뉴스레터

In the 1930s, when Japan emerged as a 'rogue state' in the international community of the time as it caused the Manchurian Incident and seceded from the League of Nations, the renowned writer of China Hu Shih (胡適) wrote to the Japanese press to express his concerns as follows.

Japan was very great over the past sixty 60 years. In recent years, however, Japan's democratic and constitutional government has turned into military dictatorship. And the Japanese virtue of discipline has collapsed. Turning into a frightening state, Japan is losing friends and isolating itself from the rest of the world. ("日本国民に 訴ふ" by 胡適, 日本評論, Nov. 1935)

With the rise of the Abe administration in 2012, intellectuals and politicians in neighboring countries began issuing warnings to Japan, just as Hu Shih did 80 years ago to the Japan that was being dragged down by militarism. Professor Zhou Yongsheng of China Foreign Affairs University criticized Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for his fascist desire, pointing out that the National Security Council established by the Abe administration was similar to the council that determined militaristic policies during the 1930s, and the Secret Information Protection Act recently established in Japan to the Military Secrets Protection Act enacted during the militarist era.¹⁾ Foreign Minister of China Wang Yi (王毅) also pointed out that the leaders of Japan are trying to reverse the wheel of history, as illustrated by their visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and leading their nation down a dangerous path. (Wang Yi, "China's development makes for better world", Global Times, January 12, 2014).

Even the U.S., the only ally of Japan, is voicing concerns over the Abe administration's historical perception and security policies. U.S. Ambassador to Japan Caroline Kennedy and the U.S. Department of State have made it clear that they were opposed to Prime Minister Abe's visit to Yasukuni Shrine. The New York Times also published an editorial critical of not only the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to Yasukuni Shrine but also the Abe administration's attempt to ease the Three Principles on Arms Exports, suggesting that to ensure stability within the region, Japan should restrict the export of arms and push ahead with arms control.²⁾

Abe himself and his brains are refuting the criticism from home and abroad of their policies. Shinichi Kitaoka (北岡伸一), one of the brains behind Abe's foreign and security policies and a former professor of the University of Tokyo, argues that there is a structural difference between the pre-war and present-day Japans, and that it is China today to blame for causing a major disturbance to the stability of regional order in that the Chinese military is leading policy moves, disregarding the international law, and promoting expansion-oriented policies. (北岡伸一, "安全保障議論、戦前と現代、同一視は 不毛"讀賣新聞" Sept. 22, 2013).

Such controversy over the Abe administration's historical perception and foreign and security policies poses important questions to Korea, a country that is not only closest in distance but also linked to Japan with a complex historical relationship of love and hatred over the past thousands of years. Where is Japan really headed? What should Korea do with the forward-looking partnership with Japan that has been maintained since 1965?

Abe Japan's approach to Korea may appear inconsistent at a glance. In the country's first National Security Strategy (NSS) adopted in December 2013, Japan specified that the biggest threats to security within the region facing Japan were North Korea's military threats and China's strengthening of its navy and air force. And, as part of the efforts to cope with these threats, Japan identified Korea, along with Australia, India, and the ASEAN countries, as an important partner country with which Japan should cooperate for security in the region. In the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), revised at the same time as the NSS, it is even specified that Japan will make efforts to conclude an agreement on security information protection and an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement with Korea (The attempts to conclude them failed in 2012).

In other areas, however, it is true that Japan today is promoting policies that go against the national interests and sentiment of Korea. Prime Minister Abe has suggested on a number of occasions that he may not uphold the 1993 Kono Statement that expressed Japan's apologies for the unlawful mobilization of 'comfort women' for the Japanese military or the 1995 Murayama Statement that expressed Japan's apologies for its aggression of the Asian region. Prime Minister Abe tried to justify his visit to Yasukuni Shrine, where the Class-A war criminals responsible for the Pacific War are enshrined, comparing the Shrine to the Arlington National Cemetery of the U.S. He also organized a panel of experts regarding outgoing messages related to territory and sovereignty, and had them write a report to suggest that Japan should make strong territorial claims on Dokdo (Takeshima) and the Senkakus (Diaoyudao) in its outgoing messages at home and abroad.

Also in terms of foreign and security policies, the Abe administration pursues agenda that might conflict with the direction of Korea's foreign strategy. The Abe administration's attempts to grant the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) the status of a constitutional legal entity through constitutional amendment and expand its participation in security activities overseas by approving of its right of collective self-defense may be regarded as domestic political affairs of Japan. On the other hand, however, Japan identified China as a potential threat in the NSS and the NDPG, and is seeking to create marine corps or otherwise strengthen the JSDF in order to cope with China's strengthening of its military power, and this could not only disturb the security order of the region but conflict with Korea's foreign strategy of seeking a strategic partnership with China.

How should we perceive and respond to such Abe Japan? To begin with, it is true that Prime Minister Abe has a conservative position on historical and territorial issues. However, considering the diversified Japanese society today and the structure of international relations, such as the Japan-U.S. alliance, Japan's return to its past militarism seems all but impossible. On the basis of this realistic perception of Japan, we need to have a clear sense of purpose toward establishing a more stable and peaceful order in the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asian region, and forge strategic and multi-layered relationships that will encourage Japan to take part in fulfilling that purpose.

As part of the efforts to correct the Abe administration's distorted views of history, we need to keep in touch with Japan's youths and civil-society organizations in a variety of ways. Increasing exchanges between mature civil-society organizations and schools between the two countries, and increasing exchanges at grass-roots levels through increased exchanges between local governments could be among the ways to correct the wrong historical perception of Japanese politicians.

In terms of diplomacy, we need to actively initiate a multilateral discussion for security in Northeast Asia that includes China and Japan. By promoting multifaced cooperation among countries within the region through the already established Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS), we need to make efforts to decrease the likelihood of confrontation between Japan and China, and create a more stable regional order. Expanding the CAMPUS Asia project already underway, and promoting the publication of the common history textbook of the three Northeast Asian nations as suggested by the President of Korea could help ease the conflicts and confrontations within the region.

The East Asian intellectuals in the 1930s, like Hu Shih, eventually failed to prevent Japan from going militaristic. However, we living in the 21st century have the challenge of using the diplomatic and cultual capacity built so far to create an order marked by mutual trust and cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China.

¹⁾ "Attempt by Japan to return to militarist past face tough new geopolitics" Global Times, December 11, 2013.
²⁾ "Editorial: Risky Nationalism in Japan" International New York Times, December 27, 2013. "Editorial: A Troubling Move on Arms Exports" International New York Times, December 27, 2013.