁵ *Songshi*, 21.395, 397, 487.14049.

¹⁶ *Goryeosa*, 15: 5b2-6a7.

legitimacy of the Goryeo king.

Korean sources show that Goryeo was clearly aware of its place and role in the triangular balance of power in Northeast Asian interstate relations. It was inevitable that Goryeo's pragmatic and realistic foreign policy disappointed and angered the Song, and the Chinese sentiments can be seen in Song Chinzong's edict of 1126.

We were hoping that you would have the [same] hatred for the enemy (Jurchens) [in times of] difficulty and that was all. [Your] kingdom and the Jin are no more than several hundred li apart from each other, but you have not repaid the "Central Kingdom" by wiping out their lair. How could we have expected this [kind of ingratitude from you] after the special treatment [we have accorded to you] for several reigns?¹⁷

Later, the Southern Song would express its disappointment and displeasure by suspending official relation in 1130 on a rather clumsy pretext that it could no longer guarantee the safety of envoys.¹⁸

Korean sources provide numerous examples that betray the misconception that Goryeo was a "loyal tributary." King Taejo, the founder of the dynasty, adopted the Later Jin 後晉 (936-946) regnal title of Tianfu 天福 in 938,¹⁹ and he was formally invested in the following year by Shi Jingtang 石敬瑭, the first ruler of the Later Jin.²⁰ However, Shi Jingtang, the "Emperor of the Great Jin," invested a few years earlier in 936 by the Khitan Taizong Yelu Deguang,²¹ is often regarded as "nothing more than a puppet of the Khitan."²² The Khitans had provided crucial military assistance, and

¹⁷ *Goryeosa*, 15: 15a3-7.

¹⁸ *Goryeosa*, 16: 8b9-10a1.

¹⁹ *Goryeosa*, 2: 13b2-3.

²⁰ *Goryeosa*, 2: 13b6-8.

²¹ Xue Juzheng 薛居正, *Jiu Wudaishi* 舊五代史, 75.985; *Liaoshi*, 3.38-39.

²² Denis Twitchett and Klaus-Peter Tietze, "The Liao," in *The Cambridge History of China, vol. 6, Alien Regimes and Border States*, Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 70.

Shi ceded the so-called Sixteen Prefectures of Yen 燕 and Yun 雲 (around modern Beijing) in addition to substantial amounts of annual tributes.²³ Here we have a case in which the Goryeo king was invested by the puppet “emperor” of the Later Jin, who was in turn invested by the Khitan emperor. Does this mean that Goryeo was a vassal state of a vassal state of the Khitan? That was hardly the case. Until 942, there were only two missions between Goryeo and the Khitan, the Khitan embassy of 922 and the Goryeo embassy a month after the Khitan conquest of Balhae in 926.²⁴

When the next Khitan embassy came twenty years later in 942, the Goryeo court took a drastic action of ban-ishing the thirty members of the Khitan embassy and had the Khitan gift of fifty camels to starve to death under a bridge in the capital city.²⁵ King Jeongjong (945-949) formed the Resplendent Army 光軍 supposedly numbering 300,000, and King Gwangjong (949-975) established several garrison forts across the Cheongcheon River in northward expansion toward the Amnok (Yalu) River.²⁶ During the mid-10th century, relations between the Khitan and Goryeo were sparse and certainly less than friendly, and certainly not what one would expect between the “suzerain” and “tributary” states. While the “emperor” of the Later Jin was a “puppet” invested by the Khitan emperor, the king of Goryeo was not yet invested by the Khitan ruler. The titles of “emperor” and “king” did not often reflect the hierarchical suzerain-tributary relations during this period, and we can find other examples of the similarly empty rhetoric of the titles of “emperor” in the puppet regimes set up by the Jurchen Jin in North China in early 12th century.²⁷

Goryeo’s foreign policy sought to exploit continental conflicts and ri-

²³ *Liaoshi*, 4.55-56.

²⁴ *Goryeosa*, 1: 16b2; *Liaoshi*, 2.21-22.

²⁵ *Goryeosa*, 2: 14a9-b1.

²⁶ *Goryeosa*, 94: 2b8.

²⁷ The Jin invested Zhang Bangchang 張邦昌 as the “emperor” of the Great Chu 大楚 in 1127, but Zhang died a couple of months later. The Jurchens then set up Liu Yu as the “emperor” of the Great Qi 大齊 in 1129, but Liu Yu’s “Empire of Great Chi” was abolished in less than a decade in 1137 (see *Da Jin diaofa lu* 大金吊伐錄, 434-36, 539-41).

valry between bigger neighbors. It cannot be overemphasized that the Khitan, Song or Jin “investitures” did not make Goryeo a “loyal vassal.”²⁸ Goryeo always pursued a pragmatic foreign policy designed to enhance its security and autonomy. Goryeo’s adoption of the regnal titles of the “suzerain” state was not a passive gesture of submission but an active diplomatic strategy.²⁹ Just as an investiture by the “suzerain” state may offer symbolic political legitimacy to the “tributary” state, an adoption or refusal of regnal titles could also recognize or deny the legitimacy of the “suzerain” state. Korean sources and modern Korean scholarship clearly show that the system of “tribute-investiture” of the time did not reflect the relationship of superiority and submission but represented reciprocity in which two sides recognized the other’s political legitimacy.

Inclusion of Korea in the Study of the Interstate Relations during the Khitan and Jin Periods.

Few Western graduate students, majoring in the conquest dynasties, attain Korean fluency, and they pay little attention to Korean sources and works published in Korean language. Their treatment and discussion of Goryeo history remain surprisingly superficial as their outlook and knowledge have been gained indirectly through the works by Chinese and Japanese scholarship. While the absence or under-utilization of Korean scholarship can be attributed to the apparent lack of Korean fluency, it is truly unfortunate that specialists in the West also ignore the important Korean primary sources written in Classical Chinese such as the Goryeosa. We are fortunate that records of premodern East Asian interstate relations can be checked against other independent sources. In particular, Korean sources

²⁸ Denis Twitchett and Klaus-Peter Tietze, “The Liao,” in *The Cambridge History of China, vol. 6, Alien Regimes and Border States*, Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 112.

²⁹ Yun Yeongin, “10-13 segi Dongbuk Asia dawonjeok gukje jilseo eseo eui chaekbong kwa maengyak” 10-13세기 동북아시아 다원적 국제질서에서의 책봉과 맹약 [Investitures and Covenants in the Multistate Northeast Asian International Order from 10th to the 13th Century], *Dongyang sahak yeon'gu* 101 (2007): 126-30.

often corroborate, contradict, and supplement the Chinese records, and most importantly, they provide rare non-Chinese perspectives. It is not the case that Western scholars were not aware of the importance of Korean sources. Indeed, the “Bibliographical Essays” in volume 6 of *The Cambridge History of China*, twice mentioned importance of the Goryeosa stating that it was a “completely independent source of great importance for the relations between the Jurchen and the Korean state of Koryŏ” and “an indispensable record of the Yüan’s relations with a land that had frequent and extended contacts with China.”³⁰ Yet, the Goryeosa was cited only once in a cursorily manner in the entire volume.

Western scholars continued to regard Korea as a highly Sinicized state that subscribed to the Han Chinese world view. In their study of Khitan-Song relations, Jing-shen Tao and David C. Wright merely assume that Goryeo was a tributary state “permanently incorporated into the Chinese cultural sphere” without any reference to Korean sources.³¹ These simplistic assertions are results of one-sided interpretations that failed to account for many works by Korean scholars who have shown realist and pragmatic strategies and the many factors such as internal politics, economic considerations, cultural exchanges, and most important, the border security. Studies on the traditional East Asian interstate relations also tended to separate the subject into a series of bilateral contacts.³² Such bilateral approach to the multistate geopolitical configuration not only misleads but also ignores the complex international political context. Goryeo’s role in east Asian multistate system has often been overlooked or under-appreciated. Western

³⁰ Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, eds., *The Cambridge History of China, vol. 6, Alien Regimes and Border States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 437, 682, 704.

³¹ Jing-shen Tao, *Two Sons of Heaven: Studies in Sung-Liao Relations* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), 79-85; David C. Wright, *From War to Diplomatic Parity in 11th-Century China: Sung’s Foreign Relations with Kitan Liao* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 33.

³² One exception is Gari Ledyard’s study that recognized the importance of Korea in East Asian balance of power and proposed the triangular balance between China-Manchuria-Korea (Gari K. Ledyard, “Yin and Yang in the China-Manchuria-Korea Triangle,” *China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries*, Morris Rossabi, ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 313-53.

scholars specializing in the conquest dynasties could benefit from many detailed works by Korean scholars.³³

During the period of “China among Equals,” the most obvious features of Northeast Asian interstate relations were pragmatism and flexibility. Studies on East Asian interstate relations must pay proper attention to the history of the region’s smaller, individual parts. The mistaken notion of the Korean states as the model tributary is a gross oversimplification and takes the historically unique mid-Joseon attitude toward the Ming as the norm for two thousand years of premodern Northeast Asian interstate relations. A few western scholars perceived significant differences in foreign policies of Joseon and the earlier dynasties. Hugh Walker saw the establishment of the Confucian state of Joseon as a major turning point in Korea-China relations that made “Confucian internationalism a reality rather than mere theory,” and the so-called *sadae* 事大 policy of the Chosŏn dynasty represented “the depth of Confucian learning at the Korean court and the dogmatic devotion to Confucian practice.”³⁴ Walker’s observation and interpretation were “puzzling” to a Chinese scholar who perceived no real difference between the policy of “merely following the ritual of tribute relations” [during Goryeo] and that of “doing the same and giving that same process a label” [during Joseon] (*italic and brackets mine*).³⁵ In fact, the kingdom of Goryeo was not “doing the same.” However, many specialists continue to rely exclusively on the Chinese sources written in formulaic terminology of the tribute system that gives a false impression of Goryeo as a “model tributary.”³⁶

³³ See Yi Miji, *Taepyeonghan byeonbang: Goryeo eui dae Georan oegyo wa geu sosan* 태평한 변경: 고려의 태거란 외교와 그 소산 [Peaceful Frontier: Goryeo’s Diplomacy with the Khitan and Its Consequences] (Seoul: Gyeongin munhwasa, 2018), 5-23.

³⁴ Hugh D. Walker, “The Yi-Ming Rapprochement: Sino-Korean Foreign Relations, 1392-1592” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1971), 55, 204.

³⁵ Melvin T. Ang, “Sung-Liao Diplomacy in 11th- and 12th-Century China: A Study of the Social and Political Determinants of Foreign Policy” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1983), 23-24.

³⁶ Peter Yun, “Rethinking the Tribute System: Korean States and Northeast Asian Interstate Relations, 600-1600” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1998), 107-29.

Even as modern Korea, China, and Mongolia make exclusive claims over all or parts of the Khitan and Jurchen history, we must approach history of the conquest dynasties on their own terms, not merely periods within Chinese history. There is a tendency to see China as the center of everything in East Asian history and to ignore the reverse flow and contributions of ideas and innovations from the “periphery.” The study of East Asian interstate relations is more than a simple inquiry into the Chinese viewpoints, and it should be perceived from a bigger, wider angle, and in a global context. Historians of pre-modern Asia need to move beyond the Han China-centered ideological and culturalistic framework of the tribute system couched in such ambiguous terms as “Chinese suzerain” and “barbarian tributaries.” A more inclusive study of East Asian history incorporating Korean sources and perspectives will enable us to transcend the anachronistic historical boundary of “China” and provide a more comprehensive and complete story of the Khitan and Jin in East Asian interstate relations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ang, Melvin T. "Sung-Liao Diplomacy in 11th- and 12th-Century China: A Study of the Social and Political Determinants of Foreign Policy." Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1983.
- Callahan, W. A. "Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or A New Hegemony?" *International Studies Review* 10: 749-61, 2008.
- _____. "History, Tradition and the China dream: Socialist Modernization in the World of Great Harmony." *Journal of Contemporary China* 24: 893-1001, 2015.
- Fairbank, John K. "A Preliminary Framework." In *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, John K. Fairbank, ed. 1-19. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.
- Fletcher, Joseph F. "China and Central Asia, 1368-1884." In *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, John K. Fairbank, ed. 206-224. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.
- Franke, Herbert, and Denis Twitchett. "Introduction." In *The Cambridge History of China, vol. 6, Alien Regimes and Border States*, Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, ed. 1-42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Jeong Inji 鄭麟趾 et al. eds. *Goryeosa* 高麗史. 3 vols. Seoul: Asea munhwasa, 1972.
- Jin Shaoying, ed. *Da Jin Diaofalu jiaobu* 大金吊伐錄校補. Zhonghua shuju, 2001.
- Kavalski, Emilian. "Conclusion: Recognizing Chinese International Relations Theory." In *Asian Thought on China's Changing International Relations*, N. Horesh and E. Kavalski, ed. 230-47. Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
- Kawachi Yoshihiro 河内良弘. *Mindai Joshin shi no kenkyu* 明代女真史の研究. Tokyo: Dohosha, 1992.
- Ledyard, Gari K. "Yin and Yang in the China-Manchuria-Korea Triangle." In *China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries*, Morris Rossabi, ed. 313-53. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
- Li Tao 李燾. *Xu Zizhi tongjian changbian* 續資治通鑑長編. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004.
- Rogers, Michael C. "The Chinese World Order in Its Transmural Extension: The

- Case of Chin and Koryŏ.” *Korean Studies Forum* 4: 1-22, 1978.
- Skaff, Jonathan K. “Survival in the Frontier Zone: Comparative Perspectives on Identity and Political Allegiance in China’s Inner Asian Borderlands during the Sui-Tang Dynastic Transition (617-630).” *Journal of World History* 15: 117-53, 2004.
- Tao, Jing-shen. *Two Sons of Heaven: Studies in Sung–Liao Relations*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988.
- Tuotuo [Toghto] 脫脫 et al., eds. *Jinshi* 金史. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1975.
- _____. *Liaoshi* 遼史. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1974.
- _____. *Songshi* 宋史. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977.
- Walker, Hugh D. “The Yi-Ming Rapprochement: Sino-Korean Foreign Relations, 1392-1592.” Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1971.
- Wang Gungwu. “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay.” In *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations*, John K. Fairbank, ed. 34-62. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.
- Woodside, Alexander B. *Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comprehensive Study of Vietnamese and Chinese Government in the First Half of the 19th Century*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.
- Wright, David C. *From War to Diplomatic Parity in 11th-Century China: Sung’s Foreign Relations with Kitan Liao*. Leiden: Brill, 2005.
- Xue Juzheng 薛居正, et al., eds. *Jiu Wudaishi* 舊五代史. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976.
- Yi Miji. *Taepyeonghan byeonbang: Goryeo eui dae Georan oegyo wa geu sosan* 태평한 변방: 고려의 태거란 외교와 그 소산 [Peaceful Frontier: Goryeo’s Diplomacy with the Khitan and Its Consequences]. Seoul: Gyeongin munhwasa, 2018.
- Yü, Ying-shih. *Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the Structure of Sino-Barbarian Economic Relations*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
- Yun, Peter I. “Rethinking the Tribute System: Korean States and Northeast Asian Interstate Relations, 600-1600.” Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1998.
- Yun Yeongin. “10-13 segi Dongbuk Asia dawonjeok kukje jilseo eseo eui chaekbong

kwa maengyak” 10-13세기 동북아시아 다원적 국제질서에서의 책봉과 맹약
[Investitures and Covenants in the Multistate Northeast Asian International
Order from 10th to the 13th Century]. *Dongyang sahak yeon'gu* 101: 119-44,
2007.

Notes for Contributors

The Journal of Northeast Asian History [JNAH] is a peer-reviewed biannual journal published by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. JNAH seeks challenging research focusing on regional and trans-national issues within the context of historical Northeast Asia. The Journal concentrates on interdisciplinary, comparative, and cross-cultural approaches to issues such as borders, identity, international relations, history issues, history education, historiography, and other relevant themes within the humanities and the social sciences. In addition to this thematic diversity, the Journal's geographical scope extends to other areas of Asia and beyond, thus inviting scholarly engagement in rethinking globalism and localism in world history. For detailed information about the submission of manuscripts, please contact the Journal at jnah@nahf.or.kr or jnah.nahf@gmail.com.

JNAH is published semiannually, in June and December. There is no set deadline for the submission of manuscripts. However, the manuscript must reach the editorial office by March 15 to be considered for publication in the June issue and by September 15 for the December issue. All submissions will be referred by specialists in relevant fields. Authors will be notified of the decision of the Editorial Board as promptly as possible, usually within three to four months of submission, as to whether their papers have been accepted for publication. Manuscripts may be edited according to the guidelines of the Editorial Board. The Editors are the final arbiters.

Preparation of Manuscripts

General Guidelines

1. *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* (ISBN 1976-3735) follows *Chicago Manual of Style*, 16th edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
2. Submitted manuscripts, including footnotes and illustrations, should be approximately thirty pages in length. The manuscript should be double-spaced in 12-point type.
3. The first page of the manuscript should provide the article title, and the names(s) and affiliations(s) of the author(s).
4. The second page should provide an abstract of no more than 150 words and at least five keywords that are placed following the abstract.
5. Romanization systems for East Asian languages are as follows: Revised Romanization, by the Republic of Korea government, for Korean, Pinyin for Chinese, and Hepburn for Japanese. For Inner Asian languages, Manchu, and Mongolian, please follow the systems used in the *Cambridge History of China*, volume 6. Exceptions to these are proper names internationally authorized, such as Koguryo.
6. Diacritics in East Asian language romanization systems (e.g., macrons in Japanese) must be included consistently.
7. East Asian (Korean, Chinese, and Japanese) scripts should appear wherever necessary in the body of the text or in the footnotes, following the appropriate romanization. Korean scripts should be in standard PC or Macintosh encoding, Chinese characters in standard Big 5 encoding (please use traditional form, or *fantizi* 繁體字), and Japanese kanji and kana in Shift-JIS.

Illustrations and Proofs

Authors are encouraged to include good quality illustrations (maps, photographs, etc.) in their manuscripts. Changes at the page proofs stage and later will be accepted only upon the Editor's approval. Final proofs are sent to both authors and book reviewers, and corrections are to be limited to printing errors only.

Copyright

Authors are to obtain permission to reproduce any copyright material. In assigning copyright, authors may use their own materials in other publications if *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* is acknowledged as the original place of publication and the Northeast Asian History Foundation is notified in writing in advance. Authors also agree to assign copyright of their manuscript to the Northeast Asian History Foundation to ensure that the materials in the journal can be distributed as widely as possible.

Submission Address

All manuscripts and communication should be directed to:

Editorial Office

The Journal of Northeast Asian History

Northeast Asian History Foundation

Imgwang Bldg., 81 Tongil-ro, Seodaemun-gu

Seoul 03739, Republic of Korea

Email: jnah@nahf.or.kr

jnah.nahf@gmail.com.

Publication Ethics

The stipulations below are the public pronouncement of *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* for academic integrity and originality.

1. Articles and book reviews in *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* do not represent the views of the Northeast Asian History Foundation or the journal's editors.
2. No part of a manuscript submitted to the journal should be under review for publication elsewhere nor have been published in another publication without the permission of *The Journal of Northeast Asian History*.
3. Three specialists, including editorial board members, if appropriate, will be appointed peer reviewers to evaluate the suitability of the manuscript. The Editor is responsible for the final acceptance or rejection of the manuscript.
4. Any form of scholarly misconduct, including plagiarism, forgery, or falsification, in the process of research or writing the manuscript is not permitted. If misconduct is reported, the editorial board will form a committee to consider the withdrawal of the manuscript. If misconduct is proved, the manuscript under investigation will be immediately withdrawn and the author will not be permitted to submit further manuscripts to *The Journal of Northeast Asian History*.
5. Quotation of or references to sources in the manuscript must be clear. Authors are fully responsible for all the factual and numerical contents published in their manuscript.
6. In the case of co-authored manuscripts, the order of authors should reflect the extent to which they contributed to the completion of the manuscript.

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 17 Number 2 Summer 2021

Published in 2021

Compiled by Northeast Asian History Foundation

Published by Northeast Asian History Foundation

Tongil-ro 81, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul 03739, Republic of Korea

Tel: +82-2-2012-6000 Fax: +82-2-2012-6189

ISSN 1976-3735

Copyright © 2021 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.

*No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.*