뉴스레터

The year 2013 marks the 60th anniversary of the armistice of the Korean War(1950-1953). On July 27, the Northeast Asian History Foundation(NAHF) and Korea University jointly held an international conference marking the 60th anniversary of the Korean Armistice Agreement. Professor James I. Matray of California State University, Chico, who was an invited presenter at the conference, delivered a special lecture entitled "Eisenhower and Korea : Still a Matter of Debate." Dr. Seol Wontai, senior administrator at the Office of Public Relations and Education of NAHF, met Professor Matray at the conference and continued their conversation via e-mail for an in-depth interview. The oral and written interview started by asking about the implications of the 60th anniversary of the Korean War armistice. -Editor's note

Q Seol Won-tai You made a presentation at Korea University concerning the Korean War on July 27. This year of 2013 marks the 60th anniversary of the armistice of the War. What does "60 years of armistice of the Korean War" mean today? Why has it lasted for so long? Do you think the armistice's structure has entered a stable phase?

A James I. Matray Sixty years under an armistice rather than peace on the Korean Peninsula means that Koreans must continue to endure as a legacy of the 20th century the second greatest tragedy for their nation. The first was thirty-five years of Japanese imperial domination and the artificial division of their country was the second . Koreans carry around their necks an albatross of a Cold War that has been over for a generation. There is only one Korea. Its artificial division at the end of World War II resulted in a war that brutalized the country for three years and resolved nothing. The armistice has lasted for six decades because there remains a basic disagreement among Koreans about the future course of their nation. Major regional powers, initially the Soviet Union and now China, have provided continuing support for a failed regime in North Korea that does not offer a viable political, social, and economic model for a united nation to follow in the 21st Century. So long as the people of North Korea consider their Communist system as best suited to advance and protect their interests, the armistice will stay in place and Korea's division will continue.

Q Seol Won-tai How should we resolve the lengthy Korean armistice structure?

A James I. Matray The North Korean government's collapse would provide the quickest and easiest resolution for the continuing impasse over replacing the armistice with permanent peace on the peninsula. If North Korea continues to sustain itself, the only other way to truly end the Korean War is through diplomacy and negotiations. This will require South Korea to resume the "Sunshine Policy" of engagement with North Korea, focusing on providing economic assistance and promoting joint economic ventures. Opening North Korea to greater free enterprise will weaken the totalitarian hold that the Kim regime has over its people, building popular support for acceptance of reunification under South Korean rule. Of equal importance is the United States also embracing a policy of engagement with North Korea, to include formal recognition of the North Korean regime, ending economic and diplomatic sanctions, and signing a formal peace treaty to replace the armistice agreement. A policy of confrontation only will perpetuate the armistice and the division of Korea perhaps indefinitely.

Q Seol Won-tai How do you assess the South Korea - US military alliance?

A James I. Matray The U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) today is stronger than it has ever been since the end of the Korean War. That South Korea has become a thriving democracy is the most important reason for this situation. The ROK's emergence as an economic power during the 1970s established the foundation for a strong partnership because South Korea no longer was a dependent of the United States. However, leadership in U.S. were unhappy about the continued denial of political freedom to the Korean people. The U.S.-ROK alliance increased in strength early in the 1990s because South Koreans gained democratic rights, but this progress was stopped in 2001 when U.S. President George W. Bush provoked a crisis with North Korea over its nuclear program and worked to undermine South Korea's "Sunshine Policy." The election of Lee Myung-bak as president in 2007 brought South Korean policy back in line with U.S. policy of engaging with North Korea conditional upon making progress toward ending its nuclear program. As a result, the United States and South Korea today share the same policy toward North Korea, ending the intense friction that existed in the alliance during the first decade of the 21st Century. In 2013, the U.S.-ROK alliance is stronger than it has ever been and this should continue under the current Pak and Obama administrations.

Q Seol Won-tai I was told that you are the scholar who criticized Bruce Cumings' theories which argued that South Korea "induced" North Korea to attack the South in 1950. Is this correct? How did you reveal the weaknesses of Cumings' theory? Could you please elaborate on this? And what is your theory of the Korean War?

Professor James I. Matray

A James I. Matray Your first assertion is an exaggeration. In my first book --The Reluctant Crusade : U.S. Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941~1950 (published in 1985)-- I did disagree with Bruce Cumings' claim that South Korea attacked North Korea first. I restated and supported the existing arguments of many scholars that the size and speed of the North Korean invasion argued in favor of the conclusion that North Korea attacked first. Also, I stressed the international involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in creating the circumstances in Korea, especially dividing the peninsula, that led to a conventional war in June 1950. In this book, I presented a theory explaining why North Korea attacked, which claimed that it was a 'preventive' war. The United States was increasing its economic, political, and military support for South Korea. Kim Il Sung knew that the United States had more resources than the Soviet Union, creating the likelihood that over time, South Korea would become far stronger than North Korea, increasing the likelihood of it absorbing his part of the country. Since my book was published in 1985, the release of Soviet documents—not my book—"broke the theories of Bruce Cumings." These documents show clearly that Joseph Stalin was directly involved in planning and implementing the North Korean invasion of South Korea. However, they also show that it was Kim Il Sung's idea and staged under his initiative. Importantly, these documents provide strong evidence supporting my theory that Kim Il Sung started the Korean War because he feared the emergence of an economically strong and politically united South Korea capable of reuniting the nation. In fact, the invasion planned was named "Operation Preemptive Strike." Kim Il Sung's fears proved correct, as the course of events that he anticipated in Korea have coincided with developments over the past generation.

Q Seol Won-tai How do you evaluate transformations in the political configuration in the East Asian political landscape between then and now, that is, 60 years ago and currently?

A James I. Matray During the sixty years since the armistice in Korea, there have been dramatic changes in the political configuration in East Asia. On the Korean peninsula, North Korea initially had far greater political, economic, and social strength and stability than South Korea. Since 1970, South Korea has experienced not only recovery from the war, but incredible economic development. Starting in the late 1980s, the ROK replaced political dictatorship with democracy. Meanwhile, North Korea became a nation of economic deprivation with a perverse political system subjecting its people to unconscionable exploitation and misery. As for the United States, it remains a powerful force in military, economic, and political terms in the region, but facing greater challenges to its authority. First, South Korea has become far more independent in making its own foreign policy decisions. Second, Japan, for a time, was the main economic force in Northeast Asia, but has lost its powerful and influential position due to stagnation over the past two decades. Third, and most important, China has emerged as a dominant economic, political, and military regional actor. After trying to isolate China for two decades after the Korean War, the United States normalized relations, envisioning China as a junior partner in checking the Soviet Union. With the demise of the USSR, China now occupies an equal place with the United States as by far the most powerful outside actors in the region. The strategic situation in Northeast Asia is entirely different and more unpredictable than it was 60 years ago.

Q Seol Won-tai One of your many articles had an interesting title "Why South Koreans Think of the United States as a Global Bully?" Why has the U.S. become "A Global Bully"? for South Koreans?

A James I. Matray Your reference is to an article that I wrote almost a decade ago, at the height of acrimonious relations between the United States and South Korea during the George W. Bush presidency. Certainly, it was younger South Koreans who viewed the United States as a global bully not least because they saw it as standing in the way of Korea's reunification, as well as provoking North Korea. At that time, the ROK was following the Sunshine Policy, which the Bush administration opposed and in fact undermined. Also, the U.S. had started without justification the war in Iraq. Around the year 2005, anti-Americanism in South Korea peaked, but has dissipated since then.

Q Seol Won-tai How did you become interested in affairs in Korea? Your academic background says that you started as a historian of American history? You have a Ph.D. in American history.

A James I. Matray In the summer of 1969, I had just completed my third year at Lake Forest College. At a neighborhood picnic, an argument erupted, as was common at the time, about the Vietnam War. In response to my bitter criticism of the conflict, a family friend defended U.S. military action to stop communism shouting that "it was just like the Korean War." Not knowing much about that conflict, his comment pretty much shut me up. That fall, I asked one of my professors to recommend a book about the Korean War to fill this gap in my knowledge. He recommended I. F. Stone's 'The Hidden History of the Korean War', a famous revisionist account that made the case for a conspiracy between South Korean President Syngman Rhee and U.S. General Douglas MacArthur that provoked a North Korean attack to invite U.S. military intervention. Six years later, I was a graduate student at the University of Virginia searching for a topic for my doctoral dissertation. I remembered the Korean War. At first, I planned to investigate the war years from June 1950 to July 1953, but soon learned that this was not possible because U.S. government documents remained classified. However, the archival materials for the prewar era were accessible, with records for the year 1950 soon to be declassified. In 1977, I completed my dissertation and, after revisions, it was published as 'The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950' in 1985.

Q Seol Won-tai On July 27 of this year, I watched a CNN journalist reporting live from Pyongyang that North Koreans claimed victory in the Korean War. I don't understand the claim that the North won the war. Which side "won" the Korean war, and why do North Koreans claim that they won?

A James I. Matray Naturally North Korea believes that it won the Korean War. North Korea has always insisted that South Korea attacked first and its counterattack was a justifiable act of self-defense. Based on this assumption, North Korea won the war because it defeated South Korea's attempt to conquer it. Also, the United States intervened in the Korean War to conquer North Korea, leading to its crossing of the 38th parallel. North Korea, without mentioning Chinese military intervention, takes credit for defeating U.S. forces and pushing them out of North Korea — another victory. Neither side "won" or "lost" the Korean War, which ended without achieving its purpose of reunification.

Q Seol Won-tai Your bio says that you served in the National Guard while young. Is there any difference between the U.S. National Guard and U.S. soldiers?

A James I. Matray I joined the National Guard in February 1970 to avoid having to fight in the Vietnam War. The prior December, my birthday received a low number in the draft lottery, which meant that my forced enlistment in the U.S. Army was certain. At that time, President Lyndon Johnson's administration had chosen not to mobilize the U.S. Reserves or National Guard to fight in Vietnam, keeping these forces within the United States. No National Guard units served in Vietnam because the Johnson administration feared that this would increase public opposition against the war. It made this decision even though U.S. National Guard units had served in the Korean War. The U.S. government no longer has a draft and has had an all-volunteer army since 1972. This means that the U.S. government has had to mobilize National Guard units to fight most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. Contrary to what was the fear during Vietnam, doing so increased American support for these wars.

Q Seol Won-tai Could you tell me your future research plans?

A James I. Matray For the past two decades, I have devoted much of my research agenda to investigating anti-Americanism in South Korea and the North Korean nuclear crisis. This year, I published an article in the International Journal of Korean Studies criticizing the George W. Bush administration's policy toward North Korea. However, I continue to be a specialist in U. S. foreign relations. My current research project is an examination of the Battles of Pork Chop Hill, which will result in the publication of a book with Indiana University Press. (Pork Chop Hill? Professor Matray explains that Pork Chop Hill received its name from U.S. Soldiers defending it because it was shaped like an American pork chop. Officially, the U.S. Army designated it Hill 255. It is located north of Yeoncheon, Korea. Two major battles occurred there in April and July 1953, resulting in Communist forces achieving final control. Matray does not believe that it has a Korean name.)