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The 21st century is witnessing a serious situation in a rapidly changing East Asia where the three nations (Korea, China, and Japan) are clashing with one another over historical perception. Now that even the U.S. is involved, abandoning its traditional position as a third party when it came to issues about historical perception, the situation is getting more complex as historical issues are intertwined with international politics. While Korea and Japan have suffered repeatedly from mutual distrust and misunderstanding since their diplomatic ties were restored, efforts beyond diplomatic politics have been made to overcome it through the promotion of private exchanges and academic exchanges among researchers of Korea-Japan relations. Despite these efforts, the recent Korea-Japan relations are strained. And the root cause lies in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan and politicians around him, who not only deny but go so far as to justify the history of aggression.

This book is based on the emergency panel discussion hosted by the Northeast Asian History Foundation on April 30, 2013 to address the reality of Japan where its political leaders have shown serious retrogression in historical perception about 'comfort women,' their visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and territorial issues since the launch of the second Abe administration in December 2012.

This book covers almost the entire spectrum of pending issues between Korea and Japan, including the historical perception of Japan's conservative politicians, the significance of the Murayama Statement, Yasukuni Shrine, history textbooks, 'comfort women,' constitutional amendment, and the Japan Self-Defense Forces. The readers of this book will gain a picture of how the issue of historical perception causing conflict between Korea and Japan has evolved since the 1990s. They will also find it easy to understand how irrational, illogical, and inconsistent the Abe administration's argument is.

Focused on Resolving Historical Conflict between Korea and Japan

It is also worth noting that this book, although covering different topics, has a common theme running through it, which is to explore what efforts are needed to resolve conflict between Korea and Japan over historical perception. This means that Japanese studies in Korea are now moving toward logical criticism away from blind criticism aimed at inflaming anti-Japanese sentiment.

For example, this book contains: suggestions to the present Korean government regarding Japan policy (by Jin Chang-soo); an argument for the need to understand the historical value and understanding of the Murayama Statement in connection with Japan's pacifist constitution (by Ha Jong-moon); criticism of the narrow nationalism of Koreans taking issue only with the 'Class-A war criminals' when it comes to visits to Yasukuni Shrine (by Park Jin-woo); an argument for the need to address 'comfort women' in terms of education policy in general and the textbook system in particular, rather than the description itself (by Seo Hyun-joo); a suggestion that the year 2015, half a century since the conclusion of the Korea-Japan Agreement, should be made a turning point to work together toward building a peace community in East Asia (by Doh Shi-whan); an argument for the need to effectively communicate our concerns to Japan and maintain close relations with the U.S. if we are to cope with Japan's conservative shift in connection with security issues in East Asia (by Choi Won-do); and a suggestion that in order to resolve historical conflict, various options should be considered and executed, such as promoting research results between Korea and Japan in short and long terms and broadening the scope of exchange (by Jang Se-yoon). All of these contents represent efforts toward peace in East Asia by finding logical solutions to pending issues causing conflict between Korea and Japan.

Of course, the above suggestions alone are never sufficient to resolve the complicated historical issues between Korea and Japan that are intertwined with international politics. Besides, the Abe administration's conservative shift still continues as we speak. And the international situation surrounding a rapidly changing East Asia constantly calls for our flexible and rational thinking and judgment. In addition to this fluid situation, we also have to take note of the trend of the Japanese people moving in support of the conservative shift in domestic politics. In the public opinion poll conducted by TBS Television on December 28, 2013, 71% of those surveyed "approved," while 28.8% "disapproved." of Prime Minister Abe's visit to Yasukuni Shrine. Also in the Asahi TV survey conducted on January 1, 2014, 71% of the viewers "approved," while 29% "disapproved," of the prime minister's visit.

Even more alarming is the trend of younger generations in general and The Net Rightist (Japanese netizens of rightist disposition) in particular. For instance, in the public opinion poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun on December 30, 2013, a few days after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to Yasukuni Shrine on December 26, 2013, more than half of the respondents in their 20s or 30 approved of the prime minster's visit to Yasukuni, whereas only 33 percent disapproved of it. In another public opinion poll, jointly conducted by the Sankei Shimbun and FNN on January 6, 2014, although overall there was more opposition (53%) than support (38.1%), the respondents in their 20s or 30s showed more support (43.2%) than opposition (41.6%) for the prime minister's visit to Yasukuni Shrine. About the criticism that Abe's visit to Yasukuni drew from Korea and China immediately afterwards, there were more respondents who found it "unacceptable" (67%) than there were who found it "acceptable" (23.3%). Nearly 60% of the respondents also expressed their displeasure about the U.S. government's statement saying "disappointed (with Abe's visit to Yasukuni)." This trend of public opinion, combined with The Net Rightist's activities to incite chauvinism and jingoism, is lending support to the Abe administration's conservative shift.

We are faced with the challenge to figure out underlying problems in broader historical contexts instead of focusing on what appears on the surface and settling for criticizing it, while working together toward peace in East Asia. We should spare no efforts to resolve conflict, especially with the approaching 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties between Korea and Japan. In this respect, we can say this book is a valuable outcome of such efforts.