뉴스레터

In 1990, Korea established diplomatic relations with the modern state of Mongolia. The Mongolian People’s Republic began its modern history as Asia’s first communist country in 1921. The democratic state of Mongolia was founded after the communist regime under Russian influence collapsed in 1990 amid a wave of openness towards de-Sovietization 70 years later, which led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Mongolia and Korea. In retrospect, however, Korea’s direct diplomatic relationship with Mongolia dates back to 1219, 800 years ago. Goryeo and the Mongol Empire concluded a pact in 1219 creating what appears to be their first diplomatic relationship. This pact is very significant as it became the starting point of Goryeo-Mongolian relations.

Haedongjido – Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies / Central Library of Seoul National University

How the Goryeo-Mongolian Pact was Concluded in 1219

The Mongolian military began its formal relationship with Goryeo in 1218-9 (5^th and 6^th years of Gojong), the era of Genghis Khan. The invasion of Goryeo by the Khitans under the rule of the Jin in August 1216 was the impetus for the creation of such a relationship. The Khitans invaded Goryeo in 1218 and the Mongolian military, which had been conducting operations in Eastern Jin, led the soldiers of Eastern Jin to enter Goryeo under the pretext of driving out the Khitans. The Mongolian military routed Hwaju, Maengju, Sunju, and Deokju in the area of the northeastern border and chased the Khitans before reaching Gangdongseong Castle (Gangdong-gun, Pyeongannam-do Province), northeast of Pyongyang, in December. The military boasted a large size, consisting of 10,000 Mongolian soldiers and 20,000 Eastern Jin troops. They carried out combined operations with the Goryeo military and overpowered the Khitans in a battle called the “Battle of Gangdongseong Castle.” This prompted the military commanders of Goryeo and Mongolia that were in the battlefield to establish diplomatic relations, or a pact, the following year in January 1219 (6^th year of Gojong). It was the starting point of the eventful Goryeo-Mongolian ties that were to be full of turns and twists thereafter. At the time, the pact was concluded as a horizontal relationship, not as a concept of domination and subjugation.

The conclusion of peace between Goryeo and the Mongol Empire after the Battle of Gangdongseong Castle in 1219 was realized at the Mongol Empire’s determined request. In a letter sent to Goryeo’s Board of Marshals right before the Battle of Gangdongseong Castle, the Mongol Empire’s generals Kajin and Zhara sent notice that there had been an order from Genghis Khan to conclude a pact of brotherhood with Goryeo after defeating the enemies. This shows that the Mongol Empire had a plan to conclude peace with Goryeo after suppressing the Khitans. The Mongol Empire’s strong demand for a pact with Goryeo was planned out of strategic necessity with the goal of placing Goryeo under the Empire’s influence upon the occasion of joint operations against the Khitans. Goryeo had no apparent reason to reject the Mongol Empire’s demands. At a time when pressure from the Mongol Empire was growing, Goryeo tried to retaliate by restoring its severed diplomatic ties with the Jin. However, Goryeo had no other choice than to enter a pact with the Mongol Empire because the Jin had already lost their motivation.

In short, it can be inferred that the 1219 pact realized between Goryeo and the Mongol Empire following the Battle of Gangdongseong Castle reflected Goryeo’s position of not wanting to cause unnecessary friction as the Mongol Empire had achieved strong military power, as well as the Mongol Empire’s strategic intention to have backup in the face of attacks from the Jin.

“Gimkonghaenggunki” by Lee Je-hyeon that highly evaluated the 1219 Goryeo-Mongolian pact – Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics

Content and Progression of Goryeo-Mongolian Pact

Goryeo’s provision of annual tributes to the Mongol Empire was an important condition for the creation of the pact. As far as Goryeo was concerned, it was a costly pact. Some presume that Goryeo kings were required to be present at the Mongol Empire’s royal court before the pact was made but this may be an excessive guess. Also, there are points of view that the entry of Kajin and Mongol Empire’s military into Goryeo in 1218 is regarded as the Mongol Empire’s actual “invasion,” namely “the Mongol Empire’s first invasion,” but it is difficult to accept these views. This is because the invasion differs greatly compared to the Mongol Empire’s invasion of Goryeo that began in 1231.

Goryeo did not willingly accept peace with the Mongol Empire after the Battle of Gangdongseong Castle. Goryeo’s general awareness surrounding the Mongol Empire was that it was the “counterpart that was uncomfortable to be with,” to such an extent that there was a saying that “they look like people but are beasts at heart, so nobody wants to get involved with them.” Jo Chung and Kim Chwi-ryeo played an important role in forming the early stages of diplomacy with the Mongol Empire. At a time when distrust of the Mongol Empire prevailed, Goryeo’s royal court’s friendly relationship with the Mongol Empire was basically a critical view. They had no other choice but to comply with the Mongolian military’s request although they had yet to receive a response from the court concerning the conclusion of the pact.

The Mongol Empire collected offerings from Goryeo every year from September 1219 through 1225 (12^th year of Gojong), in accordance with the pact concluded following the Battle of Gangdongseong Castle. The offerings were certainly a considerable burden on Goryeo. Commodities demanded by Jeogoyeo’s envoy were huge and diverse and included 10,000 ryeong of otter skin, 3,000 rolls of silk, 1,000 ink sticks (yongdanmuk), and 100,000 sheets of paper. Goryeo grumbled about this excessive collection of tributes by sending Mongolian envoys a letter asking, “How do you expect us to afford this every time?” The Mongol Empire even demanded articles that were not produced in Goryeo, young women, and technicians of every kind.

This relationship that had continued for 7 years came to a rupture in 1225 (12^th year of Gojong) in the wake of Jeogoyeo’s murder. Jeogoyeo was killed on his way back from collecting offerings from Goryeo while crossing the Yalu River. Even Mongolian envoys, who had been sent to look into the case, were thwarted after being attacked by arrows. Goryeo claimed that the incident was perpetrated by nearby thieves or soldiers of Eastern Jin who disguised themselves as Goryeo troops, but the Mongol Empire concluded that Goryeo was entirely at fault.

Jeogoyeo’s murder ruined the Goryeo-Mongolian “relationship” and the Mongolian military crossed the Yalu River to invade Goryeo in 1231, 6 years later. The Mongol Empire justified its invasion by holding Goryeo “accountable” for the murder of Jeogoyeo 6 years ago.

Goryeo’s Diplomacy that Capitalized on Goryeo-Mongolian Pact

The 1219 Goryeo-Mongolian pact greatly helped relieve the latter’s unreasonable demand in Yuan’s intervention period. After 1231, Goryeo became subject to Yuan after 40 long years of resistance, and the 1219 pact drew fresh attention as the start of the Goryeo-Mongolian relationship while the age drifted into “Yuan’s intervention period.” In particular, it was emphasized that the pact had been created through Genghis Khan’s guidance and amid a friendly atmosphere. The chapter of Kim Chwi-ryeo in “Goryeosa (History of Goryeo)” offers a long-winded explanation that Kajin and Zhara formed sibling-like relationships with Jo Chung and Kim Chwi-ryeo of Goryeo and resolved “not to forget today’s pact through all future times by becoming brothers for good” while drinking.

Goryeo in Yuan’s intervention period suffered from endless diplomatic conflicts with Yuan. When it came to solving this problem, it was very important to confirm the 1219 pact from a strategic point of view. This was because confirming the spirit of the pact that was concluded prior to the Mongol Empire’s full-fledged invasion became an important logical base for resisting Yuan’s unfair pressure. It was Lee Je-hyeon who eventually became clearly aware of the diplomatic efficacy of the 1219 Goryeo-Mongolian pact during the period of Yuan’s intervention.

With the rise of the “Theory of Ipseong,” which denied Goryeo’s independence, Lee came up with the 1219 pact to counter this theory. “A heavy snowfall blocked the supply of rations from getting to us, and thus our king allowed Jo Chung and Kim Chwi-ryeo to provide food and weapons, and to take part in combats to defeat the roaring enemies, as if to split bamboo. Then the two generals swore brotherhood with Jo Chung and others and vowed to never forget.” Lee Je-hyeon stressed that Goryeo and Yuan were countries that had built special relationship of friendly ties over the course of a very long time. Mentioning that before his ascend to the throne, Wonjong (crown prince of Jeon) visited Mongol to meet and salute Kublai Khan, who was also yet to ascend the throne, and that Goryeo and the Mongol Empire conducted joint operations at the time of the conquest of Japan and Kadan’s invasion, he refuted the “Theory of Ipseong” saying that it fundamentally contradicted the standards stated by Kublai.

The 1219 pact was used very importantly as a historic reference intended to check Yuan’s excessive pressure on Goryeo in the period of Yuan’s intervention. The “achievements” of Jo Chung and Kim Chwi-ryeo, the individuals directly involved in the conclusion of the pact, were evaluated highly during Yuan’s interference period, which may have been a “reversal” resulting from these changes in Goryeo’s diplomatic circumstances. Yuan’s Wuzong said, “Now, under heaven, only the Samhan (Goryeo) will play the role of king with the people and the royal court,” and assessed the 1219 pact as having enabled this fact.

Hangpaduseong in Jeju-do (Korea’s premier ruins representing Goryeo-Mongolian relations) – provided by the writer

Jeju where historical tracks and scars left

From the 800-year long Korea-Mongolian history, the southernmost island of Jeju-do is where biggest historical marks and scars are left. This is because Sambyeolcho rebelled at the end of war against the Mongol Empire and took Jeju-do as the base for the anti-Yuan fight in 1271. Jeju’s Sambyeolcho was suppressed under attacks from the Goryeo-Mongolian allied forces armed with 12,000 troops and 160 warships in 1273. Yet these attacks did not end with the collapse of Sambyeolcho. The supremacy over Tamra was turned over to the Mongol Empire after Sambyeolcho was defeated in 1273.

The Mongol Empire created “Tamragukchotosa” and stationed troops there. Tamragukchotosa was reorganized into Tamrachong-gwanbu in the first year of King Chungnyeol (1275) to strengthen control by sending Darughachi. For this reason, Jeju-do was directly ruled by the Mongol Empire until 1305 (31^st year of King Chungnyeol). During this period, Jeju-do played an important role as Yuan’s horse farms and its population increased rapidly due to the large amount of immigrants. The fact that 14 hyeon were installed during the reign of King Chungnyeol on Jeju-do, in addition to Jeju-mok, can be seen as a measure that was taken to reflect such population growth in Jeju-do.

Numerous family names that originated in Jeju-do are mentioned in “Shinjeung-dongkuk-yeojiseungram,” including Jo (趙), Lee (李), Seok (石), Cho (肖), Gang (姜), Jeong (鄭), Jang (張), Song (宋), Ju(周), and Jin (秦). This plainly demonstrates how profoundly Jeju society was affected by the Mongol Empire’s rule over Jeju. Hangpaduseong in Aewol-eup, Beophwa-sa Temple in Seogwipo and refuge palace site of Emperor Shun of Yuan are widely-known remains that represent Korea-Mongolian relations. The special history between the Mongol Empire and Jeju surely calls attention to the island’s special identity as the regional base for steering the history of Korea-Mongolian ties.

Scenery in Mongolia (the Mongolian People’s Republic is a main constituent of Northeast Asia in the 21^st century) – provided by the writer

Korea and Mongolia in the 21^st Century

The “pact of brotherhood” between the Mongol Empire and Goryeo that was concluded 800 years ago did not literally reflect their brother-like, friendly relationship. It was actually a strategic accord that was reached out of mutual necessity and changed frequently in accordance with circumstances and needs. As a matter of fact, diplomacy between states is developed by circumstances and needs rather than by emotions. In this regard, the conclusion of the 1219 Goryeo-Mongolian pact was no exception.

Northeast Asia in the 21^st century carries the risk of latent explosion, as the legacies of state ideology and the Cold War system have yet to be liquidated. Today, the necessity to establish the systems for peace and co-prosperity is more urgent than ever and in order to do this, securing the balance of power in Northeast Asia is an extremely important issue. In this respect, the importance of the Mongolian People’s Republic, a member of Northeast Asia, cannot be emphasized enough.

Having established diplomatic ties in 1990, Korea and Mongolia formed their “mutually complementary cooperative ties” in the 21^st century in 1999 and built their “partnership of friendship and cooperation” in 2006. This is the stage in which the elevation of Korea-Mongol ties to the “partnership of strategic cooperation” is necessary. The two entered a special relationship, given the fact that 47,000 Mongolians out of the country’s 3 million people live in Korea. The “800-year long pact of brotherhood” in 2019 will have to be used as a chance to create a new stepping stone for the development of the Korea-Mongolian relationship in the 21^st century. This will surely be a future-oriented response to the “800-year long pact of brotherhood.”