뉴스레터

Bae, Gyeong-han

A simply definition of Sino-centrism is the sense of superiority the Chinese have vis-à-vis their neighbors in terms of heritage and culture. This sense of superiority goes back to the ancient Huang-he [華夏] civilization that developed from the midstream region of the Yellow River. With the Huang-he civilization as the starting point, Chinese civilization continued its expansion as it vanquished and absorbed neighboring peoples. As such, Sino-centrism is the product of a long history. And this is why Sino-centrism cannot merely be considered a form of bias.

I often attend academic conferences as a China specialist, and I find issues surrounding Sino-centrism especially difficult. There has been a growing interest in the unfolding of contemporary Chinese nationalism and the reorganization of the East Asian regional order that began in the mid-1940s. In turn, there has also been heightened interest in Sino-centrism, a distinct expression of nationalism. As such, one runs into many more Chinese scholars at various conferences and seminars than in the past.

Until several years ago, it was almost impossible to address the issue of Sino-centrism at academic conferences in China. It seemed futile to even discuss Sino-centrism when some of the Chinese scholars were making ultra-nationalistic comments, stressing their lineage as descendants of the Yellow Emperor [黃帝]. While it was not necessarily the right thing to do, non-Chinese scholars used to self-censor, tweaking their arguments and using more roundabout expressions when talking about Sino-centrism.

Hope of overcoming Sino-centrism

However, there have been some signs of constructive change in Chinese academia over the past 7-8 years. Several years ago, a critical perspective on Pan-Asianism of Sun Yat-sen, one of the icons of early 20th-century China, was presented at a lecture for the graduate students of the Department of History at Sun Yat-sen [中山] University in Guangzhou [廣州]. The response was surprisingly very positive. The lecturer argued that Sun Yat-sen's Pan-Asianism is a Sino-centric conception as it premises China and Japan's leadership in Asia and excludes Asia's weaker powers, which should be included as equal parties in a unified Asian coalition. The young researchers—in their 20s and 30s—found the argument very novel in that it provided them a new perspective on their national hero. Their response was a breath of fresh air, marking a stark contrast from the emotionally-charged responses that the older generation of scholars had shown.

Statues of Huangdi [Yellow Emperor] and Yandi
[Red Emperor] erected along the Yellow River

I personally had a similar experience a few years ago when I presented a paper on Wang Zingwei [汪精衛], notorious in China as a pro-Japanese national traitor, and his political thought. The key argument of my paper was that while the Wang Jingwei regime was inherently flawed for its pro-Japanese stance, it must also be acknowledged that it did put in a lot of effort to secure political"independence (autonomy) from the Japanese occupiers. A majority of the Chinese scholars in attendance agreed with my evaluation. Furthermore, some even went on to say that Chinese scholars should study the diverse facets of Wang Jingwei, which had been left unexplored, hidden behind the assessment that Wang was simply a national traitor.

While the subject of my paper did not have much to do with Sino-centrism, the response from the Chinese scholars was exciting to me as it was the first time I got the feeling that an objective and logical discussion was possible with Chinese academics. Thereafter, I continued to witness more flexible attitudes toward nationalism and Sino-centrism among Chinese scholars in the discussion of a variety of topics; it seemed as though there was hope that Sino-centrism could be overcome.

However, I was thrown into confusion at the conference on Chiang Kai-shek [蔣介石] held in Beijing in August. A young scholar from Taiwan highlighted the important role Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party's policy on ethnic minorities played in the Communist Party's policy on ethnic minorities as the former led the way to the latter. He pointed out that starting in the late 1920s, Chiang Kai-shek pursued Hanism [Han chauvinism; 大漢族主義], a national integration policy that opposed the autonomy and independence of ethnic minority groups. In response to the paper, which incorporated a critical view of Hanism, some participants argued that Mongols, Tibetans, and Uyghurs, who were mentioned in the paper, had always been within Chinese territory and thus, cannot be considered subjects with the right to independence or autonomy. They went to claim that Chiang Kai-shek's policy did not go against ethnic minority groups' demand for independence but aimed to realize national integration throughout China.

Were the signs of change mere academic rhetoric?

What I found more disturbing happened after the conference at an informal gathering that the presenter in question did not attend. The Chinese scholars were in unanimous agreement that the young presenter was a separatist. It turned out that the presenter was of Uighur (Xinjiang) descent born in Myanmar who had received education and a degree in the United States. When the up-and-coming scholar's background came to light, the Chinese scholars were quick to brand him as a subversive element plotting the independence of ethnic minority groups.

The Chinese scholars were probably not aware that someone sensitive to ethnic minority issues was in their midst and spoke more openly about their support of Sino-centrism than they otherwise would have. Be that as it may, I was dumbfounded by the whole experience.

Does this mean that the change I saw and welcomed in Chinese scholars' stance on Sino-centrism was mere academic rhetoric? Was it just another form of Sino-centrism, a new expression of confidence in the rising China after the reform and opening?

As China's international influence grows, so does the Chinese people's sense of superiority and expressions of this superiority. And this paints a dark picture for the prospect of moving beyond Sino-centrism, which would be the starting point for opening a future of reconciliation and peaceful coexistence in East Asia. While there seems to be signs of change, when can we expect to truly overcome Sino-centrism?