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“Korea’s Freedom and Independence” Did Not Come Easily

A variety of events are being held to commemorate the centennial of the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea. Considering the fact that the Provisional Government paved the way for Korea’s sovereignty and gave Korean people the ability to live in the democratic republic now called the Republic of Korea, it is natural to commemorate such an event. However, there is one more thing to remember on the occasion of such a centennial: the Provisional Government was able to guarantee “Korea’s post-war freedom and independence” only as a result of the Cairo Conference.

Leaders of the United States, Britain, and China convened at a meeting in Cairo, Egypt, in November 1943, and announced the meeting’s concluded agreements through the Cairo Declaration. The Cairo Declaration states the following: “The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” This except was to mean that Korea would be free and independent if Japan was defeated, thus the declaration was important in that it ensured Korea’s independence after the war.

It is well-known that the Cairo Conference ensured Korea’s post-war freedom and independence. However, there are few, if any, who are fully aware of how Korea’s freedom and independence were able to be stipulated in the Cairo Declaration. Korea’s freedom and independence did not come easily. It was Chiang Kai-shek who proposed Korea’s freedom and independence at the Cairo Conference, and it was the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea who moved Chiang Kai-shek to propose such measures. This means that the Cairo Declaration was the outcome of the Provisional Government’s influence on Chiang Kai-shek.

International Co-management that Made the Provisional Government Nervous

It was after the outbreak of the U.S.-Japan War that the Great Powers began discussing the post-war Korea problem. As the Japanese Empire unleashed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on December 8, 1941, the U.S. and Japan erupted into war. Officials at America’s State Department and scholars of international relations began to discuss post-war problems, as the U.S. engaged in war against Japan. What had been discussed was known through the media. It was discussed that Korea would be under international co-management, which meant that Korea would be ruled jointly by the Great Powers if Japan surrendered.

As the international co-management issue emerged, the Provisional Government became nervous, because despite the defeat of Japan, Korea would not be independent and would be ruled by the Great Powers. The Provisional Government set out to figure out the real meaning of “international co-management,” and issued statements opposing the joint rule under the name of the foreign minister. In February 1943, Foreign Minister Jo So-ang issued statements saying, “Korea should become an independent state as soon as Japan surrenders,” and, “Korea would continue to battle the Great Powers like it did against the Japanese Empire for 30 years.”

When the Provisional Government was on alert, news broke that international co-management had been determined. British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, who had been on a visit to the U.S. in March 1943, had a meeting with U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt. At the time, Roosevelt offered to put Korea under the post-war international co-management system while raising issues related to Manchuria, Korea, Indochina, and Taiwan. Eden concurred with Roosevelt. This decision became known to the world through the April 27 edition of the Chicago Sun (published in Chicago). The Provisional Government also caught wind of this news.

Three leaders attending the Cairo Conference.

From left to right: Chiang Kai-shek, Roosevelt, Churchill

Photo courtesy of Han Si-jun, professor of history at Dankook University

Provisional Government’s Campaign Against International Co-Management

Upon hearing the news, the Provisional Government called an emergency State Council meeting to discuss countermeasures. The meeting determined that telegrams opposing international co-management should be sent to leaders of the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union, that campaigns should be conducted through various media channels, that the Foreign Ministry should contact China’s Foreign Ministry to figure out details, and finally that China’s prominent figures should be contacted to ask the Chinese government to oppose the decision.

Ethnic Koreans in China gathered to launch the movement to oppose the decision for international co-management. On May 10, 1943, 300 people from both the left-wing and right-wing political parties, and groups who were active in Chongqing, including the Korea Independence Party and the Korean National Revolutionary Party, held the Free Korea Conference of Ethnic Koreans in China. The conference adopted statements saying, “We demand complete independence and oppose any foreign interference,” and, “We assert complete independence for the sake of mankind’s real peace and happiness.” The statements were then sent to the leaders of the allies.

Another option was to visit China’s prominent figures in order to ask the Chinese government to come forward and oppose the international co-management scheme. Jo So-ang and Shin K-hed met China’s Legislature Chief Sun Fo and Executive Chief Yu Youren, as well as China’s Foreign Ministry officials, to ask for their cooperation. In this process, crucial information was obtained about a meeting arranged between Chiang Kai-shek and Roosevelt.

Negotiations for Chiang-Roosevelt Meeting

At this time, negotiations for a meeting between Chiang Kai-shek and Roosevelt were in progress. The meeting negotiations were realized when Roosevelt offered to meet Chiang. The U.S. had considerable difficulty fighting against Japan. Japan’s Pearl Harbor attack sank most of America’s warships, leaving many islands in the Pacific in the hands of Japan. Fearing that Japan might occupy even New Zealand and Australia, the U.S. needed China’s help and wanted to meet with Chiang Kai-shek.

China’s help meant the ability to keep Japanese troops tied up in the Chinese continent, which was advantageous to the U.S. If Chiang Kai-shek had surrendered to Japan or met them half way, Japanese soldiers in the Chinese continent could have been relocated to the Pacific region. Roosevelt had wanted to ask China to fight Japan with all their might, offering military supplies during the meeting with Chiang and proposing a meeting to do such.

Roosevelt offered to meet Chiang in December 1942 but the full-fledged push for the meeting began in June 1943. Since then, there were negotiations concerning the place and time for the meeting, and who should attend the meeting, as well. An agreement was reached in late October. The meeting place would be Cairo, Egypt, the time would be November 22-26, and attendees would be Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek, and Churchill.

Provisional Government Enlists Chiang Kai-shek’s Support

Having obtained information that Chiang was looking to have a meeting with Roosevelt, the Provisional Government also asked to meet with Chiang. The meeting was realized on July 26, 1943 at 9 a.m., at a meeting in which President Kim Gu, Foreign Minister Jo So-ang, Propaganda Minister Kim Kyu-sik, Korean Liberation Army commander-in-chief Lee Cheong-cheon, and deputy commander Kim Won-bong – an interpreter – met Chiang Kai-shek, accompanied by An Won-saeng, in the reception room on the second floor of China’s Military Committee. Chiang’s official title at this time was the chief of China’s Military Committee.

There are records detailing what was discussed between the key figures of the Provisional Government and Chiang Kai-shek. The record is an official paper entitled “Zhongguo Guo Min Dang Records: TE 16 Special Archives of the KMT Party Affairs, 1905, 1941-1948 (總裁接見韓國領袖談話紀要),” written by the Chinese side. The Korean leaders told Chiang, “Please do not be fooled by the international co-management scheme proposed by the U.S. and Britain, and instead, support and carry out Korea’s independence.” Chiang reacted negatively, saying that the U.S. and Britain had already determined the international co-management policy. Although it is a hard job, Chiang said, “China would help Korea in gaining complete independence. China would fight with full force (Junggukyeokjaeng 中國力爭).”

Chiang Kept His Promise

Chiang Kai-shek kept his word. He promised to propose Korea’s full independence while preparing for the meeting (China was preparing items to propose in the meeting in advance). There are separate records prepared by Office of the Chinese Military Committee and the Secretariat of the Chinese Supreme Defense Council, both of which contained plans to propose Korea’s freedom and independence. The “Diary of Chiang Kai-shek,” kept in America’s Stanford University and disclosed later, also contained a record of what China would propose in the meeting, which included, “Korea’s freedom and independence.” Chiang attended the Cairo Conference and proposed Korea’s freedom and independence. At a dinner at Roosevelt’s lodging on the evening of November 23, 1943, at which Chiang, Soong May-ling, Roosevelt, and his aide Harry L. Hopkins attended, Chiang proposed Korea’s freedom and independence, arguing that should Japan surrender and return China territories, such as Manchuria and Taiwan. Roosevelt agreed with this. After the dinner, Roosevelt asked Hopkins to draw up a draft based on what he discussed with Chiang. The following morning of November 24, Hopkins drew up the draft by asking Albert M. Cornelius, a document recorder at the White House, to type. The draft was shown to Roosevelt and corrected. In the afternoon of the same day, Hopkins handed over the draft to Wang Ch’unghui, head of the Chinese Supreme Defense Council, who had played the role of Chiang’s secretary. Wang translated this into Chinese and showed it to Chiang. Chiang confirmed that the contents were what he had discussed with Roosevelt the night before.

Records detailing topics discussed between key figures of the Provisional Government, 

such as Kim Gu, Jo So-ang, Lee Cheong-cheon, and Kim Won-bong, and Chiang Kai-shek on July 26, 1943

Photo courtesy of Han Si-jun, professor of history at Dankook University

China, Britain quarrel over Korea’s independence

Britain received the draft on November 25, as British Foreign Secretary Eden and Vice Secretary Alexander Cadogan arrived on November 24. The British side was not happy about the draft, bringing up the fact that the draft had been delivered to China first and claiming that China had been given too much. Britain corrected many parts, such as changing the part that stated, “Japan will be deprived of Pacific islands,” to, “Japan will be deprived of the areas that were occupied after World War 1 in 1914.”

Britain had grievances about Korea’s freedom and independence. There was turmoil surrounding this. Officials from the three countries gathered on November 26 to finalize the compromise. Then Britain proposed to change the clause in the draft from, “Korea shall become free and independent,” to, “Korea shall be liberated from Japan’s rule.” At the time, Britain had numerous colonies, including India and Burma in the Pacific region. If Korea’s freedom and independence were guaranteed, Britain would have its own colony-related problems. Wang Ch’unghui opposed Britain’s modified proposal. Wang reacted fiercely, saying, “Korea was annexed by Japan’s invasion and Japan’s invasion of the continent originated from annexing Korea. It does not make sense just to get Korea out from under Japan’s rule. Including Korea’s full freedom and independence in the declaration is very important to China and the Far East.” Britain did not back off either. Cadogan said, “Britain had never discussed Korea’s independence in the cabinet and did not exchange opinions concerning the Soviet Union’s attitude and antipathy to Korea’s independence,” proposing for, “Ommitance of all things related to Korea’s independence.” Unless the modified proposal was accepted, Britain wanted the clause about Korea’s freedom and independence contained in the draft to be omitted completely. China and Britain had a heated debate about Korea’s independence. It was U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Harryman who patched up the conflict. Harryman said, “Given President Roosevelt’s opinion, the Soviet Union has nothing to do with Korea’s independence and thus, there is no need to discuss it with the Soviet Union.” Roosevelt’s opinion refers to his agreement on Korea’s freedom and independence that Chiang Kai-shek proposed at the dinner on November 23.

Cairo Declaration Declares Korea’s independence

The Cairo Conference supposed to end on November 26. Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang Kai-shek, and Soong May-ling attended a meeting, waiting for officials to come to a compromise. The meeting was delayed as officials engaged in heated debate. The leaders called them in, reciting the details of what was discussed. When the problem of Korea’s independence came up, Roosevelt came forward. He stated, “There is no need to read the Soviet Union’s opinion about this problem.” As the reading ended, the leaders expressed their approval. With this, the Korean problem was included in the Cairo Declaration.

The Cairo Declaration was adopted on November 26, but was not announced immediately, as the U.S. and Britain were scheduled to have a meeting with Soviet leader, Stalin, in Teheran following the Cairo Conference. Chiang Kai-shek went home on November 27, and Roosevelt and Churchill left for Teheran on the same day. Leaders of the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union held a meeting in Teheran, where Stalin confirmed and agreed with the contents in the Cairo Declaration. The Cairo Declaration was announced on December 1 with the approval of the four leaders.

Although imperial Japan surrendered in August of 1945, Korea could not gain independence immediately. The U.S. and the Soviet Union divided and occupied the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. and the Soviet Union fought Japan and were victorious. They sent many young people to the battlefield and defeated Japan at an enormous cost, taking the Korean Peninsula as a trophy. Nevertheless, the U.S. and the Soviet Union could neither capture the Korean Peninsula for good, nor rule it for a long time. The two great powers retreated after three years, because of the Cairo Declaration.

Our people established the government of the Republic of Korea three years after the collapse of the Japanese colonial rule. The government inherited the Provisional Government and our people were able to keep the Republic of Korea, which was established in 1919, intact while living here. This year marks its centennial. There are things we have to remember when commemorating the 100 year anniversary of the establishment of the Provisional Government: we are able to live in the Republic of Korea today because our independence was ensured at the Cairo Conference, and Korea’s independence was ensured at the Cairo Conference, thanks to the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea. This must be remembered.