

The Journal of Northeast Asian History

Volume 18 Number 2
Summer 2022

Editorial Board

PUBLISHER

Northeast Asian History Foundation

CHIEF EDITORS

Patricia Ebrey, University of Washington

Edward Shultz, University of Hawaii

Dong Taek Kim, Sogang University

Jeong-il Lee, Northeast Asian History Foundation

EDITORIAL BOARD

Jong Chol An, Ca' Foscari University of Venice

Byung-Yool Ban, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

John P. DiMoia, Seoul National University

Tze-ki Hon, State University of New York at Geneseo

David Howell, Harvard University

Hosung Shim, Northeast Asian History Foundation

Byongtaek Lee, Northeast Asian History Foundation

Chang Wook Lee, Northeast Asian History Foundation

James I. Matray, California State University at Chico

Richard D. McBride II, Brigham Young University

Simei Qing, State University of Michigan

Maurizio Riotto, University of Naples

Michael D. Shin, Robinson College, Cambridge

Odd Arne Westad, Harvard University

Subscriptions

The Journal of Northeast Asian History (ISSN 1976-3735) is published semiannually, in June and December, by the Northeast Asian History Foundation, NH Life Bldg, 81, Tongil-ro, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea. A one-year subscription, including shipping where applicable (excluding VAT), is US\$100 for institutions, US\$40 for individuals for their personal use, and US\$35 for students. Without subscription, each issue is US\$25 plus shipping for individuals, including students. Please send your subscription order and payment directly to the publisher.

Contents

Special Topic

New National Identity in Xi Jinping Era:
Politics of History and Making Empire in Modern China

Byung-soo OH

Introduction 9

In-gap JEON

China's National Identity from Historical Perspectives:
The Return of the Chinese Empire 15

Seung-wook KIM

Historical Territory (歷史疆域) of China:
Concern (隱憂) about Chinese Nationalism 49

Byung-soo OH

The New National History of China and the Creation of
National Identity under Xi Jinping 87

Articles (Translated)

Eun-sook YOON

Liu Yi's Surrender to the Ming and the Nature of
Goryeo Missions to the Ming Dynasty 137

Review Article

In Uk KANG

Undercurrents of Go'joseon Research Reflected in the Diaries: With a Focus on
Gu Jiegang's Diary (顧頡剛日記) and An Zhimin's Diary (安志敏日記) 179

ABOUT THE JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY

The Journal of Northeast Asian History (JNAH) is a peer-reviewed biannual journal published by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. *JNAH* seeks challenging research focusing on regional and trans-national issues within the Northeast Asia historical context. The Journal concentrates on interdisciplinary, comparative, and cross-cultural approaches to issues such as borders, identity, international relations, history issues, history education, historiography, and other relevant themes within the humanities and the social sciences. In addition to this thematic diversity, the Journal's geographical scope extends to other areas of Asia and beyond, thus inviting scholarly engagement in rethinking globalism and localism in world history. For detailed information about the submission of manuscripts, please contact the Journal at jnah@nahf.or.kr or jnah.nahf@gmail.com.



Special Topic





New National Identity in Xi Jinping Era: Politics of History and Making Empire in Modern China

Introduction

Byung-soo OH

Northeast Asian History Foundation

China's National Identity from Historical Perspectives:

The Return of the Chinese Empire

In-gap JEON

Sogang University



Historical Territory(歷史疆域) of China: Concern(隱憂) about Chinese Nationalism

Seung-wook KIM

Chungbuk National University

The New National History of China and the Creation of National Identity under Xi Jinping

Byung-soo OH

Northeast Asian History Foundation

The Journal of Northeast Asian History

Volume 18 Number 2 (Summer 2022), 7-133

Copyright © 2022 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.

No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.





Introduction

Byung-soo OH
Northeast Asian History Foundation

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 18 Number 2 (Summer 2022), 9-14

*Copyright © 2022 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.*



Introduction

Byung-soo OH
Northeast Asian History Foundation

Editorial Preface

With the explosion of ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc,¹ as well as the challenges from the Reform and Opening-up, the Party-State of the People's Republic of China (hereafter PRC) realized the necessity of a new comprehensive interpretative framework in which to redefine its relationship with the rest of the world and defend the national identity of socialist China in the midst of historical upheavals. Lessons from the old socialist states in the region inspired the PRC to broaden its vision to further the meaning of national identity not only as a mixture of premodern/tradition and modern elements, but also as a linkage of politics and culture. Along this line, vigorous attention has been paid to how to reinterpret the imperial legacies of premodern China in combination with traditional culturalism, inseparable from Sino-centrism, and modern nationalism, viz. a coexistence of the imperial characteristics of premodern times and the identity of modern nation-state. To be certain, the PRC does have its imperial legacies in terms of territorial continuity and ethno-cultural diversity from the premodern periods. By re-

¹ Anthony D. Smith, *Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Basil Blackwell, 1988).

connecting tradition and modernity to (re-)envision a new civilized empire, the PRC is now seeking a new national identity. It is at this moment that re-discovering historicity of inherent imperial features in premodern China and resetting the relationship between Chinese history and world history turn out to be integral to the reformulation of the national identity. To borrow from Ge Zhaoguang, “China does not proceed from empire to nation-state but holds the notion of a finite ‘state’ in the consciousness of an infinite ‘empire,’ and simultaneously preserves the imagination of an infinite ‘empire’ in the consciousness of a finite ‘state’.”² This use of historical embeddedness of empire is brought out as a core resource for the making of the new identity.

Three articles here treat the issues regarding the new national identity of the PRC in the Xi Jinping era by analyzing how imperial traditions, historical territory, and ideological engagement are maneuvered. In the first article, ‘China’s National Identity from Historical Perspectives: The Return of the Chinese Empire,’ Jeon In-gap relates the regeneration of the imperial tradition to the vital voices of the intellectual community talking about a new non-Western *weltanschauung*, derived from Chinese imperial tradition, for a new civilized empire. In particular, some Sino-centric universal values, according to Jeon, have become invaluable resources for the notion of non-western civilized empire. The long constitutional and institutional practice of the premodern Chinese states in pursuit of civilization and universality, the ongoing belief in the unity of All under Heaven or Grand Unification, and the imperial governance system open to centralization and decentralization alike are the points of emphasis both in the legitimization of a Chinese-style civilized empire, where various traditional and historical elements are absorbed together, and in the reconstruction of the new Chinese national identity.

Second, in ‘Historical Territory of China: Concern about Chinese Nationalism,’ Kim Seung-wook explores the new national identity by observ-

² 葛兆光, *Zhai zi zhongguo: Chongjian youguan “zhongguo” de lishi lunshu* 宅兹中国: 重建有关“中国”的历史论述 [Dwelling in the Middle of the Country: Reestablishing Histories of “China”] (Zhonghua shuju 中华书局, 2011).

ing the debate on historical territory. The PRC officially affirms its territory to be the territory of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), from the mid-18th century to 1840s in particular, when non-China—Inner Mongolia, Uighur, Tibet and other regions— were incorporated into the Qing and ‘China in history’ was completed. The scholarly focus on ‘China in history’ allows national integration under the PRC, whose territory and demographic diversity were inherited intact from the Qing, to be historically justified and the dichotomy of China and non-China, which involves the question of ethnic and cultural diversities, to be solved out. What is more, the article examines how ‘China in history’ can be exploited as a counternarrative able to demonstrate the workability of Chinese empires, historicize enriched non-Western experience of imperial China, and localize the Western theories on the formation of nation-states. In doing so, Kim contends, ‘China in history’ functions as a underlying frame of reference that fastens China as a region and China as a state together, fortifies the Sinocentric sovereignty, completely devoid of non-Chinese historical and cultural identities, and couches the ethno-cultural and historical borderlands of the PRC in its terms.

Last, in ‘The New National History of China and the Creation of National Identity under Xi Jinping,’ Oh Byungsoo analyzes the new state-authorized senior secondary (high school) history textbook, or *History: the Outline of Chinese and Foreign History* (歷史: 中外歷史綱要) published in 2019 and 2020. It is the ideological policy under Xi Jinping, Oh maintains, that stimulates how to reinterpret the relationship between the PRC and the world and reconstruct a new national identity in the midst of the Reform and Opening up era. The core message of the new textbook consists of two themes. The first is ‘China as an empire of civilization’ in premodern times which displaces a typical narrative of ethnic diversities and class conflict with a formative process of integration under universal laws and institutions of historical empires. The second is ‘China as a non-Western great power’ in modern times which not only struggles for the national independent development, but also stands for Third World during the Cold War. Through the two themes, the textbook bespeaks a new alternative history that China and the rest of the world should envisage in lieu of the estab-

lished Western-centered history and the US-led global capitalism, thereby shining a new identity of the PRC in the 21st century. The new identity enables the senior secondary students to learn a proactive role of the PRC as a non-Western great power in handling international matters and regional issues.

To sum up, the PRC is reconstructing its national identity in which to reinvest Chinese history for an empire of civilization in continental East Asia and beyond. With these in mind, the three articles in the Special Topic examine academic discourses on a new mode of civilization after the Western-centered modernity, a non-Western universalism for the future of the PRC, and profound historical experience of the PRC—China in history—in ethno-cultural and territorial spheres, different from Western standard, while scrutinizing their ideological implications of the recent revision of history textbook in the secondary school. Nevertheless, this representation of a new Chinese identity might aggravate concerns from neighboring states regarding any devaluation of their historical and cultural identity. Importantly, can the new Chinese standard of the PRC be fulfilled by other states or societies? Does the new identity and worldview of the PRC guarantee a vision for an inter-civilizational communication that acknowledges more similarities than disparities? It remains to be seen how the PRC makes effort to safeguard universal values and norms without the fervent desire for an empire of civilization infiltrated into a hegemonic voice for a Sinocentric world order.




China's National Identity from Historical Perspectives: The Return of the Chinese Empire

In-gap JEON
Sogang University



The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 18 Number 2 (Summer 2022), 15-47

Copyright © 2022 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.





China's National Identity from Historical Perspectives: The Return of the Chinese Empire*

In-gap JEON
Sogang University

Introduction

Since China began to challenge the US-led world order in earnest, discussions on China's national identity have become more frequent and intense, first in the West and recently in Korea. These discussions are mostly led by experts in geopolitics and China policies.¹ The increasing interest in China's identity reflects the political, economic, and military needs to respond agilely to strategic competition with China, but an in-depth investigation also reveals the following two reasons behind it.

* This translated article is an revised and supplemented version of Jeon In-gap, "국가건설 패러다임의 전환과 민족주의-민족'과 '천하'의 길항," *동북아역사논총* 67 (March, 2020): 7-48.

¹ Lee Moon Ki analyzes the limitations of geopolitical studies on China's national identity as follows. The West's mainstream approach bases the factors for the rise of China and its resulting national identity as a world power on the premise that China would follow the same path as Western countries to modernization and becoming a great power. This approach explains both the rise of China and its national identity as a world power afterward in the context of "modernization following the Reform and Opening." Such an approach leads to an apparent limitation, Lee emphasizes, since it overgeneralizes Western-centered historical experiences and theories and inadequately explains China's unique situation. Lee Moon Ki, "Junguk minjokjueui eui se gaji teukjin gwa gukga jeongcheseong" [Three properties of Chinese nationalism and national identity: From the perspective of historical institutionalism], *Gukjejeongchi nonchong* [The Korean Journal of International Studies] 54-3 (2014): 181.

First, there was a misjudgment by the United States. The US was “convinced” that China would transform itself by following the global standards and ultimately be incorporated into the US-led universal value system and global order. At the start of the 21st century, however, the US could not but acknowledge that this “conviction” was wrong.² Consequently, it was compelled to reexamine the identity of China and reestablish its knowledge regarding China. Second, the rise of China calls for an adjustment of its premise. With Xi Jinping’s proclamation of a “New Era,” China has entered the period in which it designs the world order in terms of its own values, norms, and institutions, as well as its own concepts and philosophies, as opposed to those of the West or the U.S.³ China is now challenging Western civilization, offering alternatives to Western ways, methods, and thought. This “tremendous shift” in China has been accomplished in forty years since its Reform and Opening, and in seventy years since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter PRC). The rise of China has forced the West to face not just a hegemonic competitor but a challenge to its own civilization. Thus, the West needs to fundamentally redefine China as its strategic competitor and abandon its “intellectual arrogance”⁴ over the country.

Then what is China’s national identity? This question has a deep historical origin and contains intricate elements. It is also as inadequate a question as “What is China?” for it is hard to give a tangible answer to “What.” John K. Fairbank thus avoided giving a definite answer to this question, referring to China’s “remarkable inertia” as an impediment to the

² US scholars and strategists on China base their research on the premise that Western/American values and norms are the “only universal” ones. This premise leads to the presumption that China would eventually accept Western/American norms, standards, and order, given time. With this belief, they have interpreted China in terms of Western/American concepts and ways of thinking and judged that China would transform itself in the same way as they have. Thus, they planned and execute policies on China accordingly, but failed unequivocally.

³ The North Atlantic Council defines such moves of China as “system challenges” to the world order and pledged an aggressive engagement to the threat in the “Brussels Summit Communiqué” issued by the Heads of State and Government Meeting in Brussels (14 June 2021): 20.

⁴ It is a kind of “intellectual imperialism.”

analysis of China. Nonetheless, his response relocated the basis of understanding of the national identity of China from the Western model of modernity to the structural stability of the organism called China (or Chinese civilization), which cannot but be defined as “remarkable inertia.”

China's national identity, as well as China itself, has so far been analyzed on the basis of Western standards, theories, and concepts. This led to the fallacy of explaining China's national identity by concentrating on the aspects that did emanate from Western experiences and standards while excluding all other Chinese characteristics inconsistent with them. In order to minimize such mistakes, it is necessary to focus on distinctive Chinese characteristics (such as the “remarkable inertia” mentioned by Fairbank), namely, Chinese ways of thinking, phenomena, organizations, institutions, systems, and social practices that clearly exist although they may be difficult to understand in Western terms. In other words, research on China's national identity must presuppose that Chinese civilization, formed through its long history and often referred to as a tradition, profoundly influences the formation of the present-day Chinese national identity.

From a historical perspective, how to understand the national identity of China lies in how to balance the continuity and discontinuity of Chinese civilization to the present (hereinafter, the word “tradition” will be used interchangeably with Chinese civilization). Even today, the experiences of the over-2000-year-long imperial rule have taken a major part in the making of the universal ideology and values (the essence of which is “Sinocentrism”) of Chinese civilization. In this respect, present China must be viewed as just one phase in its long history. Therefore, this paper argues that the national identity of China should be explored with greater emphasis on the continuity rather than on the discontinuity of its tradition.

The mainstream research on China's national identity in both the United States and Korea puts more emphasis on the discontinuity between modern China and traditional China rather than on their continuity. At the dawn of the 20th century, China's imperial system, order, and “tradition” were dismantled. Since then, many theorists have tried to understand modern and contemporary China with a thematic accent on the revolutionary discontinuity and modern novelty rather than the integrated continuity with

its imperial past. However, it is doubtful that such an approach can give an insightful understanding of present and future China. This doubt also leads one to wonder how to comprehend the long perseverance of Chinese civilization and the resilience of the Chinese empire—the repetitive emergence of a unified empire—which this paper believes to be the starting point for rethinking the national identity of China.

The 20th century began with the demise of the Chinese Empire that had lasted over 2,000 years and the advent of the rise of the nation-state, viz. The Republic of China (RC) and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Did China transform from an empire to a nation-state? Another question arises here: Has this transition from an empire to a nation-state truly and irrevocably obliterated the empire of China? Previous research on China's national identity stressed the revolutionary discontinuity and worked hard to substantiate it. To different degrees, mainstream studies on China—including those on modernization, revolution history and modernity—all to different degrees, emphasized the revolutionary discontinuity and novelty of modern China.

Those studies have obvious limitations in that China must pursue the Western model and eliminate non-Western elements, or “barbaric” elements. Moreover, their discourses use Western theories and concepts to explore China and shape the future of China. Western theories and concepts are the models of thought generalized from the culture, values, and development processes of Western society, so their experiment of adopting Western models to explain and construct China is the result of preposterous reasoning. According to this reasoning, the Chinese empire must have been irrevocably dismantled.

Then, has the empire of China truly vanished? Modern China has undergone a century of turbulence and revolution with violent political upheavals as its empire collapsed. The series of events, such as the collapse of the Qing, the birth of the ROC and its eventual collapse and the establishment of the PRC, was the epitome of turbulence and revolution. However, a contradictory side to these periods is that China has not fundamentally changed. Its way of thinking, civil order, political culture, and state

system has not changed significantly, either.⁵ Despite some monumental changes, the vast organism called China is still working as a whole. This situation may be interpreted as “inertia,” but it can also be viewed as the structural stability of the organism, i.e., China.

How can one then understand the gap between exceptionally rapid political fluctuations and the structural stability of China with its own mechanism? This is an important question that should not be ignored in the research regarding modern China's national identity. Although this paper does not delve much into this question, what should be emphasized is the fact that the turbulence and revolution in modern China was a political, economic, and societal transformation that has not brought any structural alteration or complete destruction to its own mechanism. Also, the notion that political upheavals would fundamentally transform Chinese society and economy or immediately change its socio-economic structure should be inappropriate for any research on the national identity of China. Characteristically, each of China's social, economic, and political ecosystems maintained its independence whereas a certain holistic system, encompassing the aforementioned systems, has a highly stable and organic structure. This dualistic orientation, where the ecosystems have collided with one another and united together through Chinese history, can be termed the “coexistence of contradictions.”

The state of the “coexistence of contradictions” is one of the main difficulties in understanding the national identity of modern China. Thus, an in-depth study of China's national identity needs to further clarify the dualism in which structural stability and turbulent changes coexist without a major contradiction to form “one entirety.” In particular, to approach this “coexistence of contradictions” more analytically, the analysis of the national identity of China must presuppose the idiosyncratic Chinese ways of thinking which not only assumes that different cultural systems from the past and present coexist but also assumes that the future cultural system

⁵ For a closer look into these issues, refer to Jeon In-gap, *Hyeondae Jongguk-ui Jegukmong* [Modern China's Imperial Dreams] (Hakgobang, 2016).

will be formed through collision and concurrence of the past and present cultural systems. This paper explores five historical topics to highlight the research on China's national identity: 1) the idiosyncratic Chinese ways of thinking: *huitong* (會通) and *tongsantong* (通三統); 2) China's unique theory of the state, or the *culture-state*; 3) the principle of Chinese imperial rule; the flexibility of the concentration and decentralization of power, or the tradition of centralism (county system and prefecture system) and decentralism (feudal system); 4) China's experiment of reconstructing the legacy of the Chinese Empire in the 20th century; and 5) the potential of new Chinese values as "tradition."

The Chinese Ways of Thinking: *Huitong* and *Tongsantong*

Huitong (會通), a unique and typical Chinese idea, means to integrate or to gain something through a thorough understanding. It regards history and tradition not as objects to discard and deny but as ones to integrate and reform in the belief that the future is built not by severing the past and present but by connecting them. This way of thinking is deeply rooted in Chinese culture. It has been a guiding philosophy for China to use the past as political and cultural resources to plan the future. The emphasis on "innovating from tradition," or the "innovative shift of tradition" is gaining popularity in China these days. The tradition, denied for over 100 years in the 20th century, has not been trounced but is reborn as the "new tradition," and it proves that *huitong* is deeply entrenched in Chinese culture.

Zhu Xi's (朱熹) proposition, "Restore and succeed the true learning from past saints, and build a peaceful world for the future [爲往聖而繼絕學, 爲萬世而開太平]," is an *exemplum virtutis* that no Chinese intellectuals or power elites could ever ignore. The core of this tenet dictates that continuing Chinese civilization is a calling that elite intellectuals must fulfill. It also contains the notion that the future of China must be cultivated in conjunction with its civilization in the past. This is called the tradition of restoration. This cultural tradition perceives the past, present, and future not as isolated timescales but as a multilayered and integrated whole, namely the

tradition of *huitong*. In the philosophy of *huitong*, “Sinocentrism,” or Chinese values in modern terms, is an indispensable foundation on which to build the present and future. At the same time, tradition or “Chinese values” are reconfigured into the new tradition and new “Chinese values” to meet the needs of the present and future.

Tongsantong (通三統), or Bridging Three Traditions, is a representative Chinese theory that systematically explains *huitong*. The key ideas of this theory established by Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒) are as follows. The tradition of each of the three ancient Chinese kingdoms of Xia, Shang, and Zhou formed an independent cultural system. However, the tradition of the former kingdom was not replaced and obliterated but incorporated into the later ones. It means that the different cultural systems of the three dynasties are not incompatible or conflicting but harmoniously concurrent in one continuum.

Therefore, the current tradition, or the “new” cultural system, contains multiple layered traditions. The traditions of Xia, Shang and Zhou, although different from one another, were combined into a holistic culture in the Han. Dong Zhongshu argued that the Han was the era in which new political, social, economic, and cultural traditions stood on the basis of the three preceding traditions. Following this logic, if independent, the cultural systems of the past, present, and future are not contradictory without displacing one after another but coexistent in one integrative organism.

Tongsantong is a historical philosophy of the *Chunqiu Gongyang* School. It teaches that the substances of traditions must be preserved even if its forms may be replaced with new forms according to the changes of time and practical needs. In this theory, *Santong*, that is, the three traditions of Xia, Shang and Zhou, are essentially one unitary tradition, neither disparate nor contradictory, although they may appear that way in their forms. This is why “The heaven and the truth remain unchanged” [天不變 道不變]; that is, the Chinese universal values are immutable. Therefore, a cultural system is created through a process of inheriting and expanding its preceding cultural system although it takes a different form in a new era. All the cultural systems in the past, present, and future represent Chinese universal values that manifest in different forms in different eras while sharing fun-

damental substances together. Following this reasoning, it is only natural for China to uphold cultural and historical continuity.

It is not difficult to find the philosophy of *Huitong* in various recent discourses on Chinese civilization that attempt to create a new, 21st century Sino-centric universalism. A typical example of such discourse can be found in Gan Yang's notion of *Tongsantong*. He proposed *huitong* as a Chinese alternative to the Western way of thinking to explain both China and the world from a new perspective. He stated as follows at the Beijing Consensus Forum held at Tsinghua University on May 12, 2005:

“There must be a new understanding of China's success of the Reformation and its connection and continuity to Mao Zedong's era. It must also be recognized that modern China has been established on the foundation of traditional Chinese civilization formed throughout its entire history. Today, I would like to emphasize that the three traditions of Confucius, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping (i.e., Confucianism, Maoism, and Dengism) are all in the continuum of Chinese history and civilization and, to cite the Gongyang theory, should bring about a new generation of *Tongsantong*.”⁶

Dengism is a market-oriented, freedom-and-rights-pursuing tradition established after the Reform and Opening while Maoism is an equality-and-justice-seeking tradition formed after the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Gan Yang claims that the equality tradition of Maoism exerts a strong influence on modern Chinese. Confucianism is a tradition that has shaped Chinese civilization for thousands of years and is often referred to as traditional Chinese culture or Confucian culture.⁷

⁶ Gan Yang, “Xin shidai de tongsantong: Sanzhong chuantong de ronghui yu zhonghua wenming de fuxing” [The New Era's *Tongsantong* system: The revival of the Three-Lock System and Huazhong civilization], *Shucheng* 7 (Shanghai Sanlian Shudian, 2005): 39.

⁷ Gan Yang claims that traditional Chinese civilization itself is an important factor that resulted in the success of its economic reformation. He emphasizes that China has preserved its traditional civilization while many empires have relinquished their traditional civilizations as they turned into modern states. Refer to Gan Yang, “Xin shidai de tongsantong: Sanzhong chuantong de

Gan Yang's key argument is that the cultural systems of the past, present, and future must be understood to be continuous rather than in conflict with one another. Gan Yang sees that the periods of Mao's Revolution, Deng's Reformation, and the present do not conflict with traditional China but enrich and diversify Chinese history, each occupying one stage in the continuum of its long history. Thus, his claim leads us to the positive re-evaluation of Chinese tradition as the source of modern China's development. In addition, Mao Zedong's period is reinterpreted as an era that paved the way for China's rise to wealth and power. Gan Yang defined this philosophy as "new-generation *Tongsantong*" and emphasized that it would provide a new understanding of China and the world.

Gan Yang's re-interpretation of *Tongsantong* became a new tradition that absorbs the traditions of Confucius, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping altogether. These three traditions, according to Gan Yang, are the key elements of modern China's national identity and the PRC is an embodiment of those traditions. Hence, the ultimate goal of their fusion is the revival of Chinese civilization. This point is evident in his discussions on civilization. He argues for a new model of China, or "Civilization China" in juxtaposition of Chinese traditional civilization. According to Gan, China was not simply a state but a massive civilization, manifested in the form of a state, so the 20th century saw its transformation from a civilization-state to a nation-state, or from a world [literally, heaven and earth] to a state. In the 21st century, he maintains, China should take its "historical civilization" as the most valuable resource to design a modern state and re-establish a civilization-state while pursuing de-westernization beyond modernization experiences.⁸ Here, the theoretical foundation of his "Civilization China" is

ronghui" [The New Era's *Tongsantong* system: The fusion of three traditions], *Shucheng* 6 (Shanghai Sanlian Shudian, 2005): 29 and Gan, "Xin shidai de tongantong: Sanzhong chuanting de ronghui yu zhonghua wenming de fuxing" [Unifying the three traditions in the New Era: The integration of three traditions and the revival of Chinese civilization]: 37.

⁸ Gan Yang, "Cong minzu-guojia zouxiang wenming-guojia" [From a nation-state to a civilization state], *Shucheng* 2 (Shanghai Sanlian Shudian, 2004): 35-36 & 39-40.

Confucianism⁹ and the philosophy of *Huitong* pervades his discourse on civilization.¹⁰

The Chinese Theory of the State: Culture-State

China historically has had its own theory of the state, or Culture-State. It proposes the realization of a state ruled by virtue and by the unity of the world (i.e., China). These two propositions are to ensure the legitimacy of the dynasty or state power such that neglecting them will bring a fatal crisis to state power. It is no exaggeration to claim that fulfilling these propositions is a legitimate obligation and the essential function of state power.

The realization of rule by virtue—cultural universality—as a legitimate function of state power begins with the premise that ‘[N]ot only institutions and order but also the state (power) itself must be established based on universal values/culture and must be a means to realize them.’ In this theory, universal values, norms, order and institutions, as well as universal culture, the state, society and individuals constitute one whole organism. The most essential element in this organism is universal values/culture by means of which state power establishes a moral/cultural community, governs by virtue, and accomplishes cultural homogeneity. The Confucian system, more accurately, the Confucian system of ethics [禮教體制] is a state system that embodies this theory of the state. Therefore, if its universal values/culture is denied, the Confucian system will end up collapsing. Then, not only will the integration of the state and society fail, but the order of every institution, including social, economic and political ones, also cannot

⁹ For details on this issue, refer to Cho Keong-ran, *Hyeondai Jungguk Jisikin-ui Jido* [The Map of Modern Chinese Intellectuals] (Gulhangari, 2013): 96.

¹⁰ This theory of Gan Yang exudes strong confidence that the future civilization of China and the world will come from the culture, learning, philosophy, and history of China. Many Chinese intellectuals today share the opinion that the present stage is the renaissance of Chinese culture. The dawn of the 21st century saw this intellectual atmosphere becoming a general phenomenon in China, which derives universal meanings through discovering China’s philosophical resources and Confucianism, and integrating it with the experience of pursuing modernization and reconstructing the whole. It is a direct example of the *Huitong* way of thinking.

be sustained.

The preservation of the unified world (China) is another essential function of a state, in addition to the realization of rule by virtue, or cultural universality inseparable from cultural hegemony. Then, what is the premise that ensures the realization of cultural universality and the perpetuity of Chinese culture? Cultural universality and the perpetuation of Chinese hegemony cannot be achieved in the midst of divisions and chaos that results from turbulent times. A stable reign is an indispensable premise for the realization of the two propositions. Thus, the essential mission and *raison d'être* for the state and elites are to create and maintain the vast unified empire called China, and the state and elites have a moral and real obligation to unify the world (China)—in modern terms, to realize “One China” and “Community of Common Destiny for Mankind”—to guarantee the delightful and stable lives of the people.¹¹

During the reign of the Republic of China, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) proposed totally different paths to nation-building. However, both of them presupposed that the essential role of the state is to accomplish the unification of the world (China). In the first half of the 20th century, it was an obligation to build one unified China, overcoming national divisions caused by warlords and the Chinese Civil War. The nation-state was a new governance system to preserve “One China.” Both the KMT and CCP proposed a party-ruled state system, in which a political party is the main agent of nation-building. During that time, both the KMT and the CCP were aggregations of elites. In the KMT, a visionary pioneer and his elite followers led nation-building, and the CCP was also a vanguard party comprised of elites. Therefore, the political parties proposed by the KMT and the CCP were the main agents to rule the country either by a visionary pioneer or the collective will of vanguard elites. As the agent to rule the county, it was also a natural obligation for

¹¹ During the Taiping Rebellion, the gentry class [紳士層], including Zeng Guofan [曾國藩] and Li Hongzhang [李鴻章], held the view that the sacrifices of individuals are inevitable for the stability and preservation of the world (China). This is another example of expressing the preservation of the unified world (China).

the political party to exert strong leadership and create conditions able to fulfill a unified world (China).¹²

Nonetheless, these Chinese elites attempted to turn Imperial China into a nation-state without resolving China's own traditional theory of the state. Their attempt at transformation, therefore, has failed to supply a new understanding of the functions of the state. The essential role of the state was still believed to rule by virtue (i.e., cultural universality) and the preservation of the unified world (China). In this regard, the process of China's nation-state building in the 20th century can be interpreted as a Chinese way of adapting to the modern world. China seeks for cultural universality by establishing a moral state—an ideology state in modern terms—, fulfills the essential function of the state for one unified China, and uses a modern governance system in the form of a nation-state. As a result, China's ultimate goal for a nation-state and the Chinese concept of a nation-state inevitably differed from those of Western states.¹³

China is said to be a civilization rather than a country. In the late 19th century, as the Chinese imperial system began its downhill slide, its civilization tumbled from a universal civilization to merely one of several civilizations, even a backward one. China's universal imperial culture ("Sino-centrism") has also devolved into a China-only traditional culture. The diffusion of this new common sense means that Chinese universalism has lost its influence. Over the past 20 years, Chinese scholars have proposed and debated various state theories regarding the questions of what kind of country China is and what kind of state it should build. From their active discussions, the return of Chinese universalism can be observed. Outstand-

¹² Another issue to pay attention to here is that there was an undercurrent demand for strong leadership in society. The political conservatism, repeatedly surfaced in modern Chinese history, reflects Chinese society's demand for strong leadership and thus should be understood as a fundamentally identical school of thought.

¹³ A fact to notice here is that cultural universality—universalism, the core value of the traditional state theory—is the essential asset to uphold an empire. The immense realm of an empire encompasses numerous differences and diversities, and universalism is an indispensable principle to embrace them. The universal values that a hegemonic empire transmits are a crucial resource to unify its realm. Therefore, an empire gives full measure to create and promulgate its universal values.

ing examples are the theories of civilization-state proposed by neo-Confucianists,¹⁴ neo-leftists, and neo-liberals, and the state theory of neo-authoritarians (neo-conservatives),¹⁵ in addition to the theory of the civilizational state (文明型國家論).

Although these theories of civilization-state differ in their specific visions, they share the following ideas. All of them start from the perspective of civilization history which holds that Western state theories cannot thoroughly explain Chinese thought on the nature and functions of a state. In addition, these civilization theories extensively probed the matter of how to reconfigure “Chinese models,” “Chinese problems,” and “Chinese ways” into “universal models,” “universal problems,” and “universal ways.”¹⁶ Particularly noteworthy in these discussions is that their main topic was how to identify the foundation of China's civilization. In China, this issue

¹⁴ Yao Zhongqiu, *Shijie Lishi de Zhongguo Shike* [China's Moment in World History] (Hainan Chubanshe, 2019); Yao Zhongqiu, *Rujia Xianzheng Zhuyi Chuantong* [Confucian Constitutionalism Tradition] (Zhongguo Fazheng Daxue Chubanshe, 2013); Chen Lai, *Chuantong yu Xiandai: Renwen Zhuyi de Shijie* [Tradition and Modernity: The Vision of Humanism] (Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2006); Chen Ming, “Yuandao yu zhongguo wenhua baoshou zhuyi-zai sichuan daxue lunli xue yanjiu zhongxin de zuotan” [The Yuan Dao and Chinese cultural conservatism: A discussion at the Ethics Research Center of Sichuan University], *Zhongguo Ruxue Wang* (www.Confuchinan.Com) (May 2004); Jiang Qing, *Zhengzhi Ruxue: Dangdai Ruxue de Zhuanxiang, Tezhi yu Fazhan* [Political Confucianism: The Turn, Characteristics and Development of Contemporary Confucianism] (Sanlian Shudian, 2003).

¹⁵ Xiao Gongqin, *Chaoyue Zuoyou Jijin Zhuyi: Zouchu Zhongguo Zhuanxiang de Kunjing* [Beyond Left and Right Radicalism: Out of the Dilemma of China's Transformation] (Zhejiang Daxue Chubanshe: 2012).

¹⁶ Looking at the CCP's recent national development strategies, such as the community of common human destiny theory and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the idiom *Chinese characteristics* seems to be a “temporary expression of self” amid the pursuit of universalism (Chen Yun, “Tianxia sixiang yu xiandai xing de zhongguo zhi lu: Zhongguo wenti, zhongguo sixiang, zhongguo daolu lun gang” [The idea of Tianxia and the Chinese way to modernity: Chinese issues, thought, and ways], *Sixiang yu Wenhua* [Thought and Culture] 8 (2008): 35). Chinese-style development strategies, implicated in terms such as Chinese way, Chinese methods, or Chinese model, which all emphasize Chinese characteristics, do not mean the unique Chinese way, development model, or problems, but the final destination of providing the universal way, universal norms, and universal order to “China in China,” “China in Asia,” and “China in the world.”

is referred to as “establishing a civilization-state (文明立國).”¹⁷ It is the product of the thought that civilization is an indispensable element of nation-building. Furthermore, this thought follows China’s traditional state theory that equates civilization with a state (polity).

Taking the liberalist theory of civilization-state as an example, we can look into similarities between China’s traditional state theory and its recent civilization-state theory. The civilization-state sought by Chinese liberalists is a constitutional state. Their definition of the constitutional state is as follows: “The constitutional government (i.e., state or polity) creates (constitutional) civilization.”¹⁸ Civilization also provides the state with norms. From the perspective of civilization history, a state with a deep and thick civilization root can form a constitutional state.” As can be seen from the statement that “state and civilization are one but two, two but one,” their ideal state is one in which the civilization and the polity are integrated into one.¹⁹ Chinese liberalists also regard “establishing a state of civilization” and “establishing a state of freedom” as an identical matter, as stated in the following statement; the civilization capacity, provided by a constitutional polity under the democratic legislation, will honor the ‘political state’ with a crown called civilization. Consequently, the state that they seek to build is both a state and a civilization alike and its people naturally come to share the same cultural identity.²⁰

¹⁷ Establishing a state of civilization means “reviving the culture.” The controversy over this issue has been the unchanged core philosophical problem in the field of philosophy since the end of Qing.

¹⁸ Neo-Confucianism, Neo-leftists, and liberalists differ in their opinions on whether a polity (a constitutional government for liberalists) produces a civilization or whether a civilization creates a polity. The former two believe the latter while the liberalists believe that a constitutional government (polity) is the foundation of civilization.

¹⁹ This relationship seen in the liberalist theory of the civilization state is also observed in Neo-Confucianist and neo-leftist theories. Their theories differ in their views on the content and substance of civilization. See “Zhongguo shike de sixiang chuang fa” [The ideological creation of Chinese era]

²⁰ Here is the reason why liberalists emphasize the establishment of a state of civilization. Building a civilization state belongs to the establishment of historical civilization and it is to explore modern Chinese’ return to their origins and loyalty to their culture. The aforementioned interpretation of civilization nourishes the regime’s survival, masters the heart with politics, and

Then, why are various civilization-state theories being raised recently in China? It is not irrelevant to China's national strategy for a global hegemony. Universalism is an essential public item for the imperial nation-state of China in competing with the US for political and cultural hegemony. To be an unshakable global leader, it is necessary for China to offer and disseminate universal values to the world. The problem is, however, what kind of universalism it can offer. Liberalism, the New Left, neo-authoritarianism, and neo-Confucianism diverge in regard to this point.²¹ The universalisms proposed by these stances all have their roots in China's traditional world views and thoughts. Historically, China has maintained a universalism tradition. The arguments of those diverse civilization-state theories begin with the affirmation that the present is the time to discover China's universal traditions and revive its civilization. In other words, China has historically and continuously expanded its Sinocentric cultural boundaries through cultural diversity and assimilation, thereby representing globalism on their terms.

This regime of thought vividly captures China's perception and doctrine of the world in the sense of redefining the world as a structure that expresses humanitarian and globalism. The intellectual trend also emphasizes the unity of individuality, sociality, and universality altogether.²² Besides, China's universalism aims to complete the world not by denying the beauty of every individual, family, clan, community, and state but by pursuing the coexistence of all those components.²³ The Chinese scholars in PRC do seem to share the belief that their country needs a new universalist narrative.

realizes the unity of heaven's ways and human minds. Thus, the ultimate aim is to facilitate the modern order created by the dual revolution of cultural China, a nation-state, and political China, a democratic state. This is the fundamental issue of the 100 years of future transformation and the present aim. Therefore, the theories of polity and civilization must be fundamentally integrated into one (Ibid.: 6).

²¹ The question of what types of universalism, civilization, and world order each stance pursues is beyond the scope of this paper and deserves a separate comprehensive analysis.

²² "Zhongguo shike de sixiang chuang fa": 14.

²³ Ibid.

Flexibility Between Centralization and Decentralization

The harmony and conflict between centralization and decentralization is historically one of the key issues for understanding the national identity of China. China has experienced numerous divisions and unifications throughout its history, characteristic of Chinese history. This reflects a decentralization tendency due to China's vast territory and underlying social and regional pluralism. Chronic issues rooted in regional and cultural diversity, such as the conflict between the central and provincial governments and the tension between the state and the private domain, would reinforce the decentralizing trend and incur nationwide turmoil at times. Nonetheless, the conviction that "[I]f the world has stayed unified for a long time, it will definitely divide; if it has stayed divided for long, then it will definitely unify" has been widely shared in Chinese history. Since the Sui and Tang, this conviction has been accepted like an axiom.

Does this conviction have any historical substance? All Chinese dynasties have had a sense that they must succeed in the realm of Emperor Qin Shi Huang's unified empire at least. This is a proposition related closely to the legitimacy of the regime. Many dynasties successfully secured their legitimacy by incorporating and governing the so-called China proper, or the territory that the Qin had unified and ruled for the first time in Chinese history. Here, central governance has two meanings. First, it refers to the regime's (i.e., the emperor/central power) direct governance of the people. China had historically considered this direct governance of people as an ideal governing system. Second, it means rule by virtue or universal values, which realizes a cultural community based on Confucian values and ethical culture. Also, the unification of the world (China) had been the primary objective of central governance. Not only the ethnic Han-Chinese dynasties, such as the Han, the Sui, the Tang, the Song and the Ming, but the conquest dynasties such as the Yuan and the Qing also followed this "historical inertia" without exceptions and accomplished the mission of unifying "the world" (China) for their own dynastic legitimacy.

The Chinese empire had the capacity to unite its vast territory and

manage its diverse private domain. The private domain covers various institutions, including family, clan, village community, gentry group, religious association, guild organization (guild, public office, and hall), regional association, secret association, and ranger fighter group. These private institutions included not only official groups such as clans, villages, gentry groups, guilds and local associations, but also unofficial organizations such as secret associations or ranger fighter groups as found in *The JiangHu Record of Another World*.²⁴ The former belongs to the official private domain while the latter to the unofficial one.

Notable unofficial regional groups exerted a powerful influence in local society albeit exerting only unofficial power. They include secret organizations, such as the Tiandihui (天地會), Gelaohui (哥老會), and the late Qing era's Qing Bang (青幫) and Hong Bang (紅幫), and secret religious sects, such as the White Lotus (白蓮教), the Boxers (義和團), Tianli-Jiao (天理教), and Luo-Jiao (羅教). These private powers exhibited various degrees of influence in their regions, sometimes, to the point of competing or potentially competing with the state's power depending on the location and time or the degree of state control in the region.

Private organizations wielded undeniable official or unofficial power in local or private society. State power could not control the local or private domain, nor ignore their power or interests. For instance, village communities and guilds collected taxes on behalf of the state (the consignment of administrative work to private institutions). These groups also mediated disputes and conflicts within the community and exercised the right to punish when necessary.

Meanwhile, it is not unreasonable to say that spatial pluralism can be translated into regional disparities inseparable from social disparities. Having a wide diversity, in fact, means having as much disparity, so subsys-

²⁴ According to Mio Kishimoto, these groups, whether official or not, were communities with a strong bond and closed to others in the Ming and Qing periods. In addition, these groups exerted a strong influence on keeping order (and causing disorder) in the regional society and on the political trends of regional society throughout all Chinese dynasties. See "Ming-Qing-jidai-no haishin" [Local gentry in the Ming and Qing dynasties] in *Kent-to Kenryoku* [Authority and Power] (Iwanami Shoten, 1990): 53.

tems with large disparities can work as a centrifugal force to pull the empire apart. Clashes between subsystems or even conflicting interests between the state and the private domain, between the central and provincial governments, and between regional governments could degenerate into political feuds. For example, deep-seated localism and local elites' pursuit of decentralization, as well as regional factionalism accompanied by violent power struggles, suggest that political divides were not just a probability but a reality.

Although it was highly probable for regional and social diversities to cause divisions, the tendency toward integration was strong as well. This is proven by the repetition of division and unification throughout Chinese history. It has been a historical pattern that the weakening of central power immediately led to the strengthening of decentralization and the expansion of local autonomy. Eventually, completed and preserved by a central power, the centralized political system was the key requirement for integration. In order to maintain the vast empire of China, it was more important than anything else for the central government to achieve the integration of the state by effectively controlling the interests and autonomy of the regional and private domains. In order to maintain One China, it was essential to coordinate the interests between the central and provincial regions and between the state and the private domain.

How did Qing China unify the numerous disparities within and keep the stable imperial system? The Qing encompassed the Sinocentric Confucian world, the Xinjiang Islamic world, the Tibetan Buddhist world, and its sacred homeland of Manchuria, by and large. The Sinocentric world is "China Proper (or Inner China)" whereas the rest were "Outer China." The Qin observed traditional Chinese ways in "China proper." All Chinese dynasties have needed to settle the matter of balancing centralization and decentralization since the Qin and the Han. Thus, China has accumulated abundant rationale and experiences on this matter throughout its history.

A representative example is the debate over feudalism (decentralization) and the prefecture-county theory (centralization). The conflict between these two systems has long been a matter of controversy since the Qin. The prefecture-county theory advocates that the emperor (central

power) take a strong grip on regional and private sectors through the centralized bureaucracy and promote a unified world (China). Feudalism, on the other hand, argues that the separation of power or decentralization is the main requirement to achieve political and social stability and the path to avoid conflict and war caused by the privatization of the state (the biggest problem of the prefecture-county system).

The prefecture-county system historically appears to be a strong system of centralized governance, but a more thorough investigation reveals that a typical Chinese-style governance system maintains the unification of the realm through balancing centralization and decentralization. The traditional Chinese centralized system of governance differs in its character from a modern centralized system. In the traditional system, the imperial authority did not have absolute power over the military, the finance, the judiciary, and the educational institutions of the state. Instead, considerable power over those institutions was delegated to local elites and provincial governors, who were like “small emperors” of their own regions, while the imperial authority indirectly ruled or controlled the interests of regional and private domains for balance. The legitimacy of the emperor was vested by the provinces’ (local interests) agreement on his rule. In other words, China’s long successful central rule has great bearing on the fact that imperial power sought to balance and harmonize central and regional interests.

The Qing also maintained its power through the cooperation of unofficial groups and local gentries that exerted great de facto influence on the private sphere. In this regard, the centralized rule of traditional empires, including the Qing, could be maintained by way of compromising with regional and private spheres. Therefore, China’s centralized bureaucracy must be understood differently from the modern counterpart linked tightly to the nation-state. In reality, policy decisions were rarely made by one-sided orders from the central government or central bureaucrats. Clans, public offices (公局, the consensus council of local elites), guilds, village communities, or unofficial private groups were involved in policy-making along with the central government which witnessed a great process of conflict and compromise over the distribution of interests. The empire ruled the world (China) while contending or cooperating with these powers that rep-

resented regional or private interests. In other words, without the consensus of private and/or regional representatives, the empire's rule could not maintain stability.

The Legacy and Reconstruction of the Empire

Before the modern era, there was a “world order centered on China.” It is called the “Sinocentric order” and the embodiment of this order was the Chinese Empire. The Chinese Empire can be divided into the early and later Chinese empires based on the Tang-Song transition period. The typical cases of early Chinese empires are the Han and the Tang while the Ming and the Qing are later empires. These dynasties are called empires by modern scholars not merely because they were ruled by an emperor.

An empire here refers to the form of a state or governance system. China and Europe have different historical genealogies of governance systems. In general, Europe began with the empire (e.g., Roman Empire), followed by feudal states, absolutist states, and then nation-states. China has followed a totally different course of development in experiencing different state types. It can be said that China has transformed from an empire into a modern nation-state without going through the stages of feudalism and absolutism although this claim might be disputed.

An empire is a form of ruling system that precedes the current system, viz. the nation-state. An empire reigns over a vast territory, controls systematically its entire geographical and societal sphere, and encompasses diverse languages, religions, and cultures. Moreover, an empire must have hegemony over civilization to offer values and culture that the world can share. An empire should be able to integrate its vast realm into one political unit by appropriately coordinating internal bureaucracy and indirect rule; the representative example of the latter is the *Jimi Rule* (Loose Rein Rule). Of course, overwhelming military prowess, economic power, and strong tax control are the most important elements in maintaining the empire.

China's imperial system, formed by the Qin and the Han, satisfies the aforementioned requirements of an empire. Despite considerable changes, the imperial system basically continued until the early 20th century. The

Chinese imperial system was supported by the notion of Great Unification in which the territory, ideology, culture, economy, and society of the empire are all unified into one. The Qing as the last dynasty before the 20th century completed this Great Unification and declared itself to be the ruler of the world, claiming itself *Tianchao* (天朝), or the Heavenly Dynasty.

As *Tianchao*, the Qing ideologically assumed the whole world as its realm to rule and all the people of the world as its subjects to rule. However, neither the entire world nor all the peoples on earth can be under its reign. Therefore, there emerged ideological and realistic forms of the empire. The ideological form of the empire comprises a three-dimensional structure: “China Proper (or Sinocentric China)” — the realm of the Han (漢) Chinese —, “Outer China” — the realm of the nomads —, and tributary states. According to whether or not the reigning territory was unified as one single political unit, the real realm of the empire could not but be limited to “China Proper” or “Outer China.” Thus, in reality, the realm of the Qing had a two-tiered structure of “China Proper” and “Outer China.”

The *Huayi* theory justifies the ideological form of the Chinese empire through the Chinese way of understanding the world. This theory divides the world into the world of *hua* (華 civilization) and the world of *yi* (夷 barbarism). The former is the center of the world (i.e., China), where universal values are observed, while the latter is part of the world other than China (*huawai* 化外) in which universal values have not been realized. Here, the universal values are Chinese values that must be shared by the *hua* world as well as the *huawai* world. The *Huayi* theory provides a logic whereby the Chinese people perceive China as a world and Chinese civilization as a universal civilization.

The ideological form of the empire is designed by the logic of the *Huayi* theory. Ideologically, the land and people of the world must be under the unitary reign of the Chinese emperor, and the world must be the realm of the Chinese empire. In actuality, however, it is impossible for the empire to rule the entire world so the real realm cannot but be limited to a certain extent. Thus, the ideological form of the empire is modified in the *Huayi* theory as a three-dimensional realm. The realm under the unitary reign of the emperor is divided into the *hua* world and the *yi* world; the for-

mer means the Sinocentric China, or China Proper while the latter the non-Sinocentric world, or Outer China. The non-Sinocentric world, in turn, is divided into “Non-Sinocentric China” and tributary states depending on their geographical, cultural, and political distance from Sinocentric China. Historically, however, a tributary state that had belonged to the Non-Sinocentric China was sometimes incorporated into “Sinocentric China,” and vice versa. Thus, the division of “Sinocentric China,” “Non-Sinocentric China,” and tributary states were historically not fixed but changeable.

As a result of the Opium War, the Chinese empire faced serious challenges to its system and order. The breakup of the traditional universal empire became an irreversible trend of the time. The challenges that the Chinese empire faced can be summarized in the following three phenomena. First, the Chinese empire lost its universal empire status as its ideological empire structure. Second, in line with the decline of the Qing’s control over its empire, the decentralization of China Proper accelerated, thereby segmenting China into “multiple polities.” Third, the *fanbu* (藩部), or fiefdoms, were visibly departing from the empire, where they occupied one axis of the imperial structure. These factors created complicated functional relationships and plunged the empire to its demise. It is at this juncture that the nation-state system, given as a universal form of a state, has emerged as an alternative governance system over the imperial system. Establishing a nation-state turned out to be a historical mission in modern Chinese history.

Many proposals have been made for the establishment of a nation-state since 1895 when the ideological form of the imperial system was confirmed to have collapsed. Diverse governance systems, such as constitutional monarchism, enlightened monarchism and republicanism, competed with one another from the last days of the Qing to the early days of the ROC, but China settled on republicanism after the 1911 Revolution and the birth of the ROC. Later, both the KMT and the CCP based their political system on republicanism but collided as they chose capitalist and non-capitalist paths, respectively. These two conflicting paths to a nation-state spiraled into a lengthy civil war, which ended with the non-capitalist side’s victory in 1949. However, the experiment of a non-capitalist nation-state

lasted only between 1949 and 1954, and China shifted its path to building a socialist state that concluded the quest for the type of nation-state in the 20th century.

While evaluating China's overall journey of nation-building to a socialist state, can anyone assert with confidence that the Qing's ideological and imperial structures have collapsed as well? This question cannot be answered with a simple yes or no but this paper attempts to point out the importance of the following question. Does this historical understanding have any historical substance as it emphasizes the historical discontinuity between the empire and the nation-state and, thus, perceives the PRC as a completely new China?

The collapse of the Qing is a historical fact. However, its collapse does not necessarily mean the collapse of the imperial structure composed of "Sinocentric China" and "Non-Sinocentric China." It requires highly elaborate and intricate discussions to demonstrate the imperial legacy which has been inherited to date. Nonetheless, at least some attention should be paid to the obvious reality that the legacy of the traditional empire has been transmitted to present-day China and is being reconstructed. A notable example is the realm of the empire, which has been reconstructed into the realm of the PRC as a nation-state.

The value of Chinese culture in the history of its civilization and the realm of previous dynasties are the legacies that any Chinese dynasty or ruler must inherit without exception. In particular, overcoming the divided state and unifying the realm—primarily, unifying the territory—has been the key requirement for the legitimacy of any Chinese regime. The PRC has successfully inherited the empire's territory. "Outer China/Non-Sinocentric China" under the Qing is still part of China. This structure of modern China is the result of inheriting and reconstructing the structural legacy of the empire. Thus, the PRC has been able to secure historical legitimacy as one era in the long history of China.

Chinese Values as Assets for the Future

The 20th century was the era of denying Chinese culture. The PRC's desire

to create a new strong China culminated in the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution was a tremendous cultural experiment that attempted to replace China's traditional universal values with alternative universal values such as Marx-Leninism and Maoism. It was an experiment that completely denied the Chinese culture rooted in Confucian universal values. Borrowing Li Zehou's (李泽厚) words, Confucianism is the Chinese identity itself, entrenched in Chinese culture as a "cultural-psychological formation," but the Cultural Revolution tried to create a national identity that dispensed with Confucian tradition. Mao's experiment of creating new "Chinese-ness," or new Chinese-style universal values, to build a strong nation, however, could not overcome the weight of Chinese culture.

At the turn of the 20th to 21st century, The PRC's attitude toward Chinese culture shifted from denial to acceptance. The intellectuals do not hesitate to claim that present China is on the verge of a new renaissance era. Leaving behind the 20th century's experiment of denying "Chinese values" to build a strong nation, the PRC is now unfolding the reversed intellectual paradigm wherein Chinese values are the main assets to design a future the PRC. The rise of the PRC as a new powerhouse has made this reversal possible. That is, the realization of a strong China has helped it regain its confidence in Chinese culture.

The PRC's confidence in its culture became more pronounced with the global financial crisis and the Beijing Olympics in 2008. With the start of the 21st century, the PRC intellectual society delved deeply into the "civilization discourse." After the success of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the overcoming of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, the intellectual society has become more devoted to the civilization discourse and became familiar with concepts such as "universal value," "universal culture," "Chinese model," "Chinese standards," and "Beijing Consensus." the PRC's economic and political influence as a "new powerhouse" has already been expanding to the global level. China's rapidly popular civilization discourse represents its struggles for civilizational hegemony beyond economic and political hegemony.

I have divided China's nation-building process from the early mod-

ern to the Reform and Opening periods into five phases.²⁵ Each phase had to deal with fierce cultural debates over the direction of nation-building.²⁶ Those cultural debates shared the following points. First, the standards of thought and practice were from the West. Modernity²⁷ was considered truth itself and the core concept to interpret China and the world. Various cultural debates presupposed the adoption of modernity and focused on the question of how to build culture.

Second, building a strong nation was a common goal of these cultural debates. The PRC's cultural debates concern the issue of how to integrate traditions and modernity and rebuild nation and culture. It can be said that the endeavors to develop an overall strategy for nation-building manifested in cultural debates. About ten years ago, I analyzed what role the Chinese traditions represented by Confucianism have played in nation-state building and made the following points: "A nation-state per se, which the PRC tries to build sometimes by destroying Confucianism and other times by utilizing it, might not be the end goal but a means to restore the vast unified world (China) via cultural universalism. The Chinese people have a deep-rooted notion that the essential function of a state is to unify the entire realm and conserve it forever. A nation-state is simply a modern form to accomplish this mission."²⁸

²⁵ The first phase was until 1911, when China was preparing for nation building. The second phase was the stage of forming the agent of nation building from 1912 to 1927, from the establishment of the ROC to the establishment of the Nanking nationalist government. In the third phase, from the emergence of the Nanking nationalist government in 1928 to the start of the 2nd Sino-Japanese War in 1937, China experimented with building a capitalist nation. The fourth phase was the period from the 1937 Sino-Japanese War to the establishment of the PRC in 1949, then to the establishment of the constitution in 1954, when capitalist and non-capitalist national builders were in conflict/clashing. The fifth phase was the period of building a socialist nation from the enactment of the constitution in 1954 to just before the adoption of the reform and opening policy (1978-1982).

²⁶ This issue was discussed in more detail in Jeon In-Gap, "Cultural conservatism as an adaptation strategy" <https://scienceon.kisti.re.kr/srch/selectPORSrchArticle.do?cn=NART69914378>.

²⁷ "Modernity" in this paper refers to the properties of both early and late modern eras. The early modern era refers to the first half of the 20th century and the late modern era refers to the period since the 1990s.

²⁸ Jeon In-Gap, "Chongron: Gongja, takgojeon mirae gihock" [Overview: Confucius, the pretext of

The modern Chinese collective consciousness sought to find truth from the “truth” of the West, to build a strong nation with wealth and a powerful military, and to complete the establishment of a nation-state. This attitude reignited the debate over cultural powers in the 1980s. This debate was the resurgence of the spirit of the May 4th Movement. Up to this point, the PRC’s intellectual paradigm was simply a continuation of the paradigm predominant in the 100 years of the early modern era. That was interpreting China and the world with the concepts represented by “Europeanization,” adopting the Western ways of thinking and concepts. The philosophical space of this paradigm was bound to be too narrow to employ a different philosophical experiment, namely “adopting the West’s scholarly knowledge and reconstructing a new civilization with China’s own independent identity.”²⁹

As the rise of the PRC became evident with successful reform and opening, however, the intellectual paradigm also underwent a radical shift. The overarching trend of change was the “re-universalization of Chinese values” beyond the “modernistic reconstruction of traditions” and the “Chinese-style reconfiguration of modernity.” The humanism debate in Chinese studies developed with increasing enthusiasm in the 1990s, which opened the door for this change. Chinese humanism advocates tried to establish a new tradition of truth through the trinity of 1) freedom and rights, 2) equality and justice, and 3) Confucian universalism. Although the debate has not discovered and provided any substantial content sufficient to the new tradition of truth, it has made an important contribution to the spread of an idea throughout Chinese society. What matters is the necessity of critically examining the modernity-centered intellectual paradigm and designing a China-centered intellectual paradigm. Another important contribution of the debate is the revitalization of traditional Chinese cultural-

future planning] in *Gongja: Hyeondae Jungguk-ul Garojireuda* [Confucius penetrating modern China] (Saemulgyeol, 2006).

²⁹ Yeon Jae-heum, “Jungguk daeryuk-ui ‘dangdae munhwa bosujuui-e daehan yeongu” [A study on cultural conservatism in contemporary China], *Jungukhakbo* [Journal of Chinese Studies] 60 (2009): 443.

ism/universalism in contemporary cultural discourses.

What is interesting is the outcome of the postmodernism debate in China. Since postmodernism is the main theoretical tool for the deconstruction of modernity, this debate ends up with the demand for pursuing China's own modernity and Chinese-ness (Sinocentrism) as a new intellectual paradigm. This outcome exhibits a typical Chinese-style appropriation of postmodernism but through this debate, a new social consensus was formed: China must reweigh the Western intellectual paradigm and reconstruct China's own intellectual paradigm. The new consensus interconnects with the belief that Chinese cultural values and concepts must be useful for the future of the PRC and the world and for securing the hegemony of present and future discourses. This is also relevant to almost all modern Chinese schools of thought, such as neo-Confucianism, liberalism, neo-leftism, cultural conservatism and incorporate Confucianism, in their search for new models of thinking and discourse.

This overall situation provided intellectual nourishment and space for the formation of a new intellectual paradigm. It also brought another change in the late 2000s. From this period on, three new phenomena have arisen. First, the Chinese elites have begun to reconceptualize civilization and the world within their own framework originating from China's history and traditions. Second, China's own *huitong* philosophy is being restored. Third, the culture-state theory, weaving civilization and politics together in harmony of unity, has reemerged. These three phenomena dominate China's civilization discourses, which seek to advance China from a wealthy and strong nation to a civilized state. They also indicate that the intellectual community has evolved into a stage of discussing the universal values and order of mankind and the key mission of such discussions becomes the "re-universalization of Chinese values."

Therefore, it can be said that the PRC's modern intellectual paradigm began with a "cultural reconstruction" in the form of an "adaptation discourse" and concluded with a civilization discourse whose ultimate goal was the "re-universalization of Chinese values." In the forty years following the Reform and Opening, the PRC saw the Culture Fever in the 1980s, which idolized and reaffirmed modernity, the call for traditional cultural-

ism in the 1990s, and then the rapid rise of cultural conservatism as the mainstream discourse after experiencing the critical reexamination of modernity. In this philosophical and cultural atmosphere, the Chinese way of thinking has included civilization discourses that emphasize Chinese-ness and Mainland-ness.

Recent discourses on civilization engage in the topic of the civilization-state. Various forms of civilization-states have been suggested and described, including the neo-leftist civilization-state, the neo-Confucian civilization-state, the liberalist civilization-state, the neo-authoritarian state, and the civilizational state. An investigation of the logic of these state theories reveals that they have all inherited the culture-state tradition that had combined civilization and state together. All these state theories have their logic deeply rooted in the traditional culture-state ideology, which unifies the civilization and the state. Each school of thought, based on this civilization-state ideology, presented a new configuration of order, that is, a new imperial order that re-invokes the traditional Chinese tributary order, world order, world system, and worldview, all of which are to function as general strategies to “revive the great Chinese nation.” The domination (hegemony) and royal way (generosity) are in the process of unification. This is Sun Yatsen’s and Mao Zedong’s dream, as well as Xi Jinping’s “China Dream.”

The reintroduction of the *tianxia* ideology (天下主義), or “all-under-heaven-ism,” at this point symbolically suggests the impatience of the PRC. What dramatically shows the impatience is, in particular, the trend of its power elites to draw upon the *tianxia* ideology to present new world order and view. However, the fact is that today’s China is steadily developing its internal strength with the help of its gigantic economic power. Also, it is evident that the PRC is taking the challenge of building a new empire with Chinese culture, tradition, and history as assets while inheriting its imperial legacies. This challenge, I contend, displays an attempt to bring Chinese civilization back in lieu of Western civilization, reestablish the position of the standard universal civilization on their terms, and create a new universalism under “Chinese values.”

Closing Words

China's uniqueness and historical experiences are bound to conflict with modernity from the West. The Western standards, inevitably adopted during the conflict, have become rooted in Chinese society. At the same time, Chinese standards have been reconfigured to meet the needs of the new era. Despite the clash with Chinese standards starting from the late 19th century, Western standards had an overwhelming influence during the period of radical changes, such as the May 4th Movement (the Neo-cultural Movement) and the Cultural Revolution, and have provided China with a future path and model.

Then, have Chinese standards gone extinct? It never did. Instead of extinction, they have been invigorated via reconstruction. In today's China, we can find the continuity of the past. In order to examine such continuity, this paper quests the PRC's own ways of thinking, state theories, and imperial experiences (of balancing centralization and decentralization, in particular) that still continue to influence modern China. Along this line, I also examine how the PRC would inherit the legacy of Imperial China—territory (One China)—and that of Chinese values—Sinocentrism—with a view to utilizing Chinese values as a competent and even hegemonic asset for China in the 21st century.

China's national identity today will be unveiled more evidently through the *huitong* in premodern times, or integration/unification, the revolutions in the first half of the 20th century, the establishment of a socialist market economy in the late 20th century, and Chinese standards (history) accumulated gradually throughout its long history. In order to illustrate China's national identity, it is particularly necessary to understand China's idiosyncratic nature of a structurally stable ecosystem that embraces contradictory systems towards one whole (the wholeness of contradictory systems and the structural stability of the whole).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Chen Lai. *Chuantong yu Xiandai: Renwen Zhuyi de Shijie* [Tradition and Modernity: The Vision of Humanism]. Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2006.
- Chen Ming. “Yuandao yu zhongguo wenhua baoshou zhuyi-zai sichuan daxue lunli xue yan jiu zhongxin de zuotan” [The Yuan Dao and Chinese cultural conservatism: A discussion at the Ethics Research Center of Sichuan University]. *Zhongguo Ruxue Wang* (www.Confuchinan.Com), May 2004.
- Chen Yun. “Tianxia sixiang yu xiandai xing de zhongguo zhi lu: Zhongguo wenti, zhongguo sixiang, zhongguo daolu lun gang” [The idea of Tianxia and the Chinese way to modernity: Chinese issues, thought, and ways]. *Sixiang yu Wenhua* [Thought and Culture] 8, 2008.
- Cho Keong-ran. *Hyeondai Jungguk Jisikin-ui Jido* [The Map of Modern Chinese Intellectuals]. Paju: Gulhangari, 2013.
- Gan Yang. “Cong minzu-guojia zouxiang wenming-guojia” [From a nation state to a civilization state]. *Shucheng* 2 (Shanghai Snlian Shudian, 2004).
- _____. “Xin shidai de tongsantong: Sanzhong chuantong de ronghui yu zhonghua wenming de fuxing” [The New Era's Tongsantong system: The revival of the Three-Lock System and Huazhong civilization]. *Shucheng* 7 (Shanghai Snlian Shudian, 2005).
- Jeon In-gap. *Hyeondae Jongguk-ui Jegukmong* [Modern China's Imperial Dreams]. Seoul: Hakgobang, 2016.
- _____. “Chongron: Gongja, takgojeon mirae gihoek” [Overview: Confucius, the pretext of future planning]. In *Gongja: Hyeondae Jungguk-ul Garojireuda* [Confucius penetrating modern China]. Seoul: Saemulgyeol, 2006.
- Jiang Qing. *Zhengzhi Ruxue: Dangdai Ruxue de Zhuanxiang, Tezhi yu Fazhan* [Political Confucianism: The Turn, Characteristics and Development of Contemporary Confucianism]. Sanlian Shudian, 2003.
- Lee Moon Ki. “Junguk minjokjueuieui se gaji teukjingwa gukga jeongcheseong” [Three properties of Chinese nationalism and national identity: From the perspective of historical institutionalism]. *Gukje jeongchi nonchong* [The Korean Journal of International Studies] 54-3, 2014.
- Mio Kishimoto. “Ming-Qing-jidai-no haishin” [Local gentry in the Ming and Qing

dynasties] in *Keni-to Kenryoku* [Authority and Power]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1990.

Xiao Gongqin. *Chaoyue Zuoyou Jijin Zhuyi: Zouchu Zhongguo Zhuanxiang de Kunjing* [Beyond Left and Right Radicalism: Out of the Dilemma of China's Transformation]. Hangzhou: Zhejiang Daxue Chubanshe, 2012.

Yao Zhongqiu. *Rujia Xianzheng Zhuyi Chuantong* [Confucian Constitutionalism Tradition]. Beijing: Zhongguo Fazheng Daxue Chubanshe, 2013.

_____. *Shijie Lishi de Zhongguo Shike* [China's Moment in World History]. Hainan Chubanshe, 2019.



Yeon Jae-heum. "Jungguk daeryuk-ui 'dangdae munhwa bosujuui-e daehan yeongu'" [A study on cultural conservatism in contemporary China]. *Jungguk hakbo* [Journal of Chinese Studies] 60, 2009.






Historical Territory (歷史疆域) of China: Concern (隱憂) about Chinese Nationalism

Seung-wook KIM
Chungbuk National University



The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 18 Number 2 (Summer 2022), 49-85

Copyright © 2022 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.





Historical Territory (歷史疆域) of China: Concern (隱憂) about Chinese Nationalism*¹

Seung-wook KIM
Chungbuk National University

Mainstream Discourse: “China in History”

In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the term “歷史疆域” does not simply refer to the historically changing territory of a country. In general, since the territories of the various countries in history have also changed in various ways as time went by, it is difficult to specify the exact meaning when history and territory are combined to be used as a single word. However, in the case of China, as will be discussed later, this term specifically refers to China’s designated territory and is often used as a proper noun to present a historical basis for sovereign rights over that territory. In the same vein, Zhang Shiming (張世明) argued that the term “歷史疆域” and “歷史上

^{*} This translated article is an revised and supplemented version of Kim Seung-wook, “중국의 역사강역 담론과 제국 전통,” *역사문화연구* 63 (August, 2017): 105-136; _____, “중국 근대 역사학에서 國家 개념의 재구성,” *역사와 담론* 89 (January, 2019): 161-197.

¹ This presentation paper is a reorganization of the following papers for the purpose of presenting at the 2nd Joint Colloquium (May 27, 2021) of the Center for Chinese Studies-Center for Diplomatic History of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy: Kim Seung-wook, “Discourse on Historical Territory and Imperial Tradition in China,” *Journal of History and Culture* 63 (2017), pp. 105-136; Kim Seung-wook, “Reorganization of State Concepts in Modern Historical Studies in China,” *History and Discourse* 89 (2019), pp. 161-197; Kim Seung-wook, “Acceptance of Nation Concepts and Science in Early Modern Chinese History: The Case of Liang Qichao (梁啟超),” *Dongbuga Yeoksa Nonchong* 67 (2020), pp. 127-160.

的疆域” should not be used interchangeably as the former is defined as “historical territory” or “historical dominion” while the latter means “historic territories” or “territories in history.” According to Zhang, the former is a proper noun that mainly refers to the legal basis of the historical rights of the national territory while the latter is a plural noun referring to the historical transition of territories of a country.² Therefore, when the term historical territory is used, what should be taken into consideration is the fact that it also reflects regional characteristics of China in recognition of the territory.

The regional characteristics are also reflected in the term “疆域” itself. In China, the term “疆域” is used interchangeably with the word territory (領土), meaning the space under the jurisdiction of sovereign states. The two words of “疆” and “域” refer to lines and areas, so to speak, boundaries and regions, respectively. Chinese scholars seem to find the conceptual distinction between “疆” and “域” useful in explicating the historical changes in the PRC’s territory. For example, Han Maoli (韓茂莉) says that before the Treaty of Nerchinsk demarcated the distinct national borders with Russia, there had been a state of “regions but no boundaries (有域無疆)” or “regions replacing boundaries (以域代疆)” in China for a long time.³ Hence, as the aforementioned two terms imply, China as a region with vague borders and China as a country with clear territorial boundaries are considered differently.

The notion of the historical territory began to be specifically recognized only after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China as the question of how to set the spatial scope of the historical narrative arose in earnest. Particularly, the cartography project of a large-scale historical map, called *The Historical Atlas of China* (中國歷史地圖集), did serve as an im-

² Zhang Shiming, *Law, Resources, and Time-Space Constructing China in 1644-1945, Tribes in Frontier* volume 2 法律, 資源與時空建構: 1644-1945年的中國 第2卷 邊疆民族. Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshi, 2012.

³ Han Maoli, “Territorial Changes in Past Dynasties From the Perspective of Geography 地理視角下的歷代疆域變遷,” in *Fifteen Lectures on Chinese History and Geography* 中國歷史地理十五講, Peking University Press, 2014.

portant momentum. The project began in 1954 and was published in eight volumes in 1982, almost a generation later.⁴ This project had originally begun with the aim of modifying the previously widely-used historical maps, such as *The Atlas Throughout the Ages* (歷代輿地圖) by Yang Shoujing (楊守敬) from the Qing dynasty, to suit the status of a new country. However, as the number of participating personnel and organizations was expanded and the continuous discussion lasted for a long time, it was transformed into a bigger project, not only limited to the simple revision of existing maps but producing a new historical map that reflected the historical perception of the PRC.⁵ At this time, one of the major concerns was how to

⁴ Tan Qixiang 譚其驥 ed. *The Historical Atlas of China*, Beijing: Beijing ditu chubanshe, 1982.

⁵ In the winter of 1954, the Revision Committee of Yang Shoujing's *Atlas Throughout the Ages* (重篇改繪楊守敬歷代輿地圖委員會), consisted of the major members of Fan Wenlan (范文瀾) and Wu Han (吳晗), was organized and began its activities in early 1955. Its main objective was to revise Yang Shoujing's *Atlas Throughout the Ages*, which was created based on the book *Atlas of the Qing Dynasty* (大清一統輿圖) (1863). In the early days, the committee was based in the Philosophy of Social Science at Chinese Academy of Sciences (中國科學院 哲學社會科學部), and Tan Qixiang from Fudan University was assigned as the supervisor for the map compilation and the Map Publishing Company (地圖出版社) was in charge of map production. After that, the number of people and organizations was further increased. In 1957, the map compilation project was moved to Shanghai and a small group consisting of five members was organized in Fudan University. In 1959, the Research Center of History and Geography (歷史地理研究室) was established. The number of participants of the project continued to increase, reaching a maximum of 70-80 people. There were scholars such as Fu Lehuan (傅樂煥) (Minzu Univ. of China), Han Rulin (韓儒林) (School of History, Nanjing Univ.), Feng Jiasheng (馮家昇) (National Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Sciences), Wang Zhong (王忠) (Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), and Fang Guoyu (方國瑜) (Yunnan Univ.), as well as other organizations such as history and archaeology research institutes also participated. Then in the late 1950s, the school of Geodesy and Geomatics at Wuhan University (武漢測繪學院) was assigned to the supervisor in map production, which was reassigned to the National Research Institute of Surveying and Mapping Science (國家測繪總局測繪科學研究所) later in the early 1960s. The managing department maintained its existing name, and Fan Wenlan changed his title to an advisor by empowering Wu Han and Yin Da (尹達) to take responsibility for giving out specific commands. The completion of the map was originally expected in 1967 at the 1965 meeting, but it was delayed due to the Cultural Revolution and the manuscript was finally completed in 1973. Since 1974, this manuscript of temporary version for trial use has been published in total of eight volumes by the Map Publishing Company under the name of Chinese Map Publishing House (中華地圖學社). After that, under the leadership of the Chinese Academy of Social Science, scholars from the Institute of Historical Geography at Fudan University, the Institute of Ethnic Literature at Chinese Academy of Social Science, the School of History at Nanjing University, and the Minzu University of China participated in revising the temporary

associate the territory of the PRC with that of the previous dynasties especially the Qing in that historical context.

It was through an article titled ‘China in Her History and China’s Territory of the Past Dynasties (歷史上的中國和中國歷代疆域)’ published in the 1991 edition of ‘Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography (中國邊疆史地研究)’ that Tan Qixiang, editor-in-chief of this publication, first announced his thoughts regarding the compilation of historical maps.⁶ This article, in fact, was the summary of his responses to Weng Dujian (翁獨健) at the Academic Conference About the History of Relations Between the Nations in China (中國民族關係史研究學術座談會) on May 25-31, 1981, with respect to the clarification on how he handled the matter of China’s historical territory when drafting *The Historical Atlas of China*.

Tan’s main argument in this article can be summarized through the concept of ‘China in history (歷史上的中國).’ He explained this concept through two major points: first, he argued that through thousands of years of territorial development, ‘China in history’ was finally completed in the mid-18th century under the Qing and, therefore, it should be used as the standard of China’s historical territory. Second, he pointed out that the territory described in this ‘China in history’ excluded some territory following the end of the Opium War in the 1840s and, thus, specified the standard period as ‘from the mid-18th century to the 1840s.’ This logic is referred to as the concept of the Qing as the Standard for the Establishment of the PRC in that he presented the period of the Qing as the specific standard for studying historical territory of the PRC.

Tan’s argument was revealed in the process of refuting the related

 version from 1981. After a year of revision, the final version was officially published in 1982. For the compilation process and elevation of *The Historical Atlas of China*, see the article written by Zou Yilin 鄒逸麟, “The Beginning and End of Compilation of <*The Historical Atlas of China*> by Tan Qixiang and Its Academic Significance 譚其驥主編『中國歷史地圖集』編繪始末及其學術意義,” Hua Linfu 華林甫, ed., *Study on Geographical Literature of Qing Dynasty (清代地理志書研究)*, China Renmin daxue chubanshe, 2014.

⁶ Tan Qixiang, “China in Her History and China’s Territory of the Past Dynasties 歷史上的中國和中國歷代疆域,” *Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography 中國邊疆史地研究* Series 1, 1991.

claims presented by Bai Shouyi (白壽彝) and others at the time. Bai Shouyi had previously suggested the principle that the current territory of the PRC should be the standard for historical narratives on the question of what would be the scope of China's territory in describing her history. Insisting on the latter, Bai proposed two options regarding the matter of choosing the standard of the historical territory of China. The first is to take the scope of the territory of Qing Dynasty and reflect its historical changes and expansions, and the second is to take the scope of the current territory of the PRC to include all ethnic groups who have resided within that territorial border.⁷ With respect to Bai's argument, Tan claimed the necessity of choosing the territory of the late Qing from the mid-18th century to 1840s, arguing that "taking Bai's suggestion would result in discarding the regions, located east of the Ussuri River and north of the Heilong River and belonging originally to China's territory, which Russia ceded back in the Aihun Treaty and the Beijing Treaty."⁸ The argument presented by Bai, as a historian of Hui ethnicity, is based on the need for national integration incorporating multi-ethnicities by the new government at the face of criticism against Han-nationalism (大漢族主義). In fact, Bai's suggestion is not particularly distinctive given that it is quite commonly used in one country's historical narrative. On the other hand, Tan's suggestion is unique in terms of the scope of 'China in history' absorbing the area, whose history is identified completely with the sovereignty of the current state, and the

⁷ Bai Shouyi, "The Settlement of the Territorial Issue From the Standpoint of Chinese History 論歷史上祖國國土問題的處理" *Guangming Daily Newspaper* 光明日報, 1951; Bai Shouyi, "Lecture on the topic of Territorial Issues in Chinese History" 中國歷史上的疆域問題" in *Questions about the Chinese Feudal Society* 關於中國封建社會的幾個問題. It was later further narrated in his publication, *General History of China*-volume 12 中國通史 12卷.

⁸ This narrative was based on the study of the history of the Russian invasion of China by Chinese academia which mainly focused on the development of Sino-Soviet border disputes in the 1960s. Yang Jianxin 楊建新, "China Firstly Occupied by Czarist Russia and the Issue of Chinese Historical Territory 沙俄最早侵占的中國領土和歷史上的中國疆域問題," in *Collection of Essays on the History of Sino-Russian Relations* 中俄關係史論文集, edited by the Department of History of Sino-Russian Relations, Institute of Modern History at Chinese Academy of Social Science 中國社會科學院近代史研究所中俄關係史研究室 and the History Department of Lanzhou University 蘭州大學歷史系, Gansu renmin chubanshe, 1979.

area, whose history is not completely consistent with the past of the current state, alike.

Tan's logic was solidified through the support of his disciples, such as Ge Jianxiong (葛劍雄). Ge was one of the towering scholars who completed the mainstream stance on the historical territory through a series of writings and has been leading discussion until today. Ge fully supports Tan's argument to elaborate further on Tan's argument as follows. In regard to the first point of Tan's argument, he claimed that the 'largest' territory of the Qing, which was naturally formed throughout its entire history, should be considered as 'China in history.' He argued that 'China in history' shouldn't be restricted either to "'China' in the minds of ancient people" from the view of modern Chinese or the limited territory of contemporary China. In respect to the second point, he stated that there are two distinct transitions in China's historical territory-before 1840 and after 1840. He said that these two periods are differentiated based on 'naturalness': the former means the unified Chinese dynasty (i.e. the Qing) was created with the surrounding native people and was a regime without any foreign influence, while the latter sees China's territory as a result of the direct impact from the invasion of great powers. In other words, he presents the contemporary territory of China as not 'natural.' In this regard, Ge confirmed Tan's argument that China in history should take the territorial scope of China 'from the mid-18th century to the 1840s.'⁹

Since Tan initially organized his research team at Fudan University when he began to produce *The Historical Atlas of China*, the academic tradition was also formed around Fudan University. Currently, the Tan-Ge academic tradition of 'the Qing Standard Theory' has been accepted as a mainstream discourse in the discussion of historical territory. This is supported in the lectures or research books related to historical territory, thus

⁹ Ge Jianxiong, *Unity and Divide-Inspiration from Chinese History* 統一與分裂 - 中國歷史的啓示, Shangwu yinshuguan, 2013, pp. 272-273. (The first edition is from Sanlian shudian, 1994); Ge Jianxiong, *China in Her History: Changes in China's Territory* 历史上的中国: 中国疆域的变迁, Shanghai Century Publication Co.,Ltd. 上海世纪出版股份有限公司, 2007; Ge Jianxiong, "Our Country" Book Series "我們的國家"系列叢書, Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2010.

confirming their solidity in academic authority.¹⁰

In fact, these ‘seemingly-sophisticated’ logics presented by the mainstream scholars sound understandable to accept the current territory of one country as the scope of that country’s historical narratives, but it is unusual to consider a specific territory of a particular period in the past as a reference point for historical narratives. Moreover, historical study at the current stage is especially cautious about recognizing one country’s territorial border as an absolute territorial scope. Instead, the consensus on the need to relativize the historical narrative of a country has also been broadened. Therefore, it is academically uncommon to suggest a historical body of a specific period from history-“China in history”-as a particular reference point. Having said that, there is a concrete reason why a number of Chinese scholars still support the concept of the Qing as the Standard for the Establishment of the PRC. As will be discussed later, they claim for a distinct context and a particular trait, both of which are applicable only to China, in defining a state.

However, even within the Chinese academia, there have been continuous yet critical discussions through which they distance themselves from this mainstream discourse. Many scholars, including Sun Zuomin (孫祚民), Yang Jianxin, Zhou Weizhou (周偉洲), Zhang Bo-quan (張博泉) and Zhang Bi-bo (張碧波) have raised different opinions from various viewpoints. They generally paid more attention to the fact that the territory has continuously changed in history and recognized that history should be narrated in different scopes according to different historical periods.

Sun Zuomin accepted Yang Sui’s argument but also sought logical modification and harmony to establish a more flexible scope of historical territory. He pointed out that foreign ethnic groups or foreign states existed beyond the border, and they were also incorporated into the Han Chinese

¹⁰ Zou Yilin 鄒逸麟, *An Overview of the History and Geography of China* 中國歷史地理概述, Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 1993; Zhao Yong-Chun 趙永春, “From Multiple China to One China 從複數‘中國’到單數‘中國’” in *Research on Chinese Historical Territory Theory* 中國歷史疆域理論研究. Chinese Territorial Border Research Library 中國邊疆研究文庫, Harbin; Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2012; Han Maoli, *Fifteen Lectures on Chinese History and Geography* 中國歷史地理十五講. Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2014.

and became a part of Chinese history later.¹¹ Yang Jianxin was especially interested in the fact that historical territories have changed over time. Steadily converging on Bai's perspective, he tried to outline the formation process of China's territory that includes the frontier regions through two methods (模式): pioneering (開拓) and infiltrating (嵌入).¹²

On the other hand, Zhou Weizhou, particularly emphasizing the fact that territory changes historically, presented a critical stance against any discussion that takes a specific period as a reference point for historical narrative. Focusing on the unified multiethnic country's transition of territory according to the change of time, he insisted that China's territory in each period within her history doesn't exactly match that of current China. Then, he intimates, to take either the territory of present-day China as the standard (i.e. Yang's argument) or the territory of the Qing as the standard (i.e. Tan's argument) is to deny the fact that China's territory has continuously developed within history and that China is a unified multiethnic country formed from unifications and divisions.¹³

Moreover, in the case of Zhang Bi-bo, he pointed out that historical narratives should reflect the original context, depending on the historical reality which keeps expanding and shrinking within history, and cannot be fixedly identified. He asserted that "if the territory at that time was large, it should be recorded as including all of it. It is impossible to either drop eth-

¹¹ Sun Zuomin, "Problems with the Incorporation of Ethnic Minorities into Ancient Chinese History 中國古代史中有關祖國疆域和少數民族的問題," *Wenhui bao* 文匯報, 1961.

¹² Yang Jianxin, "One Center, Two Ways are the Main Modes of China's Territorial Formation 一個中心, 兩種途徑是中國疆域形成的主要模式. Re-discussing the Territorial Issue in Chinese History 再論中國歷史上的疆域問題," *Lanzhou Academic Journal* Volume 1 蘭州學刊 第1期, 1986; Yang Jianxin, "Re-discussing the Word "China" and the Formation of China's Territory "中國"一詞和中國疆域形成再探討," *Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography* volume 2 中國邊疆史地研究 第2期, 2006.

¹³ Zhou Weizhou, "China in History and Its Territorial and Ethnic Issues 歷史上的中國及其疆域, 民族問題," *Journal of Yunan Social Sciences* 雲南社會科學, 1989; Zhou Weizhou, "Some Thoughts on Constructing China's Frontier Border Studies 關於構建中國邊疆學的幾點思考," *Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography* Volume 3 中國邊疆史地研究 第3期, 2014; Zhou Weizhou, "Re-exploration of Several Issues Concerning the Territorial Theory in Ancient China 關於中國古代疆域理論若干問題的再探索," *Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography* volume 3 中國邊疆史地研究 第3期, 2011.

nicity, regime, and land within the territorial scope from the narrative or to not include ethnicity, regime, and land outside the territorial scope in the narrative. This is, indeed, the rule and standard that should be consistent with the study of ancient peoples and territory.”¹⁴ Zhang Bo-quan also objected to Tan Qixiang’s concept of ‘the Qing as the standard for the Establishment of the PRC’ by arguing that “How to determine the standard of Chinese historical territory is a fundamental problem in Chinese historical studies. Thus, we cannot simplify the complicated historical territory problem by artificially defining one standard.” Instead, he looked for specific analysis by limiting such problems to a certain scope of history.¹⁵

These discussions reflect the nature of Chinese nationalism centered on the Han Chinese or the central districts of China.¹⁶ However, these criticisms are meaningful in that they do not limit the scope of a historical nar-

¹⁴ Zhang Bo-quan, “On Ancient Frontier Nations and Territorial Research Issues 論古代邊疆民族與疆域研究問題,” *Jilin University Journal Social Sciences* 3rd Edition 吉林大學社會科學學報 第3期, 1999.

¹⁵ Zhang Bi-bo, “A Reanalysis of the Issue of Incorporating Nationalities and Territories-with a Special Focus on the Concept of ‘a Shared History’ 關於歷史上民族歸屬與疆域問題的再思考-兼評‘一史兩用’史觀,” *Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography* Volume 2 中國邊疆史地研究 第2期, 2000.

¹⁶ Discussions by Sun Zuomin and Yang Jianxin are, indeed, based on the logic of Liang Qichao. Liang explicated that current China’s unified territory is, in fact, based on the process of historical national integration centered on Han Chinese. In his *Examination of the Chinese Nation in History* (歷史上中國民族之觀察) written in 1905, he insisted that China’s ‘territory (邊疆)’ has been existed as a dynamic space where the ethnic group from the central districts of China consistently interacted or merged with various ethnic groups surrounding the central districts. He also added that the Huaxia ethnicity (華夏族), created during the time of the 3rd generations of the central districts of China, had formed a geographical and cultural territory with other neighboring ethnicities-such as the Miaoman (苗蠻族), Shu (蜀族), Badi (巴氏族), Xu Hui (徐淮族), Wu-Yue (吳越族), Min (閩族), Bai Yue (百濮族), and Bai Pu (百濮族) ethnicities-and such structure had remained until the late Qing. In addition, also in his *Studies of Ethnic Groups in Chinese History* (中國歷史上民族之研究) written in 1922, it was explained that the backbone of the Chinese nation was formed by the federal competition that occurred during the 3rd generation of Ha Sang-ju, which resulted in serving the Yuan Hou (元后)-one of the tribes among the group of Hou (群后). After then, a frequent interchange between the Zhuxia people (諸夏) and Yiji (夷狄) as well as the transformation from a group of Hou to the Yuan Hou happened which resulted in the formation of the frontier border as well as the integration of the various ethnicities of China. Liang Qichao, “Examination of the Chinese Nation in History,” *Complete Writings From the Ice-Drinker’s Studio* 飲冰室全集, 41, 5-12, 1923, pp. 1-34.

rative to a specific standard but flexibly reflect the issue of how to juxtapose newly-expandable territory and history as it is. Thus, it also makes us expect that there is room for these criticisms to continue to spread. Still, it is undeniable that these arguments haven't reached a point of changing the overall atmosphere of the mainstream academia in support of the concept of 'the Qing as the Standard for the Establishment of the PRC.'

The Combined Concepts of the Qing as a Standard for the Establishment of the PRC and as a Basis for the Establishment of the PRC

When a country is established without significantly destroying the structure of the existing state, it is natural to understand that the existing state has become the foundation of the new establishment. Despite the fact that the PRC was not directly connected to the Qing because of the period of the Republic of China in between, the territory and demographic composition of the PRC can be considered as inherited from the Qing. At the beginning of the establishment of the country, there was an atmosphere in which the political leaders emphasized that the establishment of the PRC was based on the Qing.

Around the time that production of the 'Historical Atlas of China' began, Chinese leaders, including Mao Zedong, began to point out that the PRC was built on the foundation of the Qing as well as receiving the major characteristics of China from the Qing. On April 25, 1956, at the National Assembly Intelligence Committee, Mao Zedong criticized 'Han-Nationalism (大漢族主義)' and, instead, encouraged cooperation between the Han Chinese and ethnic minorities, emphasizing the fact that such cooperation played an important role in shaping the current territory of China which is 'populated' and 'spacious yet prosperous.' He said, "The population of the ethnic minorities is big but the size of the area they occupy is large. When it comes to the population, the Han Chinese have an overwhelming majority at 94%. Thus, it is not good to let Han Chinese practice Han-Nationalism and disregard the ethnic minorities. Who has a lot of land? It is ethnic minorities who occupy almost 50-60%. When China is described as 'popu-

lated' and 'spacious yet prosperous,' 'populated' refers to the Han Chinese while 'spacious yet prosperous' refers to the ethnic minorities considering the abundant underground resources in their area."¹⁷ After that, there were more statements that the Qing created the basic structure of the territory of the PRC. Zhou Enlai (周恩來) insisted that "Today's vast territory of China is inherited from the Qing. It is undeniable that the Qing has contributed to current China being 'populated' and 'spacious yet prosperous.'"¹⁸ He also especially praised the achievements of the Qing in unifying the multiethnic country, saying that "the Qing, established by the Manchu people, ruled China for nearly 300 years and played the role of unification because, before the Qing, neither of Ming, Song and Tang, nor Han could be able to unify the country as Qing did."¹⁹ In the early 1960s, Mao tried to explain the contribution of the Qing in the formation of China's territory by using a metaphor that "the advent of the Manchu people in China's history is getting a tough bride and the food we currently eat is the Qianlong's rice." In addition, in discourse with Lao She (老舍) and others, he also pointed out that Kangxi's great contribution was the establishment of the territorial foundation of China today as the territory inherited by current China.²⁰

However, despite the fact that these remarks highlighted the relationship between the newly-established PRC and the Qing at the beginning of the establishment, it was interpreted as having special significance considering the historical context until the establishment of the state. This is because the Qing, established by the Manchurian regime, has never been re-

¹⁷ Mao Zedong 毛澤東, "On the Ten Major Relationships (on April 25, 1956)," *The Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung* volume 5 毛澤東選集 第5卷. Renmin chubanshe, 1977, p. 277.

¹⁸ Bai Jing-yuan 白靜源, Ma Qi-cheng 馬啓成, and Li Zhuqing 李竹青, "Summary of the Concluding Remarks at the Symposium on the Establishment of the Zhuang Autonomous Region held by the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (on March 25, 1957) 在政協全國委員會召開的關於建立壯族自治區問題座談會上的總結發言紀要," in *Compilation of Zhou Enlai's Commentary on Ethnic Issues and Ethnic Policies* 周恩來同志對民族問題與民族政策論述選編. Minzu University of China Department Office 中央民族學院科研處, 1981, p. 59.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p. 97.

²⁰ Feng Erkang 馮爾康, "Studies of History and Politics 清史研究與政治," *Shixue yuekan* Volume 3 史學月刊 第3期, 2005; Shu Yi 舒乙, "Chairman Mao talks about Kangxi to Lao She 毛主席對老舍談康熙," *Digest of Science and Technology* volume 3 科技文萃 第3期, 2002.

stored after its collapse during the Anti-Manchurian revolution (排滿革命) and, thus, it was natural at the time not to think that this newly built state based on socialist ideology was connected with the already collapsed feudal dynasty.

Such remarks presented by the leaders were also generally accepted by the Chinese academia and led to discussions highlighting the relationship between these two countries. For example, Dai Yi (戴逸), in his *Concise History of the Qing* (簡明清史) Volume 2 written in 1984, cited Zhou Enlai's claim in discussing the policy for frontier ethnic groups during the Qing. His writings had a great influence on spreading the claim that the Qing formed the basic framework of the PRC.

China's second-generation party and state leaders have also stressed the national spirit and distinctive features of China. At the same time, the Chinese academia emphasized that the Qing laid the foundation for the PRC, highlighting the historical fame of the Qing. They also quoted Mao Zedong's phrases 'populated and 'spacious yet prosperous' in order to support his argument that China's fundamental national spirit basically came from the Qing.²¹

However, these two countries, the Qing and the PRC, were quite distinctive, especially in terms of the principles and characteristics that constituted their territories. First of all, in terms of the structural composition of territory, the Qing existed in the form of an "empire" in which various systems (institutions) coexisted separately whereas the PRC was basically a country aiming for the unified-national system of "nation-state." In addition, the centrality of the Qing was primarily placed on Manchu (滿人) while the main habitat area for Han Chinese was limited to 'China.'²²

²¹ Dai Yi, *Concise History of the Qing* volume 2, Renmin chubanshe, 1984.

²² Mark Mancall, in his analysis of the tribute system of the Qing Empire, pointed out that Qing Empire had coexisted in the form of a heterogeneous state: the northwestern crescent region included the inland Asian world consisting of Manchuria and the Feudatory Regions (藩部), the southern crescent region was governed by both the traditional Chinese order of mainland China and the tributes which were divided into non-China and China, respectively. Mark Mancall, *The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay*, John King Fairbank ed. *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relation*, Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 63-89.

On the other hand, the centrality of ‘China’ has been restored in the PRC. The nation-state of China has begun in the form of ethnicism among Han Chinese since the Xinhai Revolution and the territorial area of current China was finally established through the process of restoration of ‘China’ by the Han Chinese.²³ There was no doubt that the centrality of maintaining the current ‘unified multiethnic’ China was based on ‘China’ and Han Chinese. From this point of view, even if the PRC is considered to have followed the Qing in respect of the territorial border as well as the demographic composition, there was already a big difference in terms of the genuine meaning that this implies. Thus, it would be unreasonable to say that the Qing was the standard for the establishment of the PRC, rather than to say that the Qing was the basis for the establishment of the PRC.

In the meantime, the discourse on historical territory presented by Tan Qixiang and Ge Jianxiong has developed the “notion that the Qing is the basis for the establishment of the PRC” into the “notion that the Qing is the standard for the establishment of the PRC,” solidifying the connection between the Qing and the PRC in historical context. By suggesting that these two countries share the so-called “China in history” as a constitutional principle, they played a role in paving the way for explicating an integration of the Qing and the PRC instead of relying on mere general explanation. In other words, they responded to the demands of political power and scholars in the early days of the establishment of the country, many of whom sought the logical grounds for national integration including Han Chinese and ethnic minorities via historical discussions.

²³ In this regard, it is questioned whether the present China, which has restored the “China,” has the right and qualifications to govern the “non-China” area under the Qing Dynasty. Lee Seong-Gyu, Kim Gwang-Eok and Yang Il-Mo, eds., *Why is it still ‘China’?* The Pluralities and Universality of Chinese Civilization, *Acanet*, 2014, pp. 448-449.

The Historical Basis of the Integration of Nation and State

There have been many studies treating how the old state systems during imperial China were linked to a new state system in China's transitional process to a nation-state. Wang Hui (汪暉), presenting the summary of the transition process, pointed out that the territory of the traditional empire underwent a series of transformations and overlapping stages in the process of building a nation-state. Specifically, he summarized the flow of the transition process as follows: (1) the Theory of the nation-state by the Han Chinese, which consisted of only half of the revolutionary faction before the Xinhai Revolution happened, which was at the end of the Qing; (2) Discussion of the Theory of Unity and Salvation (合群救國論) and Great Nationalism (大民族主義) argued by Kang Youwei or Liang Qichao based on the rationale of historical phenomena of international competition and multi-ethnicity; (3) "Nationalism that determines the scope of an ethnicity based on the national borders of the Qing Empire" or "Logic of Pluralistic Unitary Nation" suggested by Sun Wen, etc.²⁴

Meanwhile, people pay attention to the fact that the nation-state of China inherited the imperial characteristics of the Qing. There has been a continuous discussion in academia highlighting this point. For example, Cho Byong-Han explicated that the traditions of the Chinese empire turned into the ideological inspiration or origin of the formation of 'the Great Chinese Nation (大中華民族)' in the process of the formation of nationalism in China.²⁵ Yu Yong-Tae explained that Great Nationalism—including Han, Manchu, Hui, Zhuang, and Miao ethnic minorities—, first formulated by Liang Qichao, was later expanded into the Theory of Zhonghua Minzu. Moreover, with faithful support especially from Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek during the Anti-Japanese War, it was continuously transmitted to

²⁴ Wang Hui, "Questions on the Liberation of the Objects and Modernity-A Few Reflections on [The Rise of Modern Chinese Thoughts]," in *Asia is the World*. Geul Hangari, 2010.

²⁵ Cho Byong-Han "The Formation of Nationalism and the Tradition of Chinese Empire in Modern China," *The Journal of Northeast Asian History*, 23.

the era of the PRC.²⁶ He also argued that in this process, the “internalized imperialism” has also come to constitute an important characteristic of modern Chinese nationalism.²⁷ Meanwhile, Jeon In-gap referred to this as an “imperial nation-state” by pointing out that the structure, ideology, and governance strategy of the Chinese Empire were implied within the system of the Chinese nation-state through the process of dismantling and reconstruction.²⁸ In sum, these scholars are commonly pointing out the phenomenon of connection or overlap between the two systems formed in the process of transitioning from the imperial state system to the nation-state system.

However, what should be further considered here is that in the process of transitioning from an imperial state to a nation-state system the pattern and method of composing the territory and population and the trend reflecting such composition were not consistently maintained over time. This trend indeed wasn't geared to promoting the establishment of a new country based on the maintenance of Qing's territory and demographic composition from the beginning. In specific, the leaders in the early days of formation couldn't find convergence in terms of dealing with the relationship between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities, or the ‘China’ and ‘non-China’ features.

As discussed above, the differentiation of the two elements of ‘China’ and ‘non-China’ was strongly promoted among the Han Chinese revolutionaries in late Qing. The alliance's revolutionary doctrine, which led to the Xinhai Revolution, was “Expel Barbarians, Restore China (驅除韃虜, 恢復中華),” and the Han Chinese’ “ethnicism” against the Manchus during the Xinhai Revolution as well as the “revanchism” against the Qing, who

²⁶ Yu Yong-Taem, “The Theory of Zhonghua Minzu and Northeast Geopolitics: Theoretical Grounds for the Northeast Project,” *Journal of Asian Historical Studies* 93, 2005.

²⁷ Yu Yong-Tae, “The National-Imperialism and the Logic of Unitary Nation in Modern China,” *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* 23, 2009.

²⁸ Jeon In-gap, “From the Empire to the Imperial Nation-State (1) -The Structure and Ideology of the Empire,” *The Journal of Chinese Studies* 中國學報 65, 2012; Jeon In-gap, “From the Empire to the Imperial Nation-State (2)-The Empire's Governing Strategy and Modern Reconstruction,” *The Journal of Chinese Studies* 66, 2012.

destroyed the Ming, were prevalent at the moment as pointed out earlier.²⁹ The Manchu-Han ethnic contradiction raised by the revolutionaries was indeed somewhat exaggerated, considering the fact that the Manchu-Han integration was already in progress at the time. In sum, it is undeniable that the trend of establishing a novel state system through the separation of some pluralistic elements, embraced by the imperial system mainly via the separation of ‘China’ and ‘non-China,’ began to emerge.

Since then, the problem of separation and integration of the “China” and “non-China” elements within the Qing has always been a problem in addressing the development of nationalism centered on Han Chinese. The reason why Liang Qichao, in his writing “The Theories of Johann Bluntschli, Master of Political Science (政治學大家伯倫知理之學說)” in 1903, supported Greater Nationalism (大民族主義) over Lesser Nationalism (小民族主義) by questioning the revolutionary’s claim of “State Building is Only Possible When the Manchus Are Expelled (排滿方能建國)” could provide a resolution to such problem. The Great Nationalism he insisted upon was not only the nationalism of the Han Chinese, but also a nationalism that unified the various ethnicities incorporating all of central China (本部) as well as other feudatory regions (藩部).³⁰ This assertion was finally realized as a state-building strategy of “Five Races Under One Union (五族共和)” in the process of transitioning to a republican state after the Xinhai Revolution.³¹ However, the anti-Manchu spirit and Han Chinese-centrism still existed, and even Liang Qichao himself clearly recognized that there was a limitation to the integration led by the Han Chinese’ assimilative power.³² In other words, for Han Chinese, there existed the possibility of

²⁹ This is clearly revealed in the course of the debate between Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen in the late Qing Dynasty. Hiroaki Yokoyama 横山宏章, *The Republic of China-Domination by the Wise and Good Governance* 中華民國-賢人支配と善政主義, Chuokoron-Shinsha, Inc. 中央公論社, 1997.

³⁰ Liang Qichao, “The Theories of Bluntschli, Master of Political Science 政治學大家伯倫知理之學說,” *The Complete Works of In-Bing-Shih* 飲冰室合集 volume 13, 1903, pp. 75-76.

³¹ Feng Jianyong 馮建勇, *A Study on the Xinhai Revolution and the Political Changes in the Frontiers of Modern China* 辛亥革命與近代中國邊疆政治變遷研究, Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2012, pp. 277-294.

³² Kim Seung-Wook, 2020, pp. 146-147.

forming a country that both included and excluded the “non-China” elements.

The convergence over this problem couldn't be made even in the process of the Communist Party establishing the PRC. In fact, the Chinese Communist Party didn't originally plan to establish a “Grand Unification (大一統)” system by integrating the minor ethnic groups-Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang- into the “Chinese Nation (中華民族).” Instead, the declaration promulgated at the 2nd Congress of the Communist Party of China in July 1922 included a plan to establish a “Federal Republic of China” under the principle of a “free federal system” by letting Mongolia, Tibet, and Huigang exercise autonomy.³³ The General Outline of the Constitution of the Soviet Republic of China, enacted in Ruijin (瑞金) in November 1931 when Mao Zedong took control of the party, also stipulated that it recognizes the full national autonomy of all minorities-Mongolia, the Hui people, Tibet, the Miao people, the Li people, and Goryeo people-and their right to decide for themselves whether to join or to leave the Chinese Soviet Republic.³⁴ However, Mao Zedong, in his article titled “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party” written in 1939, agreed with the proposal of Sun Yat-sen on the meaning of “the Chinese People”: which included all ethnic minorities such as Mongolia, the Hui people, Tibet, and Uyghurs centered on Han Chinese.³⁵ Hence, before the establishment of the PRC, it can be said that both the Communist Party and Mao Zedong didn't have consistent stances in terms of policy towards the ‘ethnic minorities.’ However, in the process of the united front with the border

³³ The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 中共中央書記處, “Declaration of the Second National Congress of the Communist Party of China (1922.07) 中國共產黨第二次全國代表大會宣言 (1922年7月),” in *Before the 6th Party Congress*, Party Historical Materials 六大以前黨的歷史材料, Renmin chubanshe, 1980, pp. 2-11.

³⁴ Central Archives 中央檔案館, “Outline of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic 中國蘇維埃共和國憲法大綱 (Passed by the First National Congress of the Chinese Soviet on November 7th, 1931 1931年11月7日中華蘇維埃第一次全國代表大會通過),” in *The Selected File of Central Committee of Communist Party of China 7th Edition 中共中央文件選集 第7冊(1931)*, Central Party School Press 中共中央黨校出版社, 1983, pp. 464-468.

³⁵ Mao Zedong, “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party 中國革命和中國共產黨,” in *Collected writings of Mao Zedong 毛澤東集*, Sososha 蒼蒼社, pp. 93-131.

ethnic groups being promoted during the Anti-Japanese War and the national civil war, there was a consensus to incorporate those ethnic minorities into “the Chinese people” by way of giving them “autonomy”.

In the “Joint Platform” at the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference held in September just before the establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949, the basic stance on “ethnic policy” was officially decided. Here, each ethnic group in China was united into one “national” by saying, “We practice unity and mutual cooperation to oppose imperialism and the merit of the people within each ethnic group, antagonize between ethnic groups, and prohibit acts of pressuring and dividing national unity.” In this change, each ethnic group was allowed to have “regional autonomy” in its residential area, while the independence and separation from China were not allowed.³⁶ This was more clearly stipulated in the “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” promulgated in September 1954. They were incorporated into China under the name of “equal ethnic families” or “unified multiethnic countries.” In this process, the inconsistent stance between the two choices over how to establish the relationship between the two elements of “China” and “non-China” within the Qing eventually was settled on the premise of integration within a single state system.

What made each ethnic group maintain a certain cooperative front before establishing the country was the mobilization structure that tied them together under the same goal in reaction to the revolution or anti-Japanese war. However, even in the midst of this movement, there has been little in-depth discussion about the method or possibility of integrating them as a nation that constitutes the nation-state and equals the state. Even if the Chinese Communist Party advocated the principle of a “great family” since its foundation and appealed for a universe of a “grand unification,” these heterogeneous ethnic elements could not be identified as Chinese

³⁶ Central Chinese Communist Party Literature Research Office 中共中央文獻研究室編, “Common Program of The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (1st Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference on September 29th, 1949) (中國人民政治協商會議共同綱領 1949年9月29日政治協商會議第1屆全體會議通過),” in *Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of New China* Volume 1 建國以來重要文獻選編 第1冊, Central Party Literature Press 中央文獻出版社, 1992, pp. 1-13.

“nationals” in a single country. Considering the Han Chinese-centered ethnic structure and nationalism that led the process of establishing the PRC, the realistic basis for the concept of a nation that encompassed “China” and “non-China” in response to the establishment of a new country has not been solidified. As a result, when “China” and “non-China” in the Qing were eventually integrated as one nation-state, they faced the task of finding a logical basis to bind them together.

The task of finding the logical basis was, therefore, one of the critical reasons why the leaders proposed the concept of the Qing as the basis for the establishment of the PRC, in which process other scholars later came to promote the logic of ‘China in history’ along with the concept of the Qing as the standard for the establishment of the PRC. The “50s of the 18th century to the 40s of the 19th century,” according to mainstream scholars such as Tan Qixiang and Ge Jianxiong, were considered as a period of configuring the “complete territory of the Chinese Empire,” which encompassed all of Mongolia, Uighur, and Tibet and initiated Qing’s conquest of Zunghar Khanate. In other words, they regard the historical experience of these periods as a moment of integration in which ‘China’ and ‘non-China’ elements were merged into a single country.

National Traditions of Country China

In the discussion of China’s historical territory discussed above, it recognizes that the current Chinese state historically shares its history with that of the Qing. This recognition reflects the effort to see the Chinese state on a continuum from the national traditions of the preceding period. Moreover, it also reflects an understanding of the history of the Chinese state as differentiated from the perspective of the typical Western model of a nation-state. Ge Jianxiong explains that “China in history” is a concept as well as a historical entity that has its own Chinese innate context which cannot solely be described by the typical concepts like “empire” or “nation-state.” According to him, “China in history” can be interpreted both in “states in history” and “the other states” and hence China has continuously

maintained an existence and an operation of its own.³⁷

Recent scholars have pointed out that China exists as a concept with multiple meanings in various dimensions such as geography, culture, and population in addition to the state level. They argue that China in terms of “China as a state” has existed in a distinctive context differentiated from the typical ‘state’ in Western terms³⁸ while contending a particular way in explaining “China as a region,” discrete historically from “China as a state,” where the geographical, cultural, and population aspects of China are divided.³⁹ According to this explanation, the state as a concrete polity does not exist independently but constitutes a multilayered entity with other meanings (see the table below). In this vein, the newly formed “China as a state” like the PRC was given the task of maintaining and restoring the logical structure of “China as a region” in the sense that it supports the establishment of the state system of the “China as a state.”

China as a state	China as a region
A state China	Geographical China Demographical China Cultural China
China	Chinese-ness

³⁷ His explanation that the territory of the Qing era was created during “the Sang Ye Empire (桑葉帝國)” centered on “the Sixteen Interior Region Provinces (內地16省)” mainly through the process of “the replacement of chieftaincy with officials (改土歸流)”-in other words, by absorbing the ‘non-China’ regions into the already-existed territory based on Han Chinese-centered inertia-is indeed considered somewhat outdated nowadays, especially since the publication of “Concise History of the Qing” in the 80s. However, about China-in this context, he also doesn’t fully explain how the gap between the Qing and the countries before Qing is differentiated. Li Xiao-Jie 李曉杰 and Ge Jianxiang, eds., *Traditional Chinese Edition 疆域與政區*. Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2011, pp. 202-226.

³⁸ Yu Xingwu 于省吾 and Wang Yuanhua, eds., *Explain the China 釋中國*, Shanghai Literature & Art Publishing House 上海文藝出版社, 1988, pp. 1515-1523.

³⁹ Lee Seong-gyu pointed out that the concept of ‘China’ was not a simple concept of a country but became complicated by combining it with unique cultural and ethnic attributes: thus, there are “China as a state (China ①),” “China as a geographic concept (China ②),” “China as a cultural concept (China ③),” and “China as a concept of ethnicity (China ④).” Lee Seong-gyu, Kim Gwang-Eok and Yang Il-Mo, eds., *Why is it still ‘China’?* pp. 435-449.

In light of this, “China in history” can be seen as a concept that focuses on “China as a region” rather than “China as a state” in the discussion of China’s historical territory. In other words, “China in history” is interchangeable with “China as a region” which in fact defines the current “China as a state” in an authentic way as China as it is.

The discussion of the historical territory is closely intertwined with other discussions that explain China from the perspective of “China as a state,” such as in relation to the concepts like ‘Tianxia (all under heaven 天下)’ or ‘Home (家).’ Also, for this reason, there is the potential for this discussion to be widely accepted and spread across Chinese academia in the future. For example, Ge Zhao Guang (葛兆光) develops the logic by arguing that a finite “state” and an infinite (with no boundary) “empire” indeed coexist. In his “Dwelling Here in China (宅茲中國),” he opposes using the narrative style derived from European history considering it to be a common yet only measures for universal history. He argues that China does have a clear innate context, neither as a typical empire nor as a nation-state. Regarding the question of how to define China, he raised the question of “Was China an ‘empire’ with undefined boundaries as an ever-changing ‘ethnic yet cultural community’ or a ‘nation-state’ with defined boundaries based on a clear sense of unity and consistent tradition?” He replied that “China indeed established a coexistent history, intertwined between the infinite empire and the finite state-empire and nation-state- respectively.” He finally concluded that under such a coexistent structure, China’s territory has steadily developed as a historical entity, distinctive from an “imaginary community” like the West.⁴⁰ The his-

⁴⁰ Ge Zhaoguang explicated that “China did not move from the empire to a nation-state. Instead, there existed a finite ‘state’ within the consciousness of an unbounded ‘empire,’ and unbounded ‘empire’ existed within a consciousness of a finite ‘state.’ Thus in the case of China, the nation-state has still remained in the consciousness of the traditional central empire despite the fact that the modern nation-state had emerged by breaking away from the traditional central empire. As a consequence, the modern nation-state and the traditional central empire have created a coexistent history.” Ge Zhaoguang 葛兆光, *Live Here, In This Country China* 宅茲中國:重建有關“中國”的歷史歷述, edited by Lee Won-Seok, Geul Hangari, 2012, pp. 13-43; Ge Zhaoguang, Liu Fengyun 劉風雲 and Liu Wenpeng 劉文鵬, eds., “Reconstructing the Historical Discourse on “China”-Saving History From the Nation-state, or Understanding the Nation-state in History?重建關於“中國”的歷

torical entity to which he refers here is the association between China with defined boundaries and that with undefined boundaries. The entity also overlaps in meaning with “China in history” in the discussion of historical territory. In this sense, the discourse on the historical territory develops in conjunction with special attention to the national traditions of the state of China.

At this juncture, we can expect that the discussion of mainstream discourse on historical territory will broaden its scope of convergence within Chinese academia in the future. Xu Jilin (許紀霖), in his book titled ‘China in the World (家國天下),’ explains that China has been a continuum of family-state-world (家-國-天下) for a long time. In particular, the state was indeed the most “ambiguous” categorical concept, while the family or world was recognized as relatively more specific concepts.⁴¹ It is hard to say that he falls into the same category as the scholars of critical liberal intellectuals; or, that he is not directly involved in such discussion. Interestingly, on the other hand, he also pays attention to the aspect of “China as a region” couched in the concepts of family or world.

An Inseparable Nexus between Sovereignty and History?

The concept of sovereignty became a mainstream concept in political discourse in the process of establishing political order centered on the modern territorial state in the West. To borrow an expression, it was the state’s na-

史歷述 -從民族國家中拯救歷史, 還是在歷史中理解民族國家?” *In The National Identity of the Qing Dynasty-Research and Controversy of “New History of Qing Dynasty”* 清朝的國家認同-“新清史”研究與爭鳴. Beijing: China Renmin University Press 中国人民大学出版社, 2010, pp. 245-266.

⁴¹ Xu Jilin 許紀霖, *China in the World-Current Chinese People, the National Family* 家國天下-現代中國的個人、國家與世界認同, Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2017. Recently, Xu Jilin has suggested the concept of the “New Idea of Tianxia (新天下主義),” arguing that China should build an inclusive order for other peoples based on the Confucius civilization of the Han Chinese mainly through multidimensional and multi-layered self-awareness. Xu Jilin, *New Idea of Tianxia* 新天下主義, edited by Qing Liu 劉擘, Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2015.

ture of territoriality turned into a theory.⁴² It was originally initiated from the belief that there should be an absolute political authority within a single domestic community. In the modern era, it was accepted as the recognition that such authority is the basis for recognition of the independent status of a state in the competitive world order. In modern nationalism, sovereignty acquires the status of almost inviolability in consideration of the ideal of peaceful international relations, apart from the reality of international politics, among individual sovereign states.⁴³

The belief here that sovereignty works as the basis for the authority of each separate state is predicated upon the assumption that it originates from the collective identity of the people (nation) of the nation-state, or the people (nation) equivalent to the state itself. In this respect, the perception of each country's sovereignty depends on what nationalism the nation-state has as its own basis.⁴⁴

Historical Types of European Nationalism

Types	I	II	III
Foundation Principle	Civic	Civic	Ethnic
	Liberal	Liberal	Authoritarian
	Individualistic	Collectivist	Collectivist
Examples in the early days	United Kingdom	France	Russia
Typical examples	United Kingdom, United States	France	Germany

Source: Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 3-11. Reorganized by referring to the contents.

⁴² Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, p. 88.

⁴³ Park Sang-Seop, *State. Sovereignty*, Korean Conceptual History Series 2, Sowha 小花, 2017, pp. 187-225.

⁴⁴ There is disagreement over whether state sovereignty belongs to national sovereignty (i.e., the whole community of the people as in state level) or to popular national sovereignty (i.e., each individual).

As can be seen from the table above, there were various types of nationalism that constituted a nation-state even among countries in Europe. According to an analysis by Liah Greenfeld, the history of European nationalism can be largely divided into three types. Britain aimed for individualism-liberalism based on civic principles. On the other hand, France aimed for collectivism-liberalism based on civic principles. Russia and Germany developed nationalism with authoritarian-collective tendencies by emphasizing ethnic principles.⁴⁵ This shows that the issue of how to define nation-state is not limited to a single model but inclusive of numerous variations, thereby indicating a divergent evolution of each country.

Chinese nationalism can also be seen as possessing its own regional features. In general, it has mostly been based on a community, composed of its nation, to put a unit of the state before that of an individual people. The theory of state organism by Johann Bluntschli had the greatest influence on Chinese nationalism.⁴⁶ Bluntschli upheld that the sovereignty of the state lies in the state (= the people) itself as an organism.⁴⁷ Liang Qichao played a decisive role in accepting Bluntschli's doctrine in China. Actually, he originally took the position that "a state is the product of a contract" following Rousseau's position⁴⁸ but he immediately turned to Bluntschli's theory of state organisms.⁴⁹ Then, Liang's contention made a

⁴⁵ Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 3-11.

⁴⁶ Jung Hye-Jung, "Acceptance and Transformation of the Bluntschli' State Thought in Modern Korea, China, and Japan: Focusing on Hiroyuki Kato, Liang Qichao, and Najin·Kim Sangyeon", *The Journal of Asiatic Studies* 亞細亞研究 63-3, 2020.

⁴⁷ Oh Hyang-Mi, "Johann Caspar Bluntschli's Theory of Sovereignty", *Korean Journal of International Relations* 國際政治論叢 54-3, 2014.

⁴⁸ Liang Qichao, "Rousseau's Case 盧梭學案," Qing Yi Bao 清議報 volume 98-100, 1901, pp. 11-12; Liang Qichao, "The new citizen of China 中國之新民," and "Master of Social Contract Rousseau 民約論巨子盧梭之學說," *The Regenerate People Magazine* 新民叢報 volume 11-12, 1901-1902. Regarding this shift, Hazama Naoki (狹間直樹) argues that Liang Qichao indeed stood in both two axes, like the two axes of an ellipse, that he took the nationalism (國權主義) from the point of the "state," while taking populism (民權主義) from the point of "people (新民)." Hazama Naoki 狹間直樹, "New People 新民說," Joint Research on Liang Qichao-Western Modern Thought Acceptance and Meiji Japan 共同研究梁啟超-西洋近代思想受容と明治日本, Misuzu Shobo みすず書房, 1999, pp. 92-93.

⁴⁹ Liang Qichao, "The Theories of Bluntschli, Master of Political Science 政治學大家伯倫知理之學

profound impact on the formation of concepts like state and ethnicity not only in China but also in Korea and Japan.⁵⁰

The transformation of modern China into a nation-state was a process of redefining itself as a sovereign state.⁵¹ The change was also the process of restructuring a civilized empire-the Tianxia (all under heaven) including pluralism- into a homogeneous polity.⁵² If not limited to the scope of a nation-state, the concept of state sovereignty itself can be found in the Nerchinsk Treaty between the Qing and Russia from the 17th century.⁵³ However, as pointed out earlier, the foundation for the community consist-

說,” *The Regenerate People Magazine* 新民叢報 38·39, 1903, p. 4.

⁵⁰ Among Bluntschli's books, *Allgemeines Staatsrecht* (1868) was translated as *General Theories of State Law* (國法汎論) by Katō Hiroyuki (加藤弘之) between 1876 and 1879. In addition, the *Deutsche Staatslehre für Gebildete* (1974, Nördlingen), which could be an abbreviated version, was translated as *On the Nation-state* (國家論), Tokyo: Shunyōdō 春陽堂, 1889 by Hirata Tōsuke (平田東助) and Hiratsuka Daishiro (平塚定二郎), as well as *Nation Studies* (國家學), Tokyo: Zenrinyakushokan 善隣譯書館, 1899 by Azuma Heiji (吾妻兵治). Liang Qichao began to translate and publish Bluntschli's *Theory of the State* in the 11th “Qing Yi Bao” from April 10, 1899. In 1902, Guangzhi Book Company (廣智書局) compiled the books of Bluntschli as translated by Liang Qichao and published it under the title of *Standard Codes of the Study of State* (國家學綱領). Also, on May 25, 1903, the 32nd edition of *Xinmin Congbao* published an introduction of Bluntschli under the pseudonym of Liren (力人), and, on October 4th, 1903, the 38th and 39th *Xinmin Congbao* introduced the theory as a whole by publishing an article titled “The Theories of Bluntschli, Master of Political Science 政治學大家伯倫知理之學說” including the head of Bluntschli. In Korea, in 1907, An Jonghwa (安鍾和) translated and introduced “Standard Codes of the Study of State 國家學綱領” from the Guangzhi Book Company (廣智書局) under the same title. (Bluntschli Johann Caspar (伯倫知理), *Standard Codes of the Study of State* 國家學綱領, edited by An Jonghwa, Guangxue Bookstore 廣學書舖, 1907). Bak Geun-gab, *Bluntschli's Study of the State that Came Over To Korea*. Concept and Communication 20, 2017.

⁵¹ Maria Adele Carrai, *Sovereignty in China: A Genealogy of a Concept since 1840*, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

⁵² From the early stage, Fairbank analyzed the process of transformation from a culture-based empire into a modern nation-state through research on the tribute system and the Chinese-centered regional order. J.K. Fairbank and Teng Ssu-yu, *On the Ch'ing Tributary System*. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 6 No.2 (1941), pp. 135-246; J.K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1968. Levenson also distinguished between the Tianxia as a system of value and the state as a system of power. Joseph R. Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate*, vol.3, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965, p. 98.

⁵³ This is also the main argument for the claim of “China in history” within the discourse of historical territory.

ing of the nation as a unit of the state was rather weak in view of establishing national sovereignty along with the juxtaposition of the state and the people. Despite the fact that it had systematic associations among the three elements constituting the empire, still, the Qing had many heterogeneous characteristics among them, which deterred the formation of a single national organism.⁵⁴

In China, even from pre-modern times, there existed the concept of “ethnic group (族類),” which allowed for the recognition of a common ethnicity beyond the contrast with other ethnicities.⁵⁵ In addition, there was a possibility that it could be seen as an original form of national (ethnicity) perception parallel to modern sovereign states. In fact, Chinese intellectuals regarded the concept of the nation (ethnicity) as a single entity in accepting the theory of the national organism by Johann Blunchili. However, it is hard to say that the concept of the nation was developed mainly by the Han Chinese under the structure of Hwa-Yi Theory (華夷論). The “great nationalism” claimed by Liang Qichao, integral to the national organism, indeed referred both to Central China in terms of geography and Han Chinese in terms of ethnicity. The nationalism, promoted in this fashion, therefore, tended to have authoritarian characteristics centered on Han Chinese as well as collectivist characteristics. It finally resulted in placing the non-Han

⁵⁴ Koo Bum-jin, *Qing Dynasty, The Chimera Empire*, Minumsa Publishing Group, 2012.

⁵⁵ The word “ethnic group (族類)” was originally defined as a group of people of the same kind as the word “Identifying Things by Ethnicity (Zhouyi·Dongren·xiang) (族類辨物 (『周易·同人·象』))” implies. As time goes by, its scope of meaning became broadened to be referred to the blood relatives consisting of descendants of the same surname. Therefore, in the “Shi Yi’s Aspirations Saying That Those Who Are Not of Our Ethnicity Will Have Different Hearts (Zuo Zhuan·Chengong·4 Years) (史佚之志有之曰, 非我族類, 其心必異 (『左傳·成公·4年』)),” it was mainly limited to the meaning of the blood clans but it could be able to add the context connected with the meaning of the ethnicity-meaning of ethnicity used after the modern times-as the contrast to other ethnicities got highlighted from the Hwa-Yi world view. Jiang-Tong (江統), in *Theories International Migration (徙戎論)*, also remarked that “Those who are not of our ethnicity must have different hearts, and the attitudes of Rong and Di are not the same as those of China. (The Book of Jin, Volume 56, Jiang Tong Tradition)(非我族類, 其心必異, 戎狄志態, 不與華同 (『晉書·卷56·江統傳』)).” In spite the fact that the concept of “ethnic group” has a different implied meaning from the concept of “nation” used since the modern times, it is also considered as having a similar context with the currently used “nation” today.

Chinese (or non-China) elements in the margins or on a sub-level of the category of state. Even after the establishment of the PRC, it consequently led to Han-nationalism (大漢族主義) of which Bai Shouyi and others were wary. It seems that this became a contributing factor that weakened the unity of the Chinese (ethnic) people as the basis for national sovereignty.

Such vulnerabilities did not have the opportunity to be revised or shifted in other directions before the establishment of the PRC. As in the case of the state sovereignty in Western countries which grew within a competitive international system, the process of Chinese nationalism has also been stimulated by a very intense sense of external crisis. Resistance as a nation (ethnicity) preceded integration as a nation (ethnicity). In the midst of this, even after the establishment of the “new” China, it was difficult to see that the various ‘ethnicities,’ entwined with the Han Chinese nationalism, formed sufficiently a single collective identity as the people (ethnics) for the basis of national sovereignty. The reason why Tan Qixiang presented the concept of “China in history” as a basis for explaining the connection between the PRC and the Qing while compiling ‘*The Historical Atlas of China*’ has an immediate bearing on this matter. In short, it was a response to the task of national (ethnic) integration that was belatedly addressed after the establishment of the PRC.

If then, the discussion of China’s historical territory is fundamentally interrelated to the internal problems of Chinese nationalism. It contains the dark side (隱憂) of Chinese nationalism, or the hidden concerns. Dealing with internal matters that do not want to be displayed to neighboring countries, it should be treated very carefully.

At this moment, we need to be wary of this problem on the ground that this discussion itself may cause tensions and clashes with neighboring peoples and countries considering that its logic links national sovereignty with history. The territory of the state does change from time to time as a result of conducting mutual relations with neighboring countries and ethnic groups, including wars, aggressions and treaties.⁵⁶ What could be com-

⁵⁶ Since modern times, international law can be said to have served as a post-approval of effective

monly assumed here is the scope of territory in which national sovereignty is determined along with the emergence of the state in modern times. If one country sets its national territory based on what existed in the past before its establishment, this turns out to be a key factor that agitates the existing stable geopolitical structure. However, as already pointed out, the concept of historical territory in China is not simply a general noun that refers to the historically changing Chinese territory but a proper noun referring to “the basis of the historical right of the legal territory.”⁵⁷ Just as Tan Qixiang criticized Yang Sui’s claim, arguing that “isn’t it not recognizing the regions, located east of the Ussuri River and north of the Heilong River, belonging originally to China’s territory, which Russia ceded back in the Aihun Treaty and the Beijing Treaty?,” “China in history” is presented on the premise of the restoration of territories lost before the establishment of the PRC. There are also some scholars who go even further to expand the scope of the lost territories. For example, Zou Yilin (邹逸麟) claimed that “it is rare in world history for a country to lose 200 kilometers² of territory,” referring to the fact that the complete territory of the Chinese Empire experienced a number of invasions in the northeast, northwest, north, southwest, and sea areas by imperialism from the time of the Opium War before the establishment of the PRC.⁵⁸ However, it is undeniable that such a historical discussion cannot serve as a direct basis for changing the current national territorial boundaries in terms of international law. Still, even if it is limited to the historical dimension, the discussion should be cautious about the danger of becoming a topic of national sovereignty, which may

rule by the state. A colonial occupation that happened in the 19th century was mostly legalized by the principles of international law, a classic example of which was the so-called ‘terra nullius’ principle. In this case, the unoccupied land does not refer to the land without inhabitants, but land for which indigenous people do not have the right of sovereignty. It started with the concept proposed by German jurist Ferdinand von Martix at the 188th Congress of the Institute of International Law held in Lausanne, Switzerland in 188, and was later used as a basis for imperialism’s colonial occupation under the name of international law. Andrew Fitzmaurice, “The Genealogy of Terra Nullius,” *Australian Historical Studies* 38 (129) 2007, pp. 1-15.

⁵⁷ Zhang Shiming, pp. 756-757.

⁵⁸ Zou Yilin, *An Overview of the History and Geography of China* 中國歷史地利概述, Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 2007, pp. 148-163.

become a trigger provoking tension and conflict with its neighboring countries.

The unconvincing argument for the inseparable nexus between sovereignty and history does not exist merely in Chinese academia. The perception of sovereignty over China's historical territory, as reflected in the concept of "China in history," is not far from the concept of "historical sovereignty," which is often discussed in general academia. Recently, there is a trend in academia and society that has emphasized historical succession based on historical sovereignty, as differentiated from national sovereignty. However, history and sovereignty are inevitably interlinked to each other. It is not appropriate to thrust state sovereignty back into the distant past.⁵⁹ If attempting to change the territorial scope along which state sovereignty is implemented, it will have to be accompanied by a changeable to rearrange even the history of its neighboring countries or by diplomatic tension. Nevertheless, the discussions that awkwardly associate history and sovereignty among East Asian countries have vigorously continued. This phenomenon itself, therefore, shows that each country, as sovereign state, still has weak foundations on which to form peaceful international relations with its neighboring countries. In this respect, in evaluating and responding to China's discourse on historical territory, I contend, it is necessary to ensure that the collective identity of the (ethnic) peoples from which national sovereignty originates goes beyond "nationalism" and shares more universal values.

⁵⁹ Lim Ji-Hyun, *The Dilemma of Goguryeo History: Between 'National Sovereignty' and 'Historical Sovereignty'*. Research Institute of Comparative History and Culture. *The Border of Modernity, the Change of History-Standing on the Frontier and Looking at History*. Humanist, 2004, pp. 19-34.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bai Jing-yuan, Ma Qi-cheng, and Li Zhuqing. "Summary of the Concluding Remarks at the Symposium on the Establishment of the Zhuang Autonomous Region held by the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (on March 25, 1957) 在政協全國委員會召開的關於建立壯族自治區問題座談會上的總結發言紀要." In *Compilation of Zhou Enlai's Commentary on Ethnic Issues and Ethnic Policies* 周恩來同志對民族問題與民族政策論述選編. Minzu University of China Department Office 中央民族學院科研處, 1981.
- Bai Shouyi. "The Settlement of the Territorial Issue From the Standpoint of Chinese History 論歷史上祖國國土問題的處理" *Guang Ming Daily Newspaper* 光明日報.
- Bai Shouyi. "Lecture on the topic of Territorial Issues in Chinese History 中國歷史上的疆域問題" In *Questions about the Chinese Feudal Society* 關於中國封建社會的幾個問題. It was later included in his publication, *General History of China-Series 12* 中國通史 12卷, 1951.
- Bak Geun-gab. "Bluntschli's Study of the State that Came Over to Korea." *Concept and Communication* 20, 2017, pp. 349-451.
- Carrai, Maria Adele. *Sovereignty in China: A Genealogy of a Concept Since 1840*. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, Cambridge University Press, 2019.
- Central Archives 中央檔案館. "Outline of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic 中國蘇維埃共和國憲法大綱 (Passed by the First National Congress of the Chinese Soviet on November 7th, 1931 1931年11月7日中華蘇維埃第一次全國代表大會通過)." In *The Selected File of Central Committee of Communist Party of China* 7th Edition 中共中央文件選集 第7冊(1931). Central Party School Press 中共中央黨校出版社, 1983.
- Central Chinese Communist Party Literature Research Office 中共中央文獻研究室編. "Common Program of The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (1st Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on September 29th, 1949) 中國人民政治協商會議共同綱領 (1949年9月29日政治協商會議第1屆全體會議通過)." In *Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of New China* Volume 1 建國以來重要文獻選編 第1冊. Central Party Literature Press 中央文獻出版社, 1992.

- Cho Byong-Han. "The Formation of Nationalism and the Tradition of Chinese Empire in Modern China." *Journal of Northeast Asian History* 23, 2009, pp. 135-202.
- Dai Yi. *Concise History of the Qing* Volume 2 簡明清史 第2冊. Renmin Chubanshe, 1984.
- Fairbank, J.K. and Teng Ssu-yu. *On the Ch'ing Tributary System*. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* Volume 6 Number 2, 1941, pp. 135-246.
- Fairbank, J.K., Ed. *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1968.
- Feng Erkang. "Studies of History and Politics 清史研究與政治." *Journal of Historical Science* Volume 3 史學月刊 第3期, 2005.
- Feng Jianyong. *A Study on the Xinhai Revolution and the Political Changes in the Frontiers of Modern China* 辛亥革命與近代中國邊疆政治變遷研究. Harbin: Heilongjiang Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2012.
- Fitzmaurice, Andrew. "The Genealogy of Terra Nullius." *Australian Historical Studies* 38 (129), 2007, pp. 1-15.
- Ge Jianxiong. *China in Her History: Changes in China's Territory* 历史上的中国: 中国疆域的变迁. Shanghai Century Publication Co.,Ltd. 上海世纪出版股份有限公司, 2007.
- Ge Jianxiong. "Our Country" Book Series "我們的國家"系列叢書. Shanghai: Fudan Daxue Chubanshe, 2010.
- Ge Jianxiong. *Unity and Divide-Inspiration from Chinese History* 統一與分裂-中國歷史的啓示. Shangwu Yinshuguan, 2013.
- Ge Zhao Guang. *Live Here, In This Country China* 宅茲中國:重建有關“中國”的歷史論述, Ed. Lee Won-Seok. Geul Hangari, 2012.
- Ge Zhao Guang, Liu Fengyun and Liu Wenpeng, Eds. "Reconstructing the Historical Discourse on "China"-Saving History from the Nation-state, or Understanding the Nation-state in History? 重建關於“中國”的歷史論述-從民族國家中拯救歷史, 還是在歷史中理解民族國家?." In *The National Identity of the Qing Dynasty-Research and Controversy of "New History of Qing Dynasty"* 清朝的國家認同-“新清史”研究與爭鳴. China Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 2010.
- Giddens, Anthony. *The Nation-State and Violence*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

- Greenfeld, Liah. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Harvard University Press, 1993.
- Han Maoli. "Territorial Changes in Past Dynasties From the Perspective of Geography 地理視角下的歷代疆域變遷." In *Fifteen Lectures on Chinese History and Geography* 中國歷史地理十五講. Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2014.
- Hiroaki Yokoyama. *The Republic of China-Domination by the Wise and Good Governance* 中華民國-賢人支配と善政主義. Chuokoron-Shinsha, 1997.
- Jeon In-gap. "From the Empire to the Imperial Nation-State (1)-The Structure and Ideology of the Empire." *The Journal of Chinese Studies* 中國學報 65, 2012, pp. 161-183.
- Jeon In-gap. "From the Empire to the Imperial Nation-State (2)-The Empire's Governing Strategy and Modern Reconstruction." *The Journal of Chinese Studies* 中國學報 66, 2012, pp. 243-272.
- Jung Hye-Jung. "Acceptance and Transformation of the Bluntschli' State Thought in Modern Korea, China, and Japan: Focusing on Hiroyuki Kato, Liang Qichao, and Najin·Kim Sangyeon." *The Journal of Asiatic Studies* 亞細亞研究 Volume 63 Number 3, 2020, pp. 79-108.
- Kim Seung-wook. "Discourse on Historical Territory and Imperial Tradition in China." *Journal of History and Culture* 63, 2017, pp. 105-136.
- Kim Seung-wook. "Reorganization of State Concepts in Modern Historical Studies in China." *History and Discourse* 89, 2019, pp. 161-197.
- Kim Seung-wook. "Acceptance of Nation Concepts and Science in Early Modern Chinese History: The Case of Liang Qichao 梁啟超." *Journal of Northeast Asian History* 67, 2020, pp. 127-160.
- Koo Bum-jin. *Qing Dynasty, The Chimera Empire*. Minumsa Publishing Group, 2012.
- Lee Seong-gyu, Kim Gwang-Eok and Yang Il-Mo, Eds. *Why is it still 'China'? The Pluralities and Universality of Chinese Civilization*. Acanet, 2014.
- Levenson, Joseph R. *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate*, vol.3. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965.
- Li Xiao-Jie and Ge Jianxiang, Eds. *Traditional Chinese Edition* 疆域與政區. Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 2011.

- Liang Qichao. "Rousseau's Case 盧梭學案." *Qing Yi Bao* 清議報 Volume 98-100, 1901.
- Liang Qichao. "The Theories of Bluntschli, Master of Political Science 政治學大家伯倫知理之學說." *The Regenerate People Magazine* 新民叢報 38-39, 1903.
- Liang Qichao. "The Theories of Bluntschli, Master of Political Science 政治學大家伯倫知理之學說." *The Complete Works of In-Bing-Shih* 飲冰室合集 13, 1903.
- Lim Ji-Hyun. *The Dilemma of Goguryeo History: Between 'National Sovereignty' and 'Historical Sovereignty.'* Research Institute of Comparative History and Culture. The Border of Modernity, the Change of History-Standing on the Frontier and Looking at History. Humanist, 2004.
- Mancall, Mark. "The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay." In John K. Fairbank, Ed. *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*. Harvard University Press, 1968.
- Mao Zedong. "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party 中國革命和中國共產黨." In *Collected writings of Mao Zedong* 毛澤東集. Sososha 蒼蒼社, 1971.
- Mao Zedong. "On the Ten Major Relationships (on April 25, 1956)." In *The Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung* Volume 5 毛澤東選集 第5卷. Renmin Chubanshe, 1977.
- Oh Hyang-Mi. "Johann Caspar Bluntschli's Theory of Sovereignty." *Korean Journal of International Relations* 國際政治論叢 Volume 54 Number 3, 2014, pp. 45-77.
- Park Sang-Seop. *State. Sovereignty. Korean Conceptual History Series 2.* Sowha 小花, 2017.
- The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 中共中央書記處. "Declaration of the Second National Congress of the Communist Party of China (July 1922) 中國共產黨第二次全國代表大會宣言 (1922年7月)." In *Before the 6th Party Congress, Party Historical Materials* 六大以前黨的歷史材料. Remin Chubanshe, 1980.
- Shu Yi. "Chairman Mao talks about Kangxi to Lao She 毛主席對老舍談康熙." *Digest of Science and Technology* Volume 3 科技文萃 第3期, 2002.
- Sun Zuomin. "Problems with the Incorporation of Ethnic Minorities into Ancient Chinese History 中國古代史中有關祖國疆域和少數民族的問題." *Wen Hui Bao*

- 文匯報, 1961.
- Tan Qixiang, Ed. *The Historical Atlas of China* 中國歷史地圖集. Beijing: Zhongguo Ditu Chubanshe 中國地圖出版社, 1982.
- Tan Qixiang. "China in Her History and China's Territory of the Past Dynasties 歷史上的中國和中國歷代疆域." *Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography* 中國邊疆史地研究 Series 1, 1991.
- Wang Hui. "Questions on the Liberation of the Objects and Modernity-A Few Reflections on (The Rise of Modern Chinese Thoughts)." In *Asia is the World*. Geul Hangari, 2010.
- Xu Jilin. *New Idea of Tianxia* 新天下主義. Ed. Qing Liu 劉擘. Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 2015.
- Xu Jilin. *China in the World-Current Chinese People, the National Family* 家國天下-現代中國的個人, 國家與世界認同. Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 2017.
- Yang Jianxin. "China Firstly Occupied by Czarist Russia and the Issue of Chinese Historical Territory 沙俄最早侵占的中國領土和歷史上的中國疆域問題." In the Department of History of Sino-Russian Relations, Institute of Modern History at Chinese Academy of Social Science 中國社會科學院 近代史研究所中俄關係史研究室 and History Department of Lanzhou University 蘭州大學歷史系, Eds. *Collection of Essays on the History of Sino-Russian Relations* 中俄關係史論文集. Gansu Renmin Chubanshe 甘肅人民出版社, 1979.
- Yang Jianxin. "One Center, Two Ways are the Main Modes of China's Territorial Formation 一個中心, 兩種途徑是中國疆域形成的主要模式. Re-discussing the Territorial Issue in Chinese History 再論中國歷史上的疆域問題." *Lanzhou Academic Journal* Volume 1 蘭州學刊 第1期, 1986.
- Yang Jianxin. Re-discussing the Word "China" and the Formation of China's Territory "中國"一詞和中國疆域形成再探討. *Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography* Volume 2 中國邊疆史地研究 第2期, 2006.
- Yu Xingwu and Wang Yuanhua, Eds. *Explain the China* 釋中國. Shanghai Literature & Art Publishing House 上海文藝出版社, 1988.
- Yu Yong-Tae. "The Theory of Zhonghua Minzu and Northeast Geopolitics: Theoretical Grounds for the Northeast Project." *Journal of Asian Historical Studies*, 2005.

- Yu Yong-Tae. "The National-Imperialism and the Logic of Unitary Nation in Modern China." *Journal of Northeast Asian History* 23, 2009, pp. 37-71.
- Zhang Bo-quan. "On Ancient Frontier Nations and Territorial Research Issues 論古代邊疆民族與疆域研究問題." *Jilin University Journal Social Sciences* 3rd Edition 吉林大學社會科學學報 第3期, 1999.
- Zhang Bi-bo. "A Reanalysis of the Issue of Incorporating Nationalities and Territories-with a Special Focus on the Concept of 'a Shared History' 關於歷史上民族歸屬與疆域問題的再思考-兼評'一史兩用'史觀." *Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography* Volume 2 中國邊疆史地研究 第2期, 2000.
- Zhang Shiming. *Law, Resources, and Time-Space Constructing China in 1644-1945, Tribes in Frontier* Volume 2 法律, 資源與時空建構: 1644-1945年的中國 第2卷 邊疆民族. Guangdong Renmin Chubanshi, 2012.
- Zhao Yong-Chun. "From Multiple China to One China (從複數'中國'到單數'中國')". In *Research on Chinese Historical Territory Theory* 中國歷史疆域理論研究. Chinese Territorial Border Research Library 中國邊疆研究文庫. Harbin; Heilongjiang Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2012.
- Zhou Weizhou. "China in History and Its Territorial and Ethnic Issues 歷史上的中國及其疆域, 民族問題." *Journal of Yunan Social Sciences* 雲南社會科學, 1989.
- Zhou Weizhou. "Re-exploration of Several Issues Concerning the Territorial Theory in Ancient China 關於中国古代疆域理论若干问题的再探索." *Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography* Volume 3 中國邊疆史地研究 第3期, 2011.
- Zhou Weizhou. "Some Thoughts on Constructing China's Frontier Border Studies 關於构建中国邊疆學的幾點思考." *Research of Chinese Borderland History and Geography* Volume 3 中國邊疆史地研究 第3期, 2014.
- Zou Yilin. *An Overview of the History and Geography of China* 中國歷史地利概述. Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 1993.
- Zou Yilin. *An Overview of the History and Geography of China* 中國歷史地利概述. Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 2007.
- Zou Yilin. "The Beginning and End of Compilation of <The Historical Atlas of China> by Tan Qixiang and Its Academic Significance 譚其驥主編『中國歷史地圖集』編繪始末及其學術意義." In Hua Linfu 華林甫, Ed. *Study on Geographical Literature of Qing Dynasties* 清代地理志書研究. Beijing: China Renmin Daxue Chubanshe 中国人民大学出版社, 2014.



The New National History of China and the Creation of National Identity under Xi Jinping

Byung-soo OH
Northeast Asian History Foundation

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 18 Number 2 (Summer 2022), 87-133

Copyright © 2022 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.



The New National History of China and the Creation of National Identity under Xi Jinping*

Byung-soo OH
Northeast Asian History Foundation

Introduction

Since Xi Jinping came to power, the teaching of history in middle and high school in the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been undergoing major changes. While it took almost 15 years to reform the educational curriculum and to revise textbooks, the breadth of changes at the institutional level goes well beyond the norm. At the heart of the matter lies the fact that through "Curriculum Reform" the Chinese Party-State (黨國, hereafter Party-State) has widened its intervention in controlling the teaching of history in school. Introducing a state-authorized textbook system, the Party-State has enforced a single curriculum nationwide to prescribe the use of textbooks dictated by the Party-State and to enhance political and ideological education. At the very least, this is anathema to de-politicization, openness, and autonomy in public education.

The teaching of history in school has conventionally performed the function of political education by contributing to the formation of national identity and social integration in modern times.¹ With China being an ideo-

* This translated article is an revised and supplemented version of Oh Byung-soo, "시진핑시대 중국의 역사정책과 자국사의 재구성," 역사교육 156 (December, 2020): 221-272.

logical state, this tendency has become even more prominent.² In such a political culture, regimes have utilized history and history education as a tool for building the modern Chinese state, establishing its legitimacy, and mobilizing its citizens ideologically.³ Even in the Era of Reform and Opening-up, emerging as a result of criticism of the Cultural Revolution, the teaching of history in public school was always subservient to ideological education in terms of historical materialism and patriotism endorsed by the CCP.

Nevertheless, since the Era of Reform and Opening-up, there have been perceptible differences in the way history education has developed. What matters here is how to treat an autonomous path in history education despite the Party-State's slogans of 'seeking truth from the facts,' 'emancipating the mind,' and rejecting Soviet-style historical studies.⁴ A prime example is the transition to an American-style curriculum standards system in place of the old Soviet-style history education. Although operating with the sport of the Party-State that advocated the modernization of socialism, more fundamentally, this new project came in step with the reconstruction of a new national identity and ideology on the one hand and the changes in

¹ It is widely acknowledged that in modern China, school history education heightens nationalism through the spreading of historical knowledge and contributes to the formation of national identity and social integration. See Peter Zarrow, *Educating China: Knowledge, Society and Textbooks in a Modernizing World, 1902-1937* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Yu Weimin and Liu Chang, eds., *Wenhua he jiaoyu shiye zhong de guomin yishi* (Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu Chubanshe, 2012); Liu Chao, *Lishi shuxie yu rentong jiangou: qingmo minguo shiqi lishi jiaokeshu yanjiu* (Shehui kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2016).

² Because of this, Chinese scholars also see schools and history textbooks as an apparatus for the indoctrination of state ideology. Fang Chengzhi, *Jiannan de guizheng: Xin zhongguo shiqi nian (1949-1966) zhong xiaoxue jiaokeshu yanjiu* (Changsha: Hunan Normal University Press, 2013), 6-7.

³ Joseph Robert Culp, *Articulating Citizenship: Civic Education and Student Politics in Southeastern China, 1912-1940* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007); Timothy Check, *The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

⁴ In particular, see Bu Ping, "Gaige kaifang yu zhongguo jindai shi yanjiu," *Jindaishi yanjiu* 5 (2009); and Jiang Yihua, "Cong geming dao ren de jiefang: Zhongguo shixue liushi nian," in *Xinshi liguo* (Shanghai: Renmin Chubanshe, 2012).

international relations such as the Cold War and the post Cold War geopolitics on the other hand. The development of history education in China has gone hand-in-hand with the ideological policy of the Party-State in response to fluctuations in global politics.

The recent change to the teaching of history in school can also be regarded as a way China (more specifically the CCP) reinterprets its relationship with the world in the G2 era and reformulates a new national identity necessary for national integration and ideological mobilization. Complicit in this process are factors such as internal feuds, arising from the advance of globalization and the intensification of the Reform and Opening-up, and fluctuations in the international relations, especially the relationship between China and the United States. In other words, just as history education in the Era of Reform and Opening-up changed along with the constructive establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the U.S. against Russia, so too have recent conflicts with the U.S. driven new changes in the teaching of history in Chinese schools.

Then, how does the Party-State read this situation, how does this interpretation make impacts on the teaching of history in public school, and how will the change be associated with the new national identity? To answer these questions, it is necessary to analyze *History: An Outline of Chinese and Foreign History* (歷史: 中外歷史綱要 hereafter *Outline*), the compulsory textbook for teaching history in senior secondary school (high school). The *Outline* is a new textbook introduced in accordance with the new curriculum and mirrors the intentions and the ideology of the Party-State in the sense of what the Party-State deems the essential content and themes of both national history and world history.

Since the Northeast Asia Project (2002-2007), academic analysis of Chinese history textbooks has tended to operate on the premise that the presentation of historical events should reflect the mainstream ideology of the Party-State.⁵ Moreover, textbook debates in academia have gone back

⁵ Oh Byeongsu, "Gungnae hakgye ui Jungguk yeoksa gyogwaseo yeongu gyeonghyang gwa gwaje," *DongbukA yeoksa nonchong* 53 (2016).

to the issue of ideological commitment to offer a cause for a state-authorized textbook system and reaffirm the goals of the new history textbook for the formation of ‘citizens with the core values of socialism,’ i.e. a strengthening of political education.⁶ Still, I contend, what should not go unnoticed is how to contextualize the over-politicization of history education under the Party-State on top of the aforementioned research on how history education was programed and taught for the (re-)formation of the identity of the PRC.

With these in mind, this article explores the background of the new curriculum reform and the policies on history education under the Xi Jinping regime. Discussing the importance of the prior curriculum reform in juxtaposition with an analysis of the background to and the ideology of the *Outline*, I will illustrate how the *Outline* presents a new direction of national historiography and a new vision for national identity under the Xi regime. This approach to a convergence of history, identity, and power enables us to rethink how writing and teaching history in East Asia will reflect international and regional power relations.

New Standard Curriculum and *History: An Outline of Chinese and Foreign History*

1. The Logic of New Curriculum Reform

The *Outline* is the prescribed text for the senior secondary (high school) history course created under the new public curriculum (*General Senior*

⁶ Kim Yuri, “Gukjeongje ro hoegwihan Jungguk ui junghakgyo yeoksa gyogwaseo bunseok,” *Yeoksa gyoyuk* 148 (2018); Kim Jihun, “Jungguk Shanghai yeoksa gyogwaseo nonjaeng gwa jisikin: Shanghai jiyek godeunghakgyo yeoksa gyogwaseo ui byeonhwa,” *Jungguk geunhyeondaesa yeongu* 81 (2019); Kim Jihun, “Gukga uiji wa yeoksa gyogwaseo ui jeongchi hwa: 2018 nyeon Jungguk junghakgyo yeoksa gyogwaseo ui hyeondaesa seosul,” *Yeoksa gyoyuk yeongu* 33 (2019); Yun Sebyeong, “Yeoksa gyogwaseo bipan eul dulleossan Jungguk sahoe ui galdeung: 2006 nyeon Bingjeom sageon eul jungsim euro,” *Jungguk geunhyeondaesa yeongu* 83 (2019); Yun Sebyeong, “Jungguk ui yeoksa gyogwaseo nonjaeng gwa gukjeonghwa,” *Yeoksa gyoyuk yeongu* 33 (2019).

Secondary History Curriculum Standards, 2017) from the Chinese Ministry of Education in January 2018. It consists of two volumes. The first volume on Chinese history was published in August 2019 and the second volume on foreign history came out in February 2020. The curriculum is organized around the 24 topics at the senior secondary level with a view to facilitating in-depth learning such as the comparison of major themes in Chinese and world history.⁷ Nonetheless, the political significance of the *Outline* is overstated by the editor-in-chief as below:

[I]t incorporates the will of the state and the core values of socialism, contains the five core qualities—historical materialism, the concept of time and space, historical source positivism, history interpretation, and affection for family and the state—, and reflects directly the historical ideology of Xi Jinping such as ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ and ‘the realization of China Dream.’⁸

The new curriculum is divided into a compulsory subject (History: *An Outline of Chinese and Foreign History* / 4 hours); two selected compulsory subjects (State Institution & Social Governance, Economy & Social Life, or Cultural Exchange a& Transmission / each 2 hours), and elective subjects (for example, Introduction to Historical Studies or Historical Material Research). The goals of the compulsory subject are 1) to have ‘a comprehensive understanding of the content learnt in the junior secondary (middle school) curriculum, 2) to understand the major facts in the context of Chinese and world history as foundational knowledge in preparation for advanced learning at the next stage (selective compulsory subjects), and 3) to develop basic historical consciousness.’⁹

Meanwhile, in order to understand the background to the *Outline*, it

7 Ministry of Education of China, *Putong gaozhong lishi kecheng biao zhun*, 9, 12.

⁸ Zhang Haipeng, “Tong bian gaozhong lishi jiao ke shu de xueke tixi he xueshu tixi,” *Kecheng-jiao cai-jiao fa* 39, no. 9 (2019).

⁹ Ministry of Education of China, *Putong gaozhong lishi kecheng biao zhun* (2017 Nianban) (Beijing: People’s Education Press, 2018).

is necessary to look at the previous curriculum dating to 2003. The 2003 Curriculum was groundbreaking in the sense of integrating Chinese history with world history, pursuing a topic-oriented organization, and promoting research and learning on the student's initiative. Such changes aimed at the cultivation of global citizenship able to keep pace with the modernization of socialism and the global community. Accordingly, the curriculum emphasized the humanistic qualities of historical consciousness, historical way of thinking, and data-processing capabilities along with historical materialism.¹⁰

In this fashion, advocating both the acquisition of knowledge and its interpretation rather than pure knowledge-centered education, the 2003 Curriculum sought to secure the relative autonomy of history education.¹¹ Giving priority to the development of a student's ability to distinguish between historical fact and historical interpretation, the curriculum tried to emphasize critical thinking skills, including interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation and comparison, for the betterment of generalization, selection, hypothesis, distinction and logic,¹² and to transform the format of history education from the existing knowledge-centered political education to a more humanistic civic education. The school education is meant to enable students to ask questions, to interpret reality, to understand the values inherent in human culture, and to engage themselves in meaningful social practices. Then, even teachers prepare themselves to be not only experts in teaching, learning and assessment, but also masterminds in planning all these educational activities.¹³

¹⁰ Ministry of Education of China, *Putong gaozhong lishi kecheng biao zhun* (Beijing: People's Education Press, 2003); Kim Yuri, "Yeoksa gyohak daegang eseo yeoksa gwajeong pyojun euro."

¹¹ These history curriculum standards gave the highest priority to autonomous learning and teaching activities. This was different from the "Teaching and Learning Outline." Ministry of Education of China, *Putong gaozhong lishi kecheng biao zhun*, 2; Kim Yuri, "Yeoksa gyohak daegang eseo."

¹² Zhao Yafu, "Pipan xing siwei jue ding lishi jiao xue de zhiliang," *Kecheng-jiao cai-jiao fa* 33, no. 2 (2013); Song Sangheon, "Yeoksa insik eseo mirae jeonmang ui yeoksa gyoyukjeok uimi," *Yeoksa gyoyuk* 115 (2010); Song Sangheon, "Yeoksahak gwa yeoksa gyoyuk ui geori," *Yeoksa gyoyuk* 138 (2016).

¹³ Zhao Yafu and Wang Jiping, "Meiguo lishi jiao xue de yan jiu shiye," *Lishi jiao xue wenti* 4

This orientation displayed a new attempt to redefine the significance of history education in China and to create a new identity by way of using Western educational theories rather than the traditional Soviet-style history education that had bearing on the development of history education of China.¹⁴ The core of Soviet-style history education, as is well known, was “communist education” and its goal was the mobilization of citizens, devoted to the construction of socialism, into ideological fighters. Its aim was the production of students dedicated to the communist revolution through learning the major events, phenomena, and traits of national history in the Marxist interpretative framework.¹⁵ This Soviet-style was nothing more than political and ideological education. The role of teachers was merely

(2011); Xu Cicheng and Zhao Yafu, “Lishi jiao ke shu yu lishi guan jiaoyu: Yijin ershi nianlai lishi jiao ke shu gaige wei li,” *Neimenggu shifan daxue xuebao* 7 (2019).

- ¹⁴ From the 1990s, with the encouragement of the Party-State, interests in foreign history increased. Accordingly, Ye Xiaobing (葉小兵), Yu Weimin (余偉民), Zhao Yafu and others investigated overseas theories and used these to construct a theory of history education for China and took the lead in curriculum reform. In particular, Zhao Yafu tenaciously advocated the independence of history teaching from historical studies and expanded established views on teaching and learning. See, Yu Weimin, *Lishi jiaoyu zhanwang* (Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2002); Zhao Yafu, *Guo wai lishi jiaoyu toushi* (Beijing: Gaodeng Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2003); Nie Youli, *Lishi kecheng yu jiao xue lun* (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Jiaoyu Chubanshe, 2003).
- ¹⁵ Soviet-style history education began to influence China in the 1930s. In 1934, Stalin and Zhdanov emphasized the textbooks *History of the Soviet Union* and the *Modern History* should focus on the history of class struggle and party history. This then replaced Mikhail Pokrovsky’s (1868-1932) theory-oriented historical science. Stalin considered history textbooks to be key to the ideological struggle. Stress the use of such terms as “feudal despotism” and “capitalism and bourgeois democracy” instead of the “ancient regime” or “new regime,” the method of teaching and learning was to make students memorize major historical phenomena, figures, and dates, and then with the presentation of necessary historical materials, to enable them to analyze historical events from a Marxist perspective. After 1949, China actively adopted Soviet historical science and history education, including key concepts such as nation, class, the forms of society, periodization, productive forces, and relations of production, and even the school history curriculum, textbook writing, methods of teaching and learning, and the school operation methods. As a result of this influence, textbooks focused on the history of class struggle and the history of the masses. See Wang Duoquan, “Shi dalin yu zhongguo lishi jiao xue,” *Shanghai shifan daxue xuebao* 1 (1980); and Feng Yiyi, “Jiejie douzheng shi fanshi.” In addition, for the Marxist type of human beings that was imported from the Soviet Union, see Cheng Yinghong, *Creating the “New Man”: From Enlightenment Ideals to Socialist Realities* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008).

faithfully to propagate and indoctrinate in students the state ideology set by the Party-State. The 2003 Curriculum was the vigorous endeavor to break from this over-politicization of history education.

The curriculum gave rise to considerable controversy. Most of all, the overemphasis on topic learning met with criticism that it might impinge on the proper function of history education, that is, the formation of historical consciousness integral to the background of socialist history education. The reason is that the topic-centered curriculum could challenge and fragment ‘the systematic character of historical knowledge’ without a deep sense of edifying patriotism. Concerns over the student-centered style of teaching and learning widened the controversy even further.¹⁶ The indiscriminate integration of Chinese history with world history was also ascribed to an immature failure in curriculum development and design.¹⁷ In short, the opponents maintained that the 2003 Curriculum diverged so markedly from the educational reality of China.

This controversy fundamentally involved the issue of what the objectives of history education on top of how perspectives and interpretations can be useful in history class. Critics argued that by constructing the history textbook based not on historical materialism but on the historical perspectives of civilization and modernization, the revolution as the source of the legitimacy and identity of socialist China was marginalized or minimized.¹⁸ Accordingly, they claimed that developing alternative curricula

¹⁶ Wang Hongzhi, “Zhongshi lishi ke kai hao lishi ke,” *Lishi jiao xue* 470, no. 1 (2003). Wang Hongzhi (王宏志, 1937-), who was a senior researcher involved in textbook writing in the People’s Education Press for many years, argued that history education was a “vehicle for the heightening of the qualities of the nation,” not for individual development. He insisted that while the role of teachers was essential to achieve this, the student-initiated learning intended by the curriculum standards was likely not only to neglect historical knowledge but also to atrophy the teacher’s initiative.

¹⁷ Zhao Yafu, “Gaozhong lishi kecheng sheji you dui gaijin,” *Lishi jiao xue* 5 (2006).

¹⁸ This alluded to the fact that the Junior Secondary Curriculum (2001) was organized with a focus on the birth, formation, and development of Chinese civilization, while the Senior Secondary Curriculum (2003), organized political, material, and spiritual civilization as 1, 2, 3 respectively. This organization was predicated on breaking away from Soviet-style history education. Its focus was on enabling students to understand Chinese history from a world historical perspective, while

and new textbooks should befit the lift of ideological integrity and humanistic nature, strengthen historical materialism, inseparable from the cause of socialist education, and reaffirm the importance of political education geared towards the glorious history of Chinese revolution under the CCP.¹⁹ The Party-State actively launched the Marxism Project (馬工程, Marxism Theory Research and Construction Project) as an alternative to the liberal 2003 Curriculum and later designated Zhang Haipeng (張海鵬), who was in charge of teaching material for modern Chinese history in the Marxism Project, as the editor-in-chief of the *Outline* under the Xi's regime²⁰ It is thus necessary to explore the new ideological perspective of history education that went in concert with Xi Jinping's vision for new national identity of China in the 21st century.

2. History Policy in the Xi Jinping Era and the Development of the *Outline*

Since his early days in power, Xi Jinping has dealt with history policy as an ideological problem. He has adopted the slogans of "Road to the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation", "Realization of China Dream," and cultural confidence while making a revision of how historical events are perceived. In January 2013, he announced that "the two thirty years cannot

also taking into account the universality of modern society as well as local historical traditions. The rationale for this was that students could only be expected to make contributions to the solution of global problems in the future if they understood China's national history as part of the history of human civilization. The core of the controversy was the philosophical difference over whether history education should prioritize the development of individuals or the identity of the nation and the state. For a detailed discussion, see Yu Weimin, "Lishi guannian yu gongmin jiao yu: 2007 Nyeonpan Shanghai shi gaozhong lishi jiao ke shu de shijie lishi guan," in *Wenhua he jiaoyu shiye*, eds. Yu Weimin and Liu Chang; Kim Jihun, "Jungguk Sanghai yeoksa gyogwaseo."

¹⁹ Zhao Yafu, "Jin shi nianlai zhongguo dalu lishi kecheng gaige" (paper presented at the Han-Jung yeoksa gyoyuk jeonmunga semina, October 2015).

²⁰ Zhang Haipeng, "Zhongguo jindai shi jiao cai ("Ma gongcheng" xilie) bianzhu de youguan wenti yu sikao," *Shixue yuekan* 6 (2014). Succeeding Fan Wenlan 范文瀾, Hu Sheng 胡繩, and Liu Danian 劉大年, Zhang took it upon himself to be the spokesperson of the mainstream ideology and spearheaded the publication of the *Zhongguo jin xiandai shi gangyao* [*Outline of modern Chinese history*].

deny each other.” This meant that “the two historical periods before and after the Reform and Opening-up should not be taken as oppositional, nor should the history of the previous period be denied.”²¹ In effect, the aim was to revise or discard the Deng Xiaoping’s discourse on the two stages of socialism²² that claims a new stage of Chinese socialism with the advent of the Reform and Opening-up.

Xi’s second important action was the issuance of ‘Notice on the Ideological Sphere’ whose main focus was on “the Ban on the Discussion of Seven Matters” (七不講) or seven anti-establishment ideologies including historical nihilism. The Notice claimed that the problem with history education stemmed from Western-oriented anti-establishment ideologies such as Western constitutional democracy, human rights, civil society, neo-liberalism (economic freedom), and press freedom, all of which were related to historical nihilism.

The goal of historical nihilism in the guise of ‘reassessing history’ is to distort the CCP history and the history of New China.... Rejecting the revolution, claiming that the revolution led by the Chinese Communist Party results only in denying the historical inevitability in China’s vision for a socialist road.... Some people try to cleave apart the period that preceded the Reform and Opening-up from the period that followed, or even to set these two periods in opposition to one another. By rejecting the CCP history and the history of New China, historical nihilism seeks to fundamentally undermine the CCP’s historical purpose, which is tantamount to denying the legitimacy of the CCP’s long-term political dominance.

The term ‘historical nihilism,’ coined after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, signifies the liberal trend of the intellectual community that denied Mao Zedong, the CCP history, and the state. It was also used to denote an

²¹ “Guanyu dangqian yishi xingtai lingyu qingkuang de tongbao” [Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere], *Zhong ban fa* 9 hao (2013).

²² Hu Jintao, “Zai jinian dang de shiyi jie san hong quanwei zhaokai 30 zhounian dahui shang jianghua,” *Renmin ribao*, December 9, 2008.

anti-establishment ideology that sought to turn China into a capitalist state. The intent of historical nihilism, made official in the Notice, is to further ‘historical consciousness disavowing the legitimacy of the CCP regime and denying the history of the CCP and New China.’

This terminology appeared frequently in the debate on the 2003 Curriculum. At the academic conference, co-hosted by the Ministry of Education (Research Center for the Social Science Development of Higher Education) and the Association of Chinese Historians, in March 2005 on the topic of Modern Chinese History Research and the Trend of Historical Nihilism.²³ Approximately 30 researchers from major universities in the metropolitan area, including Peking University, Renmin University and Beijing Normal University, from the Academy of Social Sciences, and from the Party Literature Research Center attended the conference. Some key members of the Association of Chinese Historians such as Sha Jiansun from Peking University, Li Wenhai from Renmin University, Gong Shudou from Beijing Normal University, Liang Zhu from Peking University, and Zhang Haipeng from Academy of Social Sciences also participated in the conference. These scholars were all considered the representatives of the conservative position since the Tiananmen Square Demonstration.²⁴ Without simply handling the issue of historical nihilism, the conference also expanded the battle front into an ideological issue.²⁵ For example, the attend-

²³ The Research Center for the Social Science Development of Higher Education is in charge of ideological education in universities, while the Association of Chinese Historians, an organization affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, represents the academic views of the Party-State. I Academy of Social Sciences and the Party Literature Research Center are closely related with the ideological policy of the Party-State. Li Zhen, “‘Zhongguo jin xiandai lishi yan jiu yu lishi xuwu zhuyi sichao’ xueshu yan tao hui zhaokai,” *Gaoxiao lilun zhanxia* 4 (2005).

²⁴ Wei Zhaogai, “Jingti lishi xuwu zhuyi sichao,” *Guangming Daily*, March 15, 2005. For example, they did not shy away from making conservative remarks on the *Towards the Republic* (走向共和), a historical drama broadcast by CCTV from April, 2003. See among others, Gong Shudou, “Zouxiang gonghe yanzhong waiqu lishi,” *Wenyi lilun yu piping* 4 (2003); Zhang Haipeng, “Lishi dianshiju Zouxiang gonghe xuanyang shenmo lishi guan,” *Makesi zhuyi yan jiu* 5 (2003); Li Wenhai, “Zouxiang gonghe ji renmen tigongle shenme yang de ‘xin de lishi guandian,’” *Gaoxiao lilun zhanxian* 6 (2003).

²⁵ The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, ed., *Lishi xuwu zhuyi pipan wenxuan* (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2015).

ees took an active part in the above mentioned “Marxism Project,”²⁶ and in April 2005 they held an academic conference against a right-wing history textbook produced in Japan. By so doing, they played a crucial role in shifting the history textbook problem to the matter of state ideology and policy-making.

The conservative academics saw historical nihilism as having emerged under the influence of Western trends during the Reform and Opening-up era, denying the historical experience of modern China, and delegitimizing the formation of socialist China. The historical revisionists, according to the conservative camp, also offer a critical perspective on the CCP history and the socialist government.²⁷ The following passages present the official view of the Party-State on historical nihilism.

While annihilating the people’s revolutionary movement in China, the leadership of the CCP, the guidance of Marxism, the socialist institutions and the proletariat dictatorship, they eulogize rebels, collaborators, and reactionary rulers. They do not interpret and explain history starting from the real situation of historical development, but through the misinterpretation, falsification, distortion and denial of history; they seek another historical discipline and a direction of development alike without any historical grounds.

In order to deny the revolution, [they] claim that reformism was the only exit for modern China.... Opposing revolution with modernization, they say that the historical perspective of revolution should be replaced with that of modernization.

Historical nihilism goes in concert with the strategy of hostile forces, in other words, the soft strategy of the enemies that aim at the Westernization or division of China.²⁸

²⁶ Zhang Haipeng, “*Zhongguo jindai shi jiao caiji*.”

²⁷ Wei Zhaogai, “*Jingtǐ lishi xuwu zhuyi sichao*.”

²⁸ Xia Chuntao, “*Lishi xuwu zhuyi jiexi*,” *Shixue lilun yan jiu* 3 (2019).

Likewise, the conservative academics looked at historical nihilism as an intrusion of Western ideology whose purpose was to dismantle the mainstream historical consciousness of socialist China, more specifically a strategic product of the United States for the dissolution of China.²⁹ It was the soft imperialism that enabled the liberal camp to reinterpret modern Chinese history on the basis of the theory of modernization, and to overthrow socialist China under capitalism. And, as the Western ideological offensive involved students and school, history education became an object of defense.³⁰ History curriculum reform and the revision of textbooks were posed to be followed. The objective was the creation of a historical consciousness commensurate with the ‘China Dream’ and ‘National Rejuvenation,’ both of which were set for the preservation of state ideology under the CCP and the reformulation of collective identity. For the Party-State, the 2008 Global Economic Crisis and the growing ethnic conflicts in Tibet and Xinjiang after 2008 became a critical turning point that revalidated the necessity of creating a new identity through an adjustment of the dominant ideology and eradicating historical nihilism.

Another factor that deserves attention is how Russia has overhauled state ideology through an intensification of history education since Putin assumed power. Russia has on many occasions served as an example for China in large part because of the similarity of the situations both countries had faced during the Cold War and beyond. The shock felt by Chinese society at the disintegration of the Soviet Union is clearly illustrated by Chinese analyses of its causes,³¹ one of which was the effect on ideology of

²⁹ Gong Yun, “Zhongguo jin xiandai shi yanjiu lishi xuwu zhuyi sichao chansheng de renshi genyuan,” in *Jingtū lishi xuwu zhuyi sichao*, eds. Liang Zhu and Gong Shudou (Beijing: People’s Education Press, 2006). As its theoretical background, apart from Western historical relativism and modernization theory, reference was made to the trend of post-modernism, the discourse on the end of history, and deconstruction theory. Yu Pei, “Hou xiandai zhuyi lishi guan he lishi xuwu zhuyi,” *Lishi yanjiu* 3 (2015).

³⁰ Zhang Haipeng and Zhao Qingyun, “Lishi xuwu zhuyi de ruogan biaoxiang ji qi shizhi,” *Shijie shehui zhuyi yan jiu* 9 (2018).

³¹ See Central Party School of the Communist Party of China, *Su gong de shibai ji jiaoxun* (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1994); Xu Xin, *Chaoji daguo de bengkuai: Sulian jieti yuanyin tanxi* (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2001).

such schools of thought as historical nihilism.³² From this point of view, the criticism and denial of the socialist policy and institutions of the Stalin era were directly responsible for the fall of the Soviet state ideology.

After Putin attained power, the conservative scholars surmise, the movement to re-evaluate the Stalin era gained ground.³³ Academics in China viewed this conversion as a revival of a ‘social aspiration for the order and stability under Stalin against the entire confusion of Russia in the post-Soviet period.’³⁴ Along with the turmoil of history textbooks led by Putin in 2003 and 2007, the whole process from the discussion on the state-approved textbook system in 2013 to the publication of the new textbook in 2016 turned out to be the great object of scrutiny. What attracted the Chinese conservatives in particular was Putin’s resistance to the West with the motto of ‘reappearance of the great Soviet Union. While advocating Russian style market economy and democracy, they believed, Putin distanced himself from global imperialism such as the United States and sought, as Stalin did, Russia’s own development strategy. Reacting strongly to Western criticism of the foreign policy and the historical issues of the old Soviet era, Putin also made a clear ideological stance against the West.³⁵ He mobilized Slavism and Marxist historical science to invigorate nationalist historical science in opposition to global imperialism and neo-colonialism.³⁶

³² Chen Zhihua, “Sulian jieti qianxi de lishi xuwu zhuyi sichao ji qi tedian,” in *Jingtì lishi xuwu zhuyi sichao*, eds. Liang Zhu and Gong Shudou; Zhong Zheming, “Lishi de diandao yu sulian de dianfu,” in *Jingtì lishi xuwu zhuyi sichao*, eds. Liang Zhu and Gong Shudou. Naturally, the then Chinese official media criticized the abolition of the one-party system and the introduction of the multi-party system by Gorbachev, and exerted themselves to block the repercussions on China. They took the critique on historical nihilism as a means for ideological response. Richard Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 313-314.

³³ Wu Enyuan, “Eluosi chongxin pingjia Sidalin,” *Lishi yanjiu* 5 (2003); Wu Enyuan, “Eluosi fansi sulian lishi yu zhong ping Sidalin sixiang fenxi,” *Makesi yan jiu* 1 (2006).

³⁴ Wu Enyuan, “Eluosi chongxin pingjia Sidalin.”

³⁵ In 2009, the European Parliament in its resolution on “European Conscience and Totalitarianism” highlighted both the Nazis and Stalin. Putin responded, “I cannot accept that other people imagine themselves while compelling us to have guilty feeling.” Zhang Shengfa, “Eluosi lishi jiao ke shu wenti de yuanqi yu fazhan: 2003 nian zhijin,” *Eluosi xue kan* 3 (2012).

³⁶ Choe Deokgyu, “Global history ui suyong gwa byeon yong: Jungguk, Russia, Hanguk sarye e

This anti-Western position of Russia, leaning back on the universality of traditional Marxist historical science and rekindling the value of nationalism, has its parallels in China under Xi Jinping.³⁷

The Party-State applied the Russian example to the development of the *Outline of Chinese and Foreign History*.³⁸ First of all, it set the State Teaching Materials Commission in 2012 and revised the textbook publication system, thereby establishing the principle of direct government production, inspection, distribution, and management of textbooks. In addition, with Zhang Haipeng from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in charge, the Party-State mobilized high profile textbook writers such as Liu Guo-Xin from Institute of Contemporary China Studies, Zheng Qian from Party History Research Center of the CPC Central Committee, and other researchers belonging to the Party Documents Research Office. The project also included prominent scholars such as Bu Xianqun from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Zhang Fan from Peking University, Li Fan from Beijing Normal University, and Zhang Qing from Fudan University. They argued for a revision of Chinese history through the Discipline Evaluation Group of the Academic Degrees Committee of the State Council and the Planning Review Committee of the National Social Science Fund of China.³⁹

daehan bigyo yeongu,” *Seoyangsa ron* 40 (2016).

³⁷ The relationship between China and Russia deepened through co-hosting the World War II Victory in Europe 70th Anniversary Ceremony in 2015 and lively exchanges between Chinese and Russian historians. This was in contrast to heightening tensions between China and the US. This rapprochement culminated in an academic conference held in Moscow in 2015 co-hosted by the two countries. This rebuked what were seen as historical distortions by the West and emphasized the role of both countries during the Second World War. It could be called a declaration of anti-Western solidarity by two of the world's great powers. Chen Kaike, “Zhongguo shi xuehui daibiao tuan fu e canjia jinian fan faxisi zhanzheng shengli 70 zhounian xueshu huodong,” <https://kknews.cc/military/x5pjjor.html>.

³⁸ Zhang Haipeng, “Tong bian gaozhong lishi jiao ke shu.”

³⁹ Bu Xianqun took the lead in criticizing historical nihilism and claimed openly that the current mission of Chinese historical science was to hold fast to a line of research in the service of both socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new Xi Jinping era (習近平新時期中國特色社會主義) and the Chinese people, and to construct a system of historical science with Chinese characteristics by combining academic research and the will of the state. Bu Xianqun, “Xin

The next issue to be addressed was the ideological weight of the textbook. Zhang Haipeng stressed that in editing the content of the *Outline*, they excluded individual perspectives, incorporated state-authorized reading materials and academic writings such as Maoism and Deng Xiaoping Theory, and choose content that would lift national pride in students.⁴⁰ The textbook was thus regarded as the medium for propagating the official ideology of the Party-State. In this way, the establishment of a textbook control system on the Party-State's initiative was the official and organized outcome against the U.S.-led global capitalism and its ideological encroachment.⁴¹ Yet the production of the *Outline* goes beyond the level of textbook management to the extent of political indoctrination. The term 'Chinese and foreign history' is itself a significant retreat from world history. Similarly, the term '*Outline*', as widely used for the translation of political textbooks in Russia during the Stalin era, implies that the new history textbook is planned as a foremost material for political education.⁴²

zhongguo qishi nian shixue fazhan daolu," *Zhongguo shi yan jiu* 3 (2019).

⁴⁰ According to Zhang Haipeng, after the completion of the draft, they trialed the new materials in the secondary schools of 11 provinces and cities, and made alterations and modifications based on feedback from domestic university professors and experts. They then submitted the materials to the History Professional Expert Committee in National Teaching Materials Committee for evaluation. After a final consultation with teachers from 140 secondary schools, they submitted the final evaluation copy (color book) to the State Teaching Materials Commission. This can be considered as the establishment of a textbook control system by the state. Zhang Haipeng, "Tong bian gaozhong lishi jiao ke shu."

⁴¹ It can be ascertained in the textbook writing as discussed below. See, note 139.

⁴² At the outset, the title of the subject was the "*Outline* of Chinese and foreign history," but conscious of potential criticism that this was a retreat from world history education, the editors put the word "history" before the title at the final stage. While, of course, focusing on national history, the *Outline* retained a comparison of Chinese and foreign history. However, this was subservient to strengthening China-centered historical consciousness based on the Chinese "academic discipline system," "subject knowledge," and "academic discourse." Yang Biao (杨彪, professor at East China Normal University), interviewed by the author, September 22, 2019; Zhang Haipeng, "Tuijin woguo shixue huayu tixi jianshe," *Renmin ribao*, July 25, 2016. The word "outline" was used in in a variety of book titles ranging from *Zhongguo lishi gangyao* [Outline of Chinese history], *Zhongguo shi gangya* [An Outline of Chinese history], and *Zhongguo tongshi gangyao* [Outline of the general history of China] in the Cold War period, to *Zhongguo jin xiandai shi gangyao* [Outline of Chinese modern and contemporary history], meant as teaching material embodying the ideology of the Party-State, particularly the politics of ideas.

As Xi Jinping came to power, the CCP began to implement the new curriculum project and completed this process in 2017. There were two stages in this process: first, the writing of the draft by the Chinese Ministry of Education (2013-16),⁴³ and second, the modification of the draft and the writing of the final text by the Party Publicity Committee (2016-17). A comparison of the final text with the initial draft shows that the Committee considerably strengthened its political character. For example, the draft pursued diverse historical interpretations, based on the perspective of historical materialism, with the curricular objective of ‘the formation of the historical knowledge and identity of which the modern citizen should be in possession.’ The final text, however, avows the curricular objective of fostering ‘builders and successors of socialism’ and underscores the formation of ‘ideology-sharing citizens’ on the basis of the materialistic conception of history.⁴⁴ The final text did interweave Marxism, Maoism, and Deng Xiaoping’s Theory altogether in accordance with the CCP line, and re-strengthen ideological integrity, scientificity, and political education through the succession of traditional and revolutionary culture and the development of an advanced socialist culture. The new curriculum, different from the previous curriculum whose description of the content tended to be underplayed in favor of the autonomy of teaching and learning, not only stresses historical materialism as the principle of teaching and learning, but also actively redefines the whole spectrum of the curriculum both in content and method. Then, teaching and learning history has been retaking the place of indoctrination less than education.

⁴³ Jiaoyu bu jichu jiaoyu kecheng jiao cai zhuanjia gongzuo weiyuanhui·putong gaozhong kecheng biao zhun xiuding zu, *Putong gaozhong lishi kecheng biao zhun* (zhiqiu yijian gao) (2016).

⁴⁴ In the final text, considerable modifications were made to the content of the curriculum. For instance, the part on early Chinese civilization (Unit 1, section 1) stating that “by understanding the representative Stone Age cultural relics within the boundaries of China, the plural characteristics of the origins of Chinese civilization can be perceived ...”(the initial draft), was changed to “by understanding the representative Stone Age cultural relics within the boundaries of China, the origins of Chinese civilization, the institution of private property, and the relationship between class and the creation of the state can be perceived. Through oracle bone inscriptions, bronze inscriptions, and documentary records, the institution of private property and the characteristics of early states are to be understood.”

3. The Presentation of Chinese National History: Between Empire and Great Power

The primary objective of the new history textbook was the formation of national identity and social integration. To perform such an objective, the textbook employed a number of strategies in terms of content and method. The *Outline* followed a definite plan as regards how it was constructed and how its content was presented.⁴⁵

First, it contains the dual principles of heightening students' ideological character, scientific nature and the character as a nation on the one hand and deepening the education of patriotism, collectivism and socialism for socialist China under the CCP on the other. It is historical materialism that was placed even before the formation of students' ideological identity. Second, it turns back to the various cultural traditions of the Chinese nation and carves out the cultural identity of socialist China through a collective memory from time immemorial. Third, patriotic education empowered the new curriculum to teach state sovereignty, territory, and the relationships among ethnic peoples to the point of stating that Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan, Diaoyu Dao, and South China Sea Islands are historically the Chinese territories. The aim here was to restore the perception that from ancient times China had been a "unified multi-ethnic state" and thereby legitimize the ethnic policy of the Party-State. National identity as a "unified multi-ethnic state" was taken as seriously as territorial sovereignty.

The content of the *Outline* embodies is divided into three parts: ancient Chinese history, modern Chinese history, and world history. The first volume on national history consists of 30 units in total, 4 units with 15 sections given to Chinese ancient history, 4 units with 10 sections to Chinese modern history, and 2 units with 4 sections to contemporary history.⁴⁶ To enumerate unit names only is the following:

⁴⁵ Zhang Haipeng, "Tong bian gaozhong lishi jiao ke shu."

⁴⁶ The second volume of the *Outline* consists of 3 units with 7 sections on ancient world history and 6 units, 16 sections on modern world history.

1. From the Origins of Chinese Civilization to Qin and Han: the Foundation and Consolidation of the Unified Multi-ethnic Feudal State
2. Cross-National Interactions in the Three Kingdoms, the Two Jins, the Southern and Northern Dynasties: the Development of the Unified Multi-ethnic Feudal State
3. Liao, Song, Xia, Jin, the Coexistence of Multi-ethnic Regimes and the Unification by Yuan Dynasty
4. Ming and Qing: the Establishment of China's Domain and Responses to Challenges
5. The Late Qing Period: Internal and External Troubles and Saving the Nation and Striving for Survival
6. Xinhai Revolution and the Establishment of the Republic of China
7. The Founding of the Chinese Community Party and the Rise of the New Democratic Revolution
8. War of Resistance Against Japan of the Chinese Nation and National Liberation War
9. The Founding of the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Revolution and Construction
10. The Reform and Opening-up and the New Era of the Construction of Socialist Modernization

Volume 1 of the *Outline* is organized chronologically from the origins of Chinese civilization to the People's Republic of China, taking the late Qing as the dividing line between ancient and modern history. The ancient history section describes the process of the formation of China from the beginning of Chinese civilization through the coexistence of multi-ethnic regimes to the unification of these domains. The formation of the Chinese realm, entwining with territorial domain, historical China and the Chinese character, is presented as the goal of historical development. The modern history section describes the process of overcoming the threats to the Chinese realm, establishing the People's Republic of China, and constructing socialist modernization. Along this line, the modern section focuses on the transition from the Republic of China to the People's Republic

of China through an anti-colonial and anti-feudal revolution against Western imperialism and the emergence of the Chinese Communist Party in conjunction with Chinese nation.

1) The Tradition of Cultural Empire and “Historical China”

In the section on ancient history, the concept of social formations in accordance with historical materialism is less apparent, if relatively, while the use of term ‘feudal state’ in addition to ‘multi-ethnic’ as a qualifier is prominent. The textbook, still, accepts historical stages of development by holding fast to primitive community-slavery society, the feudal state, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, and finally the socialist transformation. The Neolithic Age represents the primitive community stage; the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties are the slavery society, and the Qin and Han empires are unified multi-ethnic feudal states. The Western Zhou period, in particular, is presented as a slavery society where state ownership of land and slave trading were rampant, with social changes in the Warring States period the result of the appearance of an emerging class of landowners. On the other hand, the long period from the Qin to the Opium War is presented as the establishment and development of a feudal state in a process of division and unification.⁴⁷ The notable feature here is that the state is not the exploiter of the people but rather an empire which creates traditional China by facilitating communication, exchange, and interactions among people and by unifying diverse ethnic groups. Without simply employing the language of class struggle, this section narrates the history of an empire embracing diverse ethnicities and classes. One example can be charted in the following passage on the Qin.

The formation of a unified and centralized state is a historical neces-

⁴⁷ In particular, Unit 4 of the textbook states that “in the period of the two dynasties of Ming and Qing, the despotism had never been stronger and the unified multi-ethnic feudal state was more stabilized, and the territory of modern China was set.” In fact, it could be called the completion of the unified multi-ethnic feudal state. *Lishi: Zhongwai lishi gangyao*, vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Education Press, 2019), 71.

sity as well as an objective demand. The feudal state, representing the first unified state, facilitated communication, exchange, and interactions among the various ethnic groups and drove the political, economic, and social development of a unified multi-ethnic state.

The *Outline* has a particular focus on imperial institutions, culture, and thought. The state management system of each dynasty, such as the costume regulations of the Shang or the enfeoffment system and the patriarchal system of the Zhou, receives special attention, for example. There is also a detailed section on the more advanced administratorship of the Qin central officialdom.⁴⁸ The *Outline* states that these systems of imperial governance developed in the Qin and Han dynasties and culminated in the more sophisticated central government system in the Tang and Song dynasties.⁴⁹ Further modifications, such as the posthouse system and the province system in the Yuan dynasty, the grand secretariat system under the Ming dynasty, and the system of the folding memorials to the emperor and the grand council in the Qing dynasty eventually completed an absolute monarchy.⁵⁰

The *Outline* also deals with the nation as an important theme.⁵¹ The whole process of ancient history is to demonstrate the ongoing course of a multi-ethnic unified feudal state absorbing the ethnic minorities into imperial China since the Spring and Autumn Period. The *Outline* erases not only the idea of class relations but also ideas such as the liberation of backward ethnic groups by more advanced ethnic groups. Instead, it overrepresents the institutional integration of the diverse ethnic groups in the narrative of im-

⁴⁸ *Lishi: Zhongwai lishi gangyao*, vol. 1, 15.

⁴⁹ *Lishi: Zhongwai lishi gangyao*, vol. 1, 38-9, 49-50.

⁵⁰ *Lishi: Zhongwai lishi gangyao*, vol. 1, 80. In the teaching material of the selective compulsory subject, Unit 1, entitled "The formation and development of the ancient Chinese political system," explained this by dividing the period into the prior Qin, Qin and post-Qin (from Han to Ming and Qing). This amounts to considering the institutions of the Qin as the precursor of a centralized absolute monarchy, which was the characteristic of the Chinese feudal state. *Lishi 1: Guojia zhidu yu shehui zhili* (Beijing: People's Education Press, 2020), 2-6.

⁵¹ *2017 Curriculum Standards*, 7.

perial China equivalent to One China. Accordingly, the *Outline* claims, this imperial expansion was completed by the restoration of Taiwan, the incorporation of Fujian Province, the Dzungar conquest, the domination over Xinjiang, Mongolia and Tibet in early Qing. The following passages exemplify the narrative of historical integration under the umbrella of imperial China.⁵²

- ① In the Spring and Autumn Period, significant changes arose in relations between ethnic gros. In this period, the states of the Central Plains Region, referred to themselves as Huaxia (华夏), were more advanced compared to the Yi, Man, Rong, and Di (夷蠻戎狄) tribes in social development. The process of the formation of Huaxia identity was a product of frequent contact and exchange. During the Warring States period, other ethnic gros were gradually assimilated into the Huaxia Tribe.
- ② After the Eastern Han dynasty, several ethnic gros in the western and northern border areas continued to migrate into the central area. Among the ethnic minorities, migrating until the time of the Western Jin dynasty, were the Xiongnu, Jie, Di, Qiang, and Xianbei, all of whom were active around the Great Wall.
- ③ [In the Eastern Jin period] in the north, separatist regimes continued to emerge ... most of them consisted of migrant ethnic minorities. All of them adopted the state title and the era name of the states in the Central Plains Region and learnt the laws and institutions of the Han people in that area.
- ④ During the Yuan dynasty, many Mongolians moved to the Central Plains Region, living and mingling with the Han people. Persians and Arabs from central and west Asia also migrated to China and mixed with the Han, Mongolian, and Uygur peoples. These peoples intermarried with the Han people, gradually assimilated into the Han culture, had formed the Huihui, or the ancestors of the Hui people.

⁵² *Outline*, vol. 1, 27, 29, 30, 54, 56, 69.

At an unprecedented level, the *Outline* explains in detail the interconnection between the territorial domains and the institutional and cultural Sinicization of numerous ethnicities. It includes maps and tables such as a map showing the distribution of migrant ethnic minorities; a topographic map of the Eastern Jin dynasty and the Sixteen Kingdoms; a table showing the ethnicity of the rulers of the Sixteen Kingdoms; and a map specifying confrontations between the Northern Qi, the Northern Zhou, and the Jin. The focus again is on the way that the non-Han peoples were assimilated into the imperial culture of the Tang or the Song and integrated into the great Chinese tradition under imperial China. The *Outline* portrays China as both an ancient empire of multiple ethnicities and a political community equipped with universal laws, institutions, and culture.⁵³ Although the degree of integration varied throughout the period, the realm of China eventually developed into a highly integrated empire through the unified empires of the Yuan, the Ming, and the Qing.

The *Outline* also clarifies a connection between the security of border areas and the relationships with neighboring states as a major concern of the historical empire. Examples include the military campaigns against ethnic groups in the north west under Emperor Wu of the Han, and the establishment of military governmental institutions such as the protectorates to pacify the western regions, the west, and the Beiting.⁵⁴ Relationships with the periphery are also a key feature of imperial order.⁵⁵ Examples are the nomination of Emperor Taizung as “Tian Khan” by the northern ethnic groups, the Tang-Tubo Alliance, the hierarchical relationship between the Yuan and the Four Khanates, and the hierarchical relationship between the Qing and Joseon·Taiwan·Vietnam·Laos. The acceptance of Chinese statutes, ordi-

⁵³ In dealing with relationships between ethnic groups, the teaching material for advanced learning describes the organizations in charge of the internal and external affairs of ethnic groups since the Qin Dynasty. The *dianke* (典客, director of guests) in the Qin dynasty and the “minister herald” (大鸿臚) of the Han are cases in point. The core of integration of ethnic groups is allegedly the imperial institution. *Lishi 1: Guojia zhidu yu shehui zhili*, 52-57.

⁵⁴ *Outline*, vol. 1, 21, 27, 33, 52, 54. Included here are the Four Commanderies of the Han, the local political powers (Bohai, for example), Jimizhou (羈靡州), and area commands (都督府).

⁵⁵ *Outline*, vol. 1, 33, 34, 57, 98.

nances, and culture by these neighboring states indicates the hegemony of the imperial China in the region of East Asia. Even, this hierarchical relationship was important to the extent that a crisis of the empires was simultaneously a crisis of the neighboring state as in the case of Taiwan and Korea through the Sino-Japanese War and Vietnam through the Sino-French War.⁵⁶ Therefore, the *Outline* regards the Chinese nation as the historical product, inseparable from a long-term nation-building process, and presents the pre-modern history of China as the history of empire under which class and ethnic relations are subsumed.

At this juncture, Ge Zhaoguang's discussion on history of empire is relevant in understanding an academic inspiration and atmosphere of the conservative historians for the reconstruction of a new Chinese history in the Age of Globalization.⁵⁷ Instead of setting the largest territorial domain of the Qing as the fixed historical territory of China and presenting Chinese national history as a process of one integrative development, Ge proposed the history of empire by concentrating the scope of Chinese history on political governance, institutional implementation, and cultural identity. His main theme is to restore historical China with special focus on 'China cre-

⁵⁶ *Outline*, vol. 1, 93, 98, 105.

⁵⁷ In an extension of his work on the history of thought, Ge Zhaoguang conducted a project called "China as seen from the periphery" (2006-). Its core was to reconstruct national history and historical identity with the rise of China. At the same time, by examining various discourses since *Zhai zi Zhongguo* (宅茲中國, Reside in this China) relating to the construction of Chinese history, it exerted considerable influence both inside and outside of China. As he was not writing with the history textbook issue in mind, it is somewhat hasty to link his ideas directly to the textbook narration. However, he sought the construction of a Chinese history that considered its relationships with its neighboring countries, and as the chief of the Junior Secondary School Textbook Examination and Approval Committee, he exerted considerable influence on the new curriculum. Although the *Outline* takes patriotic education as its basis, it is also linked to Ge's idea of "imperial" history. In addition, his concept of cultural empire provides an alternative to Western theories of the modern state, and is highlighted as an apparatus for the integration of various ethnic peoples as well as the birth of the modern state. Indeed, his intention is to overcome historical consciousness to reflect real politics. In the same context, he criticizes the ideology inherent in such discourses and concepts as Tianxia (天下, All-under-heaven) and the theory of civilized states. Ge Zhaoguang, *He wei Zhongguo: Jiang yu, min zu, wen hua yu lishi* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2014); Ge Zhaoguang, "Dui 'tianxia' de xiangxiang: Yige wutuobang xiangxiang beihou de zhengzhi, sixiang yu xueshu," *Sixiang* 29 (2015).

ated by the empires of the Qin and Han in all its political, institutional, and cultural aspects,' and its relationship with the periphery.⁵⁸ He conceptualized China as a cultural empire encompassing institutions, civilization (prefectures & counties, letters, currency, administration, law, weights & measures, and traffic system), and culture (traditional knowledge, thought, religious life, national rites, historiography, statutes & ordinances, documented administration). This Chinese identity, predicated on boundary consciousness and diplomatic protocols, also structurally involves a hierarchical relationship with the periphery in terms of regional order. The inseparable linkage between Chinese national history and Chinese identity, both of which are put together in the historical development of imperial China, enables Ge and other conservative historians to counter globalization, capitalism, nationalism and the modern state, and to recall the great politico-cultural tradition of imperial China as the great regional power before the advent of the Western powers, including the U.S., in East Asia.⁵⁹

Ge's new perspective on Chinese history had a number of realistic objectives. The first was to avoid historical conflict with neighboring states in the vision of a new regional order after the remarkable rise of China in the 21st century. In fact, China has long experienced serious historical conflicts with its neighbors including Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Mongolia and Turkey. Ge's reevaluation of Chinese history may also be related to the American school of New Qing History. In reasoning that there had been a transformation from "Little China" to "Greater China" at the end of the

⁵⁸ Ge Zhaoguang, *Lishi zhongguo de nei yu wai*, 5.

⁵⁹ Lin Chun, *China and Global Capitalism: Reflections on Marxism, History, and Contemporary Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Diverse attempts were made to construct Chinese national history as a history of empire encompassing the nomadic world, the agricultural world, and the maritime world. Such attempts viewed the history of empire as pivotal for civilization as well as a framework encompassing numerous pluralistic systems in East Asia. See, for example, Shi Zhan, *Zhou chou: 3000 nian de Zhongguo* (Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2018), who narrated chronological dynasties as the intersection of universal and specific empires, and in the ensuing controversy ("Chong shu zhongguo: Cong guoqu kanjian xianzai," *Tansuo yu zhengming* 344 (2018)). In a conference in which Yao Dali participated, the mainstream argument was that traditional China should be presented as the history of empire embracing diverse foreign ethnic peoples.

Yuan dynasty, and that the Yuan imperial governance further developed throughout the Ming and the Qing, Ge was able to avoid the Manchurian origin and identity of the Qing.⁶⁰ Recognizing Central Asian regions such as Xinjiang in the context of regional, not ethnic, history and reframing the history of peripheral territories not as ‘unity in diversity’ (多元一體) but as ‘pluralistic unity’ (多元一統), may also be a response to the New Qing History.⁶¹

The theory of empire dates to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the independence of Ukraine and other nations revealed that nationalism is not simply a product of modernity but is deeply rooted in the cultural heritage of traditional empire. Ge Zhaoguang stands against Western theories of the nation-state and argues that traditional China ended with the Qing empire and its transformation into a territorial state came in response to threats from the West and Japan around the time of the May Fourth Movement.⁶² The *Outline* also portrays the “realm of China” as the precursor to modern China.

A more fundamental problem caused by the disintegration of the Soviet Union was the national question of China. Socialist China transformed the grounds for its legitimacy from the class state to the nation-state and dealt with the national question in reference to Stalin’s theory of nations and nationality policy.⁶³ The introduction of policies such as the identification of nationalities, autonomous regions, and preference towards ethnic minorities was meant to consolidate Chinese identity as a unified multi-ethnic state. However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union endangered the ideology of socialist China as a ‘unified multi-ethnic state.’ And, the

⁶⁰ Ge Zhaoguang, “Zhangfan tan yuanchao dui zhongguo lishi de yingxiang,” in *Shu fang wei yuan: Gudai zhongguo de jiangyu, minzu yu renting*, eds. Ge Zhaoguang et al. (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2016).

⁶¹ Wang Wenguang, “‘Da yitong’ Zhongguo fazhan shi yu zhongguo bianjiang minzu fazhan de ‘duoyuan yitong,’” *Bianjiang shi di yanjiu* 25, no. 4 (2015).

⁶² Ge Zhaoguang, “Cong ‘diguojiangyu’ dao ‘guo jia lingtu’: ‘Wuss’ zhiqian youguan ‘zhuquan’ wenti de riben ciji yu zhongguo fanying,” *Wenshizhe* 3 (2019).

⁶³ Liu Xiaoyuan, “Zhongguo gongchandang guojia jiangyu guan de yuanyuan yu fazhan (2012-49),” *Ershiyi shiji* 160 (April 2017).

gap between the rich and the poor after the Reform and Opening-up and the crisis of social identity exacerbated the situation. As a result, in reexamining national policy and large-scale development projects in ethnic minority regions, the Party-State came to think about categorizing ethnic minorities not as ‘nations’ but as ‘citizens of empire’⁶⁴ based on law, culture, and the tradition of the universal empire.⁶⁵

Such an attitude to national integration also has relevance to Taiwan. Since democratization in 1990s, Taiwan has pursued a policy of de-Sinicization and the reconstruction of Taiwanese identity without perceiving historical China as its own history. For the Chinese Party-State, which regards Taiwan as part of the territory of the PRC, to put forward the universal institutions and culture of the Chinese empire and its modern version of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ is a potentially more palatable means of claiming its sovereignty over Taiwan. The *Outline* repeats this official position and we can witness the use of Ge Zhaoguang’s ideas for a new vision of Chinese history and identity.

Moreover, tailoring premodern China to the PRC historiography in an overly retrospective manner can pose new challenges to the neighboring countries. The reason is that perceiving the relationship between China and other states in a center-periphery hierarchy is questionable. Even if some key elements of imperial integration, such as Confucianism, statutes & ordinances and institutions, exerted influence on the state formation of ancient East Asia, still, interpreting the relationships between Chinese states and neighboring states merely as hierarchically given needs more careful reconsideration. This interpretation might aggravate the process of Sinicization. Then, a newer version of discourse on suzerainty can emerge and undermine the inherent characteristics of the history and identity of the neighboring states against Sinicization.

⁶⁴ Ma Rong, “Zhongguo minzu wenti de lishi yu xianzhuang,” *Yunnan minzu daxue xuebao* 28, no. 5 (2011); Ma Rong, “Dui dangdai minzu zhengce de fansi,” *Qinghai minzu yan jiu* 24, no. 4 (2013).

⁶⁵ Zhang Hanlin and Xiong Qiaoyi, “Lishi kecheng biao zhun yu guojia rentong de jiangou,” *Lishi jiaoxue* 2 (2019).

2) The Creation of a Non-Western Great Power in Modern Times

Since his ascendance, Xi Jinping has underscored the need for a cultural identity fit for the new era, in other words, a cultural confidence of social China in the 21st century, to demand an intensification of research and education on the history of the Republic of China, the war against Japan, and the revolutions. In so doing, he intends to reinforce the legitimacy of the CCP and socialist China. One of the key issues is the way the relationship between the modern global world and China is reinterpreted for a new national identity of social China in the Age of the US-China G2.

The *Outline* organizes modern history into 6 units, namely 1) late Qing, 2) the Xinhai Revolution & the Republic of China, 3) the CCP & new democracy, 4) the Anti-Japanese War & the People's Liberation War, 5) the establishment of the People's Republic of China & the socialist construction, and 6) the Reform and Opening-up. This organization is clearly based on official historical consciousness professed by the CCP in the sense of focusing on how the CCP spearheaded the National Revolution, achieved victory in the War of Resistance, won the civil war, and finally built socialist China. Under these circumstances, the *Outline* underscores a process of forced incorporation into the modern world from late Ming Dynasty,⁶⁶ less than following the typical narrative of internal development, from the perspective of global history.

- ① With the pioneering development of the new navigation route, new agricultural products were introduced in late Ming; diverse businesses flourished in the Jiangnan area; and crop cultivation increased along with the handcraft industry. From the middle Ming period, the commodity economy entered a new prosperous stage and the massive flow of silver into China from America facilitated a long-distance and large-scale trade to drive the accumulation of commercial capital... Viewed as a whole, however, the traditional self-sufficient economy of small-scale farms held a predominant position and strong despo-

⁶⁶ *Outline*, vol. 2, 39-43.

tism blocked social progress and transformation.⁶⁷

- ② The competition and scramble for colonial acquisitions (after the Industrial Revolution in Europe) became harsher among the (western) powers.... Great Britain seized colonies in America and Africa and targeted Asia. France began military operations in Asia (especially) in Vietnam. In the 1840s, Russian forces invaded eastern China and Xinjiang while the U.S. also invading the country.... The Qing government did not understand the change in the world situation. China was still a feudal society and the absolute monarchy remained obstinate.⁶⁸

Although acknowledging that capitalism had formed the groundwork of modern world, the textbook presents this transformation/transition as a typical system of class exploitation in tandem with an ongoing process of colonialization of the non-Western world.⁶⁹ The textbook pays great attention to how the colonial system of world capitalism, subduing imperial China, emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.⁷⁰

Nonetheless, the global system also structurally contained the critical momentum in which the feudal economy of these colonies stopped and national/local capitalism & nationalist movements arose. One of the prime examples was the Xinhai Revolution in China, the national liberation movement in India, and the Iranian constitutional revolution.⁷¹ Subsequently, the *Outline* emphasizes the Xinhai Revolution as a bourgeois democratic revolution and devotes two whole chapters to the revolution. It provides a detailed explanation regarding a series of historical events from Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) & the Chinese Alliance (同盟會) to the Second

⁶⁷ *Outline*, vol. 1, 83-84.

⁶⁸ *Outline*, vol. 1, 90-91.

⁶⁹ *Outline*, vol. 2, 51, 52, 55.

⁷⁰ *Outline*, vol. 2, 73.

⁷¹ The *Outline* (vol. 2) makes detailed reference to the process through which Western empires made colonies or semi-colonies out of a number of nations in Asia, including the colonization of Joseon by Japan (*Outline*, vol. 2, 70-71). However, as examples of anti-colonial national movements, it deals with only India, Iran, and Indonesia. *Outline*, vol. 2, 78, 95-96.

Revolution to the formation of the *Beiyang* warlord regime to the growth of national capital & social changes.⁷² It evaluates the Xinhai Revolution as the ‘beginning of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal national democratic revolution’ that ended the absolute monarchy and ‘created favorable conditions for the development of national capitalism by driving the ideology of democratic republic.’⁷³ The dark side of the revolution was an absence of active leadership, equipped with a scientific program of revolution, and grand strategy for mass mobilization.⁷⁴

The *Outline* identifies these limitations in all the reform movements of the late Qing period including Taiping Rebellion, Boxer Rebellion, Yangwu, Bianfa, and Xinzeng all failed without social foundation, scientific thought, and concrete leadership.⁷⁵ The logic behind this description is that it was solely the CCP that could overcome colonialism and feudalism. The textbook also defines the May Fourth Movement as a patriotic student movement, distinct from the New Culture Movement, which exploded into a nationwide movement of citizens, paved the way for the founding of the CCP, transformed the old democratic movement into a new democratic revolution. Importantly, the *Outline* employs here a much more dogmatic interpretation of facts as well as a speech by Xi Jinping in order to glorify the victorious march of the CCP. That is to say, presenting the history of modern China, the *Outline* focuses on the Chinese Communist Party to such an extent that it could be called the Party History (黨史).

At the same time, the textbook highlights the struggle of the CCP for socialist China in a global context on the ground that the CCP stood in with the Bolshevik Revolution, ‘boosted the world national movement in an epoch-making manner,’ and provided a springboard to ‘the reorganization of the world system.’⁷⁶

⁷² *Outline*, vol. 1, 108-118.

⁷³ *Outline*, vol. 1, 111.

⁷⁴ *Outline*, vol. 1, 112.

⁷⁵ *Outline*, vol. 1, 96-108.

⁷⁶ The curriculum standards set an independent unit (“The Two World Wars, the October Revolution and the Change in the International Order”) and a chapter (“The Victory of the

The October Revolution (of Russia) created for the first time in history a state where the proletariat took leadership and destroyed a world structure under capitalism. It was a great leap that brought the socialist ideal into reality and inaugurated a new epoch exploring the direction of socialism. The October Revolution, striking a huge blow against the world governance of imperialism, greatly encouraged the anti-colonial liberation struggles of the peoples in colonies. From this time forward, the significant content of world history became (a set of) coexistence and competition between capitalism and socialism, the two kinds of social system.⁷⁷

Presuming the Soviet Modernization to be an alternative to the established capitalist system,⁷⁸ the *Outline* edifies the Chinese socialism under the CCP as opposed to the capitalist world system. As a result, the CCP history, entwined with modern Chinese history, embarked on a new history in place of the old history fettered by the oppressive capitalism. It is at this juncture that modern China entered into a new chapter of world history.

We can capture this convergence of the CCP history and modern Chinese history in the passages regarding the War of Resistance, the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. In the unit entitled “The Anti-Japanese War of the Entire Nation,” the *Outline* substantially reinforces the importance of the War of Resistance in that modern China and the CCP achieved national restoration through the Resistance War to rehabilitate its status as a great power in the international anti-fascist war.⁷⁹ Alongside this, the *Outline* ex-

October Revolution and the Soviet Union’s Practice of Socialism”) to make clear the meaning of the Russian Revolution in relation to the change in the international order as well as national movements in non-Western regions.

⁷⁷ *Outline*, vol. 2, 90-91.

⁷⁸ The negative side effects of Soviet-style socialism are mentioned only briefly. *Outline*, vol. 2, 93, 103.

⁷⁹ The objective was that “by understanding the War of Resistance on the battlefields home and abroad, students will understand that the Chinese Communist Party is the pillar of the national resistance war. They must understand that the Chinese theater of war was an eastern battlefield of the world’s anti-fascist war and the historical meaning that the victory in the 14-year War of

tends the War of Resistance to 14 years, the first seven years from Mukden Incident in 1931 to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and the second seven years from 1937 to the outbreak of the Pacific War between 1941 and 1945. Again, the textbook repeatedly foregrounds the active and decisive role of the CCP in the War of Resistance and the Pacific War in contrast to the anti-communist Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT), pursuing a policy of internal pacification and staying away from a direct military confrontation with the Japanese invaders. The *Outline* ‘otherizes’ the KMT whose significance in the making of modern China was downplayed or erased.⁸⁰ In a similar vein, the *Outline* does not forget the Japanese aggression by enumerating economic exploitation and war crimes including the Nanking Massacre, comfort women, and biological warfare.⁸¹

The textbook accentuates the China’s victory against the Japanese invasions as a turning point for restoring its status as a great world power⁸² and for creating the opportunity for the ‘rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.’

Resistance had for the great restoration of the Chinese nation. *2017 Curriculum Standards*, 14. This is also the recent official position of scholars in government circles. See, for example, Zhang Haipeng, *Zhongguo kangzhan yu shijie fan faxisi zhanzheng* (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2008).

⁸⁰ Examples are the places where by expressing the subject of the total War of Resistance as ‘China’, the merits and demerits of the Nationalist government were not acknowledged. Such were the case as in the total War of Resistance including the movement of the capital city to southwest China led by the Nationalist government and the construction of the rear area ruled by it (大後方). What may be called diplomatic war as in the Washington Conference (1942), the Cairo Declaration (1943) and the Yalta Conference, not to mention the acceptance of the Japanese surrender at the end of the war. Such a narration is distanced from the position of the academic circle that has positively evaluated the diplomacy of the Nationalist government in the context of China’s national and great power diplomacy. *Outline*, vol. 1, 140; Oh Byeongsu, “Hangjeon sigi Jungguk ui ‘Jungguk geundae sa’ seosul gwa Dong-Asia insik ui byeonyong mit yusan,” *Seogang immun nonchong* 50 (2017): 280-283.

⁸¹ *Outline*, vol. 1, 136-7.

⁸² The textbook emphasizes that China contributed to the Allied powers not only by declaring war on the Axis powers and recovering the concessions of Tianjin and Hankou, but also by sending over 100,000 Chinese workers to the European theater. *Outline*, vol. 1, 115; Xu Guoqi, *Asia and the Great War: A Shared History* (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford University Press, 2017).

The victory in the Anti-Japanese War was the first complete victory by China against foreign aggression in modern times. The victory had a great influence on world peace sufficient to establish China's status as a great world power and allow the Chinese people to receive the respect of the peace-loving peoples of the world. This victory opened the door to a bright future and a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and the old China to move on to a new stage (of modern history).⁸³

This victory “combines the universal principles of Marxism, the concrete practice of the Chinese Revolution, and the victory of Maoism, changing fundamentally the direction of the development of Chinese society.”⁸⁴ With this official victory narrative, the *Outline* eventually equates the history of the CCP and modern Chinese history in the new vision for world history vis-à-vis the old version from the west.

Another important change is the portrayal of the Cold War. The *Outline* legitimizes the socialist transformation of China in relation to changes in the international order such as the Cold War and Détente and the post-Cold War world. The textbook locates the Cold War ‘a long-term state of confrontation and competition, of neither war nor peace, between the two camps headed by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. from the 1940s to the late 1980s and early 1990s.’ It deals with how the political, military, and ideological competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. intensified, beginning with the formation of the Eastern Bloc and the Berlin crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the emerging threat of nuclear war. The textbook portrays the confrontation between them as asymmetrical, with the U.S. as the first super power in the postwar world attempting to expand American social institutions on the basis of its overwhelming military superiority and with the Soviet Union seeking to hold it in check. However, the textbook is also critical of the Soviet Union. It criticizes the setting of communist parties and information bureaus in East European countries and the export of a

⁸³ *Outline*, vol. 1, 145.

⁸⁴ *Outline*, vol. 1, 152.

Soviet-style planned economy, which finally led these states to revolt against the Soviet Union and brought about the collapse of the socialist camp.⁸⁵ It also accounts for how the arms race went between the two camps due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the way the subsequent American Strategic Defense Initiative threatened world peace.

In dealing with the Cold War policy of China, the textbook emphasizes its peace diplomacy. According to the textbook, China “abolished the privileges of the imperialist states in China” and adhered to peace diplomacy not only with the states in the socialist camp such as the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, North Korea and Vietnam, but also with Third World countries including India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway and Egypt.⁸⁶ In addition, by taking a leading role at the Geneva Conference (April 1954), the Sino-India Negotiations (December 1953), and the Bandung Conference (April 1955), it portrayed itself as both a champion of the Third World and a great power contributing to world peace. As China became one of the top 5 world powers, in part due to its development of nuclear technology, and it secured the status of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, it took the lead in representing Third World.⁸⁷

The presentation of the post-Cold War in the *Outline* evinces the positioning of the Party-State even more directly. The textbook describes the revisionist spirit in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin and the policies of *perestroika* & *glasnost* as the causes of 1) ideological confusion, 2) ethnic separatism, and 3) the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ *Outline*, vol. 2, 111-2.

⁸⁶ *Outline*, vol. 1, 158, 160.

⁸⁷ *Outline*, vol. 2, 112. Although this may reflect the perception of reality of the current Chinese Party-State, it is rather different from the fact that China played the role of a regional empire acting as a proxy of the Soviet Union and had exported revolution in the name of internationalism since the Sino-Soviet conflict. Oh Byeongsu, “Hangjeon sigi Jungguk ui ‘Jungguk geundae sa’ seosul..”

⁸⁸ *Outline*, vol. 2, 121-123.

Yugoslavia undertook reform early ... establishing autonomous socialist institutions and facilitating economic development by mobilizing localities, enterprises, and the general populace. However, with the rise of localism caused by this reform and the intensification of the national question, the seeds of the break of the state were sown.... Reform in the other Eastern European states (Poland, Hungary, East Germany) was also successful. However, these reforms could not escape the Soviet Union model and from the 1980s the economies of some of these states collapsed, resulting in political turmoil. The communist parties in Eastern Europe under the auspices of the Soviet Union and the influence of the Western 'Peaceful Evolution' strategy, lost the direction of socialism, negated the leadership of Marxism and socialist institutions, denied the leading status of the communist party, and exercised political pluralism. From 1989 to 1992, the social and political system of the socialist Eastern Europe changed rapidly.

The textbook makes it clear that despite a lessening of tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union after 1985 the Soviet failure to confront Western soft strategies—Peaceful Evolution— against Eastern Europe was ultimately responsible for the disintegration of the Soviet bloc.⁸⁹ The Soviet case after the Cold War mirrors the task of socialist China, especially how to champion national liberation and socialist revolution in counter to the capitalist world system and how to maintain a great power as the main representative of Third World void of any hegemonic intervention of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Through the concept of socialism embedded in Chinese characteristics, the Party-State also brought forth a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and paved the way for the development principle of human society and the reconstruction of world socialism.⁹⁰

The *Outline* delineates the present world as the disintegration of the Cold War in the multipolar era and exemplifies the weakening of the U.S.,

⁸⁹ *Outline*, vol. 2, 113.

⁹⁰ *Outline*, vol. 2, 124-25.

the advent of the European Union, and the rise of Russia & Japan. What characterizes China of today is its contribution to the peace and prosperity of the world through multilateral diplomacy and new forms of international relations.⁹¹ Ideologically, however, the *Outline* directly opposes global capitalism by pinpointing the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 as an evidence that capitalism has not been resolved its basic contradiction that the most of the profits went to the developed countries of the west. It thus recommends that every country should protect its own economic safety and make good use of the opportunities provided by the global economy.⁹² It goes on to suggest that China, acting as the third great power, should carry on its own development and keep a distance from global capitalism. Indeed, this has also been the basic line of the Chinese Communist Party since Mao Zedong.

Conclusion

Since the beginning of the PRC in 1949, the teaching of history in China has changed in accord with the ideological policy of the Party-State and the dynamics of international relations. The official education curriculum during the Reform and Opening-up period abandoned the Soviet model and followed instead the style of history education in Europe and the U.S.. Against the background of the post-Cold War world, public education, in line with the state policy of modernization, aimed at preparing students for a future global information society. Since the Xi Jinping era, however, public history education has undergone a dramatic change. In reinterpreting its relationship with the world, China reconstructs a new state identity for national integration and ideological mobilization. This new identity is crucial given that the Party-State attempts to deal with global capitalism led by the U.S., the crisis of national identity during the Reform and Opening-up period, and the question of ethnicities & nations. As such, China is once

⁹¹ *Outline*, vol. 2, 133-5.

⁹² *Outline*, vol. 2, 135.

again resorting to the centripetal force of collective identity through knowledge-focused political education and state-led ideological education. In particular, keeping pace with Putin's Russia, the PRC strives for a non-Western hegemony in which to blend Marxism and nationalistic historical science and standardizes the form and content of history education in public school.

History: An Outline of Chinese and Foreign History embodies this new national identity able to glorify China's national history as an imperial history, based on the theory of cultural empire, in premodern times and the history of a non-Western great power in modern times. The imperial history emphasizes the ongoing process of unification, less than class struggle or conflict, where diverse ethnicities and classes through universal laws and the institutions of empire, thereby propagating the idea that China had long been a multi-ethnic regional empire since ancient times. The non-Western great power underlines the ongoing process of revolution in such a way that the CCP has marshalled the success of its anti-feudal, anti-colonial, and anti-imperial movements in the first half of the 20th century into an international solidarity to champion the interests of the Third World during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era. It further envisions socialist China to take an alternative path to development against U.S.-led global capitalism in the 21st century and to contend for their regional power in Northeast Asian and East Asia. Then, the reevaluation of Chinese history as an imperial history and a great power can grant a kind of diachronic legitimacy to the PRC for its leading role in the region. But, the new national identity of the PRC seems to be closely tied to re-Sinicization whose center-periphery framework might pronounce hegemonic involvement of the PRC in neighboring states and give rise to regional instability in East Asia. Then, the leadership of the PRC could dismantle the national identities and cultural tradition of the neighboring states by justifying a hierarchical top-down relationship, whether unwittingly or otherwise, in the region.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

- Ministry of Education of China 中國教育部, Putong gaozhong lishi kecheng biao-zhun (2017 Nianban) 普通高中歷史課程標準 (2017年版). Beijing: People's Education Press, 2018.
- . *Lishi: Zhongwai lishi gangyao* 歷史: 中外歷史綱要 [History: Outline of Chinese and foreign history]. Vol. 1 (上). Beijing: People's Education Press, 2019.
- . Putong gaozhong lishi kecheng biao-zhun 普通高中歷史課程標準. Beijing: People's Education Press, 2003.
- . *Lishi: Zhongwai lishi gangyao* 歷史: 中外歷史綱要 [History: Outline of Chinese and foreign history]. Vol. 2 (下). Beijing: People's Education Press, 2020.
- . *Lishi 1: Guojia zhidu yu shehui zhili* 歷史1: 國家制度與社會治理 [History 1: State institutions and social governance]. Beijing: People's Education Press, 2020.

Secondary Sources

- Baum, Richard. *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Bu Ping. "Gaige kaifang yu zhongguo jindai shi yanjiu" 改革開放與中國近代史研究 [Reform and Opening and research on modern Chinese history]. *Jindai shi yanjiu* 近代史研究 5, 2009.
- Bu Xianqun. "Xin zhongguo qishi nian shixue fazhan daolu" 新中國七十年史學發展道路 [The development of historical science in the seventy years of new China]. *Zhongguo shi yan jiu* 中國史研究 3, 2019.
- Cheek, Timothy. *The Intellectual in Modern Chinese History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Cheng, Yinghong. *Creating the "New Man": From Enlightenment Ideals to Socialist Realities*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008.
- Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 中国社会科学院, Ed. *Lishi xuwu zhuyi pipan wenxuan* 歷史虛無主義批判文選 [Selected critiques on historical nihilism]. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press 中国社会科学出版社, 2015.

- Choe Deokgyu. "Global hiseutori ui suyong gwa byeon yong: Jungguk, Russia, Hanguk sarye e daehan bigyo yeongu" 글로벌히스토리(Global History)의 수용과 변용: 중국, 러시아, 한국 사례에 대한 비교연구 [A study on the acceptance and transformation of global history: China, Russia and Korea]. *Seoyangsa ron* 서양사론 40, 2016.
- Culp, Joseph Robert. *Articulating Citizenship: Civic Education and Student Politics in Southeastern China, 1912-1940*, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007.
- Fang Chengzhi. *Jiannan de guizheng: Xin zhongguo shiqi nian (1949-1966) zhong xiaoxue jiaokeshu yanjiu* 艱難的規整: 新中國十七年(1949-1966)中小學教科書研究 [Painstaking regulation: A study of the primary and secondary school textbooks in the 17 Years of New China (1949-1966)]. Changsha: Hunan Normal University Press 湖南師範大學出版社, 2013.
- Feng Yiyi. "Jieji douzheng shi fanshi yu woguo xiandai zhongxue lishi kecheng de yanbian" 階級鬥爭史範式與我國現代中學歷史課程的演變 [The paradigm of class struggle and the evolution of the middle school history curriculum in contemporary China]. *Lishi jiao xue* 歷史教學 542, 2008.
- Ge Zhaoguang. "Cong 'diguojiangyu' dao 'guo jia lingtu': 'Wuss' zhiqian youguan 'zhuquan' wenti de riben ciji yu zhongguo fanying" 从“帝国疆域”到“国家领土”: “五四”之前有關“主權”問題的日本刺激與中國反應 [From “empire territory” to “national territory”: Japan’s stimulus to the “sovereignty” related problem before “May fourth” and China’s response]. *Wenshizhe* 文史哲 3, 2019.
- . “Dang ‘xian luo’ gaiming ‘taiguo’: Cong yijiusanjiu nian wangshi shuo dao lishi xue yu minzu zhuyi” 当“暹罗”改名“泰国”: 从一九三九年往事说到历史学与民族主义 [When “Siam” was renamed “Thailand”: From the Narration of the Past Event of 1939 to Historical Science and Nationalism]. *Dushu* 读书 11, 2018.
- . “Dui ‘tianxia’ de xiangxiang: Yige wutuobang xiangxiang beihou de zhengzhi, sixiang yu xueshu” 對「天下」的想像: 一个乌托邦想象背后的政治, 思想与学术 [The imagination of “the world”: The politics, thought, and academics behind a utopian imagination]. *Sixiang* 思想 29, 2015.
- . *Zhai zi Zhongguo: Chongjian youguan “Zhongguo” de lishi lunshu* 宅兹中国: 重建有关“中国”的历史论述 [Zhaizi China: Reconstructing historical discourse on “China”]. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju 中华书局, 2011.
- . *He wei Zhongguo: Jiang yu, min zu, wen hua yu lishi* 何為中國: 疆域, 民族, 文化

- 與歷史 [What is China?: Territory, ethnicity, culture, and history]. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- . *Lishi zhongguo de nei yu wai: Yuuguan “zhongguo” yu “zhoubian” gainian de zai chengqing* 歷史中國的內與外: 有關“中國”與“周邊”概念的再澄清 [Inside and outside of historical China: Re-clarification of the concepts of “China” and “periphery”]. Xianggang: Zhongwen Daxue Chubanshe 中文大學出版社, 2017.
- Gong Yun. “Zhongguo jin xiandai shi yanjiu lishi xuwu zhuyi sichao chansheng de renshi genyuan” 中國近現代史研究歷史虛無主義思潮產生的認識根源 [The origins of the perspectives that produced the trend of historical nihilism in the study of Chinese modern and contemporary history]. In *Jingtì lishi xuwu zhuyi sichao* 警惕歷史虛無主義思潮 [Alert for the trend of historical nihilism], Edited by Liang Zhu 梁柱 and Gong Shudou, 龚书铎. Beijing: People’s Education Press 人民教育出版社, 2006.
- Jiang Yihua. “Cong geming dao ren de jiefang: Zhongguo shixue liushi nian” 從革命到人的解放: 中國史學六十年 [From revolution to human liberation: Sixty years of Chinese history science]. In *Xinshi liguo* 信史立國. Shanghai: Renmín Chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 2012.
- Kim Jihun. “Gukga uiji wa yeoksa gyogwaseo ui jeongchi hwa: 2018 nyeon Jungguk junghakgyo yeoksa gyogwaseo ui hyeondaesa seosul” 국가의지와 역사교과서의 정치화: 2018년 중국 중학교 역사교과서의 현대사 서술 [State will and politicization of history textbooks: Chinese middle school history textbook’s description of modern history in 2018]. *Yeoksa gyoyuk yeongu* 역사교육연구 33, 2019.
- . “Jungguk Shanghai yeoksa gyogwaseo nonjaeng gwa jisikin: Shanghai jiyek godeunghakgyo yeoksa gyogwaseo ui byeonhwa” 중국 상하이 역사교과서 논쟁과 지식인: 상하이 지역 고등학교 역사교과서의 변화 [The “history” textbook debates and the intellectuals in Shanghai, People’s Republic of China]. *Jungguk geunhyeondaesa yeongu* 중국근현대사연구 81, 2019.
- Kim Yuri. “Daeman, JungguK gwa DongA, segye: 2018 nyeon Daeman ui jungdeung hakgyo yeoksa gwajeong gaehyeok bunseok” 대만, 중국과 동아, 세계: 2018년 대만의 중등학교 역사과정 개혁 분석 [Taiwan, China and East Asia, world: An analysis of Taiwanese history course reform in 2018]. *Yeoksa gyoyuk* 歷史教育 151, 2019.
- . “Gukjeongje ro hoegwihan Jungguk ui junghakgyo yeoksa gyogwaseo bunseok” 국정제로 회귀한 중국의 중학교 역사교과서 분석 [An analysis of Chinese

- middle school history textbooks returned to the single national textbooks]. *Yeoksa gyoyuk* 歷史教育 148, 2018.
- . “Yeoksa gyohak daegang eseo yeoksa gwajeong pyojun euro: Choegeun Jung-guk ui yeoksa gyoyuk gwajeong gachyeok” 역사교학대강에서 역사과정표준으로: 최근 중국의 역사교육과정 개혁 [From “history program” to “history curriculum standards” — The changes in recent history curricula in China]. *Yeoksa gyoyuk* 역사교육 96, 2005.
- Liu Chao. *Lishi shuxie yu rentong jiangou: qingmo minguo shiqi lishi jiaokeshu yanjiu* 歷史書寫與認同建構: 清末民國時期歷史教科書研究 [Historical writing and identity construction: A study of historical textbooks in the late Qing and the Republic of China period]. Shehuikexue Wenxian Chubanshe 社會科學文獻出版社, 2016.
- Ma Rong. “Dui dangdai minzu zhengce de fansi” 對當代民族政策的反思 [Reflections on contemporary ethnic policy]. *Qinghai minzu yan jiu* 青海民族研究 24, No. 4, 2013.
- . “Zhongguo minzu wenti de lishi yu xianzhuang” 中國民族問題的歷史與現狀 [The history and current situation of China’s national question]. *Yunnan minzu daxue xuebao* 雲南民族大學學報 28, No. 5, 2011.
- Nie Youli. *Lishi kecheng yu jiao xue lun* 歷史課程與教學論 [History curriculum and teaching theory]. Hangzhou: Zhejiang Jiaoyu Chubanshe 浙江教育出版社, 2003.
- Oh Byung-soo. “Gungnae hakgye ui Jungguk yeoksa gyogwaseo yeongu gyeonghyang gwa gwaje” 국내 학계의 중국 역사교과서 연구 경향과 과제 [Recent trends and challenges of Chinese history textbook studies in Korea]. *Dongbuka yeoksa nonchong* 동북아역사논총 53, 2016.
- . “Hangjeon sigi Jungguk ui ‘Jungguk geundae sa’ seosul gwa Dong-Asia insik ui byeonyong mit yusan” 향진시기 중국의 “중국근대사” 서술과 동아시아 인식의 변용 및 유산 [The Chinese view on East Asia in its modern historical narration of the anti-Japanese war era]. *Seogang inmun nonchong* 서강인문논총 50, 2017.
- Shi Zhan. *Zhou chou: 3000 nian de Zhongguo* 軸柵: 3000年的中國 [The axle: 3000 years China]. Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press 广西师范大学出版社, 2018.
- Song Sangheon. “Yeoksahak gwa yeoksa gyoyuk ui geori” 역사학과 역사교육의 거리

- [Distance between history teaching and the discipline of history]. *Yeoksa gyoyuk* 역사교육 138, 2016.
- . “Yeoksa insik eseo mirae jeonmang ui yeoksa gyoyukjeok uimi” 역사 인식에서 미래 전망의 역사교육적 의미 [Perspectives about the future of history teaching]. *Yeoksa gyoyuk* 역사교육 115, 2010.
- Wang Duoquan. “Shi dalin yu zhongguo lishi jiao xue” 士大林與中國歷史教學 [Stalin and the teaching of history in China]. *Shanghai shifan daxue xuebao* 上海師範大學學報 1, 1980.
- Wang Hongzhi. “Zhongshi lishi ke kai hao lishi ke” 重視歷史科 開好歷史科 [Taking the subject of history seriously and improving its development]. *Lishi jiao xue* 歷史教學 470, No. 1, 2003.
- Wang Wenguang. “‘Da yitong’ Zhongguo fazhan shi yu zhongguo bianjiang minzu fazhan de ‘duoyuan yitong’” “大一统”中国发展史与中国边疆民族发展的“多元一统” [The history of the development of “great unity” China and the pluralistic unity of the development of ethnicities in the borderlands of China]. *Bianjiang shi di yanjiu* 邊疆史地研究 25, No. 4, 2015.
- Wei Zhaogai. “Jingtì lishi xuwu zhuyi sichao” 警惕歷史虛無主義思潮 [Beware of the trend of historical nihilism]. *Guangming Daily* 光明日報, March 15, 2005.
- Xia Chuntao. “Lishi xuwu zhuyi jiexi” 歷史虛無主義解析 [Analysis of historical nihilism]. *Shixue lilun yan jiu* 史學理論研究 3, 2019.
- Xu Cicheng and Zhao Yafu. “Lishi jiao ke shu yu lishi guan jiaoyu: yijin ershi nianlai lishi jiao ke shu gaige wei li” 歷史教科書與歷史觀教育: 以近二十年來歷史教科書改革為例 [History textbook and education of historical perspective: A case study on the reform of history textbooks in the past twenty years]. *Neimenggu shifan daxue xuebao* 內蒙古師範大學學報 7, 2019.
- Xu, Guoqi. *Asia and the Great War: A Shared History*. Oxford, Eng.: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Xu Xin. *Chaoji daguo de bengkuai: Sulian jieti yuanyin tanxi* 超級大國的崩潰: 蘇聯解體原因探析 [The collapse of a superpower: An analysis of the causes of the disintegration of the Soviet Union]. Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe 社會科學文獻出版社, 2001.
- Yun Sebyeong. “Jungguk ui yeoksa gyogwaseo nonjaeng gwa gukjeonghwa” 中韓의 역사 교과서 논쟁과 국정화 [The dispute over the history textbook and the policy of country-designated textbooks in China]. *Yeoksa gyoyuk yeongu* 역사교육연

구 33, 2019.

- . “Yeoksa gyogwaseo bipan eul dulleossan Jungguk sahoe ui galdeung: 2006 nyeon bingjeom sageon eul jungsim euro” 역사교과서 비판을 둘러싼 중국 사회의 갈등: 2006년 빙점사건을 중심으로 [The conflict over the history textbook in China: Centered on the scandal of Bingdian on 2006]. *Jungguk geunhyeondaesa yeongu* 중국근현대사연구 83, 2019.
- Yu Pei. “Hou xiandai zhuyi lishi guan he lishi xuwu zhuyi” 後現代主義歷史觀和歷史虛無主義 [Postmodernist conception of history and historical nihilism]. *Lishi yan jiu* 歷史研究 3, 2015.
- Yu Weimin. “Lishi guannian yu gongmin jiao yu: 2007 Nyeonpan Shanghai shi gaozhong lishi jiao ke shu de shijie lishi guan” 歷史觀念與公民教育: 上海市高中歷史教科書的世界歷史觀 [The concept of history and citizen education: The concept of world history in the 2007 edition of Shanghai City high school history textbook]. In *Wenhua he jiaoyu shiye*, edited by Yu Weimin and Liu Chang.
- . *Lishi jiaoyu zhanwang* 歷史教育展望 [Prospects of history and education]. Shanghai: East China Normal University Press 華東師範大學出版社, 2002.
- Yu Weimin and Liu Chang 劉昶. eds. *Wenhua he jiaoyu shiye zhong de guomin yishi* 文化和教育視野中的國民意識 [National consciousness in the perspective of culture and education]. Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu Chubanshe 上海辭書出版社, 2012.
- Zarrow, Peter. *Educating China: Knowledge, Society and Textbooks in a Modernizing World, 1902-1937*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Zhang Haipeng. “Lishi dianshiju Zouxiang gonghe xuanyang shenmo lishi guan” 歷史電視劇『走向共和』宣揚什麼歷史觀 [What historical perspective is preached in the historical TV series *Towards a Republic*]. *Makesi zhuyi yan jiu* 馬克思主義研究 5, 2003.
- . “Tong bian gaozhong lishi jiao ke shu de xueke tixi he xueshu tixi” 統編高中歷史教科書的學科體系和學術體系 [The disciplinary system and the academic system of the comprehensive compilation of senior secondary history textbooks]. *Kecheng-jiao cai-jiao fa* 課程·教材·教法 39, No. 9, 2019.
- . “Tuijin woguo shixue huayu tixi jianshe” 推進我國史學話語體系建設 [Promoting the construction of my country’s historical science discourse system].

Renmin ribao 人民日報, July 25, 2016.

- . “*Zhongguo jindai shi jiao cai* (“Ma gongcheng” xilie) bianzhu de youguan wenti yu sikao” 『中國近代史』教材(“馬工程”系列)編著的有關問題與思考 [Thought on the problems relating to the compilation of *Chinese Modern History* teaching material (The “Marx Project” series)]. *Shixue yuekan* 史學月刊, 6, 2014.
- . *Zhongguo kangzhan yu shijie fan faxisi zhanzheng* 中國抗戰與世界反法西斯戰爭 [China’s war of resistance against Japanese aggression and the world anti-fascist war]. Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe 社會科學文獻出版社, 2008.
- Zhang Haipeng and Zhao Qingyun. “Lishi xuwu zhuyi de ruogan biaoxiang ji qi shizhi” 歷史虛無主義的若干表象及其實質 [Some representations of historical nihilism and their substance]. *Shijie shehui zhuyi yan jiu* 世界社會主義研究 9, 2018.
- Zhang Hanlin and Xiong Qiaoyi. “Lishi kecheng biao zhun yu guojia rentong de jian-gou” 歷史課程標準與國家認同的建構 [History curriculum standards and the construction of state identity]. *Lishi jiao xue* 歷史教學 2, 2019.
- Zhang Shengfa. “Eluosi lishi jiao ke shu wenti de yuanqi yu fazhan: 2003 nian zhi-jin” 俄羅斯歷史教科書問題的緣起與發展: 2003年至今 [The origin and development of the problem of Russian history textbooks: from 2003 to the present]. *Eluosi xue kan* 俄羅斯學刊 3, 2012.
- Zhao Yafu. “Gaozhong lishi kecheng sheji you dui gaijin” 高中歷史課程設計有對改進 [Senior secondary history curriculum design has made improvements]. *Lishi jiao xue* 歷史教學 5, 2006.
- . *Guo wai lishi jiaoyu toushi* 國外歷史教育透視 [Perspectives on foreign history education]. Beijing: Gaodeng Jiaoyu Chubanshe 高等教育出版社, 2003.
- . “Jin shi nianlai zhongguo dalu lishi kecheng gaige” 近十年來中國大陸歷史課程改革 [Reform of history curriculum in mainland China in the past 10 years]. Paper presented at the Han-Jung yeoksa gyoyuk jeonmunga semina 韓中歷史教育專門家세미나, October 2015.
- . “Pipan xing siwei jue ding lishi jiao xue de zhiliang” 批判性思維決定歷史教學的質量 [Critical thinking determines the quality of history teaching]. *Kecheng-jiao cai-jiao fa* 課程·教材·教法 33, no. 2, 2013.
- . “Xuexiao lishi kecheng de gongmin jiaoyu zhuiqiu” 學校歷史課程的公民教育

追求 [The pursuit of civic education in school history curriculum]. *Quanqiu jiaoyu zhawang* 全球教育展望 38, No. 4, 2009.

Zhao Yafu and Wang Jiping. “Meiguo lishi jiao xue de yan jiu shiye” 美國歷史教學的研究視野 [Research perspectives of American history education]. *Lishi jiao xue wenti* 歷史教學問題 4, 2011.







Articles
(Translated)






Liu Yi's Surrender to the Ming and the Nature of Goryeo Missions to the Ming Dynasty

Eun-sook YOON
Kangwon National University



The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 18 Number 2 (Summer 2022), 137-175
Copyright © 2022 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.





Liu Yi's Surrender to the Ming and the Nature of Goryeo Missions to the Ming Dynasty

Eun-sook YOON

Kangwon National University

Introduction

In 1368, the Ming dynasty drove the forces of the Yuan dynasty north and seized the Central Plain (中原). The Yuan and Goryeo, however, retained extensive influence in the Liaodong region. Following the relocation of the Yuan administrative center to the north, Naghachu – a descendant of Muqali of the Jalair Family – gained control of, as well as expanded his influence in, the Liaoyang Branch Secretariat (遼陽行省). After the ceding of the Shenyang Route (瀋陽路) to King Chungseon of Goryeo upon his investiture as Prince of Shen (瀋王), many people from Goryeo came to settle in the Shenyang area. Goryeo, therefore, believed that its ruling power extended to Shenyang, and it was this belief that led to its attempt to conquer the Liaodong region in 1370.

Although conflicts occasionally took place between Goryeo and Naghachu, the order established under Yuan rule was generally maintained in Liaodong between 1368 and 1371. This order, however, started to disintegrate when Liu Yi (劉益) – Manager of Governmental Affairs (平章政事) of the Liaoyang Branch Secretariat – surrendered to the Ming dynasty in 1371. The Ming forces were thus able to advance into Liaodong, prompting Goryeo and Naghachu to explore various means of holding them back.

For example, Goryeo sent Han Bang-eon (韓邦彥) on a mission from Goryeo through Liaodong to the Ming dynasty in 1371. For this mission, the Goryeo court ordered Han to travel overland through Liaodong on the way to Jinling (金陵; modern Nanjing), instead of taking the agreed sea route. This incensed the Ming emperor Zhu Yuanzhang as he believed the mission's deviation was to gather intelligence in Liaoyang and Niujiashuang (牛家莊). Zhu's suspicion was based on the fact that the Ming dynasty had been building military bases along the route the Goryeo mission took through Liaodong. Niujiashuang in particular was an important defensive point for the Ming dynasty because of the logistics base there. Traveling through Niujiashuang strongly suggested that the Goryeo mission intended to spy on Ming military activities in southern Liaodong.

In the context of the fierce rivalry between the Northern Yuan and the Ming, Liu Yi's surrender and Han Bang-eon's mission through Liaodong led to far-reaching consequences in East Asia. The former prompted Goryeo to form an alliance with Naghachu. When Ayushiridara – the Great Khan of the Northern Yuan (r. 1370-78) after the death of Toghon Temür – defeated the Ming forces in the battle of Qaraqorum in 1372, King Gongmin felt the need to reinforce Goryeo's ties with those in power in Liaodong including Naghachu. Han's detour through Liaodong may have contributed to Naghachu's attack on Niujiashuang in 1372 since it was unlikely Naghachu was well informed about a place far from his own base of operations, suggesting that the attack was an outcome of collaboration between Goryeo and Naghachu.

Previous studies on King Gongmin's diplomacy toward the Ming dynasty have mainly focused on investiture and tribute.¹ While King Gong-

¹ Important Chinese studies include Jiang Longfan (姜龍范) and Liu Zimin (劉子敏), *Mingdai Zhongchao guanxishi* [A History of Sino-Korean Relations during the Ming Dynasty] (Harbin: Heilongjiang Chaoxian Minzu Chubanshe, 1999); Xue Huang (薛篁), "Ming Hongwu nianjian Mingchao yu Gaoli wangchao guanxi lüelun" [A Brief Survey on Ming-Goryeo Relations during the Hongwu Emperor's Reign], *Shehui kexue zhanxian* 4 (1997); Yang Yang (楊暘), *Mingdai Liaodong dushi* [The Liaodong Regional Military Commission in the Ming Dynasty] (Zhengzhou: Zhengzhou Guji Chubanshe, 1988); Li Jiancai (李健才), *Dongbei shidi kaolue* [A Brief Examination of the History and Geography of Northeast China] (Changchun: Jilin

min certainly tried to maintain friendly relations with the Ming, he remained in close communication with the Yuan as well. Thus, King Gongmin's diplomacy was clearly driven by practical concerns. This paper thus focuses on Liu Yi's surrender – especially its role in allowing the Ming to

Wenshi Chubanshe, 1986); and Zhang Shizun (張士尊), “Gaoli yu Beiyuan guanxi dui Ming yu Gaoli guanxi de yingxiang” [The Impact of Goryeo's Relations with the Northern Yuan on the Relationship between the Ming and Goryeo], *Suihua shizhuan xuebao* 1 (1997). These studies emphasize that the Yuan dynasty's northward retreat placed East Asia under the firm control of the Ming dynasty. However, they fail to note that the power of Goryeo and the Northern Yuan still extended to Liaodong before Liu Yi's surrender to the Ming. A study by Li Xinfeng (李新峰) in 1998 suggested that given the conditions at the time, Goryeo's claim of failed missions via sea routes was an invalid reason for King Gongmin to order his envoys to take a land route through Liaodong. For details, see Li Xinfeng, “Gongminwang houqi Ming Gaoli guanxi yu Ming Meng zhanju” [Goryeo-Ming Relations in the Later Years of King Gongmin's Reign and the Progress of Ming-Mongol War], *Hanguoxue lunwenji* 7 (1998). Korean studies on this topic include Kim Kyeong-nok, “Gongminwangdae gukje jeongse wa daeoe gwangye ui jeongae yangsang” [Developments of International Situation and Foreign Relations during the Period of King Gongmin], *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 64 (2007); “Joseon sidae dae Jungguk oegyo munseo wa oegyo jeongbo ui sujip bojon chegye” [The System of Gathering and Preserving Diplomatic Documents to China and Diplomatic Information during the Joseon Period], *Dongbuga yeoksa nonchong* 25 (2009); “Yeomal Seoncho Hongmuje ui Goryeo Joseon insik gwa oegyo gwangye” [The Hongwu Emperor's Understanding of Goryeo and Joseon and the Ming Dynasty's Relations with Goryeo and Joseon], *Myeongcheongsa yeongu* 35 (2011); Kim Sun-ja, *Hanguk jungse Hanjung gwangyesa* [A History of Medieval Korea-China Relations] (Seoul: Hyeon, 2007); Park Seong-ju, “Goryeomal Ryeo Myeong gan jogong chaekbong gwangye ui jeongae wa geu seonggyeok” [The Development and Character of Tributary and Investiture Relationships between Goryeo and the Ming at the End of the Goryeo Period], *Gyeongju sahak* 23 (2004); Min Hyeon-gu, “Goryeo Gongminwangdae banwonjeok gachyeok jeongchi ui jeongae gwajeong” [The Developments of King Gongmin's Anti-Yuan Reform Politics], in *Heo Seon-do seonsaeng jeongnyeon ginyeom Hanguk sahak nonchong* [A Collection of Articles on Korean History: Festschrift for Professor Heo Seon-Do in Celebration of his Retirement] (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1992); Park Won-ho, “Goryeo wa Juwongjang ui cheot gyoseop e gwanhan sogo” [A Brief Survey on the First Contact between Goryeo and Zhu Yuanzhang], *Bukbangsa nonchong* 3 (2005); Lee Kang-han, “Gongminwang 5 nyeon (1356) ‘banwon gachyeok’ ui jaegemo” [A Reexamination of the So-called ‘Anti-Yuan Reforms’ conducted by King Gongmin in 1356], *Daedong munhwa yeongu* 65 (2009); Lee Ik-joo, “Gongminwangdae gachyeok ui chui wa sinheung yusin ui seongjang” [The Progress of King Gongmin's Reform and the Emergence of Confucian Officials], *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 15 (1995); and Hong Young-ui, “Gongminwang chogi gachyeok jeongchi wa jeongchi seryeok ui chui: Sang” [Political Reform in the Early Years of King Gongmin's Reign and Changes in Political Powers: Part 1], *Sahak yeongu* 42 (1990); “Gongminwang chogi gachyeok jeongchi wa jeongchi seryeok ui chui: Ha” [Political Reform in the Early Years of King Gongmin's Reign and Changes in Political Powers: Part 2], *Sahak yeongu* 43/44 (1992). These studies primarily focus on King Gongmin's policies or Goryeo's tributary relations with the Ming dynasty.

advance into Liaodong – and the resultant Goryeo mission through Liaodong in 1371.

The Establishment of Goryeo's Relations with the Ming Dynasty

Jinling – the capital of the early Ming dynasty – was located much further southeast than the capitals of preceding Chinese dynasties. When Zhu Yuanzhang proclaimed the establishment of the Ming Dynasty in early 1368, Dadu (大都; today's Beijing) was still under the Yuan dynasty's control. For this reason, the Ming dynasty had to choose its capital in southeastern China far away from the Yuan court in Dadu and Mongolia. The fact that the Ming capital was in southeast China suggests the possibility that the Ming dynasty would have placed more weight on its relations with Goryeo (and later Joseon) and Japan compared to other Chinese dynasties with their capitals in north or west China. Because the Goryeo royal family had blood ties through marriage with the Yuan imperial family, the nascent Ming dynasty needed to prevent Goryeo from acting in solidarity with the Yuan. As such, the Ming was eager to establish diplomatic relations with Goryeo.

Once Zhu Yuanzhang established the Ming dynasty in January 1368, he sent troops to Dadu to prepare for a showdown with the Yuan. When the Yuan emperor Toghon Temür heard that the Ming troops had entered Tongzhou (通州), he left Dadu under cover of darkness on July 28 and headed north toward Shangdu (上都), leaving barely any Mongol troops in Dadu except for a few commanders such as the Prince of Huai (淮王) Temür Buqa, the Grand Councilor (丞相) Qing Tong (慶童), and the Dadu Route Commander (大都路總管) Kuo Yunzhong (廓允中).² On August 3, the few remaining Yuan troops engaged the Ming troops led by Xu Da (徐達) and Chang Yuchun (常遇春), but the city eventually fell. The Ming immediately

² Liu Ji, "Beixun siji" [A Personal Account of the Northern Patrol], in *Mingdai Menggu hanji shiliao huibian* [A Compilation of Chinese Historical Materials on the Mongols in the Ming Period] (Huhehaote: Neimenggu Daxue Chubanshe, 1993).

changed the city's name from Dadu to Beiping (北平), a clear signal that they had overthrown the Yuan.³ Soon afterward, Zhu Yuanzhang sent Xie Si (偰斯), who was then Seals Secretary in the Chancellery (符寶郎), to Goryeo to announce the foundation of the Ming dynasty and to urge Goryeo to abandon the Yuan and establish diplomatic relations with the Ming.⁴ However, Goryeo was reluctant to break its ties with the Yuan. As such, Zhu sent gifts to Goryeo through his eunuch Kim Yeo-yeon (金麗淵) and repatriated 156 people.⁵ These gestures show how eager Zhu was to establish diplomatic relations with Goryeo.⁶

The motive behind Zhu's policy of appeasement was directly related to the Ming's confrontation with the Yuan. After it retreated to the north, Toghon Temür's court soon formed a plan to recapture Dadu and began to assemble the Mongol forces. In October 1368, Toghon Temür bestowed the royal titles Prince of Qi (齊王) on Köke Temür and Prince of Liang (梁王) on Esen Buqa and placed them in charge of recapturing Dadu. Köke Temür was one of the greatest Yuan warlords, and he had previously assisted Ayushiridara in his fight for hegemony against Bolor Temür in the mid-1360s. When Toghon Temür decided to leave Dadu in 1368, Köke Temür had a considerable number of armed forces at his disposal, albeit far away from Dadu.

In December 1368, the Mongol forces laid siege to Dadu, but to no avail. At that time, the Yuan forces were still mighty and impressive, including one hundred thousand troops led by Köke Temür, one hundred thousand troops under Bazalawarmi – Prince of Liang in Yunnan, two hundred thousand troops led by Naghachu, the Mongol troops that moved

³ Gao Dai, "Hongyoulu" [Extensive Plans], in *Mingdai Menggu hanji shiliao huibian* (Huhehaote: Neimenggu Daxue Chubanshe, 1993).

⁴ *Ming Taizu shilu* [Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty, the Taizu Reign], vol. 37, section for lunar December 1368 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1962).

⁵ *Goryeosa* [History of Goryeo], vol. 41, entry for lunar June 4, 1369 (Seoul: Asea Munhwasa, 1972).

⁶ Xue, "Ming Hongwu nianjian Mingchao yu Gaoli wangchao guanxi lüelun," 166.

north following Toghon Temür, and others.⁷ In response, Zhu Yuanzhang sought to isolate the Yuan by establishing diplomatic ties with Goryeo as quickly as possible.

At the same time as Zhu Yuanzhang was sending emissaries to Goryeo, Toghon Temür was attempting to stop Goryeo from abandoning its ties with the Yuan. Having been forced to flee Dadu due to approaching Ming troops on July 28, Toghon Temür slipped through the Juyong Pass (居庸關) and made his way to the old summer capital of Shangdu. However, the rain slowed his progress, and he was unable to reach Shangdu until August 15. Shangdu had ceased to function as a summer capital about a decade earlier when the Red Turbans destroyed its palace and government buildings. The Yuan court's financial circumstances in Shangdu deteriorated to the point that it had to rely on the 20,000 rolls of silk and 880 tons of grain that Esen Buqa – Assistant Director of the Left (左丞) of the Liaoyang Branch Secretariat – provided when building tent palaces upon arrival.

Meanwhile, Köke Temür, Naghachu, Naimandai – Vice Commissioner of the Branch Bureau of Military Affairs of Shangdu (上都行樞密副使), and Prince Tulai all gathered at Shangdu upon hearing of the Yuan court's retreat. After the Yuan court became somewhat settled in Shangdu, Toghon Temür assembled military officers and from September 11 began to devise a plan to recapture Dadu. In the same month, Hong Baobao (洪寶寶) sent an envoy to Goryeo, as did Manzi Qan (蠻子罕) in November, to ask for Goryeo's military support in recapturing Dadu. However, they received no immediate response from Goryeo. Although Goryeo did send a customary annual tribute in January 1369, it made no move to support the Yuan. Despite this, Toghon Temür still hoped that Goryeo would agree to send troops to his aid. In February, he sent Durqai – Vice Director of the Ministry of Works (工部侍郎) – with gifts of clothes and liquor to King Gongmin. In March, he appointed King Gongmin Grand Councilor of the Right (右丞相) in an attempt to pressure Goryeo into providing military support and to

⁷ Ider, *Yuan' ulsyn ikh tüshimel Khökhötömör* [Khökhötömör, A Great Official of the Yuan Ulus] (Ulaanbaatar: Soyombo Printing, 2012), 145.

prevent it from abandoning the Yuan. Given Liu Ji (劉佖)'s statement that he was then suspicious of Goryeo but did not report this to his superiors,⁸ the Yuan court in Shangdu was concerned over Goryeo's possible defection.

In Goryeo, King Gongmin continued to send annual tribute missions to the Yuan court but found it difficult to comply with the request for military support. Circumstances in East Asia were constantly changing, and coming to the aid of the declining Yuan dynasty would brand Goryeo an enemy in the eyes of the Ming. Thus, he chose to monitor developments between the two dynasties for the time being. When Xie Si arrived in Goryeo in April 1369, King Gongmin responded by presenting a diplomatic memorial (表文) to Zhu Yuanzhang.⁹ In this memorial, he acknowledged the Ming as a legitimate Chinese dynasty. After Xie Si left for home on May 4, King Gongmin discontinued the use of the Yuan reign title Zhizheng (至正) and began officially referring to the Yuan dynasty as the "Northern Yuan (北元)" from August 1369.¹⁰

These events resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations between Goryeo and the Ming, and from April 1369, vibrant exchanges ensued for about a year. In May 1369, Goryeo dispatched Hong Sang-jae – Minister of the Ministry of Rites (禮部尚書) – and Yi Ha-saeng – Superior Military Protector of the Palace Gate Guard (監門衛上護軍) – to Jinling to congratulate the Ming emperor on his enthronement. On August 14, the Ming dynasty invested King Gongmin as King of Goryeo and again sent Xie Si to Goryeo to deliver a message along with a golden seal, an edict, and a piece of the Imperial Calendar of Datong (大統曆). That same month, Goryeo sent Seong Jun-deuk (成准得) – Minister of the Ministry of Military Affairs (摠部尚書) – as an envoy to congratulate Zhu Yuanzhang on his birthday, Kim Gap-wu (金甲雨) – General-in-chief (大將軍) – to celebrate the crown prince's birthday, and Jang Ja-on (張子溫) – Minister of the Min-

⁸ Liu Ji, "Beixun siji."

⁹ *Goryeosa*, vol. 41, entry for lunar April 28, 1369.

¹⁰ *Goryeosa*, vol. 41, entry for lunar August and September, 1369.

istry of Works (工部尙書) – to deliver New Year’s greetings. As a friendly response, the Ming repatriated approximately 160 people to Goryeo.

The Ming dynasty had emerged as the new ruler of the Central Plain following the Yuan dynasty’s northward retreat. Goryeo thus sought political stability by entering into a tributary relationship with the Ming in 1369 and at the same time cutting off the official relationship with the Yuan. Nevertheless, Goryeo continued to communicate closely with the Northern Yuan.¹¹ In fact, Goryeo envoys made their way between Goryeo and the Northern Yuan nineteen times between May 1369 and 1374 when Goryeo severed its relationship with the Ming dynasty. Five of these missions occurred between May and December 1369, suggesting that King Gongmin’s foreign policy was not necessarily exclusively pro-Ming.¹² In other words, the Yuan’s northward retreat changed the international circumstance in East Asia, creating a situation where Goryeo, Yuan, and Ming interests intersected in the developments that unfolded thereafter.

Liu Yi’s Surrender and Goryeo’s Request to Switch the Travel Route for Its Missions

After Xie Si’s visit to Goryeo in 1369, envoys traveling between Goryeo and the Ming mostly used the sea route. In May 1369, Goryeo sent a mission led by Hong Sang-jae to the Ming, and they arrived in Jinling on August 2. This indicates that it would take approximately three months to reach Jinling from Goryeo by the sea route. Jeong Mong-ju’s case suggests that this sea-route journey could be reduced to two months if they could sail before the wind.¹³ In contrast, Xie Si left Jinling in November 1368,

¹¹ *Goryeosa*, vol. 41, entry for lunar November, 1369.

¹² Yoon Eun-sook, “Goryeo ui Bukwon chingho sayong gwa Dong Asia insik: Goryeo ui yangmyeon oegyo reul jungsimeuro” [Goryeo’s Use of the Name Northern Yuan and Its Perception of East Asia: With a Focus on Goryeo’s Two-pronged Diplomacy], *Jungang Asia yeongu* 15 (2010): 201-02.

¹³ *Goryeosa*, vol. 41, entry for lunar May, 1369; *Ming Taizu shilu*, vol. 44, section for lunar August, 1369.

but due to difficulties in finding a suitable sea route on the Yellow Sea, he only reached Goryeo in April of the following year. Xie again set out for Goryeo in August 1369 to deliver Zhu Yuanzhang's edict of investiture, but difficulties on the Yellow Sea again delayed his arrival until April 1370. The principal route that Ming envoys took at that time involved traveling by land from Jinling to Shandong and then by sea from Dengzhou (登州) or Laizhou (萊州) to Goryeo.¹⁴ Goryeo envoys took a similar route to reach Jinling from Gaegyeong (開京). Compared to the journeys of Goryeo envoys, however, Ming envoys appear to have suffered considerable inconveniences due to their inexperience in traveling through the Yellow Sea. Despite these difficulties, Ming envoys had to use the sea route as the Yuan forces under Naghachu and other Yuan generals still maintained control over Liaodong. Moreover, some remnants of the Yuan forces were still present in some areas of the Central Plain even after the ascendancy of the Ming dynasty. The Ming feared that if the Yuan forces in the north collaborated with Goryeo to regain Dadu, it would be extremely difficult for the Ming to gain complete control over the Central Plain. The Ming, therefore, made great efforts to convince Goryeo to sever its relations with the Northern Yuan and join the new East Asian order centered on the Ming.

Goryeo, on the other hand, wanted its envoys to travel by land instead of by sea. In November 1371, King Gongmin sent a diplomatic document to the Central Secretariat of the Ming (中書省), asking that his envoys be allowed travel by the land route. It reads:

When Jeong Sa-do (鄭思道) was dispatched this August to your capital to deliver our greetings for the coming New Year, his ship was unable to move beyond Gyodong Island as a result of running into shallow rapids that made the ship stranded. Also, when Han Bang-eon was dispatched this September for the same purpose, his ship ran into a sudden storm and sank. The sea route between our kingdom and your capital is exten-

¹⁴ Zhang Shizun, "Gaoli yu Beiyuan guanxi dui Ming yu Gaoli guanxi de yingxiang," 13.

sive, and once the weather grows cold and freezes the waters, it will be difficult for ships to set sail, and envoys may not make it on time to convey our felicitations. On the other hand, they would be able to arrive in time by traveling through the Liaodong Regional Military Commission (遼東都司) since places like Jinzhou (金州) and Fuzhou (復州) are relatively close to the sea route and have courier stations. We now hope to have Han Bang-eon travel through the Liaodong Military Commission on his way to the capital to convey our felicitations. Please present the emperor with this plan so that it may be carried out accordingly.¹⁵

In this letter, Goryeo inquires whether its envoys may travel overland across the Liaodong Peninsula and then take a ship from Jinzhou or Fuzhou to approach Dengzhou of the Shandong Peninsula. The shipwrecks Jeong Sa-do and Han Bang-eon had experienced in August and September were brought up to support Goryeo's claim that sailing all the way to the Ming would pose considerable risks to envoys. Previously, when the Kitans were in power, Goryeo and the Northern Song dynasty had their envoys travel back and forth between Dengzhou and Goryeo.¹⁶ The envoys, however, did not travel by land through the Liaodong Peninsula at that time. Thus, the route King Gongmin requested to use was not necessarily what Goryeo envoys would have been familiar with, although it may have been the shortest route to the Ming capital.

Compared to the Ming, Goryeo (and later Joseon) had more experience traveling through sea routes because Goryeo (or Joseon) envoys utilized different routes according to changing geopolitical situations of East Asia. When northern states grew dominant in and around Liaodong, Goryeo envoys would no longer be able to pass through the area and had to take the sea routes leading to Dengzhou of Shandong or Mingzhou (明州) of Zhejiang to reach the Central Plain. Compared to traveling by land, Go-

¹⁵ *Goryeosa*, vol. 43, entry for lunar November 26, 1371.

¹⁶ Yoon Myeong-cheol, "Seo Hee ui Songnara sahaeng hangno tamgu" [An Exploration of Seo Hee's Maritime Itinerary on His Mission to the Song Dynasty], *Goguryeo yeonguhoe haksul chongseo* 2 (1999): 210.

ryeo envoys encountered more difficulties while traveling by sea. Sea routes, however, would allow them to reach their destination faster if they could take advantage of favorable winds. Sea travel would also allow them to transport larger quantities of trade items on the journey.¹⁷ The volume of such goods transported by sea was such that the Central Secretariat presented a memorial to Zhu Yuanzhang, saying “Since Goryeo envoys bring so many personal items, they should be taxed. They also take too many Chinese items and then cross the border back to their country. This should be banned.”¹⁸ This memorial implies that Goryeo made substantial profits from trading goods via the sea routes. Furthermore, Goryeo was experienced in building ships, having constructed nearly nine hundred for the Yuan expedition to Japan.¹⁹ Bongnae no. 3 and no. 4 – ships from the late Goryeo period recently discovered in Shandong Province – indicate that Goryeo had acquired considerable skills in shipbuilding by the latter half of the 14th century. Such ships used a mixture of iron and wooden nails in their construction and had bulkheads and ribs to avoid sinking. They were thus well equipped to withstand long-distance voyages.²⁰

Based on the experience Goryeo envoys had sailing to China, traveling through the Yellow Sea wasn't as risky as King Gongmin made it seem in his letter. In fact, before King Gongmin sent his diplomatic document to the Central Secretariat, Goryeo had already dispatched envoys to the Ming via sea routes multiple times since 1368. The following table presents a summary of these missions based on records in *Goryeosa* (高麗史).

¹⁷ Kim Young-je, “Gyoyeok e daehan Songjo ui taedo wa Goryeo haesang ui hwaldong: Goryeo Munjong ui daesong ipgong baegyeong gwado gwanryeonhayeo” [The Song Dynasty's Attitude toward Trade and the Activities of Goryeo Marine Traders: In Relation to the Background of the Goryeo King Munjong's Tribute Missions to the Song], *Yeoksa hakbo* 213 (2012): 299-329.

¹⁸ *Mingshi* (明史) [History of the Ming Dynasty], vol. 320, “Chaoxian zhuan” (朝鮮傳) [A Treatise on Joseon].

¹⁹ *Goryeosa*, vol. 26, entry for lunar June 16, 1274.

²⁰ Kim Seong-beom, “Jungguk Bongnaesuseong chulto Goryeoseon” [Two Goryeo Wrecks unearthed in Penglai Shuicheng in China], *Hanguk jungsesa yeongu* 27 (2009): 250-53; Kim Seong-jun, “Bongnae Goryeo goseon ui Hanguk seongbak sasang ui uiui” [The Significance of Penglai Koryo Ancient Ships in the History of Korean Shipbuilding], *Haeun mullyu yeongu* 52 (2007): 63-82.

Table 1. Goryeo Envoys sent to the Ming by King Gongmin between 1368 and 1371

Time	Name of Goryeo Envoys	Mission's Purpose	Travel Route	Success/Failure
May 1369	Hong Sang-jae and Yi Ha-saeng	Congratulate the emperor on his enthronement	Sea	Succeeded
August 1369	Seong Jun-deuk, Kim Gap-wu, and Jang Ja-on	Congratulate the emperor on his birthday, celebrate the crown prince's birthday, and present New Year's greetings	Sea	Succeeded
July 1370	Gang Sa-chan	Express gratitude for the investiture and imperial edict, hand the golden seal Goryeo had received from the Yuan over to the Ming, report on the situation in Tamna (i.e., Jeju Island), and request for court musicians	Sea	Succeeded
August 1370	Yun Gong	Congratulate the emperor on his birthday and the investiture of a prince	Sea	Succeeded
August 1370	Gwon Gyun	Send Goryeo scholars including Park Shil and Kim Do to take the Ming imperial examination and congratulate the emperor on the investiture of a prince	Sea	Succeeded
July 1371	Gang Jung-sang, Jeong Sa-do, and Hong Jung-won	Congratulate the emperor on his birthday, celebrate the crown prince's birthday, and offer New Year's greetings	Sea	Failed
September 1371	Gwon Gyun	Offer New Year's greetings	Sea	Succeeded
September 1371	Han Bang-eon	Offer New Year's greetings	Sea	Failed

The table shows that of the eight missions, six were successful. Only the two missions in July and September 1371 failed. It is interesting to note that the shipwreck, which made the Goryeo missions fail in 1371, actually occurred shortly after the envoys started their voyages, resulting in only minor damage. King Gongmin, however, highlighted these two incidents as grave failures in his letter and then ordered Han Bang-eon to travel by land to the Ming territory in November 1371. It is suspicious that both shipwrecked missions occurred in 1371 and that both accidents happened

close to the Goryeo coasts. Furthermore, Han Bang-eon started his mission in November 1371 when the waters in the Yellow Sea didn't usually freeze. This rather undermines the credibility of Gongmin's claim that Goryeo envoys were unable to set sail due to the freezing of the Yellow Sea.²¹

In November 1371, King Gongmin ordered Han Bang-eon to pass through Liaodong on his way to the Ming without Ming's permission to use the land route, and this decision of King Gongmin led to a diplomatic conflict with the Ming. In general, the Ming dynasty imposed strict restrictions on foreign envoys. It had specific rules on the size of missions, the route they traveled, and the items they were to offer as tribute,²² and violations of these rules were penalized without fail. For instance, during the early years of the Jiajing Emperor's reign, a Joseon mission was banned from entering the Hostel for Foreign Envoys (會同館) because a Joseon interpreter named Kim I-seok had purchased a volume of the Ming imperial geography entitled *Records of the Unity of the Great Ming* (大明一統志). On a different occasion, Jin Zhi (金智) – a Ming official responsible for escorting a Joseon mission – was arrested by the Embroidered Uniform Guard (錦衣衛) for helping a Joseon envoy purchase a bull's horn for use in making bows.²³ Although 1371 was too early for the Ming to have established specific policies regarding foreign relations, Goryeo's arbitrary decision to switch the travel route of its envoys without Ming permission represented a serious diplomatic challenge. Believing that Han Bang-eon had gathered intelligence on his way through Liaodong and passed it on to Naghachu for the attack on Niujiazhuang, the Ming dynasty demanded an explanation from Goryeo.²⁴

²¹ Li Xinfeng, "Gongminwang houqi Ming Gaoli guanxi yu Ming Meng zhanju," 308.

²² *Daming huidian* (大明會典) [The Collection of Official Statutes of the Ming Dynasty], vols. 105-106, section for Libu (禮部) [The Ministry of Rites], vols. 63-64, entry for Chaogong (朝貢) [Tribute], vols. 1-2.

²³ Kim Kyeong-nok, "Joseon sidae dae Jungguk oegyo munseo wa oegyo jeongbo ui sujip bojon chegye," 303-06.

²⁴ Hasumi Moriyoshi, "Sōkan to sōhan-Minjin Hua Zhongqing sōkan wo megutte" [Repatriation and Suzerain-vassal: Focusing on the Repatriation Case of a Ming Person named Hua Zhongqing], in *Kaiiki kōryū to seiji kenryoku no taiō* [Political Powers' Responses to Maritime

Despite an anticipated backlash from the Ming, Goryeo had good reasons for instructing its envoys to travel through Liaodong. Even after the Yuan retreated to the north in 1368, Liaodong remained under Yuan control. In this region, therefore, the old order between the Yuan and Goryeo was maintained. The dynamics of the region, however, began to change when Liu Yi surrendered to the Ming in 1371, fueling the Ming's desire to advance into Liaodong. Liu Yi was originally Manager of Governmental Affairs (平章政事) in charge of southern Liaoyang. After the Yuan retreated to the north, he stationed his troops at the Deliyang Fortress (得利羸城) in Gaizhou (蓋州) – currently the Deli Temple (得利寺) in Fu County (復縣), Liaoning Province – and took charge of the defense against maritime intrusions by Ming forces. Upon learning that the Ming intended to carry out a resettlement policy, he decided to surrender and hand over maps of the prefectures and counties in Liaodong, including the areas of Jinzhou, Fuzhou, Gaizhou, and Haizhou (海州), along with a register of food, money, and war horses available from each area. After his surrender, Liu Yi established a district office at the Deliyang Fortress and prepared a record of the troops and horses under his command to assist the Ming's advance into Liaodong.²⁵ Having secured a bridgehead in Liaodong, the Ming dispatched Ma Yun (馬雲) and Ye Wang (葉旺) to the region and established the Dingliao Guard (定遼衛) at the Deliyang Fortress, thereby creating a strategic military base in southern Liaoyang.²⁶ Zhu Yuanzhang appointed Liu Yi Vice Commander (指揮使同知) to encourage the remaining Yuan forces in Liaodong to surrender and also informed Goryeo of these developments to discourage it from maintaining ties with the Northern Yuan.²⁷

The prospect of a Ming advance into Liaodong unnerved Goryeo and Naghachu because it would destroy the existing order between Goryeo and the Yuan. Goryeo considered Liaoyang and Shenyang to be under its con-

Exchange] (Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin, 2011), 71.

²⁵ Koo Beom-jin (trans.), *Imun yeokju* [Annotated Translation of *Liwen*], vol. 1 (Seoul: Sechang Chulpansa, 2012), 30-46.

²⁶ *Ming Taizu shilu*, vol. 61, section for lunar February and July, 1371.

²⁷ Kim Kyeong-nok, “Yeomal Seoncho Hongmuje ui Goryeo Joseon insik gwa oegyo gwangye,” 9.

trol not only because many of its people lived there but also because Shenyang Route had been enfeoffed to King Chungseon when the Yuan invested him as Prince of Shen.²⁸ Goryeo's view is clear from the following excerpts from *Goryeosa*.

The people of Liaoyang and Shenyang were told: "Since Liaoyang and Shenyang constitute the border of our kingdom (i.e., Goryeo), as well as those people belong to us, we are pacifying the regions and people by using our righteous army." ... "After the Yuan dynasty unified China, it married princesses and enfeoffed Liaoyang and Shenyang [to Goryeo kings]. When the emperor lost his virtue near the end of his reign and fled north, the leaders in Liaoyang and Shenyang no longer followed him nor did they fulfill their duties to the empire. ... Various leaders and people within the border of our kingdom, east of the Liao River, should present themselves to the Goryeo court of their own accord to receive titles and allowances, and if they don't want to submit [to Goryeo], they will face the consequences of Liaoyang."²⁹

The Manager of Governmental Affairs Liu Yi and an Assistant Director of the Right surnamed Wang (王右丞) of the Liaoyang Branch Secretariat of the Northern Yuan planned to submit [to Goryeo]. Also, out of concern that the Ming dynasty would resettle residents [in Liaodong], they sent envoys [to Goryeo], hoping to avoid Ming resettlement by asking us to appeal to the Ming on their behalf since the lands originally belonged to our kingdom (i.e., Goryeo).³⁰

These quotations confirm that around 1370, Goryeo deemed that it

²⁸ Kim Hye-won, "Goryeo hugi Sim(yang)wang ui jeongchi gyeongjejeok giban" [Prince of Shen's Political and Economic Foundation in Late Goryeo], *Guksagwan nonchong* 49 (1993): 39-53; Morihira Masahiko, "Kōraiōi no kisoteki kōsatsu: Daigen Urusu no ichi bunken seiryoku toshi no Kōraiōke" [A Preliminary Examination of the Goryeo Kingship: The Goryeo Royal Family as a Stakeholder of the Great Yuan Ulus], *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 36 (1998): 55-87.

²⁹ *Goryeosa*, vol. 114, "Ji Yong-su jeon" (池龍壽傳) [Biography of Ji Yong-su].

³⁰ *Goryeosa*, vol. 43, entry for leap lunar March 6, 1371.

could exert sovereignty over Liaoyang and Shenyang. They suggest that the origin of this control dates back to when Liaoyang and Shenyang were enfeoffed to King Chungseon after his marriage to a Yuan princess. This claim appears plausible, given that King Chungseon was invested as Prince of Shen and received appanages in Shenyang and Liaoyang from the Yuan.³¹ The references to Liaoyang and Shenyang as lands that “originally belonged to our kingdom” and Liu Yi turning to Goryeo for support before surrendering to the Ming dynasty indicate that Liu Yi recognized that Goryeo had a legitimate claim to these areas.³²

Considering that Goryeo regarded Liaoyang and Shenyang as within its sphere of influence, it would not have welcomed the Ming dynasty’s advance into Liaodong. Thus, Goryeo tried to check the Ming influence in Liaodong, reminding the Ming that Goryeo’s sovereignty was valid in Liaoyang Route (遼陽路) and Dongnyeong Prefecture (東寧府) in its diplomatic letter to the Dingliao Guard in 1372. In this letter, Goryeo offered an explanation about its three attempts to conquer Liaodong in 1370. According to this, these military actions had been triggered by the hostility of Ki Sain Temür and other officials of Liaoyang Route and Dongnyeong Prefecture, both of which did not submit to the Ming yet.³³ In 1372, Goryeo explained its military actions of 1370 in Liaodong to avoid outright friction with the Ming at a time when Ming forces successfully advanced into Lia-

³¹ The 1998 study by Morihira Masahiko (森平雅彦) concluded that just like other princes of the Mongol-Yuan Empire, King Chungseon, as an imperial son-in-law, appointed his officials in his own Princely Establishment (王府) and possessed courier stations in both Goryeo and Liaodong, as well as a private workforce that he could mobilize for a variety of tasks. Morihira also argued that Shenyang Route was granted to King Chungseon as his appanage, placing the area under his direct control. For details, see Morihira, “Kōraiōi no kisoteki kōsatsu,” 55-87.

³² According to Song Yong-deok’s research, as Goryeo expanded its perception of territory to the north, many Goryeo people went north across the Amnok (i.e., Yalu) River and settled in Liaodong, reinforcing Goryeo’s claim over the region. Therefore, Goryeo’s connections to Dongnyeong Prefecture (東寧府) and Ssangseong Route Command (雙城總管府) remained. See Song Yong-deok, “Goryeo hugi byeongyeong jiyek byeondong gwa Amnonggang yeonbyeon insik ui hyeongseong” [The Change of Borderlands and the Recognition of the Yalu River as a Frontier Region in the Latter Half of the Goryeo Period], *Yeoksa hakbo* 201 (2009): 1-33.

³³ *Goryeosa*, vol. 43, entry for lunar March 3, 1372.

odong.³⁴ Moreover, in the 1372 letter, Goryeo emphasized that both Liaoyang Route and Dongnyeong Prefecture did not belong to the Ming yet, thereby claiming its legitimate right over these regions.

Naghachu also took the movement of Ming forces into Liaodong seriously. He was a descendant of Muqali and resided in the Jinshan (金山) area after the Yuan's retreat to the north, serving as the de facto ruler of Liaodong with the area around the Yitong River in Nong'an County (農安) north of Kaiyuan (開元) as his power base.³⁵ After having an audience with Naghachu on the Jiji Mountain (鷄鷄山), Toghon Temür appointed him Grand Councilor of the Left (左丞相) of the Liaoyang Branch Secretariat and, a few days later, added the title Defender-in-chief (太尉). By conferring these titles, Toghon Temür acknowledged Naghachu's dominant status in Liaodong.³⁶ Liu Yi's surrender in 1371, however, deprived the Northern Yuan of control over southern Liaodong and left Naghachu under tremendous pressure, as he was now faced with the Ming forces. The following excerpts reveal how much Liu Yi's surrender enraged the Northern Yuan forces in Liaodong at that time.

The Prince of the State (國王), Grand Councilor (丞相), Defender-in-chief (太尉), and Manager of Governmental Affairs (平章) met the Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs (知院) Qara and Hong Baobao and agreed to requisition forty thousand soldiers and horses to advance south and take over many vessels and goods under Liu Yi's control in coming July. The troops and horses of an Administrator surnamed Gao (高平章) were not necessary for this campaign, so he was ordered to remain on the defensive and monitor the troops and horses of Goryeo to the east.³⁷

³⁴ Kim Sun-ja, *Hanguk jungse Hanjung gwangyesa*, 62.

³⁵ Yoon Eun-sook, "Nagachu ui hwaldong gwa 14 segi mal Dong Asia jeongse" [Naghachu's Activities and the Political Situation of East Asia at the End of the 14th Century], *Myeongcheongsa yeongu* 28 (2007): 10-11.

³⁶ Liu Ji, "Beixun siji."

³⁷ Koo Beom-jin (trans.), *Imun yeokju*, vol. 1, 47-58.

When the official (i.e., Liu Yi) arrived at a cottage north of an Administrator surnamed Hong (洪平章)'s house and stayed there, more than twenty men that Hong had kept hidden – such as Hong's son-in-law Jing Jianu (京家奴), his nephew Dalan Temür, a chieftain named Kim Öljei Temür, Wang Bo (汪伯), and others – rushed out from behind the cottage, seized the official (i.e., Liu Yi), wielded their swords, and then injured and murdered him. They also killed the official (i.e., Liu Yi)'s aides and servants – A Li (阿禮), Huang Zhong (黃忠), and others.³⁸

The titles – Prince of the State, Grand Councilor, Defender-in-chief, and Manager of Governmental Affairs – all refer to Naghachu, indicating the weight of his authority. Upon hearing of Liu Yi's surrender, Naghachu headed south to join forces with Qara and Hong Baobao to plan an attack on Liu Yi and seize Ming vessels, troops, and other goods. Although their plan to attack in July failed, Naghachu did succeed in attacking Niujiazhuang in November 1372. Moreover, only a month after his surrender, Liu Yi was murdered by a band of people under Hong Baobao, Administrator of the Liaoyang Branch Secretariat. This shows how much his surrender exasperated the Northern Yuan forces in Liaodong. Liu Yi's surrender thoroughly changed the circumstances in Liaodong. As the Ming advanced into Liaodong, the Northern Yuan began to assemble their forces in Liaoyang under the command of Naghachu. Liu Yi's surrender had thus forced the Northern Yuan into a direct confrontation with the Ming dynasty.


The Ming's advance into Liaodong went against the interests of both King Gongmin and Naghachu, prompting the two sides to cooperate. Although he had severed diplomatic ties with the Northern Yuan, King Gongmin had maintained connections with the Mongols in Liaodong including Naghachu. Once the Ming advanced into Liaodong, King Gongmin officially notified the Ming that a Goryeo mission would pass through Liaodong, but he did not wait for permission before dispatching his envoy, Han Bang-eon, through Liaodong in November 1371. A year later, in No-

³⁸ Koo Beom-jin (trans.), *Imun yeokju*, vol. 1, 30-46.

vember 1372, Naghachu attacked the logistics base at Niujiazhuang, the Ming's largest military supply depot in Liaodong. In this attack, Naghachu destroyed warehouses, burned nearly 100,000 *shi* (石) of grain, and killed 5,000 Ming soldiers.³⁹ The purpose of this attack was to cut off the Ming supply route to Liaodong. Thus, Naghachu's success struck a fatal blow to the Ming's ambition to make its presence and influence permanent in Liaodong.⁴⁰

The geopolitical situation of Liaodong became unstable as a result of a chain of events. King Gongmin dispatched his envoy to the Ming and ordered him to travel overland through Liaodong in November 1371. Naghachu attacked and destroyed the Ming's major supply base at Niujiazhuang in November 1372. Between these two incidents, Ayushiridara – the Great Khan of the Northern Yuan – devastated the Ming army in the battle of Qaraqorum in January 1372. All these events suggest the likelihood that Goryeo and the Northern Yuan somehow cooperated with each other in 1371 and 1372, undermining the Ming's influence in Liaodong.⁴¹

Figure 1. The route Han Bang-eon took through Liaodong



³⁹ *Ming Taizu shilu*, vol. 76, section for lunar November, 1372.

⁴⁰ Yoon Eun-sook, "Nagachu ui hwaldong gwa 14 segi mal Dong Asia jeongse," 12.

⁴¹ Yoon Eun-sook, "Bukwon gwa Myeong ui daerip" [Conflict between the Northern Yuan and the Ming], *Dongyang sahak yeongu* 105 (2008): 89-93.

The Goryeo Mission's Land Travel and the Shutdown of Tributary Route

Throughout his reign, King Gongmin gathered a considerable amount of intelligence on Liaodong. In 1362, he dispatched an envoy to the region under the pretext of monitoring the movements of the Red Turbans. In July and September 1368, Northern Yuan envoys sent by Esen Temür and Hong Baobao visited Goryeo and shared news about the Yuan's internal affairs and the movement of Ming troops into the north.⁴² Although the Yuan had retreated to the north, many Goryeo people remained in Liaodong to engage in trade, allowing King Gongmin to continue to gather intelligence on the region.⁴³ He was, therefore, aware of the Yuan's retreat to Shangdu and the Ming's seizure of Dadu in 1368. He was also well aware of almost every move of the Ming troops around Dadu. For example, when 10,000 Ming naval vessels anchored at Tongzhou in September 1368, he assembled his court officials in the very same month to discuss establishing diplomatic relations with the Ming dynasty.⁴⁴

When the Liaoyang area fell to the Ming due to Liu Yi's surrender in 1371, King Gongmin, who had considered the area as Goryeo's sphere of influence, immediately needed to ascertain the impact this would have on the region. To devise a response, he needed intelligence on the disposition of Ming forces in Liaoyang. As such, he tried to gather information from Ming envoys that included those dispatched by the Manager of Governmental Affairs surnamed Liu and the Assistant Director of the Right surnamed Wang (王右丞), who arrived in May 1371 to congratulate King Gongmin on his birthday, and those sent by Gao Jianu (高家奴) and the As-

⁴² *Goryeosa*, vol. 40, entry for 1362; and *Goryeosa*, vol. 41, entry for 1368.

⁴³ Lee Kang-han, "Goryeo Gongminwangdae jeongbu judo gyoyeok ui yeogon mit teukjing" [The Environment and Characteristics of Goryeo's State-sponsored Trade during King Gongmin's Reign], *Jeongsin munhwa yeongu* 34, no. 4 (2011): 235.

⁴⁴ *Goryeosa*, vol. 41, entry for lunar September 20, 1368; *Yuanshi* [History of the Yuan Dynasty], vol. 47, "Annals of the Zhizheng era," entry for August, 1366.

sistant Director of the Right surnamed Wang, who arrived in July.⁴⁵

Following the assassination of Liu Yi, his subordinates Zhang Liangzuo (張良佐) and Fang Gao (房高) sought retribution. In response, the remaining Northern Yuan forces immediately sought protection from Naghachu, and Liu Yi's sudden death thus did not lead to further violence. However, the Ming continued to tighten its control over southern Liaodong, preventing King Gongmin from gathering detailed intelligence on the region and making him dependent on the brief information Gao Jianu occasionally provided. Naghachu was also more or less in the dark as regards intelligence on southern Liaodong.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, Gongmin persisted in trying to gather intelligence on Ming forces in Liaodong, as indicated in a letter from Zhu Yuanzhang to King Gongmin in July 1373.⁴⁷

- A. A [Goryeo] person named Yi Hwaja (李火者) came with Mongols (達達) and Muslims (回回), pretending to engage in trade, but what he did was to spy [on the Ming]. Yi Hwaja came two to three times and conversed in Mongolian with Mongols, in Korean with Goryeo people, and in Chinese with Chinese people. That's how he spied! Our China is thriving now. What difference would it make even if you came to spy and cost us 40,000 to 50,000 troops in a couple of different areas?
- B. Your true intention for interacting with the commander surnamed Xu (徐摠兵) is to spy on the movements of our troops in Beiping Prefecture. How could you act so imprudently? Is it the traditional way that a small state serves a great state? How could you be so insincere?
- C. You offered Naghachu the intelligence you gathered from spying on our military camps, thereby allowing Naghachu to plunder 100,000 *shi* of horse feed and destroy 3,000 military horses in Niujiazhuang.

⁴⁵ *Goryeosa*, vol. 43, entry for 1371.

⁴⁶ *Ming Taizu shilu*, vol. 66, section for lunar June 1371.

⁴⁷ *Goryeosa*, vol. 44, entry for lunar July 13, 1373.

These excerpts from *Goryeosa* show Zhu Yuanzhang rebuking Goryeo for spying and the Ming suspicions against Goryeo. According to excerpt A, the Ming suspected a Goryeo polyglot of spying under the pretext of engaging in trade. Although the polyglot's exact identity and rank remain unknown, the descriptions of his activities offer some clues about him. During a mission, interpreters were less restricted than envoys in terms of their range of activities. Thus, on behalf of envoys, they delivered and received diplomatic letters, reports, and rescripts, managed expenditure, and set up markets. Because such interpreters were particularly familiar with local languages and circumstances, they were also involved in espionage, the collection of military intelligence, and activities related to the development of weaponry. These roles are quite similar to the acts that Zhu Yuanzhang accused Yi Hwaja of committing.⁴⁸ Considering the description of Yi as proficient in several languages, he was most likely an interpreter caught by Ming officials while gathering intelligence. At this time, Goryeo was collecting a large amount of information on Liaodong, the Ming, and the Northern Yuan. In this unstable time of the Yuan-Ming transition, gathering intelligence was imperative for Goryeo to sustain its power and status as an independent state.

Excerpt B confirms that Goryeo also kept an eye on affairs in Beiping Prefecture. The Ming's conflict with the Northern Yuan meant Goryeo could expect a negative reaction for monitoring Ming military activities in Beiping under the pretext of interaction with Xu Da (徐達; 徐摠兵 in the excerpt). Soon after he retreated to the north in July 1368, Toghon Temür began formulating a plan to recapture Dadu (i.e., Beiping Prefecture) and set it into motion in October. Although the plan failed due to Köke Temür's early return, the Northern Yuan continued to contend with the Ming over Dadu, attempting to recapture the city in April and November 1373. Beiping Prefecture was a symbol of the Ming's success in driving out the Yuan forces and a strategic point on the Central Plain in terms of defense

⁴⁸ Kim Kyeong-nok, "Joseon chogi tongsa ui hwaldong gwa wisang ui byeonhwa" [Interpreters' Activities and the Change of their Status in the Early Joseon Period], *Hanguk hakbo* 26, no. 4 (2000): 60-66.

against Mongol attacks. This is why the Ming accused a Joseon mission of spying after it had a private meeting with the Prince of Yan (燕王) in Beiping Prefecture, resulting in the exile of the Joseon interpreter Song Hui-jeong (宋希靖) and the horse keeper Gwon Eul-song (權乙松).⁴⁹ Regardless of whether Goryeo envoys were actually spying on Beiping Prefecture, the fact that the Ming accused them of doing so shows how sensitive the Ming was when it came to the Beiping area.

Excerpt C reveals that Zhu Yuanzhang suspected that Goryeo had shared intelligence with Naghachu prior to his attack on Niujiazuang. Zhu's accusation of "spying on our military camps" refers to Han Bang-eon traveling by land to the Ming in November 1371. The unprecedented route Han took under King Gongmin's order involved passing through the Liaodong Military Commission in Liaoyang, Haizhou, Jinzhou, and Fuzhou.⁵⁰ These were the areas where the Ming had established new military bases following Liu Yi's surrender. Specifically, the Ming installed the Liaodong Military Commission, the Dingliao Guard (with its left, right, and front branches), and battalions (千戶所) in Liaodong in July 1371.⁵¹ Goryeo was extremely interested in such military facilities in southern Liaodong, and Han Bang-eon thus received the order to pass through Liaoyang, Haizhou, Jinzhou, and Fuzhou.

King Gongmin had suggested that his envoys "would be able to arrive in time by traveling through the Liaodong Military Commission since places like Jinzhou and Fuzhou are relatively close to the sea route and have courier stations." However, the route actually took Han Bang-eon four months to arrive in Jinling in February 1372. Thus, the Ming accused Han of arriving late as a result of gathering intelligence in Liaoyang and Niujiazuang. Zhu Yuanzhang further claimed that Han was seeking to monitor the activities of Ming troops, horses, and military vessels in Shan-

⁴⁹ *Joseon wangjo sillok* [Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty], vol. 8, section for November 1404.

⁵⁰ *Goryeosa*, vol. 43, entry for 1371.

⁵¹ *Liaodongzhi* 遼東志 [A Gazetteer of Liaodong], vol. 1, "dili, yange, Liaoyang" 地理·沿革·遼陽 [geography and history of Liaoyang].

dong by taking a sea route back to Goryeo, suggesting that Zhu regarded most of Goryeo's actions as intelligence gathering.⁵² Although the size of the mission Han led cannot be confirmed, it must have been substantial considering Zhu Yuanzhang's claim that the Goryeo mission had sold one thousand horses.⁵³ Before Han's mission, Goryeo had offered a total of fifty-six horses as tributes to the Ming dynasty, six in April and fifty in November 1372.⁵⁴ Bringing a thousand horses to Liaoyang across Liaodong must have been no easy feat for Han Bang-eon. Given that the Liaoyang region remained heavily under the influence of the Northern Yuan forces led by Naghachu, Han's mission that conveyed one thousand horses and other merchandise couldn't have passed through Liaodong safely without Naghachu's approval or acquiescence at least.

The Goryeo mission also made the unusual choice of heading to Niujiazhuang after passing through Liaoyang. Situated twenty kilometers west of Haizhou, Niujiazhuang was, according to Joseon travelogues to Beijing (燕行錄), unsuitable for travel and had no suitable lodgings. Choe Rip (崔豈) mentioned that there was a well in the area, but the water was so muddy that he instead used snow to quench his thirst. The official residence for envoys was full of horse and pig excrement, and the winds were so gusty that people could barely keep their eyes open.⁵⁵ However, Han Bang-eon ignored all these problems, suggesting he had a definite purpose for visiting the area. At the time, Niujiazhuang was a military entrepôt of the Ming in Liaodong in that provisions from Shandong were carried through Lushun (旅順) and finally reached Niujiazhuang. This prompted Naghachu to target Niujiazhuang even though it was much further south than other possible targets. Naghachu's daring raid on Niujiazhuang stunned Zhu Yuan-

⁵² *Goryeosa*, vol. 44, entry for lunar July 13, 1373; *Ming Taizu shilu*, vol. 72, section for lunar February 1372.

⁵³ *Goryeosa*, vol. 44, entry for lunar July 13, 1373.

⁵⁴ Kim Sun-ja, *Hanguk jungse Hanjung gwangyesa*, 78.

⁵⁵ Lee Seung-su, "Yeonhaengno jung 'Yoyang-Ansan-Gwangnyeong gugan' e daehan inmun jirihakjeok geomto" [Anthropogeographical Study on the Section 'Liaoyang (遼陽)-Anshan (鞍山)-Guangning (廣寧)' on the Route of Joseon Diplomatic Envoys to Beijing], *Hanguk hanmunhak yeongu* 47 (2011): 575-76.

zhang. As a result, Zhu demoted Qiu Cheng (仇成) from Assistant Commissioner-in-chief (都督僉事) to Commander of the Yongping Guard (永平衛指揮使) and placed Xu Da and Li Wenzhong (李文忠) in charge of overseeing the military organization of Liaodong.⁵⁶

It is worth noting that Zhu Yuanzhang believed Goryeo had collaborated with Naghachu in his attack on Niujiazhuang. This had potentially major implications for future relations between the Ming and Goryeo. Fearing the possible deterioration of its relationship with the Ming, Goryeo sent Ju Yeong-chan (周英贊) to the Ming court to resolve the matter. The usual Goryeo tactic was to try to explain its innocence or to offer a vague explanation asking for lenience. For instance, when Zhu Yuanzhang suspected that a Ming eunuch surnamed Sun (孫內侍) had been poisoned in Goryeo, Goryeo claimed that it had nothing to do with the tragedy, which had been caused by enmity among eunuchs according to Goryeo's explanation. In the case of Goryeo's alleged collaboration with Naghachu, however, Goryeo provided a much more vague response, stating that "Goryeo is incompatible with the remnants of the old dynasty (i.e., the Northern Yuan) and Naghachu just like spears and shields."⁵⁷ This claim, however, was far from the truth because Goryeo indeed exchanged envoys with the Northern Yuan frequently as indicated in Table 2. Thus, Zhu Yuanzhang's suspicion and accusation would probably have embodied some truth. After all, Naghachu's power base was at Jinshan in northern Liaodong, which made it unlikely that he was aware of affairs in southern Liaodong where the Ming logistics base was located. The frequent exchange of envoys between the Northern Yuan (Naghachu) and Goryeo around the time Naghachu attacked Niujiazhuang adds weight to the suspicion that Goryeo was somehow involved in the attack.

⁵⁶ *Ming Taizu shilu*, vol. 76, section for lunar November 1372.

⁵⁷ *Goryeosa*, vol. 44, entry for lunar October 17, 1373.

Table 2. Goryeo's interactions with the Northern Yuan between 1370 and 1373

Time	Yuan Officials	Note
February 1370	Naghachu	Sent local specialties and requested the bestowal of a title
March 1370	Qara Batu, Esen Buqa, Prince of Wu (吳王), Prince of Huai (淮王)	Sent envoys to Goryeo
September 1370	Köke Temür	Sent envoys to Goryeo
December 1370	Naghachu	Sent envoys to Goryeo
May 1371	Prince of Wu	Sent envoys to Goryeo
July 1371	Gao Jianu, Assistant Director of the Right surnamed Wang	Sent envoys to Goryeo
September 1371	Prince of Dongping (東平王)	Sent envoys to Goryeo
October 1371-February 1372	Qarajang	Goryeo held a banquet for Qarajang in January 1372 and appointed him General-in-chief (大將軍)
January 1372	Esen Buqa, Naghachu, Gao Jianu	invaded Yiseong (泥城) and Ganggye (江界)
February 1372	Hu Batu (胡拔都), Zhang Qayimar (張海馬)	invaded Yiseong (泥城) and Ganggye (江界)
February 1372	Naghachu	Sent Wen Qara Buqa (文哈刺不花) to Goryeo
April 1372	Naghachu	Sent envoys and presented local products
May 1372	Damadai	Congratulated King Gongmin on his birthday
February 1373	Batu Temür, Esen Buqa	Sent an edict to inform Goryeo of the Yuan's revival; Goryeo appointed Wen Qara Buqa as Head of the Office of Receptions (判典客寺事) in March

Although diplomatic relations had been formally severed from 1369, Northern Yuan envoys continued to visit Goryeo. King Gongmin also continued to receive them with great hospitality, even bestowing the title of General-in-chief upon Qarajang during his four-month stay in Goryeo. In addition, he gave Naghachu the honorific title of Minister of Education of the First Rank (三重大匡司徒) in February 1370, as the Northern Yuan commander had requested, and then appointed Naghachu's son Wen Qara Buqa

as Head of the Office of Receptions (判典客寺事) in March 1373, alluding to his intention to maintain close ties with the Northern Yuan.⁵⁸ These technically unofficial exchanges appear to have been just as vibrant as those Goryeo officially engaged in with the Ming.

When Goryeo handed over intelligence on Niujiashuang to Naghachu remains a matter of speculation, but it most likely happened sometime after February 1372 when the Northern Yuan achieved a decisive victory in the battle of Qaraqorum. In January 1372, Zhu Yuanzhang had appointed Xu Da the commander-in-chief of 150,000 troops and ordered him to destroy the Northern Yuan forces in Qaraqorum. A fierce battle entailed with Köke Temür at the Tuul River, and Xu allowed himself to be lured deep into the Mongolian steppe where his forces were decimated by Mongol guerrilla warfare. At the same time, the Eastern Route Army (東路軍) led by Li Wenzhong (李文忠) swept up to the Kerülen River with provisions for a campaign of twenty days. However, the army became hopelessly lost and was forced to retreat in the face of hunger and extremely low temperatures.⁵⁹ This military fiasco of the Ming forces meant that the Northern Yuan remained a powerful opponent.

By the time the Northern Yuan army crushed the Ming forces in the battle of Qaraqorum, Naghachu stopped skirmishes with Goryeo and sent his son Wen Qara Buqa as an envoy to Goryeo in February 1372. He sent another envoy two months later to offer Goryeo gifts as tokens of friendship. These gestures took place at a time when it seemed victory over the Ming was within the Northern Yuan's grasp, a victory that would have led to Yuan hegemony in East Asia. Although Goryeo had severed its official relationship with the Yuan following the Yuan's retreat to the north, King Gongmin could not ignore the possibility of the Northern Yuan regaining power and recovering its rule over the Central Plain. In addition, the Ming's advance into southern Liaodong threatened Goryeo's influence

⁵⁸ *Goryeosa*, vol. 42, entry for lunar February 23, 1370; *Goryeosa*, vol. 44, entry for lunar March 11, 1373.

⁵⁹ Luwsandanzan, *Altan towch*, Mongol bichgees khörwүүлj, orshil bichij, kharguulan taiibar khiiw (Ulaanbaatar, 2006); *Ming Taizu shilu*, vol. 74, section for lunar June 1372.

over Liaoyang and Shenyang, and Goryeo may have seen the conflict between the Northern Yuan and the Ming as an opportunity to strengthen its influence in Liaodong. As a result, King Gongmin chose not to abandon his ties with the Northern Yuan and cooperated with Naghachu when the Northern Yuan was about to win the battle of Qaraqorum. King Gongmin and Naghachu both wished to keep the Ming forces out of Liaodong, again suggesting that King Gongmin did share intelligence on the Ming military facilities with Naghachu.

The Goryeo diplomacy at the time was trilateral, involving Goryeo, the Ming, and the Northern Yuan. King Gongmin received Northern Yuan envoys – Batu Temür and Esen Buqa – at night in February 1373 under the pretext of having eye disease, no doubt to keep this meeting secret from the Ming. As soon as the two Northern Yuan envoys departed, King Gongmin sent Jang Ja-on to the Dingliao Guard to ask why Jeong Bi (鄭庇) – a Goryeo envoy to the Ming to present horses as tributes – was not allowed to pass the Dingliao Guard and returned to Goryeo. When and why Jeong Bi turned back from the Dingliao Guard is uncertain, but it seems that King Gongmin was trying to examine through Jang Ja-on whether the Ming’s attitude toward Goryeo had ever changed as a result of receiving the Northern Yuan envoys. When the Northern Yuan emissaries left Goryeo, King Gongmin gave the envoys ramie fabric as a token of friendship with the Northern Yuan. Later that month, Naghachu sent his son Wen Qara Buqa to Goryeo. During the journey, Gang Yeong (康永) – Brigade Commander stationed at Ganggye (江界萬戶) – killed ten of Wen Qara Buqa’s attendants. To deal with this mishap, King Gongmin immediately arrested and imprisoned Gang Yeong in Police Patrol Guard Command (巡衛府) as punishment.⁶⁰ Then in March, King Gongmin appointed Wen Qara Buqa as Head of the Office of Receptions to strengthen his ties with Naghachu.

On the Ming side, after the defeat at Qaraqorum, Zhu Yuanzhang had to accept that Ayushiridara was still a powerful political and military lead-

⁶⁰ *Goryeosa jeoryo* [Essentials of Goryeo History], vol. 29, entry for lunar February 1373 (Seoul: Asea Munhwasa, 1973).

er. As a result, he gave up on directly attacking the Northern Yuan and, instead, focused on reinforcing the Ming defense of Liaodong. Due to the Ming's advance into and then reinforcement in Liaodong, Goryeo and Naghachu highly likely cooperated with one another to keep the Ming in check in Liaodong. For example, King Gongmin ordered Han Bang-eon to travel through the Liaodong region without the Ming's permission, alluding to the likelihood that Han would have contributed to Naghachu's successful attack on Niujiashuang by sharing military intelligence he gathered from southern Liaodong during his travel. This cooperation between Goryeo and the Northern Yuan put the Ming in a difficult situation, intensifying the threat that the Ming felt in Liaodong. Thus, the Ming took the drastic measure of forbidding Goryeo missions to enter Liaodong in 1372 to fundamentally prevent them from spying on the region. Specifically, Zhu Yuanzhang rejected King Gongmin's offer to present annual tributes and instructed Goryeo missions to the Ming to travel only by sea and to visit only once every three years.⁶¹ Zhu treated Goryeo strictly, saying "I will not send envoys [to you (i.e., Goryeo)] ever again because I suspect you would beat my envoys to death. If you are willing to come, come [to us]! If not, do not come!"⁶² These actions were undoubtedly aimed at separating Goryeo from Naghachu and solidifying the Ming foothold in Liaodong.

Despite Zhu Yuanzhang forbidding it, Goryeo kept sending missions through Liaodong. In January 1373, Jang Ja-on traveled to the Dingliao Guard in Liaodong to investigate why Jeong Bi – a Goryeo envoy to the Ming – had turned back from there while on his way to the Ming capital. In November of the same year, Jang attempted to go to the Ming by land once

⁶¹ *Goryeosa*, vol. 44, entry for lunar June 18, 1374; *Ming Taizu shilu*, vol. 72, section for lunar May 1372.

⁶² According to Nam Ui-hyeon's research, the Ming dynasty shut down the travel route for Goryeo missions, requested that Goryeo provide tens of thousands of horses, and frequently quibbled with Goryeo, all to weaken the military capability of Goryeo (and later Joseon) and prevent them from advancing into Liaodong. See Nam Ui-hyeon, "Wonmal Myeongcho Joseon Myeong ui Yodong jaengtaljeon gwa gukgyeong bunjaeng gochal" [Analysis of the Territorial Dispute between Joseon and the Ming over the Liaodong Region during the Late Yuan and Early Ming Periods], *Hanil gwangyesa yeongu* 42 (2012): 81-114.

again but returned halfway. In February 1374, Jeong Bi made another attempt to travel by land to the Ming capital, but the Dingliao Guard stopped him from going further. The Dingliao Guard also stopped Ju Yeong-chan – a Goryeo envoy to the Ming to present horses from Jeju Island as tributes – from proceeding to the Ming court.⁶³ King Gongmin attempted to justify these missions:

We cannot allow our mission to be delayed even if it entails traveling across mountains and sea, for it is important to pay our respects to you (i.e., the Ming emperor) ... If only my small but sincere gift could reach you, I thought going against what you strictly forbade would not matter.⁶⁴

Despite King Gongmin's professed desire to pay tribute to the Ming, it is unlikely Zhu Yuanzhang took his words at face value given the fierce military rivalry between the Ming and the Northern Yuan at the time. After the victory in the battle of Qaraqorum in January and the successful attack on Niujiazhuang in November 1372, the Northern Yuan continued their efforts to regain the Central Plain. In April 1373, Köke Temür attacked the Yingmen Pass (應門關) and in November Datong (大同).⁶⁵ Naghachu also launched several large-scale attacks on Ming military bases in Liaoyang, Haizhou, Gaizhou, and Jinzhou in November 1374 as well as in October and November 1375. There is no direct evidence to prove that Goryeo actually cooperated with the Northern Yuan in these attacks. However, King Gongmin had to keep up with the rapid changes that were taking place in Liaodong. Therefore, the Goryeo missions that attempted to travel through Liaodong to the Ming capital were likely part of a strategy to keep up with the swiftly changing circumstances in Liaodong at the time.

⁶³ Koo Beom-jin (trans.), *Imun yeokju*, vol. 1, 104-119.

⁶⁴ *Goryeosa*, vol. 44, entry for lunar February 28, 1374.

⁶⁵ *Ming Taizu shilu*, vol. 99, section for lunar November 1374.

Conclusion

After examining the impact Liu Yi's surrender had on Goryeo and Naghachu and exploring the reason why King Gongmin had his envoys travel through Liaodong to reach the Ming, the following conclusions can be drawn. First of all, King Gongmin walked a diplomatic tightrope between the Ming and the Northern Yuan. After the capture of Dadu in 1368, the Ming dynasty immediately attempted to establish diplomatic ties with Goryeo and tried to cut Goryeo's relationship with the Northern Yuan. Ming-Goryeo relations began with Goryeo responding to the Ming's request that they establish diplomatic relations. However, even after Goryeo had officially severed its relationship with the Northern Yuan, the two states were in contact no less than nineteen times between May 1369 and 1374, when Goryeo severed its relations with the Ming. This shows that King Gongmin took a pragmatic two-track approach to diplomatic relations with the two dynasties: opening friendly relations with the Ming dynasty while maintaining a certain degree of intimacy with the Northern Yuan.

Second, the destabilization of the situation in Liaodong pushed Goryeo closer to the Northern Yuan. In November 1371, King Gongmin took the risk of ordering his mission to travel through Liaodong because Goryeo's claim over Liaoyang and Shenyang was at risk due to Liu Yi's surrender to the Ming which allowed the Ming forces to advance into Liaodong. This threatened the status quo King Gongmin and Naghachu had established in Liaodong. As a result, the two strengthened their alliance to prevent the Ming from further advancing into the region.

Third, Goryeo sent Han Bang-eon through Niujiazuang and other areas in Liaodong highly likely to spy on Ming military activities in the region. The route Han Bang-eon took passed directly through areas where the Ming dynasty had just recently established military facilities. Niujiazuang in particular was a major logistics base in southern Liaodong and a crucial defensive point for Ming troops. By drawing upon the intelligence Han Bang-eon and his colleagues gained in southern Liaodong, Goryeo decided to strengthen its relationship with the Northern Yuan especially after the Northern Yuan army won the battle of Qaraqorum in early

1372. Moreover, by sharing the intelligence with Naghachu, Goryeo probably supported Naghachu's attack on Niujiashuang, aiming to maintain a triangular balance between Goryeo, Naghachu, and the Ming in Liaodong. Therefore, Naghachu's successful attack on the Ming army's key logistics base was very much an outcome of cooperation between Goryeo and Naghachu.

After Han Bang-eon's mission, the Ming dynasty shut down the Liaodong route that the Goryeo mission had utilized. However, this failed to stop Goryeo from attempting to send missions through Liaodong. Although most of these missions failed to reach the Ming capital, they still served as an important means of gathering intelligence and thus maintaining Goryeo's trilateral diplomacy with both the Ming and Northern Yuan at the time of geopolitical uncertainty.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Gao Dai. “Hongyoulu” 鴻猷錄 [Extensive Plans]. In *Mingdai Menggu hanji shiliao huibian* 明代蒙古漢籍史料匯編 [A Compilation of Chinese Historical Materials on the Mongols in the Ming Period]. Huhehaote: Neimenggu Daxue Chubanshe 內蒙古大學出版社, 1993.
- Goryeosa* 高麗史 [History of Goryeo]. Seoul: Asea Munhwasa 亞細亞文化社, 1972.
- Goryeosa jeoryo* 高麗史節要 [Essentials of Goryeo History]. Seoul: Asea Munhwasa 亞細亞文化社, 1973.
- Gu Yingtai. *Mingshi jishi benmo* 明史紀事本末 [Records of Major Events in the Ming Dynasty]. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju 中華書局, 1977.
- Hasumi Moriyoshi. “Sōkan to sōhan-Minjin Hua Zhongqing sōkan wo megutte” 送還と宗藩-明人華重慶送還をめぐって [Repatriation and Suzerain-vassal: Focusing on the Repatriation Case of a Ming Person named Hua Zhongqing]. In *Kaiiki kōryū to seiji kenryoku no taiō* 海域交流と政治権力の對應 [Political Powers' Responses to Maritime Exchange]. Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin 汲古書院, 2011.
- Hong Young-ui. “Gongminwang chogi gaehyeok jeongchi wa jeongchi seryeok ui chui: Sang” 恭愍王 初期 改革政治外 政治勢力의 推移: 上 [Political Reform in the Early Years of King Gongmin's Reign and Changes in Political Powers: Part 1]. *Sahak yeongu* 사학연구 42, 1990.
- . “Gongminwang chogi gaehyeok jeongchi wa jeongchi seryeok ui chui: Ha” 恭愍王 初期 改革政治外 政治勢力의 推移: 下 [Political Reform in the Early Years of King Gongmin's Reign and Changes in Political Powers: Part 2]. *Sahak yeongu* 43/44, 1992.
- Ider. *Yuan' ulsyn ikh tūshimel Khökhötömör* [Khökhötömör, A Great Official of the Yuan Ulus]. Ulaanbaatar: Soyombo Printing, 2012.
- Jiang Longfan and Liu Zimin. *Mingdai Zhongchao guanxishi* 明代中朝關係史 [A History of Sino-Korean Relations during the Ming Dynasty]. Harbin: Heilongjiang Chaoxian Minzu Chubanshe 黑龍江朝鮮民族出版社, 1999.
- Joseon wangjo sillok* 朝鮮王朝實錄 [Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty]. Seoul: National Institute of Korean History 국사편찬위원회, 1986.
- Kim Bo-jeong. “Yeomal Seoncho daemyeong Namgyeong sahaengno ui bukseok

- gwa yeonghyang” 여말선초 對明 南경사행로의 분석과 영향 [Analysis and Effect of Korean Missions’ Itineraries to Nanjing during the Late Goryeo and Early Joseon Periods]. *Jiyeok gwa yeoksa* 지역과 역사 27, 2010.
- Kim Hye-won. “Goryeo hugi Sim(yang)wang ui jeongchi gyeongjejeok giban” 高麗 後期 潘(陽)王의 政治·經濟的 基盤 [Prince of Shen’s Political and Economic Foundation in Late Goryeo]. *Guksagwan nonchong* 국사관논총 49, 1993.
- Kim Kyeong-nok. “Gongminwangdae gukje jeongse wa daeoe gwangye ui jeongae yangsang” 공민왕대 국제정세와 대외관계의 전개양상 [Developments of International Situation and Foreign Relations during the Period of King Gongmin]. *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 역사와 현실 64, 2007.
- . “Joseon chogi tongsa ui hwaldong gwa wisang ui byeonhwa” 조선초기 통사의 활동과 위상의 변화 [Interpreters’ Activities and the Change of their Status in the Early Joseon Period]. *Hanguk hakbo* 韓國學報 26, no. 4, 2000.
- . “Joseon sidae dae Jungguk oegyo munseo wa oegyo jeongbo ui sujip bojon chegye” 조선시대 대중국 외교문서와 외교정보의 수집·보존체계 [The System of Gathering and Preserving Diplomatic Documents to China and Diplomatic Information during the Joseon Period]. *Dongbuga yeoksa nonchong* 동북아역사논총 25, 2009.
- . “Yeomal Seoncho Hongmuje ui Goryeo Joseon insik gwa oegyo gwangye” 麗末鮮初 洪武帝의 高麗·朝鮮認識과 外交關係 [The Hongwu Emperor’s Understanding of Goryeo and Joseon and the Ming Dynasty’s Relations with Goryeo and Joseon]. *Myeongcheongsa yeongu* 明清史研究 35, 2011.
- Kim Seong-beom. “Jungguk Bongnaesuseong chulto Goryeoseon” 中國 蓬萊水城 出土 高麗船 [Two Goryeo Wrecks unearthed in Penglai Shuicheng in China]. *Hanguk jungsesa yeongu* 한국중세사연구 27, 2009.
- Kim Seong-jun. “Bongnae Goryeo goseon ui Hanguk seongbak sasang ui uiui” 蓬萊 高麗 古船의 韓國船舶史上의 意義 [The Significance of Penglai Koryo Ancient Ships in the History of Korean Shipbuilding]. *Haeun mullyu yeongu* 해운물류연구 52, 2007.
- . “Goryeo mal ui jeongguk gwa Won Myeong gwangye” 고려 말의 정국과 원·명 관계 [The Political Situation in Late Goryeo and Its Relations with the Yuan and Ming Dynasties]. In *Hanguksa* 한국사 [A History of Korea]. vol. 20. Seoul: National Institute of Korean History 국사편찬위원회, 1994.
- Kim Sun-ja. *Hanguk jungse Hanjung gwangyesa* 韓國 中世 韓中關係史 [A History of

Medieval Korea-China Relations]. Seoul: Hyeon 해안, 2007.

- Kim Young-je. "Gyoyeok e daehan Songjo ui taedo wa Goryeo haesang ui hwal-dong: Goryeo Munjong ui daesong ipgong baegyeong gwado gwanryeon-hayeo" 교역에 대한 宋朝의 태도와 高麗海商의 활동: 高麗 文宗의 對宋 入貢 배경과도 관련하여[The Song Dynasty's Attitude toward Trade and the Activities of Goryeo Marine Traders: In Relation to the Background of the Goryeo King Munjong's Tribute Missions to the Song]. *Yeoksa hakbo* 歷史學報 213, 2012.
- Koo Beom-jin, trans. *Imun yeokju* 이문 역주 [Annotated Translation of Liwen]. vol. 1. Seoul: Sechang Chulpansa 세창출판사, 2012.
- Lee Ik-joo. "Gongminwangdae gaehyeok ui chui wa sinheung yusin ui seongjang" 공민왕대 개혁의 추이와 신흥유신의 성장 [The Progress of King Gongmin's Reform and the Emergence of Confucian Officials]. *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 역사와 현실 15, 1995.
- Lee Kang-han. "Gongminwang 5 nyeon (1356) 'banwon gaehyeok' ui jaegeomto" 공민왕 5년(1356) '反元改革'의 재검토 [A Reexamination of the So-called 'Anti-Yuan Reforms' conducted by King Gongmin in 1356]. *Daedong munhwa yeongu* 대동문화연구 65, 2009.
- . "Goryeo Gongminwangdae jeongbu judo gyoyeok ui yeogeon mit teukjing" 고려 공민왕대 정부 주도 교역의 여건 및 특징 [The Environment and Characteristics of Goryeo's State-sponsored Trade during King Gongmin's Reign]. *Jeongsin munhwa yeongu* 정신문화연구 34, no. 4, 2011.
- Lee Seung-su. "Yeonhaengno jung 'Yoyang-Ansan-Gwangnyeong guban' e daehan immun jirihakjeok geomto" 연행로 중 '遼陽-鞍山-廣寧 구간'에 대한 인문지리학적 검토 [Anthropogeographical Study on the Section 'Liaoyang (遼陽)-Anshan (鞍山)-Guangning (廣寧)' on the Route of Joseon Diplomatic Envoys to Beijing]. *Hanguk hanmunhak yeongu* 韓國漢文學研究 47, 2011.
- Li Jiancai. *Dongbei shidi kaolüe* 東北史地考略 [A Brief Examination of the History and Geography of Northeast China]. Changchun: Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe 吉林文史出版社, 1986.
- Li Xinfeng. "Gongminwang houqi Ming Gaoli guanxi yu Ming Meng zhanju" 恭愍王後期明高麗關係與明蒙戰局 [Goryeo-Ming Relations in the Later Years of King Gongmin's Reign and the Progress of Ming-Mongol War]. *Hanguoxue lunwenji* 韓國學論文集 7, 1998.
- Liu Ji. "Beixun siji" 北巡私記 [A Personal Account of the Northern Patrol]. In

Mingdai Menggu hanji shiliao huibian 明代蒙古漢籍史料匯編 [A Compilation of Chinese Historical Materials on the Mongols in the Ming Period]. Huhehate: Neimenggu Daxue Chubanshe 內蒙古大學出版社, 1993.

Min Hyeon-gu. “Goryeo Gongminwangdae banwonjeok gachyeok jeongchi ui jeonggae gwajeong” 고려 공민왕대 반원적 개혁정치와 전개과정 [The Developments of King Gongmin’s Anti-Yuan Reform Politics]. In *Heo Seon-do seonsaeng jeongnyeon ginyeom Hanguk sahak nonchong* 허선도 선생 정년기념 한국사학논총 [A Collection of Articles on Korean History: Festschrift for Professor Heo Seon-Do in Celebration of his Retirement]. Seoul: Ilchogak 일조각, 1992.

Mingshi 明史 [History of the Ming Dynasty]. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju 中華書局, 1997.

Ming Taizu shilu 明太祖實錄 [Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty, the Taizu Reign]. Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo 中央研究院歷史語言研究所, 1962.

Morihira Masahiko. “Kōraiōi no kisoteki kōsatsu: Daigen Urusu no ichi bunken seiryoku toshi no Kōraiōke” 高麗王位の基礎的考察: 大元ウルスの一分権勢力としての高麗王家 [A Preliminary Examination of the Goryeo Kingship: The Goryeo Royal Family as a Stakeholder of the Great Yuan Ulus]. *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 朝鮮史研究會論文集 36, 1998.

Nam Ui-hyeon. “Wonmal Myeongcho Joseon Myeong ui Yodong jaengtaljeon gwa gukgyeong bunjaeng gochal” 元末明初 朝鮮·明의 요동쟁탈전과 국경분쟁 고찰 [Analysis of the Territorial Dispute between Joseon and the Ming over the Liaodong Region during the Late Yuan and Early Ming Periods]. *Hanil gwangyesa yeongu* 韓日關係史研究 42, 2012.

Park Seong-ju. “Goryeomal Ryeo Myeong gan jogong chaekbong gwangye ui jeonggae wa geu seonggyeok” 高麗末麗·明간 朝貢冊封關係의 展開와 그 性格 [The Development and Character of Tributary and Investiture Relationships between Goryeo and the Ming at the End of the Goryeo Period]. *Gyeongju sahak* 慶州史學 23, 2004.

Park Won-ho. “Goryeo wa Juwonjang ui cheot gyoseop e gwanhan sogo” 高麗와 朱元璋의 첫 交渉에 관한 小考 [A Brief Survey on the First Contact between Goryeo and Zhu Yuanzhang]. *Bukbangsa nonchong* 北方史論叢 3, 2005.

———. *Myeongcho Joseon gwangyesa yeongu* 明初朝鮮關係史研究 [A Study on Joseon’s Relations with the Early Ming Dynasty]. Seoul: Ilchogak 일조각, 2002.

- Song Yong-deok. "Goryeo hugi byeongyeong jiyek byeondong gwa Amnokgang yeonbyeon insik ui hyeongseong" 高麗後期 邊境地域 변동과 鴨綠江 沿邊認識의 형성 [The Change of Borderlands and the Recognition of the Yalu River as a Frontier Region in the Latter Half of the Goryeo Period]. *Yeoksa hakbo* 歷史學報 201, 2009.
- Xue Huang. "Ming Hongwu nianjian Mingchao yu Gaoli wangchao guanxi lüelun" 明洪武年間明朝與高麗王朝關係略論 [A Brief Survey on Ming-Goryeo Relations during the Hongwu Emperor's Reign]. *Shehui kexue zhanxian* 社會科學戰線 4, 1997.
- Yang Yang. *Mingdai Liaodong dushi* 明代遼東都司 [The Liaodong Regional Military Commission in the Ming Dynasty]. Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou Guji Chubanshe 中州古籍出版社, 1988.
- Yoon Eun-sook. "Bukwon gwa Myeong ui daerip" 북원과 명의 대립 [Conflict between the Northern Yuan and the Ming]. *Dongyang sahak yeongu* 동양사학연구 105, 2008.
- . "Goryeo ui Bukwon chingho sayong gwa Dong Asia insik: Goryeo ui yangmyeon oegyo reul jungsimeuro" 고려의 北元 칭호 사용과 동아시아 인식: 고려의 양면 외교를 중심으로 [Goryeo's Use of the Name Northern Yuan and Its Perception of East Asia: With a Focus on Goryeo's Two-pronged Diplomacy]. *Jungang Asia yeongu* 중앙아시아연구 15, 2010.
- . 尹銀淑. "Nagachu ui hwaldong gwa 14 segi mal Dong Asia jeongse" 나가추의 활동과 14세기말 동아시아 政勢 [Naghachu's Activities and the Political Situation of East Asia at the End of the 14th Century]. *Myeongcheongsa yeongu* 명칭사연구 28, 2007.
- Yoon Myeong-cheol. "Seo Hee ui Songnara sahaeng hangno tamgu" 徐熙의 宋나라 使行航路 탐구 [An Exploration of Seo Hee's Maritime Itinerary on His Mission to the Song Dynasty]. *Goguryeo yeonguhoe haksul chongseo* 고구려연구회 학술총서 2, 1999.
- Zhang Shizun. "Gaoli yu Beiyuan guanxi dui Ming yu Gaoli guanxi de yingxiang" 高麗與北元關係對明與高麗關係的影響 [The Impact of Goryeo's Relations with the Northern Yuan on the Relationship between the Ming and Goryeo]. *Suihua shizhuan xuebao* 綏化師專學報 1, 1997.





Review Article






**Undercurrents of Go'joseon
Research Reflected in the Diaries:
With a Focus on Gu Jiegang's
Diary (顧頡剛日記) and
An Zhimin's Diary (安志敏日記)**



In Uk KANG
Kyung Hee University



The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 18 Number 2 (Summer 2022), 179-192
Copyright © 2022 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.





Undercurrents of Go'joseon Research Reflected in the Diaries: With a Focus on Gu Jiegang's Diary (顧頡剛日記) and An Zhimin's Diary (安志敏日記)

In Uk KANG
Kyung Hee University

Introduction

In North Korea, research on Go'joseon, traditionally regarded as the first state in Korean history, began with Li Ji-lin's study and with the formation of the North Korea-China Archaeological Excavation Team^{1*} in the 1960s. The field research, which had a significant impact not only on North Korea but also on South Korea and Russia, left no detailed information other than officially published material. The work of Yuri Mikhailovich Butin's work also had a decisive influence on the study of Go'joseon in the socialist bloc including the Soviet Union. The argument that Go'joseon's location was in Liaoning has been at the center of controversy in South Korea since the 1980s.

Two incidents marked the milestone of Go'joseon's study in the 1960s. The first event started with Li Ji-lin's publication of *Study of Go'joseon* at Peking University. Then from 1963 to 1965, North Korea and

* This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2019S1A5C2A01083578)

¹ This refers to the joint investigation team of North Korea and China that excavated and investigated Go'joseon and Balhae in Manchuria from 1963 to 1965.

the People's Republic of China (PRC) jointly excavated the archaeological sites related to Go'joseon in Manchuria. Both North Korea and the PRC, however, feared that the joint research on Go'joseon would directly lead to bilateral territorial disputes. They hurriedly ended the excavation project after a major tension. North Korea unilaterally publicized the results in 1966, which had a great influence on South Korea's Go'joseon research. On the other hand, the PRC only published a report in 1996 under the title of *Shuangtuozi and Gangshang* (雙砬子與崗上) without mentioning the joint excavation project with North Korea.

No primary source is known to exist on the activities of Li Ji-lin and the North Korea-China Archaeological Excavation Team despite its importance in determining the directions of Go'joseon research. Fortunately, some helpful materials on the activities of North Korean scholars in the 1960s were recently released in the PRC. First, there is the diary of Gu Jiegang (顧頡剛, 1893-1980), who mentored Li Ji-lin, the first Korean who studied at the Peking University for about three and a half years from March 1958 to September 1961. This is Gu's lifelong diary, the *Gu Jiegang riji* (顧頡剛日記), and the Complete *Gu Jiegang Collection* (顧頡剛全集) consisted of several research notes. The South Korean academia showed great interest in Li's Go'joseon research as described in Gu's diary. Moreover, in 2020, *An Zhimin's Diary* (安志敏日記), or a collection of the diary of the archaeologist An Zhimin (安志敏, 1924-2005) was published. An was in charge of excavating Go'joseon relics at the excavation team. An's diary provides details that reveal the excavation situation experienced by the person in charge of the joint excavation team. It covers the contents of the excavation conducted after Li Ji-lin's study abroad at Peking University.

These diaries contain the sources rarely studied in the historiography and archaeological history of Go'joseon. The materials which they include provide groundbreaking information regarding disputes related the recognition of Go'joseon. This article introduces the two diaries and examines their significance.

An Analysis of Li Ji-lin's Go'joseon Research Reflected in Gu Jiegang's Diary

The *Gu Jiegang's Diary* introduces almost all of the diaries recorded by Gu Jiegang. Most of them are about ancient Chinese history which was his main subject of study. Furthermore, the records of his family, friends, and academic life were also recorded in a plain manner. His relationship with Li Ji-lin, whom he advised as a student since 1958, can also be found in the source. The first entry on Li Ji-lin appeared in March 1958 when Li visited Gu to talk about the history of China and Korea. Since then, most of the detailed diary entries related to Li Ji-lin were included in the ninth volume of the diary. The entries from 1960 to 1961 described in detail the processes of Li bringing his Ph.D. dissertation at a time and Gu supervised it. As is well known, Li's dissertation viewed Manchuria as the territory of Gojoseon which Gu expressed his dissatisfaction immediately. On September 29, 1961, at Li Ji-lin's doctoral defense, he complained in writing that the review was practically perfunctory and that he had to pass the research without pointing out the flaws for the sake of the bilateral friendship between North Korea and the PRC.

After the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Chinese intellectuals considered the region as a sovereign territory of China. As a fervent nationalist, Gu shared such a sentiment. In other words, the conflict between North Korea and the PRC over Go'joseon began to emerge in the early 1960s and this conflict intensified as the joint excavation began in earnest after Li received a doctorate degree. As the opposition from Chinese political and academic circles against the bilateral excavation was heating up, the frustration of Gu Jiegang, who advised Li, was also increasing. The diary on July 24, 1964, showed that the conflict over ancient history was already on the verge of explosion.

The North Korean historians attempt to reclaim the land, hoping to recover their pride by referring back to the people of Go'joseon who lived in the northeastern part of our country. Li Ji-lin was one of the people on these tasks. This purpose is to demonstrate that each eth-

nic group (Sukshin / Sushen, Yemaek / Huimo, Buyeo / Fuyu, Okjeo / Woju, etc.) in the northeastern region was under the rule of Go'joseon. Therefore, the North Korean historians aim to portray the northeastern part of China as being ruled by North Korea. Now, they are going to excavate the region and prove the (North) Korean origin of Go'joseon with the relics. Our government responded generously and also our archaeologists did cooperate with them in their excavation. However, it was of no use. I understand that their deed was tied to patriotism, which still makes me indignant. (*The Gu Jiegang Diary*, Vol. 10, p. 112)

The new story behind Go'joseon research revealed in Gu Jiegang's diary is as follows. First, it is highly likely that Li Ji-lin's research on Go'joseon was not his sole research but a collaboration with historians of ancient history such as Lee Sang-ho and Lim Gun-sang. Li was already in his mid-40s when he embarked on studying abroad and his original major was Chinese philosophy. Yet as soon as he arrived in China, Li completed the table of contents of his doctoral dissertation, which was examined by Gu Jiegang page by page. Moreover, Li's doctoral research was a very impressive work that reviewed a vast number of Chinese literary sources and added archaeological materials. Therefore, it would be difficult to conclude that the research was conducted by a single individual whose expertise used to be Chinese philosophy. Even, Li had little time to translate, present, and revise most of the contents, assuming that it had already been written at home.

Second, Li Ji-lin's study of Go'josen in the PRC was the political decisions of the North Korean academia and government. According to Gu's diary The North Korean embassy, for instance, participated in Li's Ph.D. dissertation defense. Gu Jiegang also regarded Li's study abroad as a political decision. In addition, in August 1961, when Li Ji-lin was about to complete his degree, the "Go'joseon Research Discussion Forum" was held in Pyongyang. It was officially determined under the direction of North Korea's Go'joseon research. Researchers presented their views at the Forum on August 30 and three days later, on September 2, they gathered together to engage in discussions. As a result, the Liaoning Location Theory of

Go'joseon's location, based on Li Ji-lin's Ph.D. dissertation, was officially adopted. However, the diary of Gu records the unexpected activities of Li. According to the diary, Li met Gu in Beijing on September 2, the date of the Forum discussion. In Li's absence, the North Korean academia held the meetings where Baek Nam-woon, the leader of these scholars, unilaterally declared the "victory" of Li Ji-lin's theory. It proves that Li's activities were politically deliberate.

Third, Gu Jiegang did not substantially guide Li Ji-lin's research on Go'joseon. Gu's diary clearly shows that he had no interest in Go'joseon, Manchuria, or the Korean Peninsula before the coming of Li Ji-lin. All the same, he was delighted to learn some Korean history including that of the Three Kingdoms, thanks to Li. In other words, the assignment of Gu as Li's advisor in studying Go'joseon can be interpreted as a tactical decision of North Korea to rely on his authority in Chinese academia.

Fourth, there is an important difference between the contents of Li's book, *A Go'joseon Study*,² published in North Korea and his dissertation at Peking University. The book shows that he added more information on "Archeological Materials in Northeast China" to his dissertation. Along this line, we can speculate that Li actually collected archaeological data for the excavation team when he was studying at Peking University. From these facts alone, *Gu Jiegang's Diary* is an invaluable source indicating the inception of the conflict between North Korea and the PRC on Go'joseon.

Source material in the form of a diary has the advantage of helping researchers see the personal opinions of a writer. *Gu Jiegang's Diary* also does unveil national emotions triggered by the historical disputes between the two countries without any filtering.

However, historical conflict did not solely characterize the relationship between the scholars of North Korean and the PRC. There were also some accounts describing the more comfortable communication situation

² Li Ji-lin's doctoral dissertation is known to be similar to *A Go'joseon Study* published in North Korea. However, the publication's actual contents have never been made public although in the 1970 while photocopies from unknown sources were circulating as "internal data" by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (Park Joon-hyung 2020).

crated by the researchers of the two states, Gu and Li in particular. It was mediated through Koryo ginseng. Around the time of his final Ph.D. defence at Peking University on September 30, Li presented Gu with the finest ginseng. Gu's liking of the ginseng is evident in many places in his diary. When he felt weary or had a sore throat, he used the ginseng for treatment. In his diary at the end of 1967, he lamented that ginseng was no longer available because of lost contact with Li. He was also unhappy with the fact that he could not travel to North Korea because his relationship with North Korea was cut off. As a non-political scholar, Gu hoped for scholarly exchanges between North Korea and the PRC. Perhaps the same sentiments were shared by North Korean scholars as well. This was Gu's last memory of Li Ji-lin. Two years later, in April 1969, the short sentence of "[P]ersonal contact with Li Ji-lin entailed the completion of the investigation report" marked the end. Gu Jiegang since then was unable to engage in academic exchanges with North Korea.

An Zhimin's Diary and Korea-China Archaeological Excavation Team

An Zhimin graduated from the Chinese University (中國大學) with a history degree and taught as an assistant professor at Yanjing University (燕京大學). He worked at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences for the rest of his life. He represented the early generation of Chinese archaeologists who led the early excavations after the founding of the PRC. Unlike other Chinese archaeologists, An Zhimin was in charge of international exchanges with the countries in East Asia as well as the West. He began his exchanges in the late 1940s when he interacted with Japanese scholars such as Torii Ryuzo (鳥居龍藏1870-1954). Under this background, An Zhimin was appointed as the director of Go'joseon division in the Korea-China Archaeological Excavation Team between 1963 and 1965. An's diary is very valuable in illuminating the situation of the joint excavation team, where the confrontation between North Korean and the PRC archaeologists over Go'joseon was intense.

In 2020, *An Zhimin's Diary* was compiled by his family after fifteen

years of his death. Unlike *Gu Jiegang's Diary*, An did not record his personal daily life. Instead, he took field notes at the excavation sites. An's diary was published thanks to his two daughters, An Jiayuan (安家媛) and An Jiayao (安家瑶, 1947-). Both are archaeologists. An Jiayao, in particular, is an ancient glassware expert who has often visited South Korea and, on the other hand, served as a State Councilor for the Chinese Communist Party of China. His diary thus can be very reliable because it was published through careful instruction by an archaeologist. However, it is regrettable that the diary section from 1966 to 1976 was deleted and published in accordance with the "method of record-keeping for major topics (重大選題備案方法)" that became available in October 2019. Therefore, An's diary has its limits in showing the domestic Chinese debates after the conclusion of the joint excavation team. Despite its limitations, the diary is an important source showing the situation pertaining to the Go'joseon research such as North Korea's attitude towards the joint excavation, China's reaction, and the subsequent bilateral conflict.

An Zhimin's diary consists of five volumes, of which the entries on the excavation team were included in the second volume. The second volume began in April 1963 and ended in August 1965. According to An's diary, the excavation began with enthusiasm. He carried out a field survey in the Liaoning and Jilin areas before the North Korean team arrived. The archaeological research in those areas was still in its infancy at that time and he organized all the data. However, the conflict began immediately after his North Korean counterparts arrived. This was because North Korea's primary goal was not to conduct archaeological research but to confirm the existence of Go'joseon. An's complaints about North Korea's efforts to find the central location of Go'joseon were spotted multiple times in his diary. Although North Korea failed to find the center of Go'joseon, it made a breakthrough to prove the existence of Go'joseon by excavating a series of stone pile tombs on the edge of Liadong Peninsula. Most famous of them is widely known Gangshang (崗上) and Loushang (樓上).

North Korea and the PRC had many differences in excavation methods and interpretation of artifacts. They had been independently studying archaeology over a decade. They also had no prior experience with the in-

ternational joint investigation until then. In this situation, it was impossible to solve the sensitive Go'joseon issue. They failed to publish a final excavation report due to disagreements. The two countries agreed to produce an excavation report without controversial contents and to have copies of the report separately. In other words, both sides concluded that they did not approve of each other's research and the research on Go'joseon between the two countries crossed irreversible paths. Since then, North Korea and the PRC no longer discuss or study Go'joseon together.

North Korea later conducted its own research. Kim Yong-gan and Hwang Gi-deok, who led the excavation on Gangshang and Loushang, published a monumental article in 1967 which recognizes the Liaodong Peninsula and the northwestern part of North Korea as the location of Go'joseon. Since the 1970s, North Korea strengthened its cooperation with the archaeologists from Siberia under the Soviet Academy of Science instead of China. In 1974, a group of Soviet scholars, including V.E. Larichev and A.P. Okladnikov, visited North Korea. The visit of Soviet scholars led to the study of Go'joseon by Yuri Mikhailovich Butin in the 1970s.

The academic exchanges and conflicts within the socialist bloc, which used to be unknown, are gradually uncovered through the diaries of the scholars who were involved in the interactions. Yet, a large portion of the whole picture still remains unclear. Nevertheless, what has become clear is that cooperation and conflict between North Korea and the PRC over Go'joseon were not purely academic issues. Instead, the two diaries evince the fact that a series of political actions in the socialist bloc under North Korean initiatives were manifested around ancient history and archaeology.

The Significance of the Two Diaries

I have analyzed the little-known contents of the two diaries as above. This revealed the hidden aspects of ancient history research in North Korea and the PRC, which rapidly developed during the late 1950s and the mid-1960s. First, Gu Jiegang's diary shows Li Ji-lin's study in China from the late 1950s to the early 1960s and his Ph.D. research on Go'joseon. A

sense of crisis over the sovereignty of ancient history in North Korea was triggered by the publication of World History by the Soviet Union under the title of *Vsemirnaya Istoriya* in the mid-1950s. In this book, authors for Korean ancient history chapter described the beginning of Korea with the legendary movement of Kija (Qizi) to Korea in the Shang-Zhou transition period, and Lelang Prefecture of Han China without referring to Go'joseon. This eventually led to Li Ji-lin's study in Beijing.

After finishing studying abroad in 1962, Li immediately challenged Do Yu-ho's hegemony in the North Korean archaeological community. In order to validate his research, Li formed the Korea-China Archaeological Excavation Team. As shown in *An Zhimin's Diary*, North Korea and the PRC experienced a serious yet unacknowledged discord with each other and Li Ji-lin eventually stepped down from the front line. From the second year of research in 1964, more archaeological efforts were put to prove the existence of Go'joseon through the excavation of stone pile tombs like Gangshang and Loushang in Dalian. The North Korean scholars claimed that these tombs were made with sacrificed burials. All this research led to define Go'joseon as an slavery society, otherwise, ancient state. Since then, the stone-filled tomb in the Dalian region has become key relics in North Korea's Go'joseon research. On the other hand, China saw the excavation as an opportunity to lay the archaeological foundation in its north-eastern region. It was China's first and last large-scale international joint excavation. Starting with the excavation, the PRC's perspective towards the peripheral region shifted from the history of diverse ethnic groups to the expansion of a Han-centric order. In this regard, it is no exaggeration to say that the PRC's doctrine on the Northeast Asia Project(동북공정, 東北工程) has begun from their reaction to its tension with North Korea over Go'joseon six years ago. For both North Korea and the PRC, the joint excavation was not a minor incident that was forgotten or simply ended in a quarrel. Rather, it was the prelude to the unfolding disputes over ancient history between North Korea and the PRC along with the undercurrents of Go'joseon research. These two diaries are the main material helping us to comprehend the hidden dynamics in understanding the history of East Asian archaeology.

Conclusion

From the end of the Korean War until the early 1970s, the PRC experienced the tumultuous history of the Cultural Revolution whereas North Korea established the Juche [Self-Reliance] Ideology. During the same period, the two countries established a chronological system for ancient history and archaeology. Since the 1990s, the Go'joseon research in South Korea has been based on their research results. However, the details of Go'joseon's research in North Korea and the PRC were not known. The two socialist countries soon began to experience conflict as nationalist views of history were spreading rapidly. After eight years of joint study from 1958 to 1965, North Korea and the PRC stopped exchanging views on Go'joseon and Goguryeo. The diaries of Gu Jiegang and An Zhimin reveal the vivid voices of the Chinese side during the eight-year collaborative period. As with all diaries, the two diaries can never be considered complete in regard to data. They are an one-sided record on the part of the PRC with many parts still missing. We can never claim that the entire situation can be grasped with these personal records. Nevertheless, they are significant in providing an important clue that conveys the undercurrents of ancient East Asian history by filling the void of information. As ancient history lacks historical data, scholars' methods and historical views inevitably influence the interpretation of archaeological materials. Archaeology can be a field that best reflects the political and social reality of the time as compared to other disciplines. That is why contemporary materials such as the diaries of Gu Jiegang and An Zhimin should be more academically read and analyzed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

In Korean

- Jo Beop-jong. "Relationship between Li Ji-lin's Research of Go'joseon and Beijing University Professor." *Silla Culture* 48: 1-28, 2016.
- Kang In Uk. "Reexamination of role and significance of Lee Ji-Rin's study on Old Joseon and Korea-Chinese joint excavation on North-Eastern Part of China in 1963~1965 years." *Prehistory and Antiquity* 45: 29-58, 2015.
- Kim Yong-gan and Hwang Gi-deok, "Go'joseon Culture in the First Half of the Millennium BC." *Ancient Ethology*: 1-17, 1967.
- Korea-China Archaeological Excavation Team, ed. *A Report on the Excavation of Historic Places in Northeast China*. Pyongyang: Press of the Academy of Social Sciences, 1966.
- Park Joon-hyung. "The Discovery and Review of Li Ji-lin's Ph.D. dissertation [古朝鮮の研究] at Beijing University." *Prehistoric and Ancient Periods* 62: 5-34, 2020.
- Song Ho-jeong. "Li Ji-lin's Research on Go'joseon and Its Influence." *History of Culture* 44: 279-304, 2015.

In Chinese

- 顧頡剛.『顧頡剛日記第9卷(1960~1963)』.臺灣聯聯經經公司,2011.
- 安家瑤,安家媛.「考古人生 緬懷父親安志敏先生」.『大眾考古』7,2014.
- 安志敏,鄭乃武.「內蒙古寧城縣南山根 102 號石槨墓」.『考古』4,1981.
- 安志敏,鄭乃武.「瀋陽肇工街和鄭家窪子遺址的發掘」.『考古』10,1989.
- 安志敏.論環渤海的史前文化—兼評“區系”觀點.『考古』7,1993.
- 安志敏.『安志敏日記(全五冊)』.社會科學文獻出版社,2020.
- 中國社科院考古研究所.『雙砣子與崗上』.考古學專刊丁種第四十九號,科學出版社,1996.
- 夏鼐.『夏鼐日記-夏鼐考古筆記(共十冊)』.華東師範大學出版社,2011.

In English

Kang In Uk. “An Unique Travel of Russian Archaeologist to the Nation of Morning Freshness-A Book Review on *An Archaeologist’s Travel to the Nation of Morning Freshness* by Vitali Epifanovich Larichev, Novosirsk, Novosibirsk, Russia, 2012.” *Localities* 3: 227-231, 2013.



Notes for Contributors

The Journal of Northeast Asian History [JNAH] is a peer-reviewed biannual journal published by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. JNAH seeks challenging research focusing on regional and trans-national issues within the context of historical Northeast Asia. The Journal concentrates on interdisciplinary, comparative, and cross-cultural approaches to issues such as borders, identity, international relations, history issues, history education, historiography, and other relevant themes within the humanities and the social sciences. In addition to this thematic diversity, the Journal's geographical scope extends to other areas of Asia and beyond, thus inviting scholarly engagement in rethinking globalism and localism in world history. For detailed information about the submission of manuscripts, please contact the Journal at jnah@nahf.or.kr or jnah.nahf@gmail.com.

JNAH is published semiannually, in June and December. There is no set deadline for the submission of manuscripts. However, the manuscript must reach the editorial office by March 15 to be considered for publication in the June issue and by September 15 for the December issue. All submissions will be referred by specialists in relevant fields. Authors will be notified of the decision of the Editorial Board as promptly as possible, usually within three to four months of submission, as to whether their papers have been accepted for publication. Manuscripts may be edited according to the guidelines of the Editorial Board. The Editors are the final arbiters.

Preparation of Manuscripts

General Guidelines

1. *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* (ISSN 1976-3735) follows *Chicago Manual of Style*, 16th edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
2. Submitted manuscripts, including footnotes and illustrations, should be approximately thirty pages in length. The manuscript should be double-spaced in 12-point type.
3. The first page of the manuscript should provide the article title, and the names(s) and affiliations(s) of the author(s).
4. The second page should provide an abstract of no more than 150 words and at least five keywords that are placed following the abstract.
5. Romanization systems for East Asian languages are as follows: Revised Romanization, by the Republic of Korea government, for Korean, Pinyin for Chinese, and Hepburn for Japanese. For Inner Asian languages, Manchu, and Mongolian, please follow the systems used in the *Cambridge History of China*, volume 6. Exceptions to these are proper names internationally authorized, such as Koguryo.
6. Diacritics in East Asian language romanization systems (e.g., macrons in Japanese) must be included consistently.
7. East Asian (Korean, Chinese, and Japanese) scripts should appear wherever necessary in the body of the text or in the footnotes, following the appropriate romanization. Korean scripts should be in standard PC or Macintosh encoding, Chinese characters in standard Big 5 encoding (please use traditional form, or *fantizi* 繁體字), and Japanese kanji and kana in Shift-JIS.

Illustrations and Proofs

Authors are encouraged to include good quality illustrations (maps, photographs, etc.) in their manuscripts. Changes at the page proofs stage and later will be accepted only upon the Editor's approval. Final proofs are sent to both authors and book reviewers, and corrections are to be limited to printing errors only.

Copyright

Authors are to obtain permission to reproduce any copyright material. In assigning copyright, authors may use their own materials in other publications if *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* is acknowledged as the original place of publication and the Northeast Asian History Foundation is notified in writing in advance. Authors also agree to assign copyright of their manuscript to the Northeast Asian History Foundation to ensure that the materials in the journal can be distributed as widely as possible.

Submission Address

All manuscripts and communication should be directed to:

Editorial Office

The Journal of Northeast Asian History

Northeast Asian History Foundation

NH Life Bldg, 81, Tongil-ro, Seodaemun-gu,

Seoul, Republic of Korea

Email: jnah@nahf.or.kr

jnah.nahf@gmail.com.

Publication Ethics

The stipulations below are the public pronouncement of *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* for academic integrity and originality.

1. Articles and book reviews in *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* do not represent the views of the Northeast Asian History Foundation or the journal's editors.
2. No part of a manuscript submitted to the journal should be under review for publication elsewhere nor have been published in another publication without the permission of *The Journal of Northeast Asian History*.
3. Three specialists, including editorial board members, if appropriate, will be appointed peer reviewers to evaluate the suitability of the manuscript. The Editor is responsible for the final acceptance or rejection of the manuscript.
4. Any form of scholarly misconduct, including plagiarism, forgery, or falsification, in the process of research or writing the manuscript is not permitted. If misconduct is reported, the editorial board will form a committee to consider the withdrawal of the manuscript. If misconduct is proved, the manuscript under investigation will be immediately withdrawn and the author will not be permitted to submit further manuscripts to *The Journal of Northeast Asian History*.
5. Quotation of or references to sources in the manuscript must be clear. Authors are fully responsible for all the factual and numerical contents published in their manuscript.
6. In the case of co-authored manuscripts, the order of authors should reflect the extent to which they contributed to the completion of the manuscript.

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 18 Number 2 Summer 2022

Published in 2022

Compiled by Northeast Asian History Foundation

Published by Northeast Asian History Foundation

NH Life Bldg, 81, Tongil-ro, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea

Tel: +82-2-2012-6000 Fax: +82-2-2012-6189

ISSN 1976-3735

Copyright © 2022 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.

*No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.*