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Feature Story
Restoration of Diplomatic Relations After the Imjin War
    Min Deok-kee (Professor, History and Culture Department, Cheongju University)

Restoration of Diplomatic Relations After the Imjin WarThe 1592-1598 Imjin War involved Japanese attacks on Korea. It was the first time Japan invaded a dynasty on the Korean peninsula. Technically, there was a much earlier attack in 663 called the Battle of Baekgang, but it hardly counts as an attack since it was launched by pro-Baekje forces in Japan seeking to reinstate the ancient Korean kingdom Baekje. Prior to the Imjin War, Korea had never in its history been under national threat from Japan. Only bands of Japanese pirates would threaten certain areas on the Korean peninsula while major Japanese clans or the daimyo of Tsushima domain would repeatedly pledge their loyalty toward and commit treason against Joseon. The Imjin War can therefore be considered the first nationwide attack on the Korean peninsula that Japan launched as a country.

Once the seven-year-long war came to an end with Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s death, Japan was the first to extend a hand of peace to the Korean kingdom of Joseon. However, Joseon kept refusing Japan’s offer out of fear of being invaded again and was conscious about how Ming China would react. It put off its decision by saying it was up to Ming China.

In 1604, Ming sent a document confirming that Joseon was free to determine its own policies toward Japan. This allowed Joseon to carry out policies toward Japan without having to consider Ming, but Joseon continued to cite Ming as an excuse to gain the upper hand in peace negotiations as it sought to strengthen its national defense.

Restoration of Diplomatic Relations After the Imjin WarHowever, Japan’s repeated requests to make peace prompted Joseon to ask for certain conditions to be met. One was to have the Japanese sovereign send an official message seeking peace and the other was to hand over the Japanese soldiers who violated royal tombs including those of King Seongjong and King Jungjong during the war. A sovereign’s message meant Japan would have to include an apology for its invasions throughout the Imjin War and handing over the Japanese soldiers who violated Joseon’s royal tombs meant surrendering up war criminals to Joseon.

Tokugawa Ieyasu, who had authority in Japan at the time, sent to Joseon a sovereign’s message seeking peace and Tsushima domain’s daimyo arrested and transported the robber of Joseon’s royal tombs, although he didn’t turn out to be responsible for the crimes. So, Joseon dispatched a mission to deliver a reply to the Japanese sovereign’s message and carry out the repatriation of Joseon people taken away during the war.

The reason Joseon changed course and decided to make peace with Japan, a sworn enemy that had to be eliminated, was because Tokugawa Ieyasu, who went for policies that went against those of his predecessor Toyotomi Hideyoshi, issued a sovereign’s message apologizing for the Japanese invasions. Ieyasu made it all the more necessary for Joseon to make a decision by threatening to punish Tsushima domain’s daimyo for the delay, a figure who had been a vassal to the king of Joseon since concluding the Kyehae Treaty in 1443. Moreover, Nurhaci’s influence was closing in on Joseon from the north, which made it difficult for Joseon to remain hostile against forces both to the north and south.

From Ming’s point of view, it hoped Joseon would appear hostile in suppressing the Japanese, but work on pacifying Japan under the table. It was best to prevent war on the Korean peninsula from spreading to mainland China, which is why Ming constantly demanded that Joseon grow strong enough to counter threats from Japan on its own.

Restoration of Diplomatic Relations After the Imjin WarDuring the early stages of Japan’s invasion, Ming had intended to invest Toyotomi Hideyoshi as king of Japan and allow Japan to engage in tributary trade through the port of Ningbo like it used to during the Muromachi period. However, Ming came to shift its policy to granting investiture but not allowing tributary trade. Such a shift had been triggered out of distrust toward Japan, fearing that trade with the country might lead to another turmoil like the Ningbo Incident caused by Japanese delegates in 1523.

After the Japanese troops withdrew, Joseon kept reporting to Ming its affairs with Japan, especially about Japan’s repeated requests to make peace. Yet, despite having participated in the Imjin War, Ming did not wish to get involved in the negotiations for peace and gave Joseon written confirmation that it was on its own in making decisions regarding Japan. Ming would have welcomed nothing more if pacification between Joseon and Japan could end the war.

Forty days after his arrival in Japan in 1607, a Joseon mission carrying their sovereign’s message was met in Osaka with a shocking request by Tokugawa Ieyasu’s associates. The mission was asked to go to Edo Castle and deliver the message to Ieyasu’s son Tokugawa Hidetada since he had inherited the title of shogun in 1605. The mission rejected the request since the message had been King Seonjo’s reply to a message from Ieyasu and not his son, but Ieyasu’s associates remained adamant. The mission eventually gave in and travelled to Edo to deliver the message to Hidetada, to which Hidetada issued a reply for the mission to carry back home and finally established peace between the two countries.

Restoration of Diplomatic Relations After the Imjin WarIeyasu must have anticipated that Joseon would demand a message from him as a condition to establishing peace. However, as sovereign, sending a message of apology for invading Joseon was not a task he could easily carry out because Hideyoshi loyalists were claiming that Japan had won the Imjin War. As such, Ieyasu sent his message to Joseon in secret through the daimyo of Tsushima domain. Naturally, a mission from Joseon was bound to come carrying a reply to Ieyasu’s message. Hence, Ieyasu came up with a scenario to make that reply appear to be a message initiated by the sovereign of Joseon. Although his son had no actual power as shogun, sending the Joseon mission to him would prevent it from constituting as a reciprocatory mission. Ultimately, Joseon was able to domestically justify sending a reciprocatory mission to Japan while Japan was able to make it look as if Joseon was the one to first send a sovereign’s message asking for peace.

What, then, made Ieyasu be so persistent for seven years in having Joseon dispatch a mission? After bringing down the Toyotomi Hideyoshi administration and newly establishing the Edo bakufu in 1603, pacification with Joseon would externally complete a task Hideyoshi left unfinished and internally secure the new bakufu’s legitimacy against Ieyasu’s adversaries. The only country at the time with the authority to place the crown of international recognition upon the newly born Japanese government was Joseon. This implies that although the Japanese invaded Joseon by force, they came to increasingly recognize it as a culturally advanced nation.