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Kim Koo and Chiang Kai-shek at the Time of the Yun Bong-gil Bombing and the Moving of the Provisional Government

After having moved to Shanghai in exile right after the March 1st Movement, Kim Koo was named the director of police affairs when the Provisional Government launched, became the director of domestic affairs in 1922, and then became premier in late 1926. Yet it was after Yun Bong-gil’s patriotic deeds on April 29, 1932 that he emerged as the central figure of the Provisional Government. This can be concluded based on a statement made by Chiang Kai-shek, China’s supreme military and political leader from 1928 through 1949. Chiang, who is famous for having kept a diary during his lifetime, wrote a diary entry on April 30, 1932, the day after the bombing incident. In this entry, he wrote that he found out through newspaper reports, mentioning that Koreans, Yun Bong-gil and An Chang-ho were the masterminds. Thus, one can assume that Chiang was not well aware of Kim Koo until this time.

As Japan’s investigations into and pressure on Korean independence fighters in Shanghai intensified following the bombing, Kim Koo sent statement letters to a few newspapers in China and revealed that Yun’s patriotic deeds were executed according to his plan. In the statement entitled, “The Truth Surrounding the Bombing Incident at Hongkou Park,” (today, Lu Xun Park) that was published in the May 10 editions of China’s major newspapers, Kim revealed, in detail, his and Yun’s profiles and the progress and objectives of the heroic bombing. It is presumed that on this day, Chiang learned that Kim Koo stood behind Yun Bong-gil and began to help Kim escape, while offering him personal security through organizations related to Kuomintang of China. A report sent to Chiang by Kong Pei-cheong under the command of Kuomintang’s Organization Department member, Xiao Zing, in early July 1932 states, “It would be better to offer Kim Koo support because he says he can form an independence army of Koreans in the northeastern region, cooperate with China’s volunteer corps, and conduct joint anti-Japan operations if we provide him with weapons.”

Kim Koo met Chiang in person in the spring of 1933, about one year after the Yun Bong-gil bombing, in the official residence of the principal of the Central Army Academy in Nanjing, the capital of the Republic of China. Records from Chiang and the Chinese side are unavailable but “Baekbeom Ilji (Baekbeom Journal)” reveals that Kim Koo met Chiang through the good offices of Park Chan-ik, an important member of the Provisional Government and concurrently a Kuomintang member who had worked for the party’s central headquarters. However, considering that Chiang was creating long-term war strategies in anticipation of an all-out war against Japan after experiencing the first Shanghai Incident from January through April in 1932 and that he thought of mobilizing Korean independence movement forces to be part of such efforts, Chiang’s meeting with Kim may have been prompted to meet Chiang’s needs.

In his first meeting with Chiang, Kim offered to deter Japan’s invasion of the continent by instigating a “big riot” in Japan, Korea, and Manchuria within two years if Chiang were to give him CNY 1 million. In response, Chiang advised Kim to train his troops, namely Korean officers, as a longer-term strategy, saying it would be impossible to deter Japan’s invasion just with operations of special duty (like the Yun Bong-gil bombing). As is widely known, a special class of Koreans was created as a result of their meeting, in February 1934, within the Luoyang branch of the Chinese Central Army Academy in Luoyang. The Korean military officers who were trained through the special class of Koreans of the Luoyang branch that formed the backbone of the Korean Liberation Army together with Korean officers fostered another Korean independence movement faction, namely the Joseon Revolutionary Academy of Political and Military Officers, created on the outskirts of Nanjing by Kim Won-bong. This prompts us to say that “support” from China’s Kuomintang government led by Chiang contributed a great deal to Korea’s independence movement, to such an extent that it makes it the absolute condition for the existence and development of the independence movement.

However, there is no denying that Chiang’s “support” for the Korean independence movement forces led by Kim Koo and Kim Won-bong had negative aspects as well. This meant that on the inside of such “support” were aspects of China’s “mobilization” and “control,” to prioritize interests. As pointed out earlier, behind Chiang’s support for Kim Won-bong and Kim Koo that began in 1933 existed a plan to “mobilize” Korean officers to help China’s anti-Japan voluntary corps in the northeastern region, which had already been under Japan’s occupation.

Nevertheless, “support” from Chiang and his Kuomintang government was absolute to the Provisional Government, which had to wander all over China for eight years after Yun Bong-gil’s heroic deeds before reaching Chungching in 1940. The fact that we most recently came to know is that Japan capitalized on conflict and discontent within the Korean independence movement circles, trying to assassinate Kim Koo several times right after the Yun Bong-gil bombing. Above all, Japan put a plan into action to assassinate Kim Koo by luring Park Chang-se, a Japan sympathizer active in Shanghai, and inciting Lee Un-hwan, a complainer, to act in the so-called Nammokcheong incident that erupted in Changsha in May 1937. At the time, Kim Koo suffered serious gunshot wounds and was in critical condition. Chiang, who had been in Wuhan at the time, sent telegrams asking after Kim several times and later sent his confidants to offer consolation along with a considerable sum of money to help cover medical expenses, a testament to the fact that “support” from Chiang and China was a decisive factor in the existence of the Provisional Government and Kim Koo’s survival.

Foundation of Korean Liberation Army, Kim Koo and Chiang Kai-shek

However, as was previously pointed out, there were aspects of “mobilization” and “control” behind this “support,” and this was revealed to be connected to the foundation and operation of the Korean Liberation Army created in Chungching in September 1940. The reason Kim Koo and the Provisional Government strove to found the Korean Liberation Army after moving to Chungching was to secure a voice in the forthcoming post-war peace conference. This would be achieved by taking part in the anti-Japan war with its own military forces. The Provisional Government at that time did its utmost to win international recognition and to obtain a voice that could be heard internationally, but the Provisional Government had no choice but to focus on securing its own military forces as international recognition was difficult to come by in the midst of complicated international relations.

Before founding the Korean Liberation Army, Kim Koo asked Chiang for approval a couple of times but held a convention to launch the army without official permission at a hotel along Jialing River on September 17, 1940, as the permission was delayed day by day. Chiang did not attend the convention, but the army consequently won a de facto approval as leaders of the Kuomintang government, such as Sun Ke, Wi Yo-ron, and Wu Tie-chong, and China’s military leaders, such as He Ying-qin, Feng Yu-xiang and Bai Chong-xi, attended the convention in droves. However, the Korean Liberation Army came out from under China’s tight “control” upon being founded because the so-called “Korean Liberation Army Action Regulations” enacted in the Military Committee of the Kuomintang government in November 1941 stipulated that the Chinese military shall monopolize the rights to command and operate the Korean Liberation Army.

The Provisional Government and the Provisional Assembly called for a repeal of the regulations several times, but Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang government would not budge. Their position of “control” was fully understandable in the light of the fact that it would be difficult to allow the foundation and operation of foreign armed forces on their soil. However, this was a humiliating measure, given that the “Korea-China mutual assistance” was in the making after many Korean independence fighters sought asylum in China following Imperial Japan’s annexation in August 1910, and after many Koreans sacrificed their lives throughout the course of the Chinese Revolution and the war against Japan. In April 1945, right before the end of the war, the regulations were repealed, paving the way for the Korean Liberation Army to be affiliated with the Provisional Government. However, this was also possible thanks to Chiang’s calculated wish that a pro-Chinese government led by the Provisional Government would be established on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the war.

Cairo Conference, Kim Koo and Chiang Kai-shek

At a conference held to prepare a plan for military cooperation among the Allies in Cairo, Egypt, in late November 1943 before the end of World War II, the four powers reached an important agreement for determining the fate of the post-war Korean Peninsula (the Soviet Union approved the agreement in the Teheran Conference in early December). Chiang Kai-shek, who attended the Cairo Conference as a member of the four powers at the request of U.S. President Roosevelt, claimed Korea’s immediate post-war independence in a face-to-face meeting with Roosevelt. Yet Korea’s post-war independence was included in the declaration with the precondition of “in due course,” deterred by Roosevelt’s assertion that independence be shelved for a certain period of time. The first reaped fruit of having Korea’s post-war independence recognized internationally was realized by Chiang. In this respect, Chiang’s “support” for Korean independence was quite significant.

Kim Koo met Chiang in person in July 1943 leading up to the Cairo Conference and asked him to discuss with Korean independence in the upcoming meeting. There have been many assertions that Chiang claimed Korea’s independence in the Cairo Conference at Kim’s request and the start of international recognition of Korea’s post-war independence was thanks to Kim Koo. Yet a closer look at preparations for the Cairo Conference by Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang government shows that the direct cause of Chiang’s contention against Korean independence was not Kim Koo’s request. Chiang dealt with Korean affairs strictly from the perspective of China’s interest and raised the issue of “Korea’s immediate independence” to Roosevelt with the objective of securing China’s influence over post-war Korea.

Kim Koo and Chiang Kai-shek Around Japan’s Defeat and Return Home

Upon hearing of Japan’s defeat in Xian on August 10, 1945, Kim Koo mourned before being happy. The Provisional Government was certainly in need of two conditions – international recognition of the Provisional Government and participation in the war through its independent military power – in order to win a voice in the international community, but the war ended without these conditions being met. Kim Koo met Wu Tiechong, chief secretary of Kuomintang’s Central Secretariat, upon returning to Chungching on August 18 and asked for China’s cooperation for returning home as soon as possible. In the meeting, Wu told Kim that American and Chinese forces would enter South Korea and Soviet forces will enter North Korea, explaining that an independent government would be established after trusteeship or military rule by these occupying powers. However, the Chinese army’s entry into the Korean Peninsula turned out to be just part of China’s unilateral wishful thinking, given that the U.S. and the Soviet Union had agreed on a plan to divide and occupy the Korean Peninsula and had already been implementing the plan before this time.

In such circumstances, the Provisional Government’s request to return home early was not properly accomplished and China’s hope to secure influence in the post-war Korean Peninsula by forming the pro-Chinese government led by Kim Koo and other leaders of the Provisional Government became an unrealistic dream. The Chinese side provided the Provisional Government with CNY 100 million and USD 200,000 in special grants while trying to realize the Provisional Government’s early return in cooperation with the U.S. It was in late October, two months after Japan’s surrender, that the “permission” was granted to allow the return home of each of the leaders of the Provisional Government as individuals, not under the name of the Provisional Government, after tedious China-U.S. negotiations. On October 24, China’s Kuomintang hosted a formal farewell party, and Kim Koo visited Chiang Kai-shek on October 29 to express appreciation for China’s support in Korea’s independence movement and provision of expenses for a return home.

On November 23, the first group of 15 Provisional Government leaders, including Kim Koo, left Shanghai aboard a transport plane prepared by the U.S. armed forces and arrived at Gimpo. The news of the Provisional Government leaders’ return home was strictly controlled by U.S. military authorities and the melancholy mood that day heralded that domestic activities by Kim Koo and the Provisional Government would be rough. As is widely known, the Kim Koo-centered Provisional Government could not take political initiative in the post-war political situation spearheaded by the U.S., and this extinguished China’s hope to establish a pro-Chinese government.

Kim Koo and Chiang Kai-shek After the Return of the Provisional Government

With changes in circumstances on the Korean Peninsula, the situation in China after 1946 also made it difficult to put Chiang’s hope into practice. China was caught in the vortex of war as an all-out war broke out between the forces of Kuomintang and the Communist Party in April 1946 (Chinese Civil War). The Kuomintang forces had had absolute superiority during the early part of the Civil War, but relinquished their supremacy in late 1947, the year after the eruption of the Civil War, and retreated. More decisively, Beijing and Tianjin fell captive to the Communist forces without bloodshed in January 1949 before Nanjing, the capital, was seized in late April. In these circumstances, efforts to establish a pro-Chinese government on the Korean Peninsula by Chiang and the Kuomintang government may have been impossible from the start.

The separate government in South Korea headed by President Syngman Rhee was founded in late July 1948 and the Republic of China’s government officially recognized the government in early January 1949. In April 1947, prior to such recognition, Chiang met Rhee, who stopped by Nanjing on his way back home from the U.S. At this meeting, Chiang rejected Rhee’s demand to give him the USD 200,000 that Chiang had offered when Kim Koo returned home. This resulted in Chiang maintaining his support for Kim Koo, but his relationship with Syngman Rhee became awkward. When Kim was assassinated in late June 1949, the Chinese side announced its official position expressing “deep condolences.” But it was impossible for the Kuomintang government, which had been in crisis under the offensive of the Communist forces, to express its position further.