뉴스레터

"While controlling historical issues to prevent them from becoming excessively political, we need to be more active in establishing a public sphere for the discussion of history."

China-Japan relations, damaged by the disputes in 2010 and 2012 over Diaoyudao (known in Japan as the Senkaku Islands), are showing no signs of improvement. To make matters worse, the political leaders of Japan are showing their backwards perception of history. To appease the international community turning against him, the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is trying to justify his visit to Yasukuni Shrine where the Class-A war criminals are enshrined. Meanwhile, he is showing his other face to Korea and China, proposing summit talks. The Korean government, however, flatly refused Japan's such offer, disappointed that it wasn't sincere, for Japan was distorting history by means of textbooks to educate future generations. The Chinese government was no different; they criticized Japan's historical perception by saying 'Try to conceal the truth, and you will only end up revealing them. The more you wipe, the blacker it will become (欲盖弥彰 越抹越黑),' and refused the offer with a sarcastic comment: "The supreme leaders of China are very busy. We would rather let them use their time doing things that are useful and effective." What is at work here, of course, is Korea's and China's sensibility in diplomacy against the Japan that is openly expressing nostalgic feelings for its imperialist past.

Even the U.S., Japan's strong ally, is concerned about Japan's behavior for the uncertainty it is generating in the Northeast Asian order. While the U.S. facilitated Japan's transition into a 'normal state' by agreeing to the first re-revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in seventeen years, the U.S. President signed the House of Representatives 'comfort women' resolution, seven years after its enaction. He also said, alluding to Japan, that "it's important that there is respect for that history and the actions that are taken." This points to the dilemma of the U.S.

Such China-Japan relations are turning more complex because they are no longer simply about territorial disputes or historical perception but reflecting a new security order in Northeast Asia. Professor Yan Xuetong (閻學通), a leading Chinese scholar of realistic international politics, has predicted that a bipolar order would be formed within the next ten years. Given such change in order in Northeast Asia, the U.S. will try to adopt a rebalancing policy that will decelerate the rise of China, while China will try to counter such move with an anti-balancing policy. Meanwhile, Japan will also try a variety of policies designed to challenge the bilateral U.S-China structure and transform it into a trilateral U.S-China-Japan structure.

Feeling isolated, Japan is responding more actively to the changing landscape of Northeast Asia. Despite the international community's disapproving looks, the Abe administration will set out to mobilize their supporters by appealing to the pride brought about by the 'Strong Japan' slogan and Abenomics. In fact, they are trying to change the U.S-Japan security system where Japan has provided the U.S. with military bases in case of emergency, in such a way to secure the right of collective self-defense that would allow the Japan Self-Defense Forces to take action along with the U.S. armed forces. Now working on the already agreed upon re-revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, Japan is on course for conservative shift toward a normal state that denies the post-war peace order. In particular, Japan sees that the current U.S.-Japan alliance gives them leeway to challenge China further, and is not hiding its intention of gaining the upper hand at the future negotiating table. This is identity politics of Japan, a tool that Japan uses to reinforce its logic while highlighting the 'China Threat Theory.'

On the other hand, China is also being more aggressive in diplomacy on the strengths of its power on the rise. Having abandoned the Taoguang Yanhui (韜光養晦) policy of defensive realism, China is involved actively in the resolution of international affairs. In other words, China is taking what we call the Taking the Initiative (主動作爲) line, which is becoming increasingly nationalistic as the public opinion, including the opinions of netizens, is reflected deeply in the government's policy-making process. While Japan is raising voice to condemn China for the conflict between the two countries, China is playing by the book and responding accordingly, although not taking economic measures, such as the ban on the export of rare earth resources in 2010 when China-Japan relations turned bad. In fact, China continues to expose the atrocities committed by the Kwantung Army of Japan. Foreign Minister of China Wang Yi also expressed his determination not to back down, by saying, "If Japan continues to provoke and push China-Japan relations to the Maginot Line, China will also go all the way."

Ironically, in the midst of U.S.-China relations and China-Japan relations, Korea is raising its strategic status relatively higher. Since the Korea-China summit last June, the relations of the two countries have been going smoothly. The two countries have also seen stronger cooperation in such areas as the North Korean nuclear issue, North Korean affairs after the execution of Jang Song-thaek, economic exchange, and humanities exchange. In particular, China built a memorial hall in Harbin to honor the Korean independence fighter An Jung-geun, which opened this January, and the Chinese media produced featured documentaries of An Jung-geun. These may be regarded as deliberate measures to show consideration for Korea. On the flip side, however, it is also worth noting that China is becoming increasingly less conscious of the bilateral relations with Korea. For instance, China's declaration last year of an air defense identification zone that included Socotra Rock of Korea gave rise to diplomatic conflict. And the Hainan Province of China drew strong opposition from the neighboring countries by issuing an ordinance, a kind of a 'marine defense identification zone,' that took effect in January this year and would require any foreign fishing boat entering the South China Sea to file with the authorities for permission beforehand.

In the process, Korea-Japan relations are drawing attention again. Present Korea-Japan relations have important strategic significance for the U.S. and China as well as Japan. China wants to regulate Japan's behavior on the basis of common conception of historical issues. As time goes by, Japan will also want to seek solidarity for democratic value. The U.S. is hoping that Korea-Japan relations will not interfere with its efforts to systemize Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation. However, now that Japan seems unfit for leadership, what with its historical perception that views An Jung-geun as a terrorist and lack of remorse for its wrongdoing, Korea-Japan cooperation is fundamentally limited. A case in point is Korea's opposition against including Japan as one of permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

China-Japan relations, being shaken by Japan, will affect the political landscape of the Korean Peninsula as well and increase strategic difficulty for Korea. The rise of rational civil-society movement and of a political opinion that 'normal politics' should be restored by upholding the Murayama and Kono statements is not enough to keep the Abe administration in check. China, which is using everything in its power to realize the 'Chinese dream,' is also determined not to repeat the 'wounded nationalism.' This means that once some time passes, China-Korea relations are also likely to be affected in the midst of changes in U.S.-China relations, the Korea-U.S. alliance, and U.S.-Japan relations.

In this respect, what is required of Korea in terms of diplomacy is to predict the changes in East Asia over the next 10 years and cope with them accordingly. Some in China established Korea as part of the Ally Sharing Theory within the next ten years. But this is not necessarily welcome by Korea as we need to maintain the framework of the Korea-U.S. alliance. The international environment surrounding Northeast Asia today is in some ways similar to that back in the late 19th century. Korea's power, of course, is significantly different from what it used to be. But so is the power of Korea's neighboring countries. In this respect, we need to find ways that will lead us to unification before we are forced to make certain diplomatic choices. This will give us the decisive leverage in securing security interests for the Korean Peninsula in Northeast Asia.

In addition, while controlling historical issues to prevent them from becoming excessively political, we need to be more active in establishing a public sphere for the discussion of history. In fact, in the midst of territorial and historical disputes in Northeast Asia, there is increasing 'leniency toward patriotism,' and the politicians are also increasingly tempted to stir nationalism. If this happens, it will significantly reduce the space of liberalism where mutual dependence and regular dialogue are pursued. Having dwelled on this issue, veteran scholar Mori Kazuku (毛里和子), a professor of Waseda University, organized a group of researchers pondering on a new type of China-Japan relations. This is an expression of the intellectual's commitment to improving in any way possible the worsening China-Japan relations. It is necessary for Korea to respond by coming up with a new type of Korea-China relations and a new type of Korea-Japan relations. Ultimately this is the job of intellectuals and researchers of history.