An Era Facing Three Layers of External Pressure
The political order in East Asia was rapidly changing under the reign of King Gwanghaegun (1608~1623). The change was triggered when Japan, who had been considered as "barbarians in the islands outside the Sino-centric world order", challenged Ming China in 1592 by invading Korea in the Imjin War. It became clear that Ming Dynasty was falling into ruins, and Joseon was faltering in the aftermath of war. In contrast, Japan emerged as a military powerhouse, and the Jianzhou Jurchens led by Nurhaci confronted Ming as a powerful group in Manchuria.
As China declined and other tribes gained strength, Korea was the weakest nation in terms of military capability and was saddled in the middle of Ming, Later Jin (Jurchens) and Japan. Moreover, the three countries threatened Joseon after the war. Ming forced Joseon to participate in the battle with the Jurchens; Later Jin urged Joseon to stay neutral; and Japan tried to maximize its benefits while keeping a close eye on the struggling Joseon between Ming and Later Jin. To deal with at least one of the three troubles, King Gwanghaegun attempted to restore the bilateral relations with Japan by signing the Treaty of Giyu in 1906.
Gwanghaegun's Boldness and Insight in Joseon's Relations with Ming and Later Jin
Joseon's diplomatic ties with Ming and Later Jin became worse under the reign of Gwanghaegun. In 1618, Later Jin declared war against Ming by occupying Fushun, and Joseon was caught in the maelstrom of confrontation between the two countries. Ming forced Joseon to send forces to its military expedition to Later Jin, and it shows China's policy of "using barbarians to control barbarians (以夷制夷)".
Gwanghaegun was never obedient to Ming's demand. He thought that although he appreciated the assistance extended by Ming during the Imjin War, Joseon would not fight against Later Jin for the sake of Ming, risking a national crisis. He sent envoys to Ming and pleaded that it was difficult for Joseon to sent troops for Ming. He made an excuse that weak Joseon troops would not be of great help to Ming and they would only undermine Ming's military actions.
However, Ming threatened Joseon that it might attack Joseon first if Joseon refused to send troops for the war with Later Jin. A number of senior government officials claimed that Joseon should accept Ming's demand, saying that it was not inappropriate for Joseon to turn a blind eye to Ming, when "the parent nation" faced a crisis. In the end, Gwanghaegun had to send soldiers to aid Ming in 1619, but the Battle of Shenhe (深河) ended in Later Jin's overwhelming victory.
Even after the defeat in the Battle of Shenhe, Ming tried to mobilize Joseon's troops. However, Gwanghaegun refused it firmly, and struggled not to become stuck in the middle of confrontation between the two countries. The biggest headache for Joseon at that time was Ming Commander Mao Wenlong and the issue of Chinese refugees in Korea. Mao Wenlong said that he would restore Liaodong, which was taken by Later Jin, and provoked Later Jin starting from 1621 in the northern region of Cheongcheon River, including Cheolsan, Yongcheon, Uiju etc. As he settled down in Joseon, a lot of Chinese refugees left Later Jin, crossed the Aprok River and came to Pyeongan Province in the Korean peninsula. The refugees robbed Joseon officials and residents of food, money and everything.
Later Jin was very indignant as Mao Wenlong threatened the country and many refugees were leaving China. In December 1621, Later Jin forces raided Yongcheon to seize Mao Wenlong. He managed to ran away and survive, and it became clear to Joseon that he was a "time bomb".
Nevertherless, Gwanghaegun was bold enough to force Mao Wenlong to move to an island. There he could be safe because Later Jin did not have marine troops at that time. In addition, Gwanghaegun urged Ming to repatriate the refugees, who incurred significant damage to Joseon. It was never easy to tell the "parent country" and its commander what to do, but Gwanghaegun was courageous and decisive enough to do so. His diplomatic skills and boldness mark a stark difference when compared to his successor, Injo, whose lack of resolution resulted in the Manchurian invasion of Korea in 1627 (Jeongmyo-Horan).
King Gwanghaegun and the Era of G-2
In 1623, Gwanghaegun was deposed by Injo and the Westerners faction (西人) with a coup. They cited the following reasons for the dethronement : stripping Queen Inmok of her title and killing his brother, Yeongchang Daegun; betraying the parent country (Ming) and maintained relations with barbarians (Later Jin); initiating a series of construction projects and devastating the economy" among others.
It remains controversial whether these reasons are appropriate and reasonable. However, it is clear that Gwanghaegun failed to bring officials together and manage internal affairs. As a second son who was born to a concubine, he had to go through hell and high water to take the throne, and he concentrated his energy on strengthening royal authority. But the problem is that he stayed close to only a few members of the Great Northerners faction (大北派), and did not pay attention to other fractions' views or government officials' public opinion. In particular, he avoided the Gyeongyeon (royal classes with the vassals in attendance), which led to fatal problems in communication with the officials. He ignored recommendations and advice of the officials from other factions, and ultimately drove them out of the royal court. The expelled officials fiercely criticized Gwanghaegun's domestic and international policies. Moreover, the situation worsened due to big-ticket construction projects, such as building a palace, as well as financial problems and tax increase. As a result, not only lower-class people but also local government officials were angered, and those who thought of staging a coup seized a timely opportunity to realize their plan.
Some voice concerns about Korea's future in the so-called era of G-2. What if the US and China cannot afford to maintain good relations and continue to confront each other? Will it be possible for Korea to frankly express its views when faced with a life-or-death situation? These questions linger as I look back on the light and shadow of the period under the reign of Gwanghaegun.