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Views
Suggestions for Desirable ROK-China Relations
    Written by_ Chung Jae-ho, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University

It may be said that over the last two decades since the establishment of diplomatic ties between the ROK and China on August 24, 1992, the bilateral relations have made remarkable progress in almost all areas, including those areas in which the achievement of continued growth and maturity may not be measured by numbers alone, such as trade volume, investments, and the numbers of tourists visiting the other countries, the number of students studying in the other countries, and the frequency with which high-ranking officials visit the other countries.

This does not mean, however, that one may guarantee a rosy future for ROK-China relations, because the closer any relations, the more likely they are to give rise to trouble and conflict. To illustrate the point, back in 2002 when celebrating the 10th anniversary of the diplomatic ties between the ROK and China, few, if any, predicted that a serious 'historical dispute' would arise between the two countries in less than two years. In my opinion, in light of changes in the security environment of East Asia, the rise of China, the uncertainty surrounding the Korean peninsula, and the current view of ROK-China relations as being "hot in economy, lukewarm in diplomacy, and cold in security," ROK-China relations will face various challenges in the future."

'Soft' Challenges to ROK-China Relations

Let me cite seven issues as the potential causes of 'uncomfortable relationship' between the ROK and China. Three of them are the potential causes of 'soft conflicts.' The first issue is the historical conflict which arose in 2004 but has been handled only superficially since. This is an issue that is difficult to resolve fundamentally with academic approaches alone, difficult for other countries to mediate, and, considering the sensitive nationalistic sentiments of both countries, could be a potential drag on ROK-China relations.

The second issue concerns possible changes in the economy/trade structure that has served as the cornerstone of the bilateral relations over the last two decades. If and when the ROK suffers trade deficit with China, how will it change the ROK's view of ROK-China relations? How will it affect the ROK-China FTA in connection with the recently raised concerns about Korea's much too high economic dependency on China?

Thirdly, international relations are not just about economic and military powers; they are also operated by various shared standards and views. If and when China, a country that has been placing emphasis on what they call 'soft power (軟實力),' sets out to spread standards and views 'of Chinese characteristics,' to which of 'Washington Consensus' and 'Beijing Consensus' will the ROK's position be closer? What will be the degree of agreement between the ROK and China on such issues as human rights, democracy, economic development, environment, disarmament, and climate change?

'Hard' Challenges to ROK-China Relations

The potential causes of 'uncomfortable relationship' between the ROK and China also include four issues as the potential causes of 'hard conflicts.' First of all, North Korea is the thickest and roughest thorn in ROK-China relations, as we have seen in the ROKS Cheonan sinking and North Korean attack on Yeonpyeong Island. So long as China has 'broad tolerance' for the nuclear issue, a potential threat for the security of China itself, i.e. so long as China "cannot turn its back against, though it may make a frown of disapproval at, North Korea," there will be a certain level of limitation in cooperation between the ROK and China.

Secondly, China is raising its voice recently over ROK-US combined military exercises, in contrast with the past when China didn't mention a thing about the ROK-US alliance during the negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic ties between the ROK and China. I feel that China was in too much haste in prejudging and generalizing much of the discord manifested between the ROK and the US during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, which seems to have much to do with the frustration that China felt about the substantially reinforced ROK-US relations from 2008 onward. Let me say that this issue requires the ROK's serious preparations and China's strategic patience.

Thirdly, there is a sovereignty/demarcation issue between the ROK and China, although its existence is not official but may not be denied. Considering that China is the country that has been most frequently involved in armed conflicts over sovereignty and its completeness, one may not say that ROK-China relations are completely safe from the possibility of such conflicts. Therefore, establishing early warning and crisis control systems is urgently needed for both countries.

The final issue is unification of the Korean Peninsula. While China officially supports peaceful unification by agreement, this method of unification, from historical perspectives, is infeasible or very unlikely to succeed. Meanwhile, China has expressed itself against other possible ways in which unification could be achieved, on the grounds that they may be detrimental to the security of the Korean Peninsula. However, when such a situation actually arises, it is not unlikely to create tension between the ROK and China (and the U.S.). To avoid it, closer communications and exchanges between both countries would be required.

Groundless optimism should be avoided;

Some say that these problems are only trivial and that there is no need to worry too much about ROK-China relations, but I think it necessary to consider if such a view is really based on serious thoughts given to the future of ROK-China relations. If we compare the ROK-China relations of two decades ago, a decade ago, and the present, I think that such a view loses ground.

Although getting prepared in advance is not the solution to all problems, a house will be obviously more stable when it is built with a blueprint than without one. For more stable development in ROK-China relations that are about to reach the age of majority, both countries would have to engage in more aggressive endeavor and dialogue. To maintain a reasonably friendly relationship between the two particularly nationalistic countries, we should remember to be frank and sincere in the bilateral relations based on 'zhengyou (諍友)-mutual trust.' A 'fair's fair' approach can never guarantee the healthy future of ROK-China relations.