Newsletter

On May 10, Thursday, 2012, the NAHF hosted the Korea-China workshop on the 420th year after the outbreak of the Imjin War(Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592) under the theme 'The Development of the Imjin War and the Response of the Ming Dynasty of China.' This workshop was designed to go beyond single-country, patriotism-driven viewpoints and learn lessons for peace in East Asia, and to find new topics and methodology in studying this war of significance in world history. This workshop had a total of four sessions participated by 16 scholars from Korea, China, and Taiwan, who provided eight presentations, which were followed by heated discussions.

Learn Lessons for Peace in East Asia and Find New Methodology in Studying the Imjin War

In Session 1, Professor Jung Jiesi(鄭潔西) at Zhejiang Gongshang University reiterated Ming's plans to conquer the mainland of Japan during the Imjin War period, arguing the significance of this fact as a clue to understanding the East Asia strategy of the Ming Dynasty at that time. With regards to Professor Jung's paper, Dr. Yoon Yoo-Sook at NAHF suggested the possibility in connection with the internal politics of China that the forces opposing the dispatch of troops to Joseon may have spread what they called the Joseon-Japan conspiracy. Professor Roh Young-goo at Korea National Defense University presented a paper which examined in detail how the Imjin War had come to bring changes in the military systems and tactics of Joseon and Japan. Professor Roh explained in historical context that following this war, Joseon and Japan perceived different threats from the continent and the seas, and this influenced the shaping of the strategy culture of both countries. Professor Chang Hsui Ming (常修銘) at the National Tsing Hua University of Taiwan, who is focused on war history, particularly the development of tactics and weaponry, pointed out that it should be kept in mind that the overwhelming superiority of the Japanese forces during the early stage of the war was due to their advances in not only iron weapons but organization and tactics.

Professor Fang Zhi Yuan (方志遠) at Jiangxi Normal University of China attempted a systematic analysis of the Chinese officers and men dispatched to Joseon during the late 16th and early 17th centuries. As a discussant of this paper, Professor Lee Wan-beom at the Academy of Korean Studies warned against the tendency to view the Imjin War as a war between China and Japan, and stressed the need for the official position of the academia on the name of the war. As another discussant, Professor Wei Zhijiang (魏志江) at Sun Yat-sen University of China raised the issues of the purpose of the Chinese naval forces having entered the war, expressing his dissenting view on the right of command of operation for the Chinese naval forces.

In Session 2, Professor Sun Wei-Guo (孫衛國) at Nankai University presented an interesting paper on the old story familiar to us, a story between interpretor Hong Sun-eon and Ms. Yoo, the second wife of the Chinese Defense Minister Suk Sung (石星). Professor Sun challenged the authenticity of the story that interpretor Hong Sun-eon had met the second wife of Suk Sung in a red-light district on his way to China as an envoy, and this had caused Suk Sung to initiate the discussion on entering the war. Professor Sun argued that not only this story was likely to have been made up later but Suk Sung's decision to dispatch troops to Joseon had been due to the success of Joseon's diplomatic efforts to ask for troops, combined with his strong sense of responsibility. Professor Sun further argued that Joseon had passed very realistic judgement based on national interests on Suk Sung after the Imjin War.

As a discussant, Professor Han Myoung-gi at Myongji University expressed his opinion that Suk Sung's excessive commitment to public service without taking Joseon's position into consideration had been the reason that Joseon had been reluctant to save his life. He also presented an opinion that further studies would be needed on issues related to whether Suk Sung's obsession with public service with Japan to the point of risking his political life had been related to the deterioration of military and financial situations.

In Session 3 in the afternoon, Dr. Yang Hai-Ying (楊海英) at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences gave a presentation focused on Zong-Dao Wu (吳宗道), the person who had established a huge trade network connecting from the Joseon-China border to inland canals of China. Professor Hur Nam-Lin at the University of British Columbia, Canada, commented that Dr. Yang's approach to war, which viewed war in terms of the pursuit of personal gains rather than such notions as nation, people, or patriotism, was a very significant progress. Dr. Lee Sang-hun at the Korea Naval Academy Museum presented the letters written by General Lee Sun-sin to give a review on the background of the Chinese naval forces entering the Jeongyu War, and various issues related to the joint operations. Dr. Lee, revealing the letters written by General Lee Sun-sin in person, commented that these letters allow us to get a sense of the meticulousness with which General Lee achieved harmony in joint operations with the Chinese naval forces under the challenging circumstances.

In Session 4, Korean and Chinese scholars presented their conflicting views on the issue of provisions, an issue considered to have been important during the Imjin War. Professor Hur Nam-lin opposed the existing trend of research that focused on the difficulties of procurement and transportation of provisions, and presented his view that the issue of provisions is a major subject that provides insight into the political dynamics between Ming and Joseon. He argued that Ming had a strong tendency to use the issue of provisions as a political weapon while they were engaged in war and then negotiated peace with Japan. On the other hand, Professor Chen Shang Sheng at Shandong University said that Joseon's insufficient supply of provisions had interfered with the operations of the Chinese forces, and it only showed Joseon's political weakness and limited abilities to cope with war. In response, Professor Hong Sung-gu at Kyungpook National University said that it would be necessary to explore the provisions procurement system during the Ming Dynasty and pointed out the need for the presentation of specific statistical records that show the amount of provisions arranged by the administrative official Song Yingchang and the amount of provisions actually transported to Joseon. Dr. Kenneth Robinson at NAHF stressed that the routes of the troops and provisions would need to be reviewed and that Joseon at that time had a good understanding of the conflict between the south and north troops of the Chinese forces and used it for diplomatic purposes.

"Yellow Sea May Be Deep, but Not as Deep as Friendship between Korea and China"

In the studies of the Imjin War, the development of the Imjin War and the response of the Ming Dynasty of China had been relatively less-studied areas. I can say that this workshop served as a turning point to fill such a gap and to explore the future of Korea-China relations through historical reflection on the Imjin War.

In the concluding discussion, the participants also agreed to this and expressed their satisfaction with the fruitful outcome of the workshop. In particular, the Chinese scholars said that a recent trend in the academic community of China was to view China from outside, and expressed their hope that the Northeast Asian History Foundation would continue to provide support for the systematic collection of materials on the Imjin War and for follow-up studies from the position that the purpose of studying war is to achieve peace. Professor Chen Shang Sheng summarized the significance of this workshop in the words borrowed from Li Bai's poem presented to his friend, titled Zeng Wang Lun (贈王倫): "Yellow Sea May Be Deep, but Not as Deep as Friendship between Korea and China."