뉴스레터

Liaodong in the Post-Mongol Empire Period

Historically, the Liaodong region has been a geographical hub connecting Manchuria, northern China, Mongolia, and the Korean peninsula. The transition of power in the region was a major factor in the northward policies of the Korean kingdoms of Goryeo and Joseon. Like the Mongol-controlled Yuan dynasty, the Ming dynasty ruled by the Han Chinese also strived to secure control over the eastern regions including the Liaodong region as it unified the central plain. Evidence of this was the five fortresses―Dongzhoubao (東州堡), Magendanbao (馬根單堡), Qinghebao (淸河堡), Jianyangbao (鹻陽堡), and Aiyangbao (靉陽堡)―the Ming dynasty built between Fushun and the Amnok River to the east of a succession of eight post stations between Liaoyang and the Amnok River.

Cautionary Arguments

One year after the New Year's envoy Oh Baek-chang sent news to Joseon in 1469 about the five newly built fortresses, a Joseon translator named Choi Yu-gang provided a more detailed report on the extent of the five fortresses, the distances between each fortress, the number of troops stationed at each fortress, and the distance between the southernmost Aiyang fortress and Joseon's military base in Changseong at the midstream of Amnok River. Unlike the buffer zone that previously existed between Lianshangguan and the Amnok River, Joseon now found itself in a burdensome situation of having its border confront that of the Ming dynasty. This increased the possibility of further complicating major security issues including those involving migrants. Moreover, in case Joseon was to conduct military operations against the Jurchens beyond the Amnok River including the Liaodong region, the Ming dynasty would easily be able to detect such activities. Taking military actions under the pretense of collaborating with the Ming dynasty could result in Joseon's direct involvement in the Ming dynasty's policies toward the Jurchens, which could in turn significantly restrict the range of polices Joseon would be able to adopt toward the Jurchens.

In fact, cautionary arguments were raised within the Joseon court, claiming that the extension of the Ming dynasty's defense line would not be entirely advantageous for Joseon. Yang Seong-ji pointed out that by continuing to build fortress walls in the Liaodong region, the Ming dynasty would not only be able to defend itself from the Jurchens but accept and incorporate Joseon and Jurchen locals nearby crossing over to areas within the fortress walls. If the Ming dynasty attempts to exercise effective control, Joseon might even have to share the same border with the Ming dynasty. And if that happens, Yang Seong-ji warned that the Ming dynasty could use a military operation against the Jurchens or some other border security issue as an excuse to cross the Amnok River and occupy the Korean peninsula.

Yu Ja-gwang also predicted that Joseon would not be able to avoid being pillaged by the Ming dynasty unless it takes preventive measures such as officially designating districts in border areas and installing fences around them. Based on the moves the Ming dynasty had made up until then, there was a possibility for the two country's interests to clash, and if such a situation persists, their relations could remain hostile for a long time.

Joseon's Response

Amid such concerns and tension, the Joseon government set national security as its priority as it sought to employ push and pull, or give and take strategies in its diplomacy toward the Ming dynasty.

The import of water buffalo horns was an instance in which Joseon employed such a strategy. Joseon had been completely relying on the Ming dynasty to import water buffalo horns necessary for producing bows that shot a short but effective type of Korean arrow called pyeonjeon. 

However in 1477, the eighth year of King Seongjong's reign, an imperial birthday embassy returning to Joseon was reprimanded nearby a post station in Gongle (公樂) for smuggling water buffalo horns from the Ming dynasty. The embassy had tried to secure more than the maximum limit of fifty horns. Since the smuggling occurred while the embassy was on its way back, the Chenghua Emperor let go of the matter. Yet, if the Ming government had found fault with the embassy, the incident could have developed into a serious diplomatic problem, especially because Gongle was near today's Tianjin and quite close to Beijing. Interestingly enough, the Joseon government took advantage of the incident as an opportunity to ask the Ming dynasty to deregulate the trade of water buffalo horns. The request was justified by a purpose that applied to both Joseon and the Ming dynasty: to secure enough military supplies to defend themselves against barbarians to the north and the Japanese to the south. Joseon also justified allowing greater amounts of water buffalo horns to be imported by appealing to the fact that it had maintained particularly close relations with the Ming dynasty since its establishment. They were close enough to allow only envoys from Joseon to carry their bows and arrows around just like Ming locals and the Hongwu Emperor had even once bestowed Joseon with gunpowder and cannons. By stipulating that imported water buffalo horns would only be used for defense against "the barbarians," Joseon openly suggested that it had no intention of betraying the Ming dynasty. At the time, frontier issues were critical to the Ming dynasty's national defense, which was a situation Joseon fully took advantage of by arguing that increasing its military supplies would be helpful to maintaining the Ming dynasty's national security. While readily accepting the reality of having to cooperate with the Ming dynasty on the opposite side of the Amnok River, Joseon pursued the practical interest in securing more supplies for its military operations against the Jurchens.

Meanwhile, prior to its attempt to smuggle water buffalo horns in 1477, the Joseon government continued to hold discussions about utilizing the newly developed pyeonjeon for military operations in the Seobukmyeon region. In 1483, Byeongjo, Joseon's Ministry of Military Affairs, consulted the royal court while seeking for a way to constantly practice shooting pyeonjeons during military training. Eight years later, at a meeting held to discuss ways to tighten Joseon's guard in frontier areas since the Wudiha barbarians' attack of the Josan Fortress in 1491, it was suggested that pyeonjeons be distributed to prepare for emergencies. This was quite possibly because the pyeonjeon was an effective weapon. According to records about a battle in Changseong, there were a hundred enemy troops either on horseback or on foot and half of them were heavily armed, clad in iron all over except for their eyes. When the Joseon army shot standard arrows, the enemy parried them with their armor or even picked the arrows up and used them to shoot back. However, when the Joseon soldiers began to shoot pyeonjeons, the enemy became greatly intimidated. This is a testament to how effective pyeonjeons were in terms of speed and penetration. A year later in 1492, Yi Geuk-gyun presented King Seongjong with an ungraded pyeonjeon with a chisel-shaped tip guaranteeing greater accuracy and penetration. The king thereby ordered for all pyeonjeons used outside the capital to implement Yi geuk-gyun's prototype.

The above cases involving water buffalo horns and pyeonjeons seem to demonstrate how proactively Joseon responded to the Ming dynasty's advancement into the Liaodong region. It pointed out a common enemy to stress the need to increase military supplies and form a stronger alliance with the Ming dynasty, while constantly making efforts to increase its military strength by distributing and developing pyeonjeons. Joseon's strategy was about realistic defense by utilizing a Ming-led regional order.

Diachronic Studies on Korea-China Relations

After the mid-fifteenth century, the Ming dynasty sought to tighten its grip over Manchuria, including the Liaodong region, as it constructed five fortresses between Fushun and the Amnok River to the east of the eight post stations in Liaodong. Joseon did not passively yield to the imbalance of power between itself and the Ming dynasty. Within a Ming-led regional order, Joseon used the mutual trust and security alliance it had formed with the Ming dynasty to take preemptive measures to justify its military activities and increase its armaments. Such a response is likely to have been possible by remaining faithful to its priority of national defense as it came to accept the reality of the Ming dynasty's expanding influence in the Liaodong region.

The circumstances at the time were quite different from those in the first half of the seventeenth century when the Ming dynasty's conflict with the Jianzhou Jurchens grew worse enough to force Joseon to explicitly side with one or the other. Nevertheless, Joseon's proactive response in the late fifteenth century toward the Ming dynasty's spreading influence in the Liaodong region and areas nearby is an important fact to keep in mind while examining the macroscopic changes that occurred within the Northeast Asian regional order. Beyond the second half of the fourteenth century, Beijing continued to serve as the capital of dynasties established by the Han Chinese or Jurchens. As such, stabilizing the Liaodong region was key to each dynasty's national security scheme. Analyzing how Joseon's northward policy unfolded within that context could open new windows of opportunity to investigate and determine what Korea-China relations were like before Korea became invaded by the Japanese and the Manchus.