Newsletter

On April 4, 2017, the Japanese ambassador returned to his post after being summoned to his home country over the installation of a statue of peace in front of the Japanese general consulate in Busan. The longest withdrawal yet for a Japanese ambassador shows that the diplomatic tension between Korea and Japan as well as the negative public sentiment toward one another has only been growing worse. At times like these, Professor Lee Won-deog, based on his extensive experience in studying the history of Korea-Japan relations, shares his ideas on how historical issues can be resolved between the two countries and which direction their respective diplomatic efforts should head toward.

Interviewer: Kim Gwan-won (Director, NAHF Office of Research Administration

Lee Won-deog (Director, Kookmin University Institute of Japanese Studies)

Professor Lee Won-deog studied diplomatic science at Seoul National University and acquired his doctoral degree in international relations from the University of Tokyo in Japan. He has been teaching as a professor at Kookmin University since 1998 and is currently serving at the university as the head of the department of Japanese studies, the director of the Institute of Japanese Studies, and the leader of the East Asia Localization & Future Exploration Youth Development Project Group.

He co-authored publications including "Hanil gukgyo jeongsanghwa yeongu" [Studies on the Normalization of Korea-Japan Relations], "Hanil gwangaesa 1965-2015" [History of Korea-Japan Relations (1965-2015)], and has also translated into Korean "Anzen hosho: Sengo 50-nen no mosaku" [National Security Since the War: 50 Years of Searching] by Tanaka Akihiko and "Kiki no Nihon seiji" [Japanese Politics in Crisis] by Yamaguchi Jiro.

Q1. Why don't we start with what you've been preoccupied with lately? Please tell us about any research topics or activities you've particularly been interested in these days?

Lee Won-deog Nowadays I'm trying to devote my time to research and teaching at school rather than getting involved in external activities. Some undergraduate and graduate students have been telling me that they feel like they're "imposing upon me" whenever they need to meet and discuss things with me since I'm so busy. It's true that I've been wearing more hats at the university than other professors my age. And from this semester, I've begun handling administrative affairs as the head of the Department of Japanese Studies, which has now become part of the Global College of Humanities and Area Studies instead of the College of Social Sciences. I've also been serving as the director of the Institute of Japanese Studies for nearly a decade now. And for the past three years, I've been leading the "East Asia Localization Project," which has been selected to become part of the Korean Ministry of Education's "University for Creative Korea" program. That means much of my time is spent taking care of administrative affairs like attending meetings related to either the department, the research institute, or the project. In terms of activities outside the university, I offer advice on policies toward Japan mainly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, the National Intelligence Service, and the Northeast Asian History Foundation. I'm also involved in policy research done by other think tanks, so I do tend to struggle for time.

Q2. As someone who has studied Japan for a long time, if you were asked to define Japan in a single sentence, how would you do it?

Lee Won-deog That's a very tricky question. Yet, if I could narrow the definition's range down to Japanese politics and diplomacy, I would say "Japan is a nation that cunningly acts according to the rules and spirit of practicality." If Korea can be called a nation of pathos that values ideologies, justice, and emotions, Japan can be called a nation of logos that values level-headed reason, rationalism, and practical benefits. If "dynamics" and "leadership" are what drives Korea, "level-headedness" and "followership," meaning a disposition to cooperate with leadership, are what seems to drive Japan.

Q3. This may be a rather sensitive subject to discuss, but we cannot help but bring up the "comfort women" agreement made between South Korea and Japan on December 28, 2015. Many in Korea view it negatively, but you once mentioned through an interview with the Korea Economic Daily (December 22, 2017) that "the comfort women agreement may not be the best, but the next best solution." What did you mean by that?

Lee Won-deog I'm well aware that people in Korea have been heavily critical toward the comfort women agreement and have been calling for it to be either annulled or re-negotiated. Despite the former president Park Geun-hye's claim that "the agreement was made in pursuit of a solution that can be accepted by both the victims and the public," it is undeniable that the contents of the agreement are unsatisfactory and that communication with the victims and their support groups about the agreement has been insufficient. Moreover, it was problematic for the agreement to include phrases like "taking care of the statue of peace" and "final, irrevocable resolution" because they can be misleading in terms of determining which side is the real victim or perpetrator.

In any case, I think the essence of the comfort women agreement lies in the Japanese government's acknowledgement of its responsibility (toward the crimes against humanity committed by Japan), along with an apology made in the prime minister's name and a promise to provide victims with monetary reparations out of the Japanese government's budget. The main point of the comfort women issue is to restore the dignity and honor of the victims and help them heal their wounded hearts, so having the Japanese government openly acknowledge its responsibility, sincerely apologize, and make legal restitution is key to resolving the issue. The agreement failed at more clearly stipulating Japan's legal responsibilities and reparations, but it did make the Japanese government acknowledge its responsibility, apologize, and commit to provide monetary reparations out of its budget, which seems the closest Korea has ever got in trying to have the Japanese government take legal responsibility toward the issue.

Despite all sorts of efforts the Korean government has so far made to resolve the comfort women issue, the results have remained unsatisfactory in the face of the Japanese government's impervious policies toward post-war settlements. There can be no one-sided victory when it comes to settlings matters through diplomatic negotiations instead of war, so there is no choice but to push and pull. I think the Obama administration's omnidirectional pressure worked well in forcing a historical revisionist such as Prime Minster Abe to accept the agreement. In order to push Prime Minster Abe toward resolving the comfort women issue, the Obama administration highlighted the universal norms of respecting women's rights. Forming a system of cooperation between the United States, Korea, and Japan was vital to successfully executing the Obama administration's policy to "rebalance Asia," which is why the U.S. president urged the governments of Korea and Japan to end their "war over history."

Q4. The presidential candidates in Korea also seem to be arguing for the agreement to either be annulled or renegotiated, so how do you think the new administration soon coming into power in May should deal with the matter?

Lee Won-deog Asking for the agreement to be annulled or renegotiated is a possible diplomatic choice in theory, but in reality, there is close to no chance of getting Japan to renegotiate. Moreover, we in Korea need to carefully consider the fact that it will become much less likely for a renegotiation to produce an outcome better than the existing agreement. Of course, since the agreement is being fiercely criticized, the upcoming administration should organize a committee of experts to thoroughly investigate and review how negotiations proceeded to reach the agreement, how the agreement should be understood, and how it is being carried out. It will not be too late to formally bring to Japan's attention the need to supplement or revise the agreement once it surfaces through such a process.

My guess is that at the heart of criticism toward the agreement lies the misconception of viewing it as an "agreement to deal with the statue of peace." My impression of the agreement is that it is basically about apologizing. So, the absurd post-agreement remarks made by the Japanese government that are contradictory to what it has apologized and expressed remorse for through the agreement can practically be rendered as an irreverence or violation of the agreement's final, irrevocable nature. In that respect, Abe's remark that he has "no intension whatsoever of writing a letter of apology" or Japanese right-wing forces acting as if "the one billion Yen payment has allowed Japan to wash its hands of responsibility over the issue" should be considered direct violations of the agreement. Such remarks or actions therefore deserve to be met with firm objections raised by the Korean government. Concluding a final agreement only means the comfort women issue will no longer be a subject of negotiation between the two governments. It doesn't mean academic research and investigation on the issue, mourning for the victims, commemoration projects and education related to the issue should all be discontinued. Those should continue since they have nothing to do with the agreement. That is why I think, regardless of the agreement, we should proceed with the project aimed at listing comfort women material with UNESCO this year.

Q5. The Japanese ambassador to Korea was withdrawn for 85 days due to controversies over how to execute of the comfort women agreement and over the installation of the statue of peace in front of the Japanese general consulate in Busan. What do you make of the conflicts between Korea and Japan that seem to be growing more and more complicated?

Lee Won-deogThe statue of peace in front of the Japanese general consulate in Busan was installed by a civic group. The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the district government of Dong-gu in Busan did in fact make efforts to stop the installation. The Korean government tried to faithfully carry out the agreement by establishing the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation to financially support former comfort women in restoring their dignity and healing their wounds. However, right-wing Japanese began to press for the statue in front of the Japanese embassy to be removed since a one billion Yen payment is being made. Such pressure enraged Korean civic groups and drove them to think that the payment has rewarded Japan with a waiver from the comfort women issue and has muzzled Korea from mentioning the issue. So, the statue installed in Busan can be considered an expression of the Korean civic groups' rage and a symbol of protest against Japan's insinuations that the issue should altogether be dropped because a payment has been made. The statues are not the crux of the comfort women issue, they are repercussions of the issue that are likely to dissipate once Japan sincerely takes responsibility for its crimes, apologizes, and makes reparations commensurate to their sincerity.

What Korea needs to be level-headed about, on the other hand, is not the installation of the statues itself, but where they are installed. Even without having to bring up article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, installing a symbol at a location where it could harm a diplomatic mission's dignity and safety does not seem ideal in light of international norms or convention. It's a matter involving the very foundation of the modern diplomatic system. In that sense, it may better suit the original purpose of the statues if they can be installed at a public park or a memorial hall where they would be more accessible to the public than in front of an embassy or consulate. It is after all a fact that installing a statue in Busan has suddenly disheartened supporters of Korea in Japan and has internationally put Korea in a delicate position. It seems somewhat ironic to find that what has been done out of a patriotic motive has inconvenienced Korea in its relations with Japan.

Q6. Do you believe conflicts surrounding history between Korea and Japan can be resolved? If so, what sort of efforts would it take?

Lee Won-deog Conflicts between Korea and Japan over the past are not problems the government can solve in the short run through a clever policy or resolution. And it seems near impossible to arrive at an ultimate resolution by coordinating policies or reaching an agreement between the two governments. Because historical conflicts originate from a fundamental gap between Koreans and the Japanese in terms of how they each perceive history. So, there seems to be no choice but to resolve such matters over the long run by amassing and widely sharing outcomes of historical research and having civic groups make various attempts at international exchange. Nevertheless, Korea still needs to firmly and clearly respond against Japan turning historical issues into political provocations by paying respect at the Yasukuni Shrine, distorting historical facts about "comfort women," or retrogressing history education. If possible, it would be ideal to carefully treat and strategically manage issues surrounding history to prevent them from surfacing as political, diplomatic conflicts and friction. There are many areas that require cooperation between Korea and Japan such as security, North Korea, economy, social and cultural exchange, natural environment, energy, and science and technology. And there are much more realms at the East Asian or global level where the two countries can cooperate and collaborate with one another. Letting such possibilities get buried by conflicts over history would not only harm immediate national interests, but also prohibit the two countries from realizing peace and co-prosperity in East Asia in the twenty-first century.

Q7. Finally, we would be grateful if you could offer any advice you may have for the Northeast Asian History Foundation on the role it should play in overcoming Korea-Japan historical conflicts and achieving a peaceful co-existence.

Lee Won-deog The Northeast Asian History Foundation is a very unique public think tank established for the purpose of overcoming the gradually spreading and intensifying conflicts involving history and territory in Northeast Asia and ultimately contribute to bringing peace and co-prosperity to the region through academic research, network building, and education and promotion. For the past ten years, I believe the Foundation has greatly contributed to amassing research outcomes on East Asian history and assisting the Korean government in forming diplomatic policies involving history.

If I were allowed to offer some advice for the Foundation, one of them would be that it needs to further reinforce its research capabilities in order to boost its reputation. At least when it comes to territorial issues in Northeast Asia like that of Dokdo and issues involving Northeast Asian history, I sincerely hope the Foundation will be able to cultivate and support its researchers so that they may reach the top of their respective fields of expertise. To do so, it will be necessary to have policies and a system in place that allows researchers to focus on academic research instead of being consumed by administrative tasks to operate research projects. The other piece of advice would be that the Foundation needs to be aware of the fact that because of its rigid rules on budget execution, its research grants only cover single year projects. That forces research projects to be "executed for the sake of the project" instead of the research itself in a rush to submit final reports on time. I hope the Foundation's rules on budget execution can be changed or applied more flexibly to allow multi-year grants capable of supporting mid-to-long term research projects.