뉴스레터

Our reality now is rampant with phrases like "the worst-ever postwar Korea-Japan relationship" in all directions like cherry blossoms fluttering amid a spring breeze. Is it that their bilateral relationship is being driven into this situation because their respective identities are facing radical changes? Japan, having marked its peak with “Japan is Number One” in the 1980s, has been turning rightist while undergoing economic woes known as the "lost 30 years". Korea is showing its best confidence since the dawn of history thanks to economic development and the progress of democratization from the poorest nation on earth around 1965. Can we find the reason for the deeply rooted animosity between Korea and Japan from the crossing of identities—economic reversal of both nations, conservative swing, and democratization?

In 2018, the Northeast Asian History Foundation carried out planning research regarding how Japan's changed national identity following the Meiji Restoration had been linked to international relations in Northeast Asia in cooperation with the Korean Association of Contemporary Japanese Studies. Although the development of the Korea-Japan relationship as we see it today had not been predicted, it might have been researchers' foresight to have chosen the topic. I am convinced that the results of this research will help general readers as well as researchers to ascertain the essence of the present Korea-Japan relationship and to respond accordingly.

We remember vividly that Japan's national power strengthened rapidly after the Meiji Restoration was completed, with disputes with neighboring countries in history after all. Meanwhile, after its defeat, Japan changed its identity from an expansionary militaristic state to an inward-looking state of "one-nation pacifism"—in other words, a "trading state" focusing on commercial activities by curbing military power and seeking economic gains. But as the Cold War ended, there has been a fierce move to pursue a new Japan. The emergence of political forces seeking to revise the constitution by shouting "active pacifism" through the "exit from the postwar regime" will certainly change Japan into a new state from a "trading state".

What would the Japan that these forces are seeking be like? What is meant to us by the identity of Japan that might emerge afresh? We cannot help feeling nervous, recalling the history of the Korea-Japan relationship in which Japan's identity has influenced Korea. In this book, eight researchers majoring in the modern history and politics of Korea looked for answers to these questions based on diverse methodology.

A Japanese right-wing group is entering the Yasukuni Shrine for the visit
(Yonhap News Agency)

Kim Sang-joon (Yonsei University) emphasized the usefulness of the national identity concept through his research into "national identities and international relations". His position that national identities created by various domestic factors have an influence while constituting international relations is expected to continue to expand its domain through research into international relations in the future.

Park Young-june (Korea National Defense University) conducted research into "changes in Japan's national identity before and after the Meiji Restoration and external policies". As for relations with neighboring countries, Iwakura Tomomi expresses the alliance theory or the solidarity theory concerning Qing and Joseon, with which Japan has maintained friendly relations traditionally while raising the theory of a Russian threat. With that in mind, he argued against the policy of conquering Korea by military force. In the meantime, Fukuzawa Yukichi divided the international order into uncivilized, semi-civilized, and civilized states in terms of civilization and concluded that Japan had remained semi-civilized.

Jeong Ji-hi (Seoul National University Institute for Japanese Studies) reviewed wartime Japan's military state discourse in relation to an attempt to establish national identity through his research into the topic of "wartime Japan's national identity and East Asian order". The military state as a national system functioned as an important medium imagining leading positions in Asia by relativizing the West's modern times and envisioning Japan as a modern state.

Nam Ki-jeong (Seoul National University Institute for Japanese Studies) dealt with the double identities of good loser and good ruler through his research into "Japan's identity as a vanquished nation and Korea-Japan relations". Double perceptions about identity were reflected over the course of preparing the peace treaty, and what was confirmed in this process strengthens the duplicity yet again. But the good loser identity was not applicable to the Korea-Japan relationship, and the good ruler identity was manifested. In that sense, the author claims that Korea should take how it would cope with the "good loser" identity as its task in dealing with historical issues between Korea and Japan.

Lee Myong-chan (Northeast Asian History Foundation) studied "changes in Japan's national identity in the Cold War era and international relations in Northeast Asia". The Yoshida doctrine symbolizing Japan's identity in the Cold War era was hidden in the shadow of the scheme of "complete pacification" versus "independent pacification". The San Francisco Peace Conference was burdened with the serious problem of Asian absence, and reduced compensation amounts and payment methods in consideration of the early postwar recovery of this expedited Japan. Yet this was caused by Cold War-type negotiations by the United States and Britain, not by the forgiveness of Asia's war-ravaged countries, resulting in a kind of distortion.

Lee Jeong-hwan (Seoul National University) conducted research into "Japan's identity as a normal state in the post-Cold War era and revivalism identity". Okazaki Hisahiko established his security theory from the viewpoint of a traditional realist and laid out his logic to cope with the limitations to state autonomy concerning power and alliance to combat the enemy's potential threat. He shares normal state identities in the post-Cold War era. The changed security system that he desired for Japan throughout his life has been realized by Abe, who he supported actively.

Jo Yang-hyeon (Korea National Diplomatic Academy) conducted research into the "changes in Japan's national identity in the 21st century and Korea-Japan relations", revolving around the Abe administration's "postwar regime". Duplicity related to the East Asian security order is internalized in Japan's work for a "military normal state". From a long-term perspective, Japan can be an important deterrent so that China does not upset the regional order and it can make a soft landing. On the other hand, this could prompt a regional arms race and hegemonic war because Japan's recent defense and security policies are directed toward keeping China in check by strengthening US-Japan security cooperation.

Park Cheol-hee (Seoul National University) claims that diverse views must be established when international politics are used as a tool to analyze national identity through his research into "Korea and Japan's national identities for East Asian peace". First, the identity of national strategy is not a constant, but a variable. Second, the identity of national strategy takes on a contested nature reflecting diverse voices and political positions. Third, it is necessary to pay heed to relativity and liquidity as far as the identity of national strategy is concerned.