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"Tripartite Partnership Key to Peaceful and Prosperous Future for Northeast Asia"
  • Interviewed by Research Fellow Cha, Jae Bok (Department of Policy Research, NAHF) Edited by Chinese Editor Yun, Seon Hwa

Editor's Note: The United States and China are fiercely vying for supremacy over Asia; while China is trying to construct the Belt (帶) of overland and marines routes that will link Asia, the United States is trying to build the Network (網) of an integrated Asia-Pacific with the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP). Against this backdrop, the two recent Chinese initiatives, 'One Belt, One Road (一帶一路)' and the 'Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),' were discussed at an experts seminar held by the NAHF on April 14 (Tue), 2015. One of the experts who visited the NAHF and spoke at this seminar, Professor Shu Jianzhong (舒建中) at Nanjing University met with Research Fellow Cha, Jae Bok at the NAHF and talked about historical issues, tripartite relations in Northeast Asia, U.S.-China relations, etc.

Professor Shu Jianzhong (舒建中)

He is an Associate Professor of the School of History at Nanjing University and also Professor at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies (HNC). Active in research in International Politics and Economics, he is the author of many books, including: Multilateral Trading System and American Supremacy: A Study on the GATT System (2009); A New Order in International Economy: History and Reality (2013); and Clayton: From the World's King of Cotton to the Trading Fighter (2014).

Cha, Jae Bok If the 'comfort women' issue is one of the primary causes of conflict between Korea and Japan over history, it is the Nanjing Massacre (referred to as the 'Nanjing Incident' in Japan) in the case between China and Japan. What do the local students and citizens think about this?

Shu Jianzhong The Imperial Japanese Army (IJP), under the command of Matsui Iwane (松井石根), the Commander in the Shanghai (華中) area, and Tani Hisao (谷寿夫), commanding officer of the 6th Division, occupied Nanjing on December 13, 1937, and went on to steal, rape, and slaughter unarmed civilians (including women and children) and surrendered soldiers for as many as six weeks. Specifically, the IJP was responsible for 28 mass-killings of up to 190,000 people and 858 individual killings of about 150,000 people, according to the numbers confirmed at the Nanjing Military Tribunal of China in February 1946. The IJP's atrocities were also confirmed at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, and have been consistently condemned by the citizens of Najing including students. There is a consensus among them that the Nanjing Massacre was a crime against humanity committed by the Japanese militarists, a case in the history of human civilization where conscience and dignity were lost in the commitment of cruel, anti-civilization acts.

Cha, Jae Bok I understand that Nanjing has an exchange relationship with a number of Japanese cities and there are many Japanese visitors to Nanjing. How are they received?

Shu Jianzhong While the citizens of Nanjing are well aware of the atrocities committed by the Japanese militarists during the Najing Massacre, they are very friendly to those Japanese who love peace. In fact, Nanjing welcomes many visitors from Japan every year, and many of its citizens also visit Japan. Japanese civil-society organizations send their representatives to visit China to attend the annual Nanjing Massacre Memorial Day ceremony and express their strong commitment to opposing war and defending peace. Three former Prime Ministers of Japan, Toimichi Murayama (村山富市), Toshiki Kaifu (海部俊樹), and Yukio Hatoyama (鳩山由紀夫), have already visited the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, although no incumbent Prime Minister of Japan has done so yet.

Cha, Jae Bok Why did the Chinese government designate the national day of commemorating the Nanjing Massacre as many as seventy-seven years after it occurred? In December 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall and supervised the memorial ceremony in person. What does that mean?

Shu Jianzhong Japanese right-wing conservatives have glorified their nation's past of aggression and challenged the post-war international order in recent years. They are trying to downplay the sacrifices and contributions that the Chinese made during the war against Japan. The Chinese government's designation of the national day of commemorating the Nanjing Massacre is the expression of their determination to oppose Japan's reversion to militarism and defend peace in the region and the world by revealing how Japanese right-wing conservatives have tried to cover up their nation's history of aggression.

And what it means for Chinese President Xi Jinping to have attended the memorial ceremony last year for the victims of the Nanjing Massacre and given an important speech is that he is determined to defend peace by calling on everyone to remember the cruelties of war. In other words, he emphasized once again that no amount of time that passes will change history, and that no amount of illogical and far-fetched claims will erase the facts of history. But the memorial ceremony for the victims of the Nanjing Massacre is not intended to keep stirring hatred in people's heart. It is only the expression of China's determination to cooperate with the rest of the world to bring permanent peace and prosperity to the world.

Cha, Jae Bok What do China experts in the United States think of China's recent strategy to build the New Great Power Relationship?

Shu Jianzhong There is no consensus among U.S. scholars. Li Cheng (李成) from the John L. Thorton China Center, a research institute affiliated with the Brookings Institute and dedicated to studying China, says that United States, while not having acknowledged the concept of the New Great Power Relationship entirely, has at least acknowledged that it is advocating pace with a 'no collision and no confrontation' concept. Some U.S. scholars argue that China's proposal to build the New Great Power Relationship is nothing but a 'trap.' They think that China is trying to make its core interests more credible (assuming that the United States will accept the New Great Power Relationship). Michael Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), for example, said it was wise of the United States to decide not to accept the New Great Power Relationship. He believes that accepting the New Great Power Relationship will undermine the interests of U.S. allies in Asia.

Cha, Jae Bok What is the New Great Power Relationship really about?

Shu Jianzhong Viewing the New Great Power Relationship as a kind of an initiative or framework would be more appropriate. China and the United States need to respect each other's core interests. And it requires an enhanced understanding and trust between the two countries, a strategic consensus on their core interests, and an appropriate negotiation mechanism. In a nutshell, creating a new system is what the New Great Power Relationship is all about. Once a new system is established based on the existing international system, it could drive 'negotiation' in reconciling the differences of opinion between the two countries, thereby breaking the vicious cycle of the rise and fall of powers and war and moving toward co-existence and co-prosperity.

Cha, Jae Bok China and the United States are in fierce competition over Asia. It seems to me that the U.S. policy of "rebalancing to Asia" is clashing with the Chinese One Belt, One Road/AIIB initiatives.

Shu Jianzhong First of all, I disagree that China is vying with the United States for supremacy over Asia. China is committed to peaceful development as a national policy. And China's motto in international relations is co-existence and co-prosperity. China thinks of nothing else but to protect the cores of its national sovereignty, security, and development. Protecting the national core interests while seeking peaceful development is the two-fold principle of China's foreign policy. And I should make it clear that China follows its foreign policy of independence and peace and, therefore, does not seek supremacy, and is unlikely to seek supremacy over Asia even if it becomes a superpower someday. China's 'One Belt, One Road' strategy aims to achieve economic development and co-existence and co-prosperity in the region. Therefore, it is fundamentally different from the U.S. policy of 'rebalancing to Asia' that is designed to maintain their supremacy.

Cha, Jae Bok How do you think the China-led AIIB will affect Korea-China relations?

Shu Jianzhong I can think of at least two potential impacts. First, the AIIB will help further enhance Korea-China relations. Currently, China is Korea's largest trading partner, largest export market, largest importer, and largest overseas investor. And Korea's trade with China is twice as large in amount as its trade with the United States. Furthermore, the Korea-China FTA has been essentially concluded. And Korea has started setting up an offshore yuan trading center, stepping up its effort for cooperation in currency finance. Under the circumstances, the AIIB will create new development opportunities by accelerating the development of trade and finance and other areas in economic relations between Korea and China. Secondly, the AIIB will help enhance the 'Korea-China strategic partnership.' Both China and Korea are highly influential countries in Northeast Asia. The development of relations between the two countries will be good, not only for the well-being of their peoples but also for peace, stability, and prosperity in the Northeast Asian region. The AIIB is a new multilateral organization that will allow Korea and China to further enhance their economic and trading relations and build on this framework to explore possibilities for strategic cooperation in many areas based on mutual trust.

Cha, Jae Bok The United States and Japan revised the Guidelines for U.S-Japan Defense Cooperation for the first time in 18 years since 1997. It seems to me that the dispute between China and Japan has led directly to a conflict of interest between China and the United States.

Shu Jianzhong When the United States and Japan announced the New Guidelines for U.S-Japan Defense Cooperation in April 2015 that removed "geographical limits" on their defense partnership, they stated that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applied to Diaoyu Dao (釣魚島) of China. China's policy has been consistent and clear, which is that the United States, not a party to the dispute over the South China Sea, is advised to take an objective and fair position and refrain from making any remark or taking any action that might complicate the dispute and thereby undermine peace and stability in the region. China-Japan relations had been good and developing with gradually increasing cooperation in every area, until 2011. When the U.S. adopted the so-called 'rebalancing to Asia' strategy, it incited conflict between China and Japan, making the bilateral relations worse than ever since the establishment of their diplomatic ties. It is not true that the dispute between China and Japan has led to a conflict of interest between China and the United States. On the contrary, the U.S. strategy of 'rebalancing to Asia' turned China-Japan relations upside down and caused a disturbance in the situation of Northeast Asia.

Cha, Jae Bok Some critics say that by taking an ambiguous position regarding the historical disputes that have arisen between Korea and Japan, or between China and Japan, since World War II, the United States has let those disputes go on. What do you think of their case on 'the United States being responsible for the historical conflicts in East Asia?"

Shu Jianzhong I think their argument is a result of mixing the way of thinking from the Cold War era with a logic to explain history. The Chinese Communist Party and government have made it clear from day one, the day of the country's establishment, that China follows its foreign policy of independence and peace. U.S. political advocates of the Cold War argued that "Asia was faced with the threat of communism," but it was nothing but an excuse that they used to maintain U.S. supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region. Because of its strategic reason to maintain its supremacy and the Cold War system, the United States occupied Japan at the end of WWII, but didn't seek to hold the Japanese Emperor accountable for the war or purge the Japanese militarists. They even let militarism come back to Japan. This was not "a mistake" of the United States. It was a result of the U.S. supremacy strategy. I don't think that the United States can escape responsibility for this.

Cha, Jae Bok What institutional measures do you think are needed to be taken in order to overcome the historical conflicts among the three Northeast Asian countries?

Shu Jianzhong Korea, China, and Japan are neighbors sharing a long history of friendly exchange and common interests. They are destined to be bound with one another as a community of interest. As history has demonstrated again and again, the development of friendly relations among the three countries is conducive to peace and stability in Northeast Asia and beneficial to all of the three countries. Dispute, on the other hand, is a threat to peace and development in the region. If solutions to the territorial disputes are not found, the disputes should be "put on hold" to protect the development of relations. The three countries should prevent their territorial disputes from being used by forces outside the region as an excuse to destroy the development of their relations.

At the turn of the 21st century, there was some remarkable progress in the development of relations among the three Northeast Asian countries. In December 2008, for example, the three heads of states met for the first Tripartite Summit in Fukuoka, Japan and issued a Joint Statement on the Partnerships among the Three Northeast Asian Countries. At the Tripartite Jeju Summit of 2010, an agreement was reached to establish the Tripartite Secretariat. However, the efforts to set up a system for 'Tripartite Partnership' ended up being suspended in the aftermath of the U.S. strategy of 'rebalancing to Asia.' If a clear system that is binding and a stable negotiation mechanism are in place, the capacity to control risk factors will be enhanced considerably. In other words, the absence of such a system is an important obstacle to the development of relations among the three countries.

Fortunately, the tripartite relations began to show signs of improvement from 2015. In March 2015, for example, the foreign ministers of the three countries had a meeting in Seoul. The process to institute 'tripartite partnership' should begin with small steps and move toward resolving more difficult challenges. FTAs and other systems that are binding need to be put in place in environment, trade, finance, and maritime rescue, and these should serve to find common ground and enhance mutual trust. And this should spread to national defense and defense so as to lay a full and comprehensive framework for cooperation and ultimately promote peace and development in the three Northeast Asian countries.