뉴스레터

Wada Haruki, an honorary professor at the University of Tokyo, is one of the world authorities in the field of history who is well-versed in international relations in Northeast Asia, including the history of the Soviet Union, Russia, China, the Joseon Dynasty, North Korea, and South Korea and has published pioneering works on a series of these topics. He has gained high recognition for his pioneering publications on the Korean War, commonly referred to as the ‘Joseon War’ in Japan. His book 『Transcription of the Joseon War』 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten Publishers, 2002) has been published in Korea under the title 『Wada Haruki’s Transcription of the Korean War』 (translated by Nam Sang-gu and Jo Yoon-su, Chunga Publishers, 2023), and I would like to reflect on the significance of this book.

Prof. Wada’s Accumulated Research on the Korean War

  Professor Wada began to take a great interest in Korea when he encountered this war ‘broke out in a neighboring country’, on June 25, 1950, when he was just 12 years old and in the first year of middle school. His initial curiosity was sparked by the Soviet Union’s policy of occupying North Korea, publishing 『Soviet Policy on Joseon, August-October 1945』 (republished in the 『Social Science Research』 Vol. 33, No. 4, November 1981 and Vol. 33, No. 6, March 1982 by the Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo). Soon his focus shifted to Kim Il-sung, publishing 『Kim Il-sung

and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War』 (Tokyo: Heibonsha Publishers, 1992; translated by Lee Jongseok), 『Kim Il-sung and the Manchurian Anti-Japanese War』 (Changbi Publishers, 1992). These were followed by 『North Korea: The Present of a Guerrilla State』 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten Publishers, 1998; translated by Seo Dongman and Nam Kijeong), and 『North Korea: From a Guerrilla State to a Regular Army State』 (Dolbegae Publishers, 2002).

  Based on these fundamental studies and publications, he delved into nearly all domestic and foreign writings on the ‘Joseon War’ and analyzed excavated materials, especially from Russia and China. He then presented a series of papers in 『Thought』 between 1990 and 1993 and released his book 『Joseon War』 through Iwanami Shoten Publishers in 1995. Shortly after completing the writing of this book, Professor Wada contacted the Soviet Union’s confidential documents related to this war, which were handed over to President Kim Young-sam by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in June 1994. He then added a 「Supplementary Remarks: A Review of New Russian Materials」 at the end of his draft of the book just before publishing it while maintaining the original thesis.

  Professor Wada’s research didn’t stop there. Following the release of the former Soviet Union’s classified documents by Yeltsin, he utilized newly released or discovered confidential documents from various sources in Russia and rewrote the whole story from the planning stage of the war to the ceasefire stage to publish a revised edition under the same title in 2002 through Iwanami Shoten Publishers. Subsequently, he published a revised and enlarged edition, incorporating newly released materials. Frank Baldwin, an American historian, translated and published this revised and enlarged edition as ‘The Korean War: An International History’ (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014).

The Scholarly Contributions of This Book

  So, what are the scholarly contributions of 『Transcription of the Joseon War』?

  First, in the 「Introduction」, the author chronologically points out the details of the Japanese studies related to this war, as well as the materials and books from relevant countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and South Korea, and explains their strengths and weaknesses in detail. By just reading this 「Introduction」 alone, researchers can easily understand what the academic debate on this topic is and how it has changed. Additionally, it will help them find clues to set their own research directions. It should be necessarily recalled that the author is not only fluent in English and Korean but also in Chinese and Russian, making extensive use of sources from China and Russia. This book is very helpful for researchers who may not be familiar with these sources.

  Second, the author succeeded in unearthing new materials within a certain scope. For example, he was able to locate copies of newspapers, 『Liberation Daily』 and 『Democratic Korea』 that were allowed to resume publication after the North Korean army occupied Seoul. He could then analyze the statements made by some Korean political leaders, who were unable to flee and virtually became ‘captives’, that were interpreted as criticizing South Korea and the United States while aligning themselves with North Korea. The author expressed sympathy for them, commenting that it is doubtful whether those statements truly reflected their intentions. The wartime conditions were harsh. Kim Gyu-sik, Cho So-ang, Ahn Jae-hong, and others could not avoid being ‘abducted to North Korea’ despite their statements.

  Third, the author also produced new interpretations. One small example is that he believed the reason for the absence of the Soviet representative at the U.N. Security Council, held immediately after the war, was laid in Stalin’s decision. The author attributes this absence to Stalin’s military strategy. He interpreted Stalin’s aim as engaging the United States, which he always regarded as a threat, in this war to exhaust national strength. As a result, Stalin chose not to send a Soviet representative with veto power to the Security Council that would approve the deployment of a US-led UN force.

  Fourth, the author consistently maintained academic diligence throughout his research on this topic. When new materials were discovered, he thoroughly analyzed them and adjusted his existing interpretations. The 「Supplementary Remarks」, as mentioned earlier, is a prime example of it. Additionally, he did not hesitate to revise his thesis after accessing new materials. For instance, he initially agreed with the interpretation that Stalin and Kim Il Sung believed that the United States would not intervene even if they invaded South Korea, based on Dean G. Acheson’s January 1950 speech at the National Newspaper Association while he was the U.S. Secretary of State, who did not include Korea within the U.S. Far Eastern Defense Line. However, he later abandoned this interpretation and proposed that Stalin and Kim Il Sung were confident in U.S. non-intervention regardless of this interpretation. This case is especially noteworthy because it demonstrates his academic diligence.

  Fifth, the author acknowledged that this war began ‘with North Korea’s attack, supported and aided by the Soviet Union’. However, he also pointed out that

the war resulted from the context of both South and North Korea seeking to establish a unified nation under their own leadership through armed force, which followed the division of Korea into South and North on August 15, 1945, the establishment of the Republic of Korea in the South on August 15, 1948, and the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on September 9, 1948. The author at this point proposed the interpretation that ‘this war began as a civil war but expanded into an international war’. Here, the point of contention is that the author views this war as an inevitable outcome given the historical context of Northeast Asia, centered on the US-Soviet-China-Japan relations, and the socio-economic background of Joseon (the Korean race) in the modern era. The reviewers of the book disagree with this perspective. Humans are rational beings and can escape from ‘historical inevitability’. In plain language, this war was avoidable, and in this sense, Kim Il Sung and Park Heon-young, who ultimately obtained Stalin’s consent after years of persistent persuasion, deserve condemnation.

  Sixth, the author defined this war as the ‘Northeast Asian War’ after years of research. Professor William Whitney Stueck, Jr. referred to this war as a ‘substitute for World War Ⅱ’ in his 1995 book, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, N.g: Princeton University Press, 1995). In a similar vein, Professor Wada named this war the ‘Korean War as the Northeast Asian War’ in his paper published in a collection of papers at Rikkyo University in 1996. He regarded the Sino-Japanese War as the ‘First Korean War as the Northeast Asian War’, the Russo-Japanese War as the ‘Second Korean War as the Northeast Asian War’, and the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 as the ‘Third Korean War as the Northeast Asian War’.

  Seventh, the author, above all else, succeeded in maintaining objectivity. In this regard, Professor Kathryn Weathersby, who has made significant contributions to the study of this war,

praised Professor Wada’s book, saying “the most comprehensive and balanced book among the history books of the Korean War published so far”.

  Eighth, as the title 'Transcription of the Joseon War' suggests, this book provides entertaining details of all stages, including the roots, causes, development, and ceasefire. Furthermore, it encourages us to deliberate on the challenges of achieving peace in Joseon (Korea) from the perspective of today, 70 years after the end of the ceasefire. In this regard, the author, in the 「Preface to the Korean Edition」, made a premise that “people of South and North Korea must share a common understanding that both sides engaged in the war to achieve reunification through force in order to put the three-year war behind them and move steadily toward peace”. He then added, “there is also need for both sides to reflect on such a war together and apologize to each other. Without a common understanding of this war, and without sharing feelings of reflection and apology, the Korean race cannot leap towards coexistence and peace”.

  The Korean War was a national tragedy and placed a significant burden and impact on the various related countries. The legacy of this war continues to cause pain for us today. It is desirable to continue dialogue and negotiations to alleviate this suffering and to achieve reunification through establishing peace. However, it is difficult to agree to a mere superficial declaration of the end of war or peace treaty without adequate follow-up guarantees. I recommend reading this book for a full and balanced understanding of this war.