Newsletter

During the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592, there were fundamental differences in opinions between Joseon and Ming on the subject of military cooperation. Troops from Ming, who had entered Joseon after crossing the Liaodong Peninsula where the eastern-most line of defense against the Jurchen army had been established, had no reason to fight at the risk of their lives. The royal government of Ming also had no reason to fight hard in other countries either, even with the risk of creating more damage than necessary, with Jurchen's front lines behind the boarder of the Liaodong Peninsula and deep in their southward advance. This was because the starting and ultimate points of Ming’s military deployment were its own security. In fact, since its defeat in the Battle of Byeokjegwan on January 27, 1593 (of the lunar calendar), the Ming dynasty led the war into a stalemate by stopping the fighting Japanese troops and beginning peace negotiations. What efforts did Joseon make at a time in which it could not stop military cooperation with Ming?

The Retreating Ming and the Fighting Joseon

The Ming army took the initiative to go to war after winning the Battle of Pyongyang Castle on January 9, 1593 (of the lunar calendar), moving southward to the northern end of the Imjingang River in just two weeks. Ming claimed to restore Hanseong in February with a high degree of confidence while Joseon tried to respond to this with its backup support, despite Joseon’s devastated situation. However, Ming’s vigor did not last long. Ming troops halted their advance after a unit led by commander Li Rusong suffered an unexpected defeat in an ambush led by Japanese soldiers in Byeokjegwan (the area of present Goyang City) on January 27 (of the lunar calendar). Having experienced solid counterattacks by Japanese troops that were assembled in Hanseong after retreating from Pyongyang, Ming’s military command realized how difficult it would be to advance to Hanseong and began to attribute all responsibilities for the frontline standoff, such as provisions delays, to Joseon. On February 5 (of the lunar calendar) when the Battle of Byeokjegwan was officially confirmed, Joseon’s royal court received news that Ming soldiers had been ambushed in Byeokjegwan because of the Joseon army’s false report. The theory that it was Joseon’s responsibility can also be found in other places. In connection with the provision delays, chief manager Song Yingchang demanded extreme punishments to be given to Joseon, including execution of those responsible, and criticized Joseon, claiming that the advance to Hanseong was being delayed due to Joseon’s procrastination. Song then concluded that Joseon troops should be responsible for restoring Hanseong and other remaining regions, arguing that the Ming army had fulfilled its duties of restoring Pyeongan-do, Hwanghae-do, Gangwon-do, and Gyeonggi-do through victories in Pyongyang, Gaeseong, and Byeokjegwan amid Joseon’s refusal of responsibility. As such, Ming handed the key responsibility for combat, including advance into Hanseong, over to Joseon and slowly stepped back from the rear to a supporting position.

Joseon’s royal court began to seek measures to directly deal with its counterpart, Ming, while trying to persuade the Ming troops. One of the measures was to introduce proposals after the Battle of Byeokjegwan through “Jumun (奏文),” written as a token of appreciation for the Battle of Pyongyang Castle. “Jumun” vividly stated Ming’s triumph at Pyongyang Castle and pleaded with Ming to resume fighting indirectly in three ways.

First, the war was not over yet, and Hanseong, the capital, was not yet restored, which underscored the urgency of Ming troops’ need to advance. Second, if Ming troops were to pullout, the Japanese army would certainly reinvade. Third, 5,000 hunters from Zhejiang Province were dispatched to emphasize the need to drive Japanese soldiers from all areas of Joseon. Thus, Ming blocked the gap that allowed the Japanese troops to move towards southern cities, such as Busan, through peace negotiations.

Turning the Table with a Dependent Relationship (sun-mang-chi-han)

The Joseon Army fought off Japanese troops single-handedly resulting in a big triumph in Haengjusanseong Fortress on February 12 (of the lunar calendar), two weeks after the Battle of Byeokjegwan. The victory was all the more meaningful as it meant the triumph over the area south of the Imjingang River. Did the time come for the Joseon-Ming allied forces to defeat Japan and reclaim Hanseong?

However, things were tough. This is because Ming troops stood unyielding, claiming their desire to withdrawal their main forces to Pyongyang. Joseon stuck to its tactic after the Battle of Byeokjegwan, namely that of dealing with Ming’s royal court directly, and came up with two new bargaining chips.

First, there was the possibility that Japan would send more troops. Japan’s dispatch of more troops, rather than retreat, would result in the circumstances caused by the failure of the Ming army that had assured the restoration of Hanseong and therefore, being reprimanded by Ming’s royal court was certain. Another bargaining chip was the theory of seaborne attacks on Ming’s mainland by Japanese troops and the defense theory of Beijing. The key point was that Japanese soldiers could land in Kyeju and Tianjin along the waterways of the western coast in Hwanghae and Gyeonggi without difficulty, if left untouched. The argument that Japan could launch seaborne attacks even on Tianjin would endanger Beijing, which was serious enough to provoke Ming’s royal court. However, this was not a simple hypothesis, and instead had the objective ground of geographical and topographical characteristics of Joseon’s western coast. In this respect, the theory of Japan’s attacks on Ming’s mainland is notable, as Joseon actively used the logic of “sun-mang-chi-han (if Joseon collapses, Ming may also be put in danger),” and thus emphasized that it was for the sake of Ming’s own security. This was also important in that it helped advocate for the pro-war argument to Ming’s royal court, indicating that Ming must ward off Japanese troops in Joseon for the sake of Ming’s own survival, which included attacks by Japanese soldiers on the shores of Jeolla-do Provinces, not the Yalu River or Imjingang River.

Ever since its participation in the Imjin War, Ming viewed Joseon completely from the viewpoint of “sun-mang-chi-han.” For this reason, after the Great Haengju Victory, Ming stepped back, rather, although it could have joined forces with Joseon troops that had an elevated level of morale and repel Japanese soldiers from Hanseong. Joseon didn’t forget the fact that completely driving out Japanese troops was the only way to ensure its own security, despite its difficult situation in which victory or defeat was at the mercy of Ming’s decision. The reason that Joseon opted to create a sense of crisis vis-a-vis Ming by raising the theories of Japan’s reinvasion and attacks on Ming’s mainland in the midst of the stalemate in the frontier was to stick to its principle of ensuring security. The Battle of Byeokjegwan vividly shows that Joseon and Ming were each looking for different solutions for their own security in the same battleground. Is this not suggestive to us as we face the rapidly changing political situation in Northeast Asia?