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While the tension between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue is growing as Japan repeats its claim that 'Dokdo is a Japanese territory' through its blue book of foreign affairs among other sources, the Northeast Asian History Foundation has published the book titled Sixty Years of the Dokdo Issue and Korea's Territorial Sovereignty: Dokdo Event Data (1952 to 2010) in which a sample of 538 'Dokdo events' that occurred between the two countries from 1952 to 2010 was used to analyze the pattern of Japan's provocative sovereignty claims over Dokdo and lay an academic foundation for reinforcing the new logic that supports Korea's sovereignty over Dokdo. The interview of this issue is with Bae Jin-soo, the senior researcher at NAHF and author of this book.
_ Note by the Editor

What motivated you to write "Sixty Years of the Dokdo Issue and Korea's Territorial Sovereignty: Dokdo Event Data (1952 to 2010)"?

It has been already 60 years since the Dokdo issue was first raised, but Japan is still making sovereignty claims over Dokdo. I undertook this project because I felt the need to check and see if insufficient preparations on our side might be responsible for this situation. Since territorial and historical conflicts are issues that can easily appeal to nationalistic sentiment, it is all the more critical to ensure that the international community correctly understands and supports these issues based on universal standards and values. To this end, it is essential to organize our data and logic in an empirically and objectively convincing manner so that they can be accepted in the international academia where empirical data and reasonable logic are valued.
I decided that to develop and reinforce new logic that supports our sovereignty over Dokdo, it would be necessary to apply a new analysis method to existing data in addition to finding new historical data. For this reason, I attempted to collect 'Dokdo event data' from a sample of about 500 events from 1952 to 2010 by adopting the 'event-data analysis method' that had been used by experts around the world.

I understand that this is the first time that the event-data analysis method has ever been applied to the Dokdo issue. Could you explain what the event-data analysis method is?

'Event' refers to "a certain action taken by an actor against the opponent at a certain point in time." When events are sorted into specific categories, such as date, actor, opponent, and action type, and coded into numbers, then they become 'event-data.' Therefore, 'event-data analysis' refers to a method with which to identify the patterns of a series of conflict-cooperation interactions among nations by time series or circumstantial variable depending on the issue, the action type, etc. so that one can predict possible scenarios and come up with useful policy solutions when a similar issue arises. This method is widely used in the social sciences.

I am curious to know how you came up with the idea of applying this analysis method to the Dokdo issue.

In 1994, a few years after I returned from the U.S after earning my degree, Kim Il-sung of North Korea died. At that time, whether the tension in inter-Korean relations would rise or ease was the focus of increasing attention in Korea. And I published a paper on "Measurement of Tension in the Korean Peninsula" in which I made a graphical representation of fluctuations (tension-peace) in inter-Korean relations with arguably the first event-data analysis method ever used in Korea. Likewise, there have been also similar interactions between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue for decades. I decided to apply the same method to that particular set of data in the belief that it would be worthwhile to confirm empirically whether Japan's provocative sovereignty claims over Dokdo had been continually escalated or simply repeated on and off at similar levels. I thought that my attempt to collect and analyze the decades of data on the different patterns of interactions between Korea and Japan might prove useful at least in helping the Korean government make strategic and systematic moves in the future.

I would like to hear about the preparation steps that led up to the collection of Dokdo event data. What were the challenges that you faced in the process?

There are many sets of collected event data on various issues in different regions around the world. But none of them included the sample of a single issue (such as Dokdo) between two countries as in this project. It was a challenge, therefore, to set up the 'new analysis framework for data collection' that I thought fitted best. Fortunately, it was possible to sample about 500 events, which I think formed the basic framework. I intended Dokdo-related events to be sampled basically from publicly available sources. As with most event data, I primarily relied on the archives of newspaper articles, including the 'Press' section of the NAHF Dokdo Research Institute website, the 'Press' section of the Korea Ocean Research & Development Institute's Dokdo Information System site, the KINDS site of the Korea Press Foundation, and the news DB of other media. In addition, I complemented the news articles, where possible, by referring to parts of the diplomatic documents that had been made public by the 'Information Disclosure Program' of Korea and Japan, the minutes of the National Diet of Japan, and the results of existing studies, etc.

I understand that you have analyzed the Dokdo event data by year, action purpose, actor, action type, and issue. Could you briefly describe the analysis results that are worthy of attention?

Let me first give you a brief summary of the annual trend of Dokdo events between Korea and Japan. The Dokdo events surged first in the early 1950s and there was a lull in the next 40 years before they surged again from the mid-1990s. From then on, the number of Dokdo events has been on the rise. Next, let me compare the trend of the incidents of 'Japan's Dokdo provocation' and of 'Korea's exercise of its territorial sovereignty' by '5-year period.' Interestingly, the trend was reversed starting from the 1990s; Korea's exercise of its territorial sovereignty became more frequent than Japan's Dokdo provocations, and this trend has been becoming more prominent toward the late 2000s. This suggests that the surge of Dokdo events from the late 1990s might have resulted from not only Japan's increasing Dokdo provocations but also Korea's more active exercise of its territorial sovereignty or reinforced effective control over Dokdo. In particular, the (jurisdiction) areas in which Korea exercised its territorial sovereignty over Dokdo, in order of frequency, are: 'jurisdiction to prescribe' (13.6%), 'national defense'(11.3%), 'maritime affairs'(11.3%), 'construction'(10.2%), 'politics·election'(8.5%), 'information & communication'(7.9%), 'education'(5.1%) …'diplomacy'(3.4%), etc, which empirically proves that Korea has been actually exercising its territorial sovereignty over Dokdo in wide areas.

Do you imply that the Korean government's actual moves might be a little bit different from what the Korean people have felt about them?

Whenever Japan made provocative sovereignty claims over Dokdo, the Korean government has been doing its best in making strategic moves. But I think that the Korean people have often expressed disappointment with the government's moves that appeared to be passive almost every time. But, with the real data on the incidents of Korea's exercise of territorial sovereignty, I can empirically prove that the Korean government has been exercising its territorial sovereignty over Dokdo in wide areas, including jurisdiction to prescribe, national defense/security, politics/diplomacy, and public administration. While conducting this study, I was surprised myself by the extensive cases of the Korean government's exercise of territorial sovereignty. If presented with these data in at-a-glance graph, the Korean people would see objectively that the Korean government has been solidly exercising its sovereignty in its own terms. This is why we need such empirical data.

According to the Dokdo events by action type, the higher percentage of the events by Japan is the use of PR materials whereas the higher percentage of the events by Korea is the use of administrative and legal action. This is one of the many differences noticed at a glance in the event data between Korea and Japan. What conclusion can we draw from this finding?

This tendency is a clear indicator that the country with effective control over Dokdo is Korea, not Japan which relies primarily on inappropriate statements, complaints by verbal notes, descriptions of Dokdo through their publications including textbooks, national defense white papers or blue books of foreign affairs, illegal intrusion on the territorial waters or attempt to land on Dokdo.
This does not mean, however, that we may take Japan's provocations lightly. We should pay close attention to whether or not their provocations have any hidden agenda. For example, if they provoked us or took issue with us simply to achieve temporary goals such as raising their domestic approval ratings, we would only need to respond accordingly. If, however, their provocations were part of their step-by-step long-term moves to publicize the issue in the international community and eventually bring it to the international body of justice, we might need thorough preparation just in case. Therefore, if we were to identify Japan's hidden agenda and make effective moves, we would need in-depth, thorough analysis of the patterns of their provocations from multiple angles.

In the book's conclusion 'Dokdo, how can we defend it?' you presented ways to defend Dokdo by area. Of them, could you briefly describe the strategy towards the international community?

I began writing books on the Dokdo issue from 1997. At that time, I thought about 'how long this Dokdo issue will persist.' As a major in theories of international conflict, I have explored all the similar cases of international conflict existing in the world for comparison. It's not like we are going to wage a war over the Dokdo issue, nor do we want the issue to be brought to international trial. However, if and when the Dokdo issue becomes the subject of international debate, as Japan desires, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Dokdo issue, not unlike the conflict between Turkey and Greece over the islands in the Aegean Sea in the 1970s, might lead the UN Security Council to issue recommendations regardless of our intentions. If that happens, Korea, the country that produced the incumbent U.N. Secretary General and even hosted the G20 Summit, could be placed in a predicament. Therefore, we must not let ourselves get caught up in Japan's long-term plot to make Dokdo an internationally disputed area, and must thwart the plot in advance.
In addition, to counter Japan that keeps raising issues to serve their purposes, we must make sure that the international community has a correct understanding of the issue. Before it's too late, before the international community is convinced by Japan's claims, we must make continued efforts to present empirical and reasonable evidence to convince the international community that Japan's claim is wrong and Dokdo is a Korean territory. To convince the international community, it is essential to have background information on the similar experience of each country in territorial dispute or island sovereignty dispute, and also prepare presentation materials tailed to that particular country. This is because some countries might be closer to Korea while others to Japan in their experience of island dispute. Simply translating and distributing our PR materials in the languages of the countries concerned will not further the correct understanding worldwide.

You have also stressed the roles of the press. Is there any suggestion that you want to make to the Korean press?

Journalists can explain academic material in such a way that lay people can easily understand it. This is an ability envied by experts. But I don't believe that it is easy for journalists to have expertise in Dokdo. This means that when new material is released, it is not easy for them to determine if it is really new, or if the interpretation of experts or the source of the material is correct. The general public will accept whatever is exposed by journalists through the press. In this regard, I believe it desirable for journalists to have a certain level of expertise. I believe that it is the strengths and roles unique to the press that they verify the claims by experts and incessantly present new research agenda so that experts could develop and reinforce the objective and convincing logic that supports our sovereignty claim over Dokdo and is accepted by the international community.

As this is your first undertaking on Dokdo event data, I guess you would like to build on it further. What future studies are you planning to conduct on Dokdo event data?

As my possible follow-up studies using event data, I could develop 'the index of Japan's provocative sovereignty claims over Dokdo (tentative title)' with which to make time-series comparison of the trend of Japan's provocation levels made into numbers, or also develop 'the index of Korea's protection of its territorial sovereignty over Dokdo (tentative title)' with which to make time-series comparison of the trend of the levels of Korea's territorial sovereignty over Dokdo made into numbers.