뉴스레터

Cho Young-nam, Professor of Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University

He graduated from Seoul National University with a master's degree and doctoral degree in political science. Since then, he has been a visiting researcher at the Modern China Research Center in Peking University, a visiting scholar at Nankai University and the Harvard-Yenching Institute in the United States. Since 2002, he has been a professor at Seoul National University's Graduate School of International Studies.

Q. Why did you study Chinese politics? And I wonder what the topic you've been interested in lately.

A. I graduated from the Department of Oriental History and studied Chinese modern history in the graduate school of the same graduate school. After going to the graduate school of political science, I chose the Chinese politics field according to the advice of several teachers who said that research on 'rising as a top' is needed. From 10 years ago, I am focusing on selecting topics that are essential but basic for studying Chinese politics. And in 2006-2007, I spent a year of sabbaticals at the Harvard-Yenching Institute in the United States, thinking about what to do in the future. I selected the topics to study until retirement, and I studied them in turn and set the goal of publishing one book every three years. The series I published in 2016 ‘China in the Deng Xiaoping Era’ : 『Reform and Opening』, 『Faction and Struggle』, and 『Tiananmen Square protests』 are the first results. And 『China's Elite Politics: From Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping』 published in 2019, is a second-round result. I am currently writing 『The Chinese Rule: From the Central to the Base』 which I aim to publish in September 2022. I plan to publish 『Ideologies in China』 and 『Modern Political History in China』.

Q. Next year is the 100th year of the Chinese Communist Party. What is the goal of China?

A. China’s goal is to build a well-off society. The 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party(2012) set a goal of doubling GDP and per capita GDP from 2010(GDP is $14-15 trillion, per capita GDP is $10,000). But this goal has already been achieved last year. So, the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party(2017) raised its goal and said it would resolve the absolute poverty of less than $1 a day by 2020. As of the end of 2019, China's absolute poverty population is 5.61 million, and it will be fully resolved next year. The issue is, whether it's sustainable. The Chinese government has been spending astronomical amounts of money on rural and ethnic minorities to address absolute poverty for years. Even if the state does not supply blood to the economy, it is important whether it will work and be alive.

Q. Some experts predicted that the spread of COVID-19 would have a significant impact on Xi Jinping's political leadership. I wonder how you see this situation, how you judge it, and what the 'specificity' of Chinese politics is in the same context.

A. When SARS broke out in China in 2002, some domestic and foreign media said that ‘China's Chernobyl’ broke out. They reported that the Communist regime was facing a serious crisis. This time, it's not different. I thought that this assessment and prospect was wrong. Rather, China is likely to reduce the national power gap with the United States by taking COVID-19 as the occasion. Recently, I published three papers on China's response to COVID-19, and I was able to confirm that my outlook was valid.

I made this decision because I know what China has experienced in the 40 years of reform and opening. China has been dealing with the crisis that occurs every 10 years. They pushed for a reform-opening policy to overcome the serious crisis caused by the Chinese Cultural Revolution(1966–1976). And ten years later they have another crisis: the Tianamen Square Protests(1989) and the collapse of the Soviet Union(1991). However, China has grown dramatically through Deng Xiaoping's South Tour Speeches(1992), and by adopting market socialism. China also emerged as an Asian powerhouse in response to the Asian financial crisis(1997-1998), which occurred ten years after that time.

It has become relatively clear that Japan has declined. Even during the World Financial Crisis(2007–2008), China was given the title G2(Group of Two: US and China). It is very symbolic that China overtook Japan, which was the second largest economy in the world for decades. And this time, China, which is facing the crisis of COVID-19(2019-2020), is leaping to a great power by overcoming it again.

This is not because of China's 'specificity'. It was possible because political reform improved the government system and the government capacity of the country. The goal of China's political reform was not 'democracy-building' but 'state-building'. And they made great efforts to rationalize and improve the efficiency of the Communist Party and national organizations. As a result, the state's governing system and governing ability have greatly improved. For the past 40 years, China has recorded an annual economic growth rate of 9.2% and has been able to cope with domestic and international crises. This was possible because of political reform. But if we only focus on the problem of democracy-building, we can not understand these situations. We should pay attention to what China has achieved through state-building. The American governing system is not in crisis because of a particular president or specific case. We need to know that China's governing system is not facing a crisis due to a particular leader or event.

Q. What is the meaning of 'The Chinese Dream', 'One Belt, One Road', 'Community with a shared future for mankind(more accurately translated as Community of common destiny for mankind)' that Xi Jinping constantly says?

A. The Xi Jinping government had to solve two challenges: to maintain one party system and to strengthen Xi Jinping's power. First, it's about strengthening the legitimacy of the Communist Party's rule. Deng Xiaoping has set its main goal to solve the people's life problems, and Jiang Zemin(1992-2002) has begun to solve this problem by accelerating economic growth. Hu Jintao(2002–2012) has spread its achievements in marginalized areas. But Jiang and Hu Jintao did not answer properly why the Communist Party should maintain one party system. On the other hand, Xi Jinping has clearly and specifically presented the goals as follows. "We will achieve the 'well-off society' in 2020, build a 'modernized socialist powerhouse' in 2035, and become a superpower comparable to the United States in 2050." This is the Chinese dream. He suggested the logic of justification to maintain one party system. By this logic, the Communist Party will be able to maintain its current political system by at least 2050, while at the same time doing its best to achieve the Great Revival of the Chinese nation.

The other is the U.S. check, or break through the blockade. China has become confident by successfully overcoming the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2008 Global Economic Crisis. They began to act hard and aggressive in the core interests of foreign security policies(Sovereignty, Territory, Development) since 2009. The Xi Jinping government seems to have set a policy to break through the U.S. checks in this area. The foreign policy of the Xi Jinping government consists of two axes: One axis is the 'strict policy', which applies to Taiwan, the South China Sea, Xinjiang Uyghur, and Hong Kong. This is well represented by the pressure on Taiwan to use force, the construction of military bases while dominating various islands in the South China Sea, the demand for democratization in Hong Kong and the strictly response to Xinjiang Uighur without regard to international criticism and sanctions. Another axis is the ‘moderate policy’, which includes the ‘One Belt, One Road’ policy, which China has invested $1 trillion, and the ‘Building a community with a shared future for mind’ plan.

Q. I wonder how such political ideology and external strategy affect Korea and the Korean peninsula.

A. All of the tasks of the Xi Jinping government mentioned above are affecting the Korean peninsula. For example, the Communist Party of China emphasizes patriotism or nationalism to strengthen the legitimacy of rule. The slogan 'the Great Revival of the Chinese nation' itself is the product of patriotism. The strengthening of Communist power and the strengthening of the power of Xi Jinping can also be understood in this context. It is from this background that China retaliated against the 'THAAD' deployment in Korea as a violation of 'core interests'. If this situation comes in the future, China will not hesitate to retaliate. From the same point of view, if the popular culture of Korea or other countries is active in China, it will never be allowed. The patriotic Chinese people will not be favorable to Korean pop culture. Therefore, it would be better not to expect that Korean Wave is popular in China, popular culture exports are greatly increased, and Chinese tourists will come to Korea on a large scale.

Regarding the resolution of issues related to North Korea, China will not press North Korea according to the demands of South Korea or the United States. In particular, China's 'strict policy' will worsen the conflict with the United States, and North Korea's 'strategic value' will increase to China. So even if the U.S. and the U.N. sanctions continue, the viable space of North Korea will be wider than ever. This is because China is more likely to support North Korea without worrying about the United States.

In addition, the relationship between China and Taiwan is heading to the worst, so it is not strange that military conflicts occur in the Taiwan Strait. The United States is trying to "encircle" China in partnership with the countries involved. But China will not just be watching it. After all, the confrontation and conflict between the United States and China, and the complicated tensions surrounding East Asia and the Korean peninsula, are unlikely to be avoided.

Q. China considers Korea-China relations not as equal international relations but as sibling relations. In other words, China regards itself as a brother and treats Korea like a younger brother. Is the concept of ‘recovery of the Chinese order’ in the traditional era and the modern ‘Chinese dream’ linked?

A. I think that the so-called 'the Chinese order' or 'the Chinese system' is an exaggerated or distorted myth or fiction. Therefore, it is not appropriate to predict or evaluate China's emerging. There are two biases. One is what Chinese scholars have argued for a decade ago, and it tends to exaggerate only the positive aspects of Chinese order. What this means is clear. The New East Asian order to be led by China will be a peaceful and stable system, so neighboring countries do not have to be wary of it at all. This is the academic response of China to the theory of China Threat, and it is fiction.

The other is the phenomenon that appears in some countries in East Asia. This is the tendency to regard China's emerge as a recovery of the Chinese order, and to be wary and afraid of it. In the past, China was the only superpower in East Asia, reigning around the country, but not now. The United States exists as a superpower, and Japan and India exist as regional powers. Russia is a military power, Korea, Australia are middle power. There are also various multilateral organizations such as ASEAN, and economic systems such as FTA. In this situation, China will not dominate East Asia based on military, economic, and soft power.

Q. What if there are tasks of Korean academia studying China and some things to improve?

A. Chinese research in Korean academia has developed dramatically in both quantitative and qualitative ways. But we can’t be satisfied or complacent with the current situation. This is because not only the rise of China, but also domestic and overseas changes become faster and more complicated. China is not the same China as it was ten years ago. In another 10 years, China will not be the present China. 

Therefore, research on China should be more active. There are two tasks to do this. First, we need to train undergraduate and master-level local experts who want to study China as well as world-class Chinese experts as doctoral students. I hope that many students will grow up studying based on my research results, so that we will not face a crisis that depends on Chinese research abroad. The other is to study a field in depth and systematically for a long time at the academic level. Then, we can accumulate research achievements and secure excellent experts. All professors from Korean academia studying China should work together to solve this problem.