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On February 25, Monday, 2013, Park Geun-hye was sworn in as the president of South Korea. Three days later, on February 28, Thursday, almost immediately after the Park Geun-hye administration took off, an international conference was held at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University under the title 'The Rise of a New Government in Japan and an Outlook on South Korea-Japan Relations.' This conference was obviously about the South Korean government's dealing with the second Abe cabinet launched on December 26 last year and the bilateral relations in coming years. It must have been difficult for the speakers to predict bilateral relations when the one (Japan) government had been operation for no more than three months and the other (South Korea) for only three days. Nevertheless, this conference was made possible by 'high national interest in South Korea-Japan relations' and the 'historicity of the bilateral relations.' South Korea-Japan relations turned chilly as former South Korean president Lee Myung-bak paid a visit to Dokdo on August 10 last year, and the launch of the Abe (安倍晋三) cabinet late last year wouldn't help improve the bilateral relations, either. Under the circumstances, the launch of a new government in South Korea could be a turning point in bringing about changes in the future bilateral relations. In addition, the historicity of the bilateral relations that go way back allows the speakers to look forward in the future of the bilateral relations and point them in desired directions.

This conference consisted of a total of three sessions. Session 1 was about identifying the characteristics of the Abe cabinet, i.e. how we should make of what we often call 'Japan's rightward shift.' In Session 2, the Abe cabinet's foreign policies. i.e. Japan-US relations, Japan-China relations, and Japan-North Korea relations, were analyzed. The foreign policies of Japan's main political parties were also compared. In Session 3, the future of South Korea-Japan relations was forecast; the policy trends expected to be pursued by the two governments were predicted, and then based on this prediction, policies for cooperation between the two nations were proposed.

The Abe Cabinet: Rightward Shift or Conservative Swing?

The first speaker, SNU professor Park Cheol-hee, argued that "conservative swing is more appropriate than rightward shift" as the term describing the latest trend in Japanese society. He made four points in explaining the nature of that conservative swing. First, 'conservative' here is only a relative term in comparison to the past. Second, unless it means going back to years before the war, it shouldn't be confused with right wing. Third, it isn't that the entire Japanese society is making a rightward shift. Finally, this is only a recent trend of times, and it isn't irreversible. The next speaker, Gakushuin University professor Nonaka Naoto (野中尙人), also agrees that this is a conservative swing. Abe's LDP has guidelines emphasizing that "(LDP's ideology) is traditional conservatism in that it is rooted in liberalism and democracy, and LDP itself is a conservative party that has failed to change." He added that on the social front, it wasn't that Japan as a whole has made a rightest swift, but that election results had reflected the people's dissatisfaction with indecisive politics in which there was only agreement but no leadership. As the next speaker, I criticized the grant of the right to collective self-defense, saying that it would amount to "renouncing pacifism and anti-militarism which Japan had been boasting in the international community." From this perspective, renouncing anti-militarism may be a conservative swing, but it may not necessarily mean a rightward shift or a right-wing policy.

But such assessment of Japanese society seems quite different from the assessment made only a couple of months ago. Professor Park Cheol-hee himself had once said that the pledges of LDP led by Abe included not just one but dozens of policies that could be considered right-wing. Kukmin University professor Lee Won-deok had also said that while their moves to amend the constitution or territorial policies may be considered right-wing, the grant of the right to collective self-defense should be regarded as a realistic policy. In this respect, I can say that the assessment made that day of the Abe cabinet as a conservative cabinet had been strongly influenced by the Abe cabinet's actual policy execution over the last two months. Prime Minister Abe is concentrating almost all his power on getting Japan out of deflation and stimulating economy. As for territorial and historical issues, he is doing no more than simply following through his campaign pledges. Furthermore, not only South Korea-Japan relations but Japan-China relations, in which territorial conflict is almost a daily event, are showing signs of improvement. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the Abe cabinet can be still said to be making a conservative swing even after discussion for consitutional amendment begins following the LDP's victory in the upper-house election, and changes in textbook-related policies begin to be made, and policies related to the Self Defense Forces are put in place.

The U.S. and Japan with Different Purposes about China

In his presentation on Japan-US relations given in Session 2, Yonsei University professor Sohn Yeol alludes to the nationalist aspects of the Abe administration's identity. The utmost priority of Prime Minister Abe's foreign policy is to restore the Japan-US relations which were damaged while the DPJ was in power. To this end, he has the burden of settling two issues as soon as possible: accession to TPP (Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership) and the relocation of the Futenma (普天間) base. Neither issue is easy to settle, considering that TPP is facing strong opposition within the LDP, and that the failed relocation of the Okinawa base wasn't due to the DPJ's failure to promise compensation. The Abe cabinet is trying to stand up to China by strengthening its alliance with the U.S. But in the next decade, China and the U.S. will place the main focus of policies on mutual cooperation. Therefore, the U.S., while expecting the sharing of roles from strong Japan, is wary of getting involved. Professor Sohn comes to the conclusion that Japan is in a situation where it needs to pursue both multilateral relations in Asia and various bilateral relations to ensure its security, but achieving it will be difficult due to the nature of the Abe administration. Mainichi Shimbun editor Osawa Bungo and University of Tokyo professor Kimiya Tadashi (木宮正史) expressed their interests in North Korean issues. Osawa points out that the North Korean leadership's perception of threats from the U.S. is based on the downfall of the Ceaușescu regime of Rumania and the leaders of Iraq and Libya, and insists that their wariness against the U.S. needs to be eased. Therefore, as he suggests, the Abe administration should persuade North Korea to come to the dialogue table through dialogue and contact in the long term. and try to resolve the abduction issue in the process, although they need to take tough measures against the imminent threats of missiles and nuclear weapons. Professor Kimiya insisted that through cooperation about North Korean issues, South Korea and Japan should find common grounds and move toward improving the bilateral relations while recognizing that they need each other.

South Korea-Japan Relations in the Next Five Years: The Future of the Two Countries, Where Is It Headed?

Finally, Dr. Jin Chang-su with the Sejoing Institute made a few specific suggestions on the Park Geun-hye administration's Japan policy. As for the 'comfort women' issue, he proposed to establish a South Korea-Japan working group to seek solution, include this working group in the third South Korea-Japan Joint History Committee, and make that committee's recommendations mandatory so that they could turn into enforceable policies. Finally, he also suggested that the Northeast Asian History Foundation should be reorganized and reinforced to serve the same functions as the Future Foundation of Germany. In other words, the NAHF should be assigned the functions of working on reconciliation, education, and compensation at Northeast Asian levels so that it could serve to resolve issues over history at Northeast Asian levels beyond the levels of the two countries.

The conference that day where a large number of Korean and Japanese experts on South Korea-Japan relations were assembled was the center of attention from both the audience and the media. There were also many media interview requests, especially because it was the day before an anniversary of the March 1st Movement. Most importantly, anyone could see that the experts from the two countries attending this conference were struggling to come up with ideas that would help the bilateral relations. At the after-party, a participant from Japan said, "If discussion went as well as it did today, I think that South Korean-Japan relations would work out."