Newsletter

"Agwan pacheon" refers to the incident in which King Gojong of Joseon fled to and sojourned at the Russian legation for about one year between February 11, 1896 and February 20, 1897. As an incident almost unprecedented throughout world history, many of the facts involved in it are yet to be uncovered, including the origin of the incident's name.

In an editorial looking back on the first year of the Geonyang (建陽, Lustrous Inauguration) era published that year in the December 26th issue of the daily Dongnip Shinmun (獨立新聞), the term "ieo" (移御) was used to refer to the incident instead of "pacheon" (播遷). [Source: Lee Tae-jin, "Geundae seoyang jeongchi jedo suyongeui yeoksajeok seongchal" (A Historical Examination of the Acceptance of the Western Modern Political System), Jindan hakbo no. 84, 1997].

“… On the eleventh day of February, His Majesty the Emperor, overcome by imminent danger, left the palace and took residence at the Russian legation, requesting to be protected by the Russian minister….”

In the end, the expression "Agwan pacheon" seems to have been adopted later on, but it is yet to be known as to when the expression started to be used to refer to the incident.

"Agwan pacheon" falls under the realm of historic events that everyone is aware of, but do not know deeply about. This implies that dramatic elements of the event have been painted into a myth to attract more attention to such elements rather than the actual historical facts involved with the event. Examples of those dramatic elements would be King Gojong and the crown prince riding in palanquins usually used by court ladies to slip out of Gyeongbok Palace at dawn, King Gojong visiting Gyeongun Palace only when ancestral rites were held, and the newly appointed and former Russian minister both residing at the Russian legation for two months around the time Agwan pacheon occurred.

This essay focuses on two points in an attempt to contribute to the process of recasting the myth of Agwan pacheon into history. One point concerns the question of why Russia had been so deeply involved in Korea's affairs. The other point has to do with why King Gojong particularly chose to head to the Russian legation out of the several foreign legations located in Seoul.

The Reason Russia Intervened in Korea's Affairs

When it comes to the background of how Russia came to intervene in Korean affairs at the risk of running into armed conflict with Japan, without even having finished building the Trans-Siberian Railway, the predominant view is the one presented by Russian scholars who have had easier access to relevant historical sources. That view is based on the idea that the Russian government's "ex post facto approval" was involved. When the newly appointed Russian minister Alexey Shpeyer (А.Н.Шпейер) arrived in Seoul on January 1, 1896, his predecessor Karl Ivanovich Weber (К.И.Вебер) remained there with him for about two months before returning to Russia. Over the span of those two months, they accepted King Gojong's request for refuge and then asked for the Russian government's approval after King Gojong had already relocated to the Russian legation. Considering the usual pace of communication back then, the two ministers went for ex post facto approval, suggesting that the Russian government could not have had the chance to intervene in the incident beforehand.

Then, is that view a truly valid one? It does seem so by looking at documents from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that indicate minimizing conflict and maintaining friendly relations with nearby countries as a priority. However, a different interpretation unfolds from looking at materials issued by the Russian Admiralty, which attempted to acquire an ice-free port on the Korean peninsula since the late nineteenth century. In the age of imperialism, the foreign policies of great powers tended to represent not only the voice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also those of the Ministry of War, the Admiralty, and the Ministry of Finance. This means each of their opinions also need to be considered in order to truly understand what really happened. Especially since high-ranking officials within the Russian Navy at the time remembered the Korean peninsula as the stage where the British Royal Navy suffered the traumatic Port Hamilton incident (1885-1887). The Russian Admiralty understood the incident as one that blocked the straits of Korea, Russia's only exit from Vladivostok to the oceans beyond. Therefore, the government under the Russian Tsar had been on the lookout for a change of circumstances that would allow it turn the task of acquiring either the island Geojedo or Masan port along the straits of Korea into a priority in order for Russia to secure the right to freely sail past Korea.

What provided Russia with an opportunity to solve the aforementioned issue was the First Sino-Japanese War. Justifications for Russia's occupation of the island Geojedo were officially brought up during the second meeting of the Russian government's special committee on East Asian affairs held on February 1, 1895. That was when Japan was expected to win the war, and the Foreign Office report drafted for the meeting mainly suggested that "should a peace treaty between the Qing empire and Japan invade Russian interests in East Asia, Russia must first occupy Geojedo to secure unobstructed passage through the Korean straits, and then turn the island into a leased territory like the naval base Britain built in Hong Kong." Regarding the Foreign Office's report, the Russian Tsar Nicholas II subsequently revealed on April 6, 1895 his consent on intervening more deeply in Korea's affairs by admitting that "it would be desirable to acquire an ice-free port on the southeast part of the Korean peninsula, which is connected to the coasts of Russia."

The intelligence report dated July 21, 1895 sent to Vice Admiral Tyrtov by Admiral Alekseyev (А.И.Алексеев), commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet who visited Joseon in mid-July of 1895, indicates that the Russian government already had a highly detailed policy planned for the Korean peninsula. When Admiral Alekseyev arrived in Seoul on the 13th of July, he was offered an audience with King Gojong by a Korean officer sent over by the king himself. The offer had been unexpected for the admiral, but after being advised by Weber, the then Russian minister to Korea, someone was sent to quickly fetch a dress uniform from Jemulpo and the audience was able to take place on the 15th of July. When King Gojong received the commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet accompanied by four Russian officers at eleven o'clock in the morning, he mentioned that "the Russian emperor's friendship and trust is highly valued by Korea, which is enduring difficult times, and that Minister Weber is a most reliable advisor to the Korean government." This is why Admiral Alekseyev wired Saint Petersburg saying that "now is precisely the time for Russia to become actively involved in Korea's affairs."

Russia's plan to acquire an ice-free port on the Korean peninsula was linked to the Pacific Fleet's reinforcement. This became materialized when an extra 7 million rubles were allocated to the budget for the Russian Admiralty's seven-year warship building project between 1896 and 1902. Moreover, the Tsar Nicholas II believed it was his historical mission to bring Siberia closer to European Russia and secure an exit for Russia to the Pacific, just as Peter the Great and Catherine the Great had secured exits to the Baltic and Black Sea to draw closer ties between Russia and Europe. This world view of the last Russian emperor acted as the force which propelled the East Asian policies of Russia until its Baltic Fleet became annihilated over the Battle of Tsushima.

Even after Japan's vicious attempt to pillage Korea by assassinating Queen Min, the Russian government firmly upheld its intention to obtain an ice-free port at a meeting of the special committee on East Asian affairs held on December 1, 1895. This was shown by the decision to acquire an ice-free port along the East Sea or Yellow Sea so that the Russian Pacific Fleet may succeed in its operations primarily to "take the lead in stopping Japan's ambition to invade." This plan was set into motion when the commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet Admiral Alekseyev led two cruisers to survey the coasts of Geojedo and Masan in December 1895.

The Russian emperor’s interest in an ice-free port on the Korean peninsula surfaced in the form of active involvement in Korea’s internal affairs. This was also why on December 5, 1895 after the First Sino-Japanese War, the Russian Navy Chief of Staff admiral Kremer ordered commander Tyrtov of the Russian combined squadron, who had been residing in the Far East, to do his best to support Weber, the Russian Minister to Korea. So, it was no coincidence when Weber’s replacement Shpeyer reported through a confidential telegram dated February 12, 1896 that “the Korean king secretly communicated his plans to soon take refuge at the Russian legation with the crown prince, and we have consented,” the Russian emperor gave his authorization with the response that “the largest among our warships be dispatched to Jemulpo.” The Russian government must have figured that allowing King Gojong to take refuge at their legation would help eliminate Japan from Joseon without engaging in armed conflict and thus strengthen its influence over Korea. It must have also meant to be a strategic move to secure an ice-free port on the Korean peninsula by the time the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Pacific Fleet’s reinforcement would be finished.

Why Gojong Went to the Russian Legation

In February 1895 when Russia had been eyeing Geojedo under expectations that Japan would win the First Sino-Japanese War, King Gojong was drawing up plans to turn Joseon into a modern, independent nation. Those plans were reflected in the edict he issued about education. The edict’s main code was that “It is very difficult for a nation to become stable when its people have not received education. Reviewing developments throughout the world reveals that the people of advanced nations rich enough to exert independent sovereign authority are all knowledgeable. To be knowledgeable means to have been well educated, which is why education is the true foundation of a nation.” This makes it clear that King Gojong believed “The royal family’s stability depends on the education of its subjects, and the nation’s prosperity and power depends on it as well.” A system to educate teachers was subsequently created and promulgated as of April 16, 1895, which became a framework for regulations on modern schools in Joseon.

However, King Gojong’s plans were frustrated due to the Eulmi jibyeon (乙未之變) incident in which Japan assassinated his wife Queen Min. King Gojong’s plan to establish Korea as a state based on education had been incompatible with Japan’s policy to make Korea its protectorate through the First Sino-Japanese War. That plan's momentum was taken away as King Gojong’s movements became practically restricted by Japanese officials after Eulmi jibyeon. This steered King Gojong’s attention toward forming a new administration while his personal safety could be protected.

Then whom could he reach out to for assistance? Rather than rely on one particular power, King Gojong had tended to pursue a diversified diplomacy in which multiple powers would jointly protect Joseon. This can be witnessed through the letter King Gojong personally wrote to the Russian minister Weber on November 20, 1895. The letter officially proposed that Britain, Russia, and the United States jointly take the responsibility of guarding the royal palace by dispatching 50 troops from each of their garrisons stationed in Seoul.

However, the Russian minister Weber convinced King Gojong that it would be more efficient to receive protection from a single power rather than be jointly protected by several different powers. That was because Weber had been putting into motion the Russian government’s plan to intervene in Korea’s affairs. King Gojong thus chose to resolve the issue by making a deal with Weber. In exchange for accepting Weber’s advice, Weber was to get the Russian government’s approval to have the guards at the Russian legation in Seoul protect King Gojong. By doing so, King Gojong intended to turn Korea's political situation back to the way it had been before Eulmi jibyeon occurred. Back to the time when he had been tightening the reins of reform in order to have Korea join the ranks of modern, independent nations.

On February 10, 1896, the day before King Gojong was to move to the Russian legation, King Gojong sent a special envoy to H. N. Allen, the secretary to the American legation in Seoul, asking whether he should take refuge at the Russian legation. The reason King Gojong sought advice from Allen was to give off the impression that the United States was also involved in Korea’s internal affairs. That was, in a sense, King Gojong's approach of "using one enemy to control another" (以夷制夷). It seems that King Gojong had wanted the United States to present an alternative different from Russia. That is because, considering all the exchanges King Gojong had for more than ten years with various nations that each had a presence in Seoul, including the United States, he might not have necessarily chosen the Russian legation if he had the liberty to choose. Nevertheless, the United States adhered to its policy to stay out of Korea's internal affairs. And it continued to adhere to such a policy long after that day.

After relocating to the Russian legation, King Gojong managed to succeed in taking down the pro-Japanese administration and brought change to Korea's political situation. He went on to execute a full-scale modern reform by changing the political status of Korea into an empire. Regardless, the Gwangmu Reform led by the Korean emperor Gojong failed against the invasion of Japan as it took advantage of the Russo-Japanese War. Korea remained without any chance of reforming and modernizing itself until Japan backed out after losing the Pacific War.

The Northeast Asian History Foundation held its first conference of 2016 on February 3 under the theme "A 21st Century Review of Agwan pacheon: Considering the Korea-Russia Relations and the Future of Korean Diplomacy." The conference facilitated an opportunity to discuss various topics related to Agwan pacheon that have been well known, but have never been considered in-depth. Those who participated in the conference all agreed that the event was only the beginning to gaining a better understanding of the incident.